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IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED 


MENTAL  ACTION 


OUTLINES 


OF 

IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED 


MENTAL  ACTION. 


THOMAS  C.  UPHAM, 

PROFESSOR  OF  MENTAL  AND  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN 
BOWDOIN  COLLEGE- 


NEW  YORK: 

HARPER  & BROTHERS,  PUBLISHERS, 
329  & 331  PEARL  STREET, 

FRANKLIN  SQUARE. 

1868. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  184D,  by 
Harper  &. Brothers, 


In  the  Clerk’s  Office  of  the  Southern  District  < ^ew  York. 


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In  undertaking  to  prepare  the  present  volume, 

[ was  strongly  influenced  by  a conviction  of  the 
practical  importance  of  the  subject.  It  is  perhaps 
true,  that  the  public  mind  is  but  little  informed,  cer- 
tainly much  less  than  it  should  be,  in  relation  to  the 
true  doctrines  of  regular  or  normal  mental  action  ; 
but  it  is,  undoubtedly,  much  more  ignorant  of  the 
philosophy  of  defective  and  disordered  mental  ac- 
tion. Nor  is  it  surprising  that  this  should  be  the 
case,  when  we  consider  that  but  very  few  writers, 
even  of  those  who  have  professedly  devoted  them- 
selves to  mental  inquiries,  have  particularly  investi- 
gated this  portion  of  the  Philosophy  of  Mind.  It 
has,  in  fact,  been  almost  totally  neglected,  except  by 
a few  learned  and  philosophical  writers  of  the  med- 
ical profession,  who,  in  the  discharge  of  their  pro- 
fessional duties,  could  not  well  avoid  giving  some 
attention  to  this  subject.  But  the  books  of  these 
writers,  of  great  value  as  they  undoubtedly  are, 
are  for  the  most  part  taken  up  with  the  consider- 
ation of  disordered  mental  action  as  it  is  connect- 
ed particularly  with  the  physical  system,  and  with 
various  practical  directions  having  relation  to  the 
treatment  of  insane  persons.  These  works  were 
not  designed  for  popular  circulation ; nor,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  has  this  been  the  case. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  naturally  suggested 


IV 


PREFACE. 


itself  to  the  proprietors  of  the  Family  Library  that 
something  might  be  prepared  on  this  subject  which 
would  be  both  interesting  and  useful.  In  underta- 
king this  task,  although  1 had  for  some  time  direct- 
ed my  attention  to  inquiries  of  this  nature,  I deeply 
felt  my  inability  to  do  justice  to  a subject  hitherto 
considered  so  doubtful  in  its  principles,  and  univer- 
sally acknowledged  to  be  exceedingly ‘complicated 
in  its  relations.  Believing,  however,  that  such  a 
work  might  be  practically  useful,  and  that,  in  fact, 
it  was  much  needed,  I was  willing  to  do  what  I 
could  in  the  somewhat  narrow  limits  which  the 
plan  of  the  Family  Library  allowed  me.  I have 
therefore  laid  down  the  outlines  of  this  great  sub- 
ject in  the  manner  which  facts  and  nature  seemed 
to  me  to  dictate,  and  with  a sincere  regard  to  what 
seemed  to  me  to  be  the  truth.  As  the  work  is  de- 
signed for  popular  reading  as  much  and  even  more 
than  for  men  of  science,  I have  endeavoured  to  be 
simple  and  natural  in  the  plan  of  inquiry  as  well 
as  in  style.  I commit  it  to  the  reader  in  the  hope 
that  tie  will  accept  whatever  merit  the  work  has, 
and  regard  it  leniently  in  whatever  it  may  fall 
short  of  his  reasonable  expectations. 

Thomas  C.  Upham. 


Bowdoin  College , Oct.,  1839. 


INTRODUCTION. 

CHAP.  I. — OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY, 
action  . PaS® 

1.  Extent  and  importance  of  the  subject  to  be  examined  17 

2.  Necessity  of  some  preliminary  or  introductory  State- 

ments   ...  19 

3.  The  idea  of  Insanity  of  Mind  predicated  on  that  of 

Sanity 20 

4.  Outlines  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Mind  . . .21 

5.  Further  considerations  on  the  same  subject  . . 23 

6.  Of  the  Intellect,  particularly  the  External  Intellect  . 24 

7.  Of  the  Conceptive  Power  and  Conceptions  . . 25 

8.  Of  the  External  Intellect  in  connexion  with  peculiari- 

ties of  character 26 

9.  Of  the  Internal  Intellect,  or  the  Intellect  as  it  is  brought 

into  action,  independently  of  the  direct  agency  of 
the  Senses 27 

10.  Of  the  Nature  of  Original  Suggestion  . . . 29 

11.  Consciousness  another  form  of  Internal  mental  action  30 

12.  Of  Relative  Suggestion  or  Judgment  . . . .32 

13.  Of  the  Nature  of  the  Reasoning  Power  . . .33 

14.  Remarks  on  the  Imagination  . . . . .35 

15.  Of  other  important  Intellectual  Principles  . . .36 

16.  Of  the  Sensibilities  in  Distinction  from  the  Intellect  . 37 

17.  Other  and  more.  Subordinate  Divisions  of  the  Sensibil- 

ities   38 

18.  Of  the  Will,  and  its  Relation  to  th£  other  Powers  . 40 

CHAP.  II. — CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY. 

19.  The  Origin  of  many  mental  disorders  to  be  found  in 

the  Connexion  between  the  mind  and  the  body  . 42 

20.  The  Mind  constituted  on  the  Principle  of  a Connexion 

with  the  Body 44 

21.  Illustration  of  the  subject  from  the  effects  of  old  age  . 45 

22.  The  Connexion  of  the  body  and  mind  farther  shown 

from  the  effects  of  diseases 46 

23.  Shown  also  from  the  effects  of  stimulating  drugs  and 

gases  


47 


VI  CONTENTS. 

Section  Page 

24.  Influence  on  the  Body  of  Excited  Imagination  and  Pas- 

sion . 49 

25.  Connexion  of  the  Mental  Action  with  the- Brain  . 51 

26.  Of  the  Brain,  considered  as  a part  of  one  great  Senso- 

rial Organ 53 

27.  .Relation  of  these  Views  to  the  General  Subject  . . 54 

CHAP.  III.— GENERAL  ARRANGEMENT-OF  THE  SUBJECT. 

28.  The  Classification  of  Insane  mental  action  should  be 

predicated  on  that  of  Sound  mental  action  . . 56 

29.  Defects  in  early  Classifications,  and  Improvements  of 

them  . . . 57 

30.  The  Inquiry  naturally  begins  with  the  External  Intel- 

lect   59 

31.  Proceeds  from  the  External  to  the  Internal  Intellect  . 61 

32.  Is  continued  in  the  Sensibilities  and  the  Will  . . 62 

33.  Of  popular  adaptation,  combined  with  philosophical 

precision 63 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  EXTERNAL  IN 
TELLECT. 

CHAPTER  I. 

NATURE  OF  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

34.  Remarks  on  the  Nature  of  Sensation  . . . .67 

.35.  All  Sensation  is  properly  and  truly  in  the  mind  . . 68 

36.  Of  the  Actual  Process  in  cases  of  Sensation  . . 69 

37.  Of  the  Meaning  and  Nature  of  Perception  . . .70 

38.  Of  the  Connexion  between  Sensation  and  Perception  71 

CHAPTER  II. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

(I.)  THE  SENSES  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE. 

39.  Circumstances  attending  Disordered  Sensations  . 72 

40.  Disordered  Perceptions  consequent  on  Disordered  Sen- 

sations   74 

41.  Of  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions,  connected 

with  the  Organ  of  Smell 75 

42.  Statements  Illustrative  of  the  Preceding  Section  . 77 

43.  Of  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions  connected 

with  the  Sense  of  Taste 79 

44.  Illustrations  of  the  foregoing  Views  in  connexion  with 

Disordered  Taste 82 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 


Vll 


DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

(II.)  THE  SENSE  OF  HEARING. 

Sectton  . 

45.  Of  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions  in  connex- 

ion with  the  Hearing 84 

46.  Facts  illustrative  of  Disordered  Auditory  Sensations 

and  Perceptions  . . • • . . 85 

47.  Of  the  Brain  in  connexion  with  Diseased  Auditory 

states  of  Mind  86 

48.  Third  Cause  of  Disordered  Auditory  Sensations  and 

Perceptions 89 

49.  The  Disordered  auditory  Sensations  of  the  poet  Cow- 




CHAPTER  IV. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

(III.)  THE  SENSE  OF  TOUCH. 

50.  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions  connected  with 

the  Sense  of  Touch 93 

51.  Facts  illustrative  of  Tactual  Disorders  . . .94 

52.  Other  cases  illustrative  of  Disordered  Sensations  and 

Perceptions 97 

53.  Application  of  these  views  to  the  Witchcraft  Delusion 

in  New-England  . . . 98 

CHAPTER  V. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

(iv.)  THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT. 

54.  Of  the  Outward  or  Physical  Organ  of  the  Sensations 

and  Perceptions  of  Sight j00 

55.  Disordered  Visual  Sensations  and  Perceptions  . . 101 

56.  The  Preceding  Views  confirmed  by  the  analogy  of  the 

other  Senses • 102 

57.  Illustrations  of  the  Subject  from  the  use  of  Opium  . 104 

58.  Disordered  Action  may  exist  in  connexion  with  more 

than  one  Sense  at  the  same  time  ....  i05 

59.  Of  Disordered  Perceptions  in  connexion  with  exciter 

Religious  Feeling 

60  Concluding  Remarks  on  Disordered  Sensation  and  Pet 
ception 

B 


CONTENTS. 


viii 

CHAPTER  VI. 

EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

Section  P*?8 

61.  On  the  General  Psychological  Nature  of  Conceptions  109 

62.  There  may  be  Disordered  Conceptions  connected  with 

the  Action  of  all  the  Senses 110 

63.  Of  the  less  permanent  Excited  Conceptions  of  Sight  . Ill 

64.  The  Conceptive  Power  may  be  placed  in  a wrong  po- 

sition by  habit  . . . . . . .113 

65.  Of  Permanently  Disordered  Conceptions  . . . 115 

66.  Of  disordered  Conceptions,  combined  with  a disor- 


68.  Instance  illustrative  of  this  Subject  ....  120 

CHAPTER  VII. 

SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

69.  Of  the  General  Nature  of  Spectral  Illusions  or  Appa- 

ritions   123 

70.  First  Cause  of  the  States  of  Mind  termed  Apparitions. 

— Neglect  of  Periodical  Bloodletting  . . . 124 

71.  Methods  of  Relief  adopted  in  this  case  . . . 128 

72.  Second  Cause  of  Spectral  Illusions  or  Apparitions. — 

Attacks  of  Fever 129 

73.  Third  Cause  of  Apparitions. — Inflammation  of  the  Brain  131 

74.  Facts  having  relation  to  the  third  Cause  of  Apparitions  133 

75.  Fourth  Cause  of  Spectral  Illusions  or  Apparitions. — 

Hysteria 134 

76.  Of  Ghosts  and  other  Spectral  Appearances  . .135 

77.  Other  Circumstances  characteristic  of  their  recurrence  136 

78.  Farther  Illustrations  and  Remarks  on  the  same  Sub- 

ject   138 

79.  Remarks  of  Walter  Scott  on  the  subject  of  Ghost- 

stories  139 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE  POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION. 

80.  Remarks  on  the  general  Nature  of  this  Power  . 142 

81.  Farther  considerations  on  the  Nature  of  this  Power  . 143 

82.  Of  Natural  Defect  in  the  Power  of  Abstraction  . .144 

83.  Illustrations  of  natural  Defect  in  this  Power  . . 146 


CONTENTS. 


action 

84. 


11 

Page 

147 

149 

152 

154 


Of  excessive  facility  and  Profoundness  in  the  Abstract- 
ing Power  

85.  Further  Illustrations  of  this  Topic  .... 

86.  Illustration  from  Bruyere’s  Manners  of  the  Age 

87.  Other  instances  illustrative  of  excessive  Abstraction 

CHAPTER  IX. 

DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 

88.  Of  the  general  nature  of  Attention  .... 

89.  Of  differences  in  the  Degree  of  Attention  . . . — 

90.  Of  Absence  of  Mind,  or  inability  to  fix  the  Attention  . 160 

91.  Illustration  of  inordinately  weak  or  disordered  Atten- 

tion   • 

92.  Cases  of  sudden  failure  of  the  Attention 

93.  Additional  illustration  of  this  disordered  Action  . 

94.  Of  the  course  to  be  taken  to  restore  the  power  of  At- 

tention   

CHAPTER  X. 


157 

159 


161 

163 

166 

166 


ON  DREAMING. 

95.  General  statement  in  regard  to  Dreams 

96.  Connexion  of  Dreams  with  our  waking  Thoughts 

97.  Dreams  are  often  caused  by  our  Sensations 

98.  Explanation  of  the  incoherency  of  Dreams  . 

99.  Apparent  reality  of  Dreams.  (1st  cause.)  . 

100.  Apparent  reality  of  Dreams.  (2d  cause.)  . 

101.  Of  our  estimate  of  time  in  Dreaming  . . . . 

102.  Dreams  sometimes  lay  the  foundation  of  a permanent- 

ly disordered  state  of  Mind  ..... 

103.  Mental  disorder  sometimes  developes  itself  in  connex- 

ion with  Dreams 

104.  Case  of  destruction  of  life  arising  from  a Dream 

CHAPTER  XI. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

105.  General  view  of  Somnambulism  .... 

106.  Singular  instance  of  Somnambulism  . . 

107.  Of  the  senses  falling  to  sleep  in  succession 

108.  Similar  views  applicable  to  the  muscles 

109.  Of  the  connexion  of  Somnambulism  with  Dreaming 

110.  Further  illustrations  of  Somnambulism 

111.  Reference  to  the  case  of  Jane  Rider  . 


169 

170 

171 

172 

173 

175 

176 

177 

178 
180 


181 

, 182 
, 183 
, 185 
, 185 
, 188 
, 189 


X 


CONTENTS. 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  INTEL. 
LECT. 


CHAPTER  I. 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 

H2.nOf  the  Internal  in  distinction  from  the  External  Intel- 
lect   : 

113.  Original  suggestion  to  be  regarded  as  a distinct  power 

of  the  Mind  . . . ... 

114.  Insanity  in  connexion  with  the  conviction  of  personal 

Identity • • • 

115.  Disordered  mental  action  in  connexion  with  the  idea 

of  Space  . . . . 

116.  Disordered  mental  action  in  connexion  with  Time 

117.  Further  illustrations  of  disordered  Time 

118.  Varieties  or  peculiarities  in  disordered  ideas  of  Time  . 


Fage 

193 

194 

196 

198 

200 

203 

204 


CHAPTER  II. 

DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

119.  Of  the  meaning  of  the  term  Consciousness  . . . 206 

120.  Two  forms  of  disordered  Consciousness  . . . 207 

121.  Illustrations  of  suspended  Consciousness  . . . 208 

122.  Illustrations  of  divided  or  intermittent  Consciousness  210 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR  JUDGMENT. 

123.  Relative  Suggestion  or  Judgment  a distinct  Power  . 214 

124.  Of  the  views  which  have  sometimes  been  taken  of  this 

Power 215 

125.  Weak  or  disordered  Judgment  arising  from  natural  ob- 

tuseness of  Mind 216 

126.  Disordered  Judgment  as  connected  with  incapacity  of 

Attention  . . ...  ...  . . 218 

127.  Of  disordered  Judgment  in  connexion  with  facility  of 

Belief  . . ...  ...  ..  .220 

128.  Of  disordered  judgment  in  connexion  with  obstinacy 

of  Belief  . . ...  . ..  ..  .222 

129.  Of  mere  unsoundne^s  in  distinction  from  insanity  of 

Judgment 223 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


CHAPTER  IV. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSOCIATION^ 

^General  remarks  on  the  nature  of  Association  . . 225 

31.  Of  sluggish  and  ineffective  Association  . . • 

32.  Of  mental  defect  in  consequence  of  too  quick  and  rapid 

Association  . . • • . • * * * if! 

33.  Instances  illustrative  of  the  preceding  section  . . 231 

34.  Remarks  on  fickleness  of  Character  . • . •.  • 

35.  Of  temporary  excitement  of  the  associating  Principle  233 

36.  Additional  instance  of  this  view  of  the  subject  . . 234 

CHAPTER  V. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MEMORY. 

137.  General  nature  of  the  Memory  . • • • 

138.  Cases  involving  a general  prostration  of  the  Memory 
139  Of  loss  of  Memory  in  relation  to  particular  Subjects 
L4(X  Impaired  Memory  in  connexion  with  Names  . 

141.  Of  loss  of  Memory  during  particular  periods  ot  lime 

142.  Of  other  modifications  of  disordered  Memory 


, 237 
. 238 
. 241 
, 242 
. 244 
. 245 


CHAPTER  VI. 

IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  REASONING 
POWER. 


143.  Of  the  nature  of  the  Reasoning  Power  . 

144.  Of  failure  of  Reasoning  from  the  want  of  Ideas  . 

145  Of  mere  weakness  or  imbecility  of  the  Reasoning  Power 

146.  Of  disordered  Reasoning  in  relation  to  particular  sub- 

147.  Instance  of  the  foregoing  form  of  perverted  Reasoning 

148.  Of  disordered  Reasoning  arising  from  a disordered  state 

of  the  other  powers  of  the  Mind  • 

149.  Of  readiness  of  Reasoning  in  the  partially  Insane 


246 

249 

249 

250 

252 

253 

254 


CHAPTER  VII. 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

150.  General  Remarks  on  the  nature  of  Imagination  . 

151.  Great  Imagination  does  not  necessarily  imply  a disor 

dered  or  insane  action  of  the  Mind  . 

152.  Of  cases  of  marked  deficiency  of  Imagination  . 

153  Disorder  of  the  Imagination  as  connected  with  Asso 

ciation  and  excited  Conceptions  .... 


256 

257 

259 

260 


XU  CONTENTS. 

Section  , • ***** 

154.  Disorder  of  the  Imagination  as  connected  with  the 

Sensibilities 2G2  * 


155.  Other  illustrations  of  the  same  subject  . . . 263  I 

156.  Of  inordinate  Imagination,  the  opposite  of  misanthrop- 

ical   265 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

157.  Idiocy  generally  implies  a defective  action  of  the  whole 

Mind 267 

158.  Of  the  degree  of  intellectual  power  possessed  in  Idiocy  268 

159.  Of  the  natural  and  moral  sensibilities  in  Idiocy  . . 269 

160.  Of  certain  marked  or  peculiar  aspects  of  Idiocy  . . 270 

161.  Of  the  Origin  and  causes  of  Idiocy  ....  272  i 

162.  Idiocy  to  be  ascribed  sometimes  to  the  effects  of  age  . 273  : 

163.  Illustrations  of  the  causes  of  Idiocy  ....  275 

164.  Of  restoration  from  a state  of  Idiocy  ....  276 

165.  Of  the  beneficial  results  connected  with  Idiocy  . , 277  J 


DERANGEMENT  OF  THE  SENSIBILITIES. 
CHAPTER  I. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  APPETITES. 

166.  Classification  and  method  of  inquiry  ....  281 

167.  Of  the  distinction  between  mere  disorder  and  Insanity 

of  the  Sensibilities 282 

168.  Of  the  disordered  and  alienated  action  of  the  Appetites  283 

169.  Facts  illustrative  of  the  preceding  statements  . . 285 

170.  Further  notices  on  the  disorder  of  the  Appetites  , 286 

CHAPTER  II. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

(i.)  PROPENSITY  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION. 

171.  General  remarks  on  the  Propensities  ....  288 

172.  Disordered  action  of  the  principle  of  Self-preservation  289 

173.  Other  disordered  forms  of  the  Self-preservative  princi- 

ple   291 

174.  Explanation  of  the  above-mentioned  cases  . . . 292 

175.  Fuither  remarks  on  this  subject 294 


CONTENTS. 


X1U 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 
(II.)  PROPENSITY  TO  ACQUIRE  OR  ACQUISITIVENESS. 


Page 


297 

299 

300 

301 
303 


1760nThe  propensity  to  acquire  an  original  or  implanted  one  296 
177  Instances  of  the  first  kind  or  form  of  disordered  action 
of  the  Possessory  Principle  • • ; * 

178.  Instances  illustrative  of  the  subject  Di.  * 

179.  Second  form  of  the  alienated  action  of  the  Possessory 

180.  Reference  to  the  singular  case  of  Sir  Harvey  Elwes  . 

181.  Reference  to  the  case  of  Jeremiah  Hallet  . 

CHAPTER  IV. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

(III.)  AMBITION,  OR  THE  DESIRE  OP  POWER. 

182.  The  desire  of  Power  an  original  or  implanted  principle  304 

183.  This  propension,  like  others,  susceptible  of  derange- 

184.  ResuU^ofa  disappointed  love  of  Power  . . -307 

185.  Additional  illustrations  of  this  subject  . • • duo 

186.  Of  this  form  of  Insanity  m connexion  with  particular 

periods  of  society 

CHAPTER  V. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

(IV.)  IMITATIVENESS,  OR  THE  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION. 

187.  Evidence  of  the  existence  of  this  principle  . - 311 

188.  Explanations  in  relation  to  sympathetic  Imitation  . 313 

189.  Familiar  instances  of  sympathetic  Imitation  . 

190  Of  Sympathetic.  Imitation  in  large  multitudes  . • 3io 

191*  Of  the  Animal  Magnetism  of  M.  Mesner  in  connexion 

with  this  subject  . ...  * * , * A 6 

192.  Instances  of  Sympathetic  Imitation  at  the  poorhouseot 

Haerlem  .....  • • • * * „9ft 

193.  Other  instances  of  this  species  of  Imitation  . . . 330 

194.  Additional  and  striking  facts  on  this  subject  • • 

195.  Application  of  these  views  to  the  Witchcraft  Delusion 

in  New-England  . • . • • ; .*  * 

196.  Practical  results  connected  with  the  foregoing  views  • 325 
197’.  Application  of  these  views  to  Legislative  and  other  As- 

sembliesr , mo 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

Sec,;on  (V)'  TIIE  DESIRE  OF  ESTEEM. 

199'  Further’ susceptible  of  a disordered  action  328 
900  Tno  1 t ^ ry  remarks  on  thjs  subject  . . 329 

20?'  nfW?  t1UStratlTP,0f  this  form  of  Alienation  . . 330 

201.  Other  instances  still  further  illustrative  of  the  subject  331 

CHAPTER  VII. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

(VI.)  SOCIALITY-,  OR  THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY. 

9fn  thr  P,roPensive  principle  of  Sociality  . . 332 

204  T oVdeai  Agnation,  or  Insanity  of  the  Sensibilities  333 
4.  The  irregular  action  of  the  Social  principle  exists  in 

two  forms 

205.  Further  remarks  on  the  disordered  action  of  the  Social 

propensity  ...  ooP 

2°6-  0LrhmeeddNeortaelg^rided  °"  th°  S°‘ial  33g 

207.  Disordered  action  of  the  principle  of  Veracity  . ! 339 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 

20®*  nr  thAA 5tates  mind  denorninated  Presentiments 

Ot  sudden  and  strong  impulses  of  Mind 

oi1?*  au ity  the  Affecti°ns  or  Passions  ] 

010  nlfh  m?ntal  di^ase  termed  Hypoehondriasis  .'  ] 

212.  Of  other  forms  of  Hypochondriasis 

213.  Of  intermissions  of  Hypochondriasis,  and  of  its  reme- 

dies . 

214.  Further  remarks  on  the  remedies  of  Hypochondriasis" 

215.  Disordered  action  of  the  passion  of  Fear 
- 21 6-  0tg^  illustrations  of  the  disordered  action  of  this  pas- 

o!o  Pfurversions  of  the  Benevolent  Affection  ’. 

218.  Other  cases  of  perverted  Benevolent  Affections  . 

CHAPTER  IX. 


343 

313 

345 

346 

347 

349 

350 

351 

353 

354 

355 


219. 

220. 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MORAL  SENSIBILITIES. 

T^ature  of  voluntary  Moral  Derangement  . . .356 

Ol  Accountability  in  connexion  with  this  form  of  Dis- 
ordered Conscience  ....  oeo 


CONTENTS 


XV 


5?rnOf  natural  or  congenital  Moral  Derangement  . . 359 

222*  Further  illustrations  of  congenital  Moral  Derangement  360 
Facts  in  relation  to  an  indtvidual  m the  Lunatic  Asy-  ^ 

224  Of  UMoral^ccountability  in  cases  of  natural  or  con- 
genital  Moral  Derangement 

CHAPTER  X. 

CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN  CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBIL. 
TIES. 

225.  Frequency  of  Casual  Association,  and  some  instances  ^ 

22fi  Of°Assodation  in  connexion  with  the  Appetites  . - 366 

227!  Of  Casual  Associations  in  connexion  with  the  Propen-  ^ 

228  Other  Instances  of  Casual  Association  in  'connexion 
with  the  Propensities  . • . • * * * 

229.  Inordinate  fear  from  Casual  Association  * * 311 

230  Casual  Associations  m respect  to  persons  . • • 371 

231.  Casual  Association  in  connexion  with  objects  and  ^ 

232.  0?laCaesual  Association  in  connexion  with' particular  ^ 

days  . . 375 

233.  Antipathies  to  Animals 


disordered  action  of  the  will. 

CHAPTER  I- 

NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 

234.  On  the  relation  of  the  Will  to  the  other  parts  of  the 

235.  Oflhe  attribute  of  Power  as  existing  in  the  Will 

236  Of  the  degree  of  Power  existing  in  the  ill  * _ , * 

237  Of  Positive  in  distinction  from  Relative  disorder  of  the 

Will 

CHAPTER  II. 

IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 

238  Of  natural  weakness  or  imbecility  of  the  Will 

460.  KJL  uam  /-  — mrwr  ofnlpmp.nt.s  inr.O 


381 

382 

383 

381 


, 385 


>38  Of  natural  weakness  or  imbecility  oi  tne  yv  in  . . 

>39]  Consideration  of  the  foregoing  statements  in  connexion  ^ 

240.  UlSmUoiTof  natural  imbecility  of  the  Wili  . .387 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


Section 

241.  Further  remarks  on  imbecility  of  Will  . . .388 

242.  Of  alienation  of  the  Will  termed  Inconstantia  . 389 

243.  Of  superinduced  weakness  of  Will,  or  that  which  is  oc- 

casion by  wrong  mental  training  . . . .391 

CHAPTER  IIL 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  WILL  IN  CONNEXION  WITH 
OTHER  POWERS. 

244.  The  action  of  the  Will  may  be  perplexed  through  the 

medium  of  the  other  faculties 392 

245.  Disordered  Action  of  the  Mind  in  connexion  with 

Casual  Associations . ib. 

246.  Additional  illustration  of  the  preceding  view  . . 394 

247.  Of  alienation  of  the  Will  as  connected  with  a disor- 

dered state  or  alienation  of  Belief  . . . .395 

248.  Alienation  of  the  Will  in  connexion  with  Melancholy  396 

249.  Of  Accountability  in  connexion  with  Alienation  or  In- 

sanity of  the  Will 333 


afes 


LIBRARY 

AL?No^y* 


INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 1.  Extent  and  importance  of  the  subject  to  be 

examined. 

The  reader  will  notice  that  I have  entitled  this 
Treatise,  Imperfect  and  Disordered  Mental  Action. 
A title  designedly  made  thus  general,  in  order  to 
include  all  the  varieties  of  imperfect  and  alienated 
action  of  which  (and  they  are  almost  without  num- 
ber') the  human  mind  is  the  subject.  Our  inquiries 
are  not  meant  to  be  limited  to  those  more  aggrava- 
ted forms  of  mental  disorder  which  infringe  upon 
moral  accountability,  and  which  are  commonly  had 
in  view,  when  what  is  called  Insanity  or  Madness 
comes  under  discussion.  We  propose  to  take  a 
more  extensive  view  of  the  subject;  and  indulge 
the  hope,  that,  in  thus  extending  the  plan  of  remark, 
the  Treatise  may  be  found  to  be  more  interesting 
and  useful  to  the  common  reader  at  least,  if  not  to 
the  philosopher. 

I can  hardly  consider  it  necessary  to  delay  toi 


18 


INTRODUCTION, 


the  mere  purpose  of  attempting  to  illustrate  the  im- 
portance of  the  subject  which  it  is  now  proposed  to 
examine.  It  commends  itself  at  once  to  every  so- 
ber and  reflecting  mind,  as  intimately  and  seriously 
connected  with  the  well-being  of  men.  Every  man 
ought  to  have  some  knowledge  of  the  general  struc- 
ture and  action  of  the  mind,  and  of  its  irregular  as 
well  as  its  regular  action.  Nor  will  it  be  enough 
that  he  has  some  general  knowledge  of  the  more 
aggravated  cases  of  insanity,  such  as  are  character- 
ized by  a total  confusion  of  the  powers  of  thought, 
and  sometimes  by  ungovernable  ferocity.  There 
are  cases  of  partial  mental  disorder,  less  perceptible 
to  the  unpractised  eye,  which  come  nearer  home. 
There  are  mental  aberrations  and  shades  of  aberra- 
tion ; there  are  mental  imperfections  and  shades  of 
imperfection,  short  of  a total  overthrow  of  the  spir- 
itual fabric,  which,  although  they  have  seldom  had  a 
place  in  any  Treatise  designed  to  be  generally  acces- 
sible, it  is  nevertheless  important,  for  various  rea- 
sons, to  understand.  A person  may  not  be  insane, 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term  insanity,  and  yet 
may  be  the  subject  of  various  modifications  of  men- 
tal disorder,  which  have  no  inconsiderable  bearing 
upon  his  usefulness  and  happiness.  He  is  merely 
called  by  his  neighbours  an  “ odd  man,”  a “ hair- 
brained man,”  a “ violent  man,”  a “ visionary  man,” 
or  by  some  other  name,  indicative,  in  their  view,  of 
some  peculiarity  of  mental  structure,  although,  by 
no  means,  of  insanity,  in  the  ordinary  import  of  that 
term.  And  yet  such  specialities  of  intellect  and 
temper,  inconsiderable  as  they  may  appear,  ought 


OUTLINES  . OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  19 

to  have  their  place  in  the  philosophy  of  the  mind's 
disordered  action. 

But  there  are  other  cases,  much  more  marked  in 
their  nature,  and  more  decisively  injurious  in  their 
consequences.  We  refer  to  those  instances  of 
mental  disorder  where  the  mind  is  not  merely  dis- 
composed, not  merely  temporarily  set  ajar,  but  in 
ruins.  No  sight  is  so  afflicting,  so  overwhelming, 
as  that  of  a mind  fundamentally,  and,  perhaps,  per- 
manently unsettled.  What,  then,  can  be  more  im- 
portant than  to  understand  the  facts  and  causes  of 
its  ruin,  and  the  principles  on  which  a restoration 
may  be  possible ! 

§ 2.  Necessity  of  some  Preliminary  or  Introductory 
statements . 

Before,  however,  entering  directly  upon  this  im- 
portant subject,  it  may,  for  various  reasons,  be  desi- 
rable to  attempt  a brief  examination  of  some  matters 
of  a somewhat  general  nature  which  are  closely 
connected  with  it. 

X. — In  the  first  place,  it  seems  to  me  just  and  rea- 
sonable to  say,  that  we  cannot  have  a correct  knowl- 
edge of  insanity  or  unsoundness  of  mental  action, 
without  some  knowledge  of  the  laws  and  principles, 
which  are  involved  in  a sane  or  sound  action.  It  is 
necessary,  therefore,  as  a preliminary  matter,  to  give 
a concise  view  of  the  Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Mind. 

II. In  the  second  place,  it  is  well  known  that 

there  is  a close  connexion  between  the  body  and  the 
mind,  especially  between  the  brain  and  the  mind. 


20 


INTRODUCTION. 


And  such  are  the  various  influences  and  results  ot 
this  connexion,  that  it  is  impossible  to  explain  fully 
the  aberrations  to  which  the  mind  is  subject  without 
some  reference  to  it.  Here,  then,  although  frequent 
references  will  be  subsequently  made  to  it  from  time 
to  time,  is  obviously  another  preliminary  topic. 

III. — In  the  third  place,  it  seems  proper,  before 
we  go  into  the  facts  and  details  of  the  Work,  to  lay 
down  the  basis,  at  least,  of  a philosophical  Classifi- 
cation. In  the  early  history  of  any  department  of 
science,  when  the  facts  in  relation  to  it  have  not 
been  collected  in  sufficient  number,  or  have  not 
been  subjected  to  a sufficiently  careful  examination, 
this  course  would  perhaps  be  premature.  But  the 
facts,  or  what  might  properly  be  termed  the  Statis- 
tics of  Insanity,  have  been  so  greatly  multiplied, 
and  that,  too,  under  the  supervision  of  men  eminently 
fitted  for  the  task,  that  this  cannot  properly  be  said 
in  the  present  case. 

§ 3.  The  idea  of  Insanity  of  Mind  predicated  on 
that  of  Sanity . 

The  three  distinct  topics  which  have  now  been 
mentioned  will  bo  introduced  and  examined  as  Pre- 
liminary views  ; and,  consequently,  will  not  occupy 
a place  in  the  body  of  the  work,  except  incidentally 
and  concisely.  In  accordance  with  these  intima- 
tions, I shall  now,  in  the  present  chapter,  proceed  to 
give  the  Outlines  or  general  principles,  on  which  the 
mind  appears  to  be  constituted.  If  we  have  a right 
understanding  of  things  in  this  particular ; in  other 
words,  if  we  know  what  the  regular  action  of  the 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  21 

mind  is,  we  shall  be  more  likely  to  appreciate  cor- 
rectly the  statements,  which  we  shall  have  occasion 
to  make  of  its  irregular  or  disordered  action.  The 
fact  is,  that  every  appropriate  or  sound  action  of  the 
mind  (at  least  this  is  so  generally  the  case  as  to  ad- 
mit of  no  exception  worthy  of  notice  here)  is  sus- 
ceptible of  degenerating  into  a defective  or  alienated 
one.  The  philosophy  of  insanity,  therefore  (using 
the  term  here  in  the  broadest  sense,  as  including  all 
the  various  forms  both  of  defective  and  irregular 
mental  action),  is  parallel  with  that  of  sanity  ; it  oc- 
cupies the  same  wide  field ; it  goes  side  by  side. 
To  know,  therefore,  what  the  mind  is  in  its  insane 
action,  we  must  know  what  it  is  in  its  sane  action ; 
in  other  words,  we  must  know  something  of  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  Mental  Philosophy,  properly  so 
called.  But  this  knowledge,  in  its  minuter  details 
at  least,  and  in  its  illustrations,  must  be  obtained 
from  other  books.  It  cannot  reasonably  be  expect- 
ed, in  such  a Treatise  as  the  present,  to  furnish  any- 
thing more  than  some  general  outlines,  which  we 
now  propose  to  do. 

§ 4.  Outlines  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Mind. 

The  human  mind  exists  in  the  three  great  de 
partments  of  the  intellect  or  understanding,  the  sen- 
sibilities, and  the  will.  I am  aware  that  this  view 
of  the  mind’s  constitution  has  not  always  been  taken 
by  writers  on  Mental  Philosophy  ; but  there  is  great 
reason  to  believe  that  it  i3  substantially  a correct 
one.  It  would  be  pleasing,  and  perhaps  profitable, 
to  enter  into  a consideration  of  the  proofs  by  which 


22 


INTRODUCTION. 


this  fundamental  arrangement  is  sustained.  But  our 
limits  will  not  permit  this  ; and  we  can  only  refer 
the  reader,  in  general  terms,  to  those  works  on 
Mental  Philosophy,  where  such  a discussion  would 
find  a more  appropriate  place.  Nevertheless,  in 
view  of  the  multiplied  sources  of  evidence  applicable 
to  the  inquiry,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that 
we  consider  this  great  distinction  as  sufficiently  es- 
tablished, and  as  constituting  the  true  point  of  de- 
parture in  all  investigations  into  the  mind. 

Taking  it  for  granted  that  this  fundamental  dis- 
tinction exists,  we  proceed  to  say  that  it  is  the  office 
of  the  understanding  (what  may  be  called,  perhaps, 
the  perceptive  or  cognitive  department  of  the  mind) 
to  give  us  knowledge.  The  product  of  its  action  is 
intellection,  not  passion.  The  result  of  the  ac- 
tion of  the  sensibilities,  on  the  contrary,  is  found  in 
those  states  of  mind  which  are  denominated  emo- 
tions and  desires,  and  in  those  combinations  of  these 
elementary  feelings,  which  constitute  the  benevolent 
and  malevolent  affections.  The  office  of  the  will, 
which  is  called  later  into  action,  and  seems  to  hold 
a higher  position,  is  mandatory  and  executive.  Vo- 
litions, which  are  the  results  of  the  will’s  action,  have 
no  perceptive  power,  nor  are  they,  in  themselves,  im- 
pregnated with  any  emotive  or  affective  element. 
They  are  not  only  subsequent  in  time  to  the  states 
of  mind  just  mentioned,  but  are  invested,  as  has  just 
been  intimated,  with  the  supervisory  and  executive 
duty  of  carrying  them  into  effect. 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  23 


§ 5.  Further  considerations  on  the  same  subject. 

The  mind  may  be  regarded  as  departmental  (that 
is,  as  susceptible  of  leading  generic  distinctions), .not 
only  in  reference  to  its  results,  but  also  in  its  law  ot 
movement,  or,  more  explicitly,  in  its  successive  or- 
der of  action.  It  is  true  that  the  mental  depart- 
ments, to  a certain  extent,  rest  upon,  and  are  impli- 
cated with,  each  other  ; but  still  their  connexion  and 
action  are  always  consistent  with  a prescribed  and 
definite  law  of  progress.  The  order  of  movement 
is  that  in  which  the  departments  have  already  been 
enumerated,  viz.  : the  intellect,  the  sensibilities,  and 
the  will ; commencing  in  the  intellect,  continued, 
under  various  forms  and  modifications,  in  the  sensi- 
bilities, and  terminating  in  what  Richard  Baxter 
(in  a Treatise  almost  forgotten,  but  not  without  mer- 
it) has  denominated  the  “volitive”  faculty.  The 
intellectual  developement,  in  distinction  from  the  sen- 
sitive and  volitive,  is  obviously  first  in  the  order  ot 
nature.  On  this  point  we  do  not  suppose  that  there 
can  possibly  be  any  great  difference  of  opinion.  As 
a general  thing,  certainly,  there  can  be  no  action  ot 
the  sensibilities  without  a previous  action  of  the  un- 
derstanding. If  we  put  forth  any  sensitive  act ; if  we 
exercise  any  desire  or  passion,  it  is,  of  course,  in- 
volved in  the  very  expressions,  that  there  is  and 
must  be  some  object  of  desire  or  of  passion,  which 
is  the  subject  of  our  knowledge  ; in  other  words, 
upon  which  the  intellect,  in  its  perceptive  or  cogni- 
tive action,  has  been  employed.  There  can  be  no 
question,  therefore,  that  in  a history  of  the  mind’s 
action  our  inquiries  ought  to  begin  with  the  intellect, 
C 


24 


INTRODUCTION. 


§6.  Of  the  Intellect , particularly  the  External  In- 
tellect. 

In  considering  the  intellect  first,  as  it  is  proper 
we  should  do,  we  must  keep  in  mind  the  great  di- 
vision of*  the  intellect,  which  is  more  or  less  hinted 
at  by  writers  (and  which  certainly  has  its  foundation 
in  nature),  viz.,  into  the  external  and  the  internal 
intellect. 

Under  the  head  of  the  external  intellect  we  in 
elude,  especially  and  chiefly,  those  intellectual  sus- 
ceptibilities which  are  brought  into  action  in  direct 
and  immediate  connexion  with  the  external  world, 
particularly  sensation  and  external  perception.  With 
out  this  connexion,  which  nature  has  obviously  es- 
tablished, there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  these 
powers  would  ever  become  operative.  Intellectual 
states  of  external  origin  depend  for  their  existence, 
therefore,  upon  the  antecedent  existence,  and,  with 
one  exception,  upon  the  actual  presence,  of  external 
objects.  If  the  mind  were  insulated  and  cut  off  from 
the  outward  and  material  world,  or  if  the  outward 
world  had  no  existence,  we  could  not  taste,  we 
could  not  touch,  nor  hear,  nor  see.  All  those 
mental  states,  which  we  express,  when  we  speak  of 
the  diversities  of  touch,  and  smell,  and  taste,  of 
6ound  and  sight,  are  immediately  dependent  on  the 
existence  and  presence  of  something,  which  is  exte- 
rior to  the  intellect  itself.  And  it  is  the  intellect,  so 
far  as  it  is  brought  into  action  in  this  way,  which  we 
characterize  by  a convenient,  though  not,  in  all  re- 
spects, a felicitous  phraseology,  as  the  external  in 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  25 

tellect. — It  is  not  necessary,  however,  as  has  already 
been  intimated,  to  restrict  the  import  of  the  phrase 
to  these  states  of  mind  exclusively ; since  there  is 
at  least  one  other  state  of  mind  which  is  so  based 
upon  antecedent  sensations  and  perceptions  as  to 
become  intimately  and  specifically,  though  not  di- 
rectly, connected  with  external  objects  ; and  which, 
therefore,  may  properly  be  arranged  under  the  same 
general  head. 

§ 7.  Of  the  Conceptive  Power  and  Conceptions . 

In  accordance  with  the  intimation  at  the  close  of 
the  last  section,  we  proceed  to  say  that  under  this 
general  head,  viz.,  of  the  external  intellect,  we  may 
properly  include  the  conceptive  power,  or  that  power, 
not  by  which  we  originate  things  or  discover  them 
absolutely  for  the  first  time,  but  by  which  we  recall 
or  revive  to  the  mind  those  impressions  which  we 
have  previously  received  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses.  Conceptions,  therefore,  which  are  the  re- 
sults of  the  exercise  of  this  power,  is  the  name  of 
re-existing  sensations  and  perceptions,  when  the  out- 
ward causes  and  objects  of  such  sensations  and  per- 
ceptions are  no  longer  present.  It  is  particularly  in 
this  respect,  that  conceptions  differ  from  ordinary 
sensations  and  perceptions,  viz.,  the  absence  of  their 
outward  causes  and  objects.  When,  for  instance, 
the  rose,  the  honeysuckle,  or  other  odoriferous  body 
is  presented  to  us,  the  effect  which  follows  in  the 
mind  is  termed  a sensation.  When  we  afterward 
think  of  that  sensation  (as  we  sometimes  express  it) ; 
when  the  sensation  is  recalled,  even  though  very 


26 


INTRODUCTION. 


imperfectly,  without  the  object  which  oiiginally 
caused  it  being  present,  it  then  becomes,  by  the  use 
of  language,  a conception. 

And  it  is  the  same  in  any  instance  of  perception, 
considered  as  distinct  from  mere  conception.  When, 
in  strictness  of  speech,  we  are  said  to  perceive  any- 
thing, as  a tree,  a river,  a building,  or  a mountain, 
the  objects  of  our  perceptions  are  in  all  cases  be- 
fore us.  But  we  may  form  conceptions  of  them  ; 
they  may  be  recalled  and  exist  in  “ the  mind’s  eye 
they  may  be  conceptively  brought  near  and  made 
internally  existent,  however  remote  they  may  be  in 
fact,  both  in  time  and  place.  Nevertheless,  as  this 
re-existence  and  restoration  is,  in  the  strict  and  spe- 
cific sense  of  the  terms,  based  upon  what  had  pre- 
viously been  addressed  to  the  outward  senses,  there 
is  certainly  reason  for  including  the  conceptive  power 
and  its  results  under  the  general  head  of  the  exter- 
nal  intellect. 

§ 8.  Of  the  External  Intellect  in  connexion  with 
peculiarities  oj  character. 

It  may  be  proper  to  remark  here,  that  the  view  of 
the  mind  which  separates  the  external  from  the  in- 
ternal intellect,  furnishes  some  assistance  in  forming 
a correct  estimation  of  those  varieties  of  intellectual 
character,  which  frequently  present  themselves  to  our 
notice.  There  are  some  men  who  have  great  pow- 
ers of  external  perception  ; who  readily  perceive 
and  appreciate  all  the  varieties  and  peculiarities  of 
extension,  form,  colour,  and  magnitude  ; who,  in  a 
word,  can  accurately  and  promptly  estimate  what- 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  27 

ever  has  tangibility  and  visibility  ; but  in  whom  the 
powers  of  comparison,  judgment,  and  reasoning,  and, 
in  general  terms,  all  those  capacities,  which  are  inter- 
nal and  reflective,  are  greatly  deficient.  It  is  un- 
doubtedly the  case,  that  these  men  often  give  the 
impression,  at  first  sight,  of  great  ability ; nor  is  it 
true  that  they  are  wanting  in  ability  of  a certain  kind. 
But  it  is  rather  practical  than  philosophical  ability ; 
ability  suited  rather  to  the  appreciation  of  the  exte- 
rior and  the  visible  manifestations  of  things  than  of 
what  may  be  called  their  subjectivity,  or  the  more 
remote  and  intimate  principles  ; ability  better  adapt- 
ed to  the  every-day- business  of  common  life  than  to 
the  speculations  of  the  closet  and  the  intricacies  of 
science.  This  peculiarity  of  mental  structure  has 
frequently  been  noticed ; and  no  system  of  Mental 
Philosophy,  which  derives  its  doctrines  from  a care- 
ful observation  of  nature,  will  be  likely  to  deny  its 
existence. 

§ 9.  Of  the  Internal  Intellect,  or  the  Intellect  as  it 
is  brought  into  action,  independently  of  the  direct 
ao-ency  of  the  Senses. 

The  mind  is  first  brought  into  action  through  the 
mediation  and  assistance  of  the  senses.  It  is  by 
means  of  the  senses  that  we  become  acquainted  with 
outward  things,  with  whatever  is  visible  and  tangi- 
ble, and  has  outline  and  form.  Accordingly,  the 
first  great  theatre  of  mental  movement  is  the  exter- 
nal world.  This  is  the  source  from  which  the  mind 
may  be  considered  as  drawing  its  earliest  nutriment, 


28 


INTRODUCTION. 


and  from  which,  in  the  first  instance,  it  takes  its 
character 

But  the  development  of  the  external  intellect  is 
followed,  particularly  where  there  are  opportunities 
of  mental  cultivation,  by  a new  movement,  which  is 
strictly  internal.  In  other  words,  the  soul,  when 
once  called  into  action  by  means  of  its  connexion 
with  external  things,  finds  sources  of  knowledge  in 
itself,  entirely  distinct  from  the  outward  sources  of 
hearing,  touch,  and  the  like.  There  are  inward 
powers  of  perception,  constituting,  as  it  were,  hidden 
fountains  of  knowledge,  which  open  themselves  and 
flow  up  in  the  mind’s  remote  and  secret  places. 
There  is,  therefore,  philosophically  considered,  an 
internal  as  well  as  an  external  intellect ; a percep- 
tive power,  which  reaches  to  invisible  and  intangible 
existences  and  relations,  as  well  as  a perceptivity, 
which  is  merely  occupied  with  what  is  presented  to 
touch  and  sight,  and  the  other  senses. 

I am  aware  that  some  mental  philosophers,  who 
have  enjoyed  more  or  less  note  in  the  literary  world, 
have  objected  to  this  doctrine,  particularly  Hobbes, 
Condillac,  and  Helvetius  ; but  it  is  supported  by 
others  certainly  of  not  inferior  weight ; by  Reid, 
Stewart,  and  Brown,  and  the  Scotch  school  gener- 
ally ; by  Cousin,  and  all  the  writers  of  the  Platonic 
and  Kantian  school ; by  the  leading  phrenological 
writers  ; and,  as  it  seems  to  me,  by  Mr.  Locke. 
The  authority  of  the  more  recent  writers,  those  who 
have  had  the  best  opportunities  to  form  a correct 
opinion,  is  decidedly  in  favour  of  it.  And  if  it  could 
be  said  that  philosophy,  as  it  exists  in  books,  does 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  29 

not  favour  it,  still,  have  we  not  indubitable  grounds 
for  saying  that  philosophy,  as  it  exists  in  nature, 
does  1 And  what  shall  we  say  of  that  philosophy, 
which  is  at  variance  with  nature  ? 

§ 10.  Of  the  Nature  of  Original  Suggestion. 

Under  the  head  of  the  Internal  Intellect  are  prop- 
erly included,  as  leading  powers  (or  perhaps  we 
should  more  properly  say,  as  leading  sources  of 
knowledge),  Original  Suggestion,  Consciousness, 
Relative  Suggestion  or  Judgment,  and  Reasoning. 

I. By  means  of  Original  Suggestion  we  become 

possessed  of  various  ideas,  which  we  cannot  ascribe 
directly  to  the  senses  on  the  one  hand,  nor  to  an 
act  of  the  judgment  or  of  the  reasoning  power  on 
the  other  ; ideas  which,  in  the  language  of  Dr.  Reid, 
are  not  gotten  by  comparison,  “and  perceiving 
agreements  and  disagreements,  but  immediately  in- 
spired by  our  constitution.”  Mr.  Stewart  also  rec- 
ognises the  existence  of  this  mental  power.  In 
his  Philosophical  Essays  he  speaks  of  certain  men- 
tal phenomena  as  attendant  upon  the  objects  of  our 
consciousness,  and  as  suggested  by  them.  The 
notions  of  time,  number,  motion,  memory,  same- 
ness, PERSONAL  IDENTITY,  PRESENT  EXISTENCE, 

&c.,he  ascribes  neither  to  the  external  world  on  the 
one  hand,  nor  to  the  internal  mental  operations,  of 
which  we  are  conscious,  on  the  other,  except  so  far 
as  they  are  the  occasions  on  which  the  mind  brings 
them  out  or  suggests  from  its  own  inherent  ener- 
gy. Of  the  notion  of  duration,  for  instance,  he 
would  say,  I do  not  see  it  o"  hear  it,  or  feel  it,  nor 


30 


INTRODUCTION. 


become  acquainted  with  it  by  means  of  any  other  of 
the  senses  ; nor  am  I conscious  of  it,  as  I am  of 
believing,  of  reasoning,  of  imagining,  and  of  other 
mental  exercises  ; but  it  is  suggested  by  the  mind 
itself;  it  is  an  intimation  absolutely  essential  to  the 
mind’s  nature  and  action.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  an 
intimation,  or  conception  rather,  which  the  mind, 
constituted  as  it  is,  cannot  fail  to  originate. 

§11.  Consciousness  another  form  of  Internal  men- 
ial action . 

II. — The  term  Consciousness  expresses  another 
of  the  forms  of  internal  mental  action.  By  the 
common  usage  of  the  language,  the  term  conscious- 
ness is  appropriated  to  express  the  way  or  method, 
in  which  we  obtain  the  knowledge  of  those  objects 
which  belong  to  the  mind  itself,  and  which  do  not, 
and  cannot,  exist  independently  of  some  mind.  The 
words  remembering,  imagining,  and  reasoning,  are 
terms  expressive  of  real  objects  of  thought ; but  evi- 
dently the  objects  for  which  they  stand  cannot  be 
supposed  to  exist  independently  of  some  mind,  which 
remembers,  imagines,  and  reasons.  Of  these,  there- 
fore, he  may  properly  be  said  to  be  conscious.  And 
in  all  other  cases  where  we  apply  the  term  under 
consideration,  consciousness  is  limited,  in  the  testi- 
mony which  it  gives,  to  mere  mental  action  and  the 
modifications  of  action  ; and  does  not  properly  ex- 
tend to  anything  which  has  existence,  extraneous  to 
the  conscious  subject  or  soul  itself. 

Consciousness  seems  to  sustain  the  same  relation 
to  the  attributes  of  mind  which  sensation  does  to 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


31 


those  of  matter.  In  both  cases  we  have  direct 
knowledge  ; that  is  to  say,  knowledge  without  the 
necessary  intervention  of  other  facts.  In  the  case 
of  Sensation,  whenever  an  object  is  presented  to  us, 
we  have  a new  state  of  mind  at  once,  and  necessa- 
rily. So  in  Consciousness,  whenever  a new  state 
of  mind  exists,  we  recognise  its  existence  at  once, 
without  any  accessory  aid.  We  cannot  help  do- 
ing it. 

Consciousness  is  a ground  or  law  of  belief. 
And  the  belief  attendant  on  the  exercise  of  it,  like 
that  which  accompanies  the  exercise  of  Original 
Suggestion,  is  of  the  highest  kind.  It  appears  to 
be  utterly  out  of  our  power  to  avoid  believing,  be- 
yond a doubt,  that  the  mind  experiences  certain  sen- 
sations, or  has  certain  thoughts,  or  puts  foith  partic- 
ular intellectual  operations,  whenever,  in  point  of  fact, 
that  is  the  case.  We  may  be  asked  for  the  reason 
of  this  belief,  but  we  have  none  to  give,  except  that 
it  is  the  result  of  an  ultimate  and  controlling  princi- 
ple of  our  nature  ; and  hence,  that  nothing  can  evei 
prevent  the  convictions  resulting  from  this  source, 
and  nothing  can  divest  us  of  them. 

In  the  course  of  this  Work  we  shall  have  occasion 
to  bring  forward  some  instances  where  the  power  of 
consciousness  (whether  we  call  it  the  power,  or,  as 
some  would  prefer,  the  mere  fact  of  consciousness, 
is  not,  perhaps,  in  the  present  discussions,  very  es- 
sential) appears  to  be  disordered.  The  examination 
of  Insanity,  as  it  presents  itself  under  this  particular 
head,  will  furnish  some  cases,  which  are  interesting 
in  a high  degree. 


32 


INTRODUCTION. 


§ 12.  Of  Relative  Suggestion  or  Judgment . 

III. — Another  of  those  powers,  coming  under  the 
general  head  of  the  Internal  Intellect,  is  Relative 
Suggestion.  It  is  well  known  that  the  mind  has  the 
power,  as  we  commonly  express  it,  of  bringing  its 
thoughts  together,  of  placing  them  side  by  side,  of 
comparing  them.  These  expressions,  although  they 
are  for  the  most  part  of  material  origin,  indicate  nev- 
ertheless an  important  fact  in  the  mental  action. 
When  it  is  said  that  our  thoughts  are  brought  to- 
gether, that  they  are  placed  side  by  side,  and  the 
like,  the  meaning  undoubtedly  is,  that  they  are  im- 
mediately successive  to  each  other.  And  when  it 
is  further  said  that  we  compare  them,  the  meaning 
is,  that  we  perceive  or  feel  their  relation  to  each  other 
in  certain  respects. 

The  mind,  therefore,  has  an  original  susceptibility 
cr  power  corresponding  to  this  result ; in  other 
words,  by  which  this  result  is  brought  about ; which 
is  sometimes  known  as  its  power  of  relative  sug- 
gestion, and  at  other  times  the  same  thing  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  term  judgment,  although  the  latter 
term  is  sometimes  employed  with  other  shades  of 
meaning.  “ With  the  susceptibility  of  relative  sug- 
gestion” (says  Dr.  Brown,  Lect.  51),  “the  faculty  of 
judgment,  as  that  term  is  commonly  employed,  may 
be  considered  as  nearly  synonymous  ; and  I have 
accordingly  used  it  as  synonymous  in  treating  of  the 
different  relations  that  have  come  under  our  revie w.” 
Degerando,  in  his  Treatise  on  the  Origin  of  Human 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  33 

Knowledge  (pt.  ii.,  chap,  ii.),  has  a remark  nearly 
to  the  same  effect. 

We  arrive  here,  therefore,  at  an  ultimate  fact  in 
our  mental  nature  ; in  other  words,  we  reach  a prin- 
ciple so  thoroughly  elementary  that  it  cannot  be  re- 
solved into  any  other.  The  human  intellect  is  so 
made,  so  constituted,  that,  when  it  perceives  differ- 
ent objects  together,  it  immediately  and  necessarily 
has  a knowledge  of  some  of  the  mutual  relations  of 
those  objects.  It  considers  them  as  equal  or  un- 
equal, like  or  unlike,  as  being  the  same  or  different 
in  respect  to  place  and  time,  as  having  the  same  or 
different  causes  and  ends,  and  in  various  other  re- 
spects. 

§ 13.  Of  the  Nature  of  the  Reasoning  Poiver. 

IV. — Another  of  the  internal  powers  is  Reason- 
ing. An  expression  by  which  we  are  to  understand 
the  rinental  process  or  operation,  by  means  of  which 
we  deduce  conclusions  from  two  or  more  propositions 
premised.  For  our  knowledge  of  the  operations  of 
the  reasoning  power  we  are  indebted  to  conscious- 
ness, which  gives  us  our  direct  knowledge,  not  only 
of  this,  but  of  all  other  mental  processes.  It  is 
hardly  necessary,  therefore,  to  add,  that  reasoning  is 
not  identical  with,  or  involved  in,  consciousness.  If 
consciousness  gives  us  a knowledge  of  the  act  of 
reasoning,  the  reasoning  power,  operating  within  its 
own  limits  and  in  its  own  right,  gives  us  a knowl- 
edge of  other  things.  It  is  a source  of  perceptions 
and  knowledge,  which  we  probably  could  not  possess 
in  any  other  way. 


u 


INTRODUCTION. 


Considered  as  sources  of  knowledge,  none  of  the 
forms  of  intellectual  action  which  have  been  men- 
tioned are  identical  with  each  other.  Each  occu- 
pies its  appropriate  sphere,  and  has  its  specific  and 
appropriate  results.  Without  the  aid  of  Original 
Suggestion,  it  does  not  appear  how  we  could  have 
a knowledge  of  our  existence  ; without  Conscious- 
ness we  should  not  have  a knowledge  of  our  mental 
operations  ; without  Relative  Suggestion  or  Judg- 
ment, which  is  also  a distinct  source  of  knowledge, 
there  would  be  no  Reasoning ; and,  unassisted  by 
Reasoning,  we  could  have  no  knowledge  of  the  rela- 
tions of  those  things  which  cannot  be  compared 
without  the  aid  of  intermediate  propositions.  The 
reasoning  power,  accordingly,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a new  and  distinct  fountain  of  thought,  which,  as 
compared  with  the  other  sources  of  knowledge  just 
mentioned,  opens  itself  still  farther  in  the  recesses 
of  the  internal  intellect ; and  as  it  is  later  in  its  de- 
velopement,  so  it  comes  forth  with  proportionally 
greater  efficiency.  It  not  only  discloses  to  us  those 
separate  relations,  which  are  so  complicated  and  re- 
mote, that  relative  suggestion,  or  judgment  in  its 
elementary  form,  cannot  reach  them  ; but  sustains 
the  higher  office  of  bringing  to  light  the  great  prin- 
ciples and  hidden  truths  of  nature  ; revealing  to  the 
inquisitive  and  delighted  mind  a multitude  of  fruit- 
ful and  comprehensive  views,  which  could  not  other- 
wise be  obtained. 

This  powrer  too,  pre-eminent  and  important  as  it 
is  acknowledged  to  be,  is  not  exempt  from  an  im- 
pairment and  alienation  of  its  action.  Indeed,  Cul- 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  FHILOSOPHY.  35 

en  and  Locke,  and  we  know  not  how  many  other 
leading  writers,  seem  to  have  regarded  it  as  the 
oreat  seat  of  mental  disorder. 

§ 14.  Remarks  on  the  Imagination. 

Y. Another  leading  power  which,  when  we  ac- 

curately consider  its  nature,  seems  properly  to  be 
arranged  under  the  general  head  of  the  Intellect,  is 
the  Imagination.  We  shall  have  occasion  hereaf- 
ter to  recur  again  to  the  nature  and  intellectual  pro- 
cess of  imaginative  action,  when  it  comes  in  place 
to  consider  the  disorders  to  which  this  important 
faculty  is  subject.  All  we  propose  to  do  here  is 
briefly  to  point  out  the  relation  existing  between  the 
imagination  and  the  reasoning  power.  D’Alembert 
somewhere  intimates  very  distinctly,  that  this  rela- 
tion is  a very  close  one ; and  suggests  farther,  in 
illustration  of  his  views,  that  Archimedes,  the  geom- 
etrician, of  all"  the  great  men  of  antiquity,  is  best 
entitled  to  be  placed  by  the  side  of  Homer.  If  such 
a relation  exists,  it  furnishes  one  reason  at  least  in 
support  of  the  classification,  which  arranges  the  ima- 
gination, in  connexion  with  the  reasoning  power, 
under  the  general  head  of  the  Intellect. 

Some  of  the  particulars,  in  which  the  imaginative 
and  deductive  powers  are  closely  related,  are  these. 
They  both  imply  the  antecedent  exercise  of  the  pow- 
er of  abstraction  ; they  are  both  employed  in  framing 
new  combinations  of  thought  from  the  elements  al- 
ready in  possession  ; they  both  ' put  in  requisition, 
and  in  precisely  the  same  way,  the  powers  of  asso- 
ciation and  relative  suggestion.  Nevertheless,  they 


36 


INTRODUCTION. 


are  separated  from  each  other,  and  characterized  by 
the  two  circumstances,  that  they  operate  in  part  on 
different  materials,  and  that  their  objects  are  differ- 
ent. Reasoning,  as  it  aims  to  give  us  a knowledge 
of  the  truth,  deals  exclusively  with  facts  more  or  less 
probable.  Imagination,  as  it  aims  chiefly  to  give 
pleasure,  is  at  liberty  to  transcend  the  limits  of  the 
world  of  reality,  and,  consequently,  often  deals  with 
the  mere  conceptions  of  the  mind,  whether  they  cor- 
respond to  reality  or  not.  Accordingly,  the  one  as- 
certains what  is  true,  the  other  what  is  possible  ; the 
office  of  the  one  is  to  inquire,  of  the  other  to  create. 

§ 15.  Of  other  important  Intellectual  Principles . 

In  addition  to  the  intellectual  susceptibilities  which 
have  been  mentioned,  there  are  others  which,  in  a 
full  account  of  the  mental  powers,  would  be  entitled 
to  an  important  place  ; such  as  Association,  Mem- 
ory, and  Abstraction.  The  power  of  Abstraction, 
in  consequence  of  the  applicability  of  its  exercise 
either  to  external  or  internal  objects,  might  be  ar- 
ranged under  either  of  the  two  great  divisions  of  the 
intellect.  Association  and  memory,  as  they  have  a 
very  intimate  relation  to  the  reasoning  and  imagina- 
tive powers,  would,  with  a high  degree  of  propriety, 
piesent  themselves  for  consideration  in  immediate 
connexion  with  those  powers  ; and,  accordingly,  be 
arranged  under  the  head  of  the  Internal  Intellect 
rather  than  of  the  External.  These  important  pow- 
ers of  the  mind  our  limits  will  not  permit  us  partic- 
ularly to  notice. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred,  however,  from  the  cir- 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  37 


lumstance  of  their  not  being  considered  here,  that 
.hey  will  not  hereafter  receive  their  appropriate  place 
ind  their  full  share  of  notice.  Whatever  may  be 
true  in  respect  to  the  power  of  abstraction,  certain 
it  is  that  no  view  of  insanity  would  be  adequate 
which  should  fail  to  point  out  the  phenomena  pre- 
sented by  a disordered  condition  of  association  and 
memory. 

§ 16.  Of  the  Sensibilities  in  Distinction  from  the 
Intellect. 

The  second  great  division  of  the  mind  is  that  of 
the  Sensibilities.  The  action  of  the  sensibilities  is 
subsequent  in  time  to  that  ot  the  intellective  nature. 
As  a general  thing,  there  is  and  can  be  no  move- 
ment of  the  sensibilities  ; no  such  thing  as  an  emo- 
tion, desire,  or  feeling  of  moral  obligation,  without 
an  antecedent  action  of  the  intellect.  If  we  are 
pleased  or  displeased,  there  is  necessarily  before  the 
mind  some  object  of  pleasure  or  displeasure  ; if  we 
exercise  the  feeling  of  desire,  there  must  necessarily 
be  some  object  desired,  which  is  made  known  to  us 
by  an  action  of  the  intellect.  So  that  if  there  were 
no  intellect,  or  if  the  intellectual  powers  were  en- 
tirely dormant  and  inactive,  there  would  be  no  action 
of  the  emotive  part  of  our  nature  and  of  the  pas 
sions. 

The  department  of  the  sensibilities  is  itself  sus- 
ceptible of  being  resolved  into  some  subordinate 
yet  important  divisions  ; particularly  the  natural  and 
moral  sensibilities.  The  department  of  the  natural 
sensibilities  considers  objects  chiefly  as  they  have  a 


38 


INTRODUCTION. 


relation  to  ourselves.  The  department  of  the  moral 
sensibilities,  taking  a wider  range,  contemplates  ob- 
jects as  they  relate  to  all  possible  existences.  The 
one  looks  at  things  in  the  aspect  of  their  desirable- 
ness, the  other  fixes  its  eye  on  the  sublime  feature 
of  their  rectitude.  The  one  asks  what  is  good, 
the  other  what  is  right. 

It  will,  perhaps,  throw  light  upon  the  distinction 
which  we  suppose  to  exist  in  the  sensibilities,  if 
we  call  to  mind  that  the  natural  (or  pathematic 
sensibilities,  as  they  are  sometimes  called)  exist 
in  brute  animals  the  same  as  in  man.  Brute  ani- 
mals are  susceptible  of  various  emotions  ; they 
have  their  instincts,  appetites,  propensities,  and  af- 
fections, the  same  as  human  beings  have,  and  per- 
haps even  in  a higher  degree.  They  are  pleased 
and  displeased  ; they  have  their  prepossessions  and 
aversions  ; they  love  and  hate,  with  as  much  ve- 
hemence at  least  as  commonly  characterizes  hu- 
man passion. 

But  if  we  look  in  the  lower  animals  for  the  other 
and  more  elevated  portion  of  the  sensibilities,  it  is 
not  there.  And  here,  we  apprehend,  is  the  great 
ground  of  distinction  between  men  and  brutes.  The 
latter,  as  well  as  human  beings,  appear  to  understand 
what  is  good,  considered  as  addressed  simply  to  the 
natural  affections  ; but  man  has  the  higher  knowl- 
edge of  moral  as  well  as  of  natural  good. 

§ 17.  Other  and  more  Subordinate  Divisions  of  the 
Sensibilities. 

The  natural  or  pathematic  sensibilities  resolve 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  39 

themselves  again  into  the  yet  more  subordinate  di- 
vision of  the  Emotions  and  Desires.  These  two 
classes  of  mental  states  follow  each  other  in  the  or- 
der in  which  they  have  been  named  ; the  emotions 
first,  which  are  exceedingly  numerous  and  various  ; 
and  then  the  desires.  The  desires  are,  in  theii 
own  nature,  essentially  fixed  and  uniform,  and  are 
chiefly  modified  in  their  combination  with  emotions. 
The  various  modifications  which  the  desires  assume, 
appear  in  the  distinct  shape  of  Instincts,  Appetites, 
Propensities,  and  Affections.  And  it  is  here  that  we 
find  a very  interesting  and  important  department  of 
the  mind,  especially  in  connexion  with  insanity. 

The  moral  sensibilities  divide  themselves  in  a 
manner  analogous  to  the  classification  which  exists 
in  the  natural.  The  first  class  of  mental  states 
which  presents  itself  to  notice  under  this  general 
head,  is  that  of  Moral  Emotions ; corresponding  in 
the  place  which  they  occupy  in  relation  to  the  intel- 
lect, as  well  as  in  some  other  respects,  to  the  natu- 
ral emotions.  The  moral  emotions  are  followed  by 
another  class  of  moral  feelings,  which  may  be  des- 
ignated as  obligatory  feelings,  or  feelings  of  moral 
obligation ; which  hold  the  same  relation  to  the 
moral  emotions,  which  the  desires  do  to  the  natural 
emotions.  If  we  had  not  moral  emotions  (that  is  to 
say,  feelings  of  moral  approval  and  disapproval),  it 
would  not  be  possible  for  us  to  feel  under  moral 
obligation  in  any  case  whatever,  the  latter  state  of 
the  mind  being  obviously  dependent  on  the  former. 
D 


40 


INTRODUCTION, 


§18,  Of  the  Will , and  its  Relation  to  the  other 
Poiuers. 

Of  the  three  leading  divisions  of  the  mind,  which 
are  supposed  to  embrace  the  whole  mental  structure, 
that  of  the  Will  naturally  comes  last.  The  natural 
course  of  investigation  in  Mental  Philosophy  obvi- 
ously commences  in  the  understanding,  and  is  pios- 
ecuted  through  the  sensibilities  upward  to  the  will. 
We  shall  not  undertake  here  to  go  into  a philosophi- 
cal explanation  of  the  nature  of  this  power,  but 
merely  indicate  in  a few  words  the  relation  which  it 
sustains  to  the  other  departments. 

The  will  may  be  considered  as  occupying,  in 
some  important  sense,  a higher  and  more  authori- 
tative position.  In  other  words,  as  we  have  already 
had  occasion  to  intimate,  it  sustains,  as  compared 
with  the  other  great  mental  departments,  the  part  of 
the  controlling  and  executive  power  of  the  mind. 
Action,  in  some  form  or  other,  was  undoubtedly  the 
great  object  which  was  had  in  view  in  the  creation 
of  the  mind  ; and  although  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  preparatives  of  action  (we  mean  now,  action 
which  has  an  object  exterior  to  the  mind)  exist  in 
the  intellect ' and  in  the  sensibilities,  the  presiding 
element  of  action,  its  effective  or  consummating 
power,  is  unquestionably  lodged  in  the  will.  TV  hat- 
ever  other  powers  he  might  possess,  if  man  were 
destitute  of  the  power  of  exercising  volitions,  and 
could  not  realize  the  results  involved  in  such  an  ex- 
ercise, he  would,  in  the  present  state  of  existence  at 
least,  be  an  inefficient  and  useless  being. 


OUTLINES  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4/. 

We  admit  that  the  intellect  and  the  sensibilities, 
in  their  various  forms  of  action,  constitute  the  ante- 
cedents to  volition.  They  are  to  be  regarded  as 
the  established  prerequisites  of  the  internal  volun- 
tary movement,  as  furnishing  the  basis  of  motives, 
on  which  the  subsequent  operations  of  the  will  de- 
pend. But,  without  the  will  to  carry  into  effect  the 
antecedent  suggestions  of  the  intellect,  and  to  arbi 
trate  among  the  conflicting  elements  of  the  sensibil- 
ities, the  mind  would  present  an  appearance  but 
little  better  than  that  of  a complete  chaos.  It  is 
the  will  which,  in  the  executive  sense  of  the  terms 
at  least,  if  not  in  the  advisory  and  consultative,  sits 
the  witness  and  arbitress  over  all  the  rest.  It  is  es- 
sential alike  to  the  action  and  accountability,  the 
freedom  and  order  of  the  other  parts  of  the  mind. 
They  seem  to  revolve  around  it  as  a common  cen- 
tre ; kept  in  their  place  by  its  power,  and  controlled 
by  its  ascendency. 

In  closing  this  sketch  of  the  Outlines  of  the  Mind, 
it  may  be  proper  to  remark,  that  the  doctrines  of  this 
chapter  are  essentially  those  which  are  given  in  the 
Elements  of  Mental  Philosophy,  published  a number 
of  years  since  by  the  author  of  this  treatise.  In 
some  of  the  statements,  almost  as  a matter  of  ne- 
cessity, the  same  expressions  are  employed.  The 
analysis  which  has  been  given  has  necessarily  been 
concise  ; and,  consequently,  makes  no  pretensions 
to  completeness  and  perfection.  For  a more  full 
and  explicit  account  of  the  writer’s  views  of  the 
leading  doctrines  of  Mental  Philosophy,  the  reader 
is  referred  to  the  work  just  mentioned. 


42 


INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER  II. 

CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY. 

§19.  The  Origin  of  many  mental  disorders  to  he 
found  in  the  Connexion  between  the  mind  and  the 
body . 

We  proceed  now  to  another  general  topic,  which 
may  properly  be  embraced  in  this  Introduction.  It 
is  undoubtedly  true,  that,  in  a great  majority  of  cases, 
the  human  mind  conforms  in  its  action  to  the  pre- 
dominant principles  of  its  own  nature.  In  other 
words,  it  acts,  in  all  ordinary  instances,  as  its  Crea- 
tor designed  it  to  act.  But,  unhappily,  this  is  not 
always  the  case.  The  fact  that  there  may  be  dis- 
order or  insanity  of  mind,  implies  that  the  mind 
sometimes  suffers  a disastrous  deviation  from  the^ 
laws  which  commonly  regulate  it.  Undoubtedly, 
the  causes  of  these  deviations  are  very  various,  and 
will  repeatedly  present  themselves  to  our  notice,  and 
receive  more  or  less  of  comment  in  the  course  of 
the  present  work.  In  connexion  with  this  topic, 
however,  viz.,  the  causes  of  disordered  mental  ac- 
tion, we  take  this  opportunity  to  say,  that  the  origin, 
as  we  apprehend,  of  no  small  portion  of  mental  dis- 
order (stating  the  matter  in  the  most  general  terms) 
is  to  be  found  in  the  connexion  existing  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  This  leading  cause  of*  irregu- 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  43 

lar  action,  considered  in  its  most  general  aspect, 
may  properly  be  made  a distinct  subject  of  inquiry. 
It  is  in  its  general  aspect,  and  not  in  its  particulars, 
that  it  has  a place  in  this  Introduction. 

We  do  not  deny,  it  will  be  noticed,  that  there  may 
be,  as  there  undoubtedly  are,  other  causes  of  mental 
irregularity.  We  do  not  agree  with  some  respecta- 
ble writers  in  considering  Insanity  as  being,  in  its 
basis,  exclusively  a physical  disorder.  We  have  no 
hesitancy  in  admitting  the  doctrine  that  there  may 
be  other  causes  of  mental  irregularity,  more  remote 
from  common  observation,  and  more  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  mind’s  interior  nature  and  secret 
impulses.  But  this  view  of  the  subject,  neverthe- 
less, does  not  preclude  a distinct  and  particular  at- 
tention to  a cause  of  mental  disorder  so  obvious, 
and,  by  general  consent,  so  powerful  as  that  which 
we  now  particularly  refer  to.  Whatever  may  be 
true  of  sources  of  disorder  in  the  internal  relations 
of  the  mind,  there  is  no  dispute  that  they  may  be 
abundantly  found  in  its  external  relations.  In  other 
words,  expressing  the  matter  in  few  and  plain  terms, 
it  is  hardly  possible  for  the  body  to  be  disordered, 
without  the  fact  of  physical  disorder  having  an  in- 
fluence on  the  mental  movement. 

Accordingly,  it  will  be  the  object  of  the  remarks 
embraced  in  this  chapter,  and  as  introductory,  in 
some  degree,  to  the  statements  to  be  made  hereaf- 
ter, to  show,  by  some  facts  and  illustrations,  the 
connexion  existing  between  the  body  and  mind,  and 
the  influence  they  reciprocally  exert.  This  topic  is 
one  of  so  much  importance,  that  it  ought  to  be  thor- 


44 


INTRODUCTION. 


oughly  understood.  And  it  seems  a proper  one,  in 
its  general  form  at  least’,  to  occupy  a place  in  these 
introductory  remarks. 

§ 20.  The  Mind  constituted  on  the  Principle  of  a 
Connexion  ivith  the  Body . 

In  endeavouring  to  illustrate  the  subject  of  the 
intimate  connexion  and  the  reciprocal  influence  of 
the  mind  and  body,  we  naturally  remark,  in  the  first 
place,  that  the  mind  is  evidently  constituted  on  the 
principle  of  such  a connexion. — The  human  mind, 
as  we  have  already  had  occasion  distinctly  to  ob- 
serve, exists  in  the  threefold  nature  or  threefold  di- 
vision of  the  Intellect,  Sensibilities,  and  Will.  These 
great  departments  of  the  mind,  although  the  limits 
which  separate  them  are  distinctly  marked,  have, 
nevertheless,  an  intimate  connexion  with  each  other. 
The  action  of  the  will,  for  instance,  depends  upon 
the  antecedent  action  of  the  sensibilities  ; and  that 
of  the  sensitive  nature  is  based  upon  the  antecedent 
action  of  the  intellect ; so  that  the  commencement 
of  action  in  the  other  parts  of  the  mind  seems  to 
depend  upon  the  antecedent  action  in  the  purely  in- 
tellectual part. 

The  inquiry  then  arises,  In  what  way  is  the  Intel- 
lect first  brought  into  action  ? And,  in  answering 
this  inquiry,  we  are  led  to  remark,  that  the  action  ot 
the  intellect  (the  understanding,  as  Mr.  Locke  calls 
it)  is  twofold,  external  and  internal.  Accordingly, 
we  not  unfrequently  employ  the  convenient  phrases, 
External  Intellect  and  Internal  Intellect.  By  the 
phrase  external  intellect,  as  we  have  already  had 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  45 

occasion  to  explain,  we  mean  the  intellect,  as  it  acts 
in  immediate  or  nearly  immediate  connexion  with 
the  external  world.  And  it  is  in  this  department  of 
the  mind  that  we  find  the  beginnings,  the  initiation 
of  all  mental  action.  But  it  is  well  understood  (so 
much  so,  we  suppose,  as  not  to  be  a matter  of  con- 
troversy) that  the  action,  which  takes  place  here, 
takes  place  in  connexion  with  bodily  action.  The 
external  intellect  does  not  act,  nor  is  it  capable  of 
acting,  although  the  mind  is  so  constituted  that  the 
movement  of  all  the  other  parts  depends  upon  move- 
ment here,  without  the  antecedent  affection  of  the 
outward  or  bodily  senses.  Hence  the  remark  at 
the  commencement  of  this  section,  that  the  mind  is 
constituted  on  the  principle  of  a connexion  with  the 
body.  Hence  the  propriety  of  the  remark,  too,  that 
the  action  of  the  mind  cannot  be  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained, neither  its  sane  action  nor  its  insane  ac- 
tion, without  a careful  consideration  of  this  con- 
nexion. 

§ 21.  Illustration  of  the  subject  from  the  effects  of 
old  age . 

The  existence  of  the  connexion  between  the  mind 
and  body,  and  of  their  influence  upon  each  other, 
appears,  in  the  second  place,  from  the  effects  which 
are  witnessed  in  old  age.  The  effects  of  old  age, 
it  is  true,  are  first  experienced  in  the  bodily  system. 
The  outward  senses  become  blunted  and  dim  ; the 
eye,  considered  as  a merely  material  organ,  loses  its 
keenness  of  sight ; the  ear  its  quickness  of  hearing  ; 
the  palate  its  nice  discriminations  of  taste ; and  in 


46 


INTRODUCTION. 


various  other  ways  the  whole  bodily  system  shows 
the  rapid  diminution  of  its  activity  and  power.  But 
it  is  well  known,  since  it  is  a matter  of  every  day’s 
observation,  that  these  effects  are  not  restricted  to 
that  part  of  the  human  system  where  they  first  show 
themselves.  The  mind,  also,  is  unfavourably  affect- 
ed at  the  same  time,  and  through  the  influence  of 
the  same  causes. 

These  results,  it  is  true,  are  not  experienced,  to  a 
great  extent,  in  the  Internal  intellect,  or  that  division 
of  the  intellect  which  operates  in  the  discovery  of 
truth,  independent,  in  a great  measure,  of  the  out- 
ward senses  ; but  they  are  seen  and  felt,  in  a high 
degree,  in  that  department  of  the  mind  which  we 
have  proposed  to  designate,  in  consequence  of  its 
depending  in  its  action  on  the  external  senses,  as 
the  External  Intellect.  This  portion  of  the  mind 
seems  at  once  to  fall  with  the  outward  organization 
and  the  material  instrumentality  upon  which  it  rested. 

§ 22.  The  Connection  of  the  body  and  mind  far- 
ther shoivn  from  the  effects  of  diseases . 

In  addition  to  what  has  been  said,  it  may  be  re- 
marked further,  in  confirmation  of  the  same  general 
views,  that  violent  corporeal  diseases  in  youth  and 
manhood,  before  any  decays  take  place  from  age, 
often  affect  the  powers  of  thought.  Persons  have 
been  known,  for  instance,  after  a violent  fever,  or 
violent  attacks  of  some  other  form  of  disease,  to 
lose  entirely  the  power  of  recollection.  Thucydides, 
in  his  account  of  the  plague  of  Athens,  makes  men- 
tion of  some  persons  who  had  survived  that  disease ; 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  47 

but  their  bodily  sufferings  had  affected  their  mental 
constitutions  so  much,  that  they  had  forgotten  their 
families  and  friends,  and  had  lost  all  knowledge  of 
their  own  former  history. — It  is  a singular  fact,  also, 
that  the  result  of  violent  disease  is  sometimes  quite 
the  reverse  of  what  has  now  been  stated.  While  in 
one  case  the  memory  is  entirely  prostrate,  we  find 
in  others  that,  under  the  influence  of  such  attacks, 
the  memory  is  suddenly  aroused,  and  restores  the 
history  of  the  past  with  a minuteness  and  vividness 
unknown  before.  But  both  classes  of  cases  confirm 
what  we  are  now  attempting  to  show,  viz.,  the  ex 
istence  of  a connexion  between  the  mind  and  body, 
and  a reciprocal  influence  between  them. 

§ 23.  Shown  also  from  the  effects  of  stimulating 
drugs  and  gases. 

If  there  be  not  a close  connexion  between  the 
body  and  mind,  and  if  there  be  not  various  influen- 
ces propagated  from  one  to  the  other,  how  does  it 
happen  that  many  things  of  a stimulating  nature, 
such  as  ardent  spirits  and  opium,  strongly  affect  the 
mind  when  taken  into  the  system  in  considerable 
quantities  1 But,  without  delaying  upon  the  effects 
of  drugs  of  this  description,  which,  unhappily,  can 
hardly  fail  to  be  noticed  every  day,  we  would  in- 
stance particularly  the  results  which  are  found  to 
follow  from  the  internal  use  of  the  nitrous  oxyde  gas. 
This  gas,  when  it  is  received  into  the  system,  oper- 
ates, in  the  first  instance,  on  the  body.  The  effect 
is  a physical  one.  In  particular,  it  quickens  the 
circulation  of  the  blood,  and  also,  as  is  commonly 
R 


48 


INTRODUCTION. 


supposed,  increases  the  volume  of  that  fluid.  But 
its  effects,  which  are  first  felt  in  the  body,  are  after- 
ward experienced  in  the  mind,  and  generally  in  a 
high  degree.  When  it  is  inhaled  in  a considerable 
quantity,  the  sensations  are  more  acute  ; the  con- 
ceptions of  absent  objects  are  more  vivid  ; associa- 
ted trains  of  thought  pass  through  the  mind  with 
increased  rapidity ; and  emotions  and  passions,  gen- 
erally of  a pleasant  kind,  are  excited,  corresponding 

in  strength  to  the  increased  acuteness  of  sensations 
© 

and  the  increased  vividness  of  conceptions. 

There  is  another  gas,  the  febrile  miasma, which 
is  found,  on  being  inhaled,  to  affect  the  mind  also, 
by  first  affecting  the  sanguineous  fluid.  But  this 
gas  diminishes,  instead  of  increasing  the  volume  of 
blood  ; as  is  indicated  by  a small,  contracted  pulse, 
and  an  increasing  constriction  of  the  capillaries.  As 
in  the  case  of  the  nitrous  oxyde  gas,  the  mental  ex- 
ercises are  rendered  intense  and  vivid  by  the  febrile 
miasma ; but  the  emotions  which  are  experienced, 
instead  of  being  pleasant,  are  gloomy  and  painful. 
The  trains  of  thought  which  are  at  such  times  sug- 
gested, and  the  creations  of  the  imagination,  are  all 
of  an  analogous  character,  strange,  spectral,  and 
terrifying.* — We  may  add  as  a general  remark 
here,  that,  whenever  the  physical  condition  of  the 
Drain,  which  is  a prominent  organ  in  the  process  ot 
sensation  and  external  perception,  is  affected,  wheth- 
er it  be  from  a more  than  common  fulness  of  the 
bloodvessels  or  from  some  other  cause,  the  mind 
itself  will  be  found  to  be  affected  also,  and  often- 
times in  a high  degree. 

* See  Hibbert’s  Philosophy  of  Apparitions,  pt.  ii.,  ch.  i. 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  49 


§ 24.  Influence  on  the  Body  of  Excited  Imagination 
and  Passion . 

The  powers  of  the  mind  are  not  only  liable  to  be 
powerfully  affected  by  certain  conditions  of  the  cor- 
poreal system,  but  the  body  also,  on  the  other  hand, 
even  to  the  functions  of  the  vital  principle  itself,  is 
liable  to  corresponding  affections,  superinduced  by 
certain  conditions  of  the  mind.  When  the  passions, 
for  instance,  are  excited,  particularly  that  of  fear, 
the  body  at  once  feels  the  influence;  and  instances 
have  occurred  where,  under  the  influence  of  the  last- 
named  passion,  even  death  itself  has  followed.  In 
the  city  of  New-York,  a few  years  since,  a little 
child  was  left  in  the  evening  in  the  care  of  a maid- 
servant, the  mother  having  gone  out.  As  the  child 
was  disposed  to  be  troublesome  and  to  cry,  after 
being  placed  at  the  usual  time  in  bed  in  another 
room,  the  domestic  resorted  to  the  expedient  of  qui- 
eting it  by  making  and  placing  before  it  the  image 
of  some  frightful  object.  The  fears  of  the  little 
child  were  greatly  excited ; and  when,  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  evening,  the  mother  returned  and  went 
to  the  room,  she  found  it  dead ; its  eyes  being  open 
and  fixed  with  a singularly  wild  and  maniac  kind  of 
stare  on  the  frightful  image,  which  the  girl  had  so 
cruelly  placed  before  it.  In  the  time  of  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  as  the  transaction  was  related  by  an 
officer  who  was  present,  a soldier  who  had  com- 
mitted some  crime  was  condemned  to  be  shot. 
He  was  finally  pardoned,  without  a knowledge  of 
the  pardon  being  communicated  to  him,  since  it  was 


50 


INTRODUCTION 


thought  advisable  that  he  should  be  made  to  suffer 
as  much  as  possible  from  the  fear  of  death.  In  ac- 
cordance with  this  plan,  he  was  led  at  the  appointed 
time  to  the  place  of  execution ; the  bandage  was 
placed  over  his  eyes ; and  the  soldiers  were  drawn 
out,  but  were  privately  ordered  to  fire  over  his  head. 
At  the  discharge  of  their  muskets,  although  nothing 
touched  him,  the  man  fell  dead  on  the  spot. 

“ A criminal  was  once  sentenced  in  England  to  be 
executed,  when  a college  of  physicians  requested  lib- 
erty to  make  him  the  subject  of  an  experiment  con- 
nected with  their  profession.  It  was  granted.  The 
man  was  told  that  his  sentence  was  commuted,  and 
that  he  was  to  be  bled  to  death.  On  the  appointed 
day,  several  physicians  went  to  the  prison,  and  made 
the  requisite  preparations  in  his  presence  ; the  lancet 
was  displayed ; bowls  were  in  readiness  to  receive 
the  blood ; and  the  culprit  was  directed  to  place 
himself  on  his  back,  with  his  arms  extended,  ready 
to  receive  the  fatal  incision.  When  all  this  was 
done,  his  eyes  were  bandaged.  In  the  mean  time, 
a sufficient  quantity  of  lukewarm  water  had  been 
provided  ; his  arm  was  merely  touched  with  the 
lancet,  and  the  water,  poured  slowly  over  it,  was 
made  to  trickle  down  into  the  bowl  below.  One  of 
the  physicians  felt  his  pulse,  and  the  others  frequent- 
ly exchanged  such  remarks  as,  ‘ He  is  nearly  ex- 
hausted ; cannot  hold  out  much  longer  ; grows  very 
pale,’  &c. ; and,  in  a short  time,  the  criminal  actu- 
ally  died,  from  the  force  of  imagination.”* 

* A s the  statement  is  given  in  the  Work  entitled  Popular  Su 
perstitions. 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  51 

§ 25.  Connexion  of  the  Mental  Action  with  the 
Brain. 

From  what  has  been  said,  we  suppose  it  has  been 
made  sufficiently  clear,  that  there  is  a close  and  im- 
portant connexion  existing  between  the  mind  and 
the  body,  and  that  they  are  reciprocally  the  subjects 
of  various  influences  resulting  from  this  connexion. 
In  what  has  been  hitherto  said,  however,  we  have 
considered  the  subject  in  the  most  general  point  of 
view.  In  other  words,  we  have  had  no  other  ob- 
ject than  the  announcement  and  establishment  of  the 
general  fact.  We  have  now  to  add  further,  that  this 
doctrine  is  particularly  true  as  far  as  the  brain  is 
concerned.  Without  admitting  the  doctrine  that 
the  mind  is  identical  with  the  brain,  or  even  that  the 
mind  finds  in  the  brain  a congeries  of  organs  spe- 
cifically suited  to  the  development  of  each  of  its 
separate  faculties,  we  nevertheless  hold  it  to  be 
certain,  not  only  that  there*is  a reciprocal  connexion 
and  influence  between  the  two,  but  that  such  con- 
nexion and  influence  exist  in  a remarkably  high  de- 
gree : so  much  so  that  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  advert  to  it  in  any  attempt  to  explain  the  mental 
action,  especially  disordered  mental  action. 

It  may  be  proper,  therefore,  to  make  some  gen- 
eral statements  in  regard  to  the  brain,  although  we 
are  not  left  at  liberty,  by  our  proposed  course  of  in- 
vestigation, to  enter  minutely  into  that  subject. 

The  brain,  although  it  is  susceptible  of  various 
subordinate  divisions,  such  as  the  cerebrum  and  the 
cerebellum,  may  in  general  terms  be  described  as 


52 


INTRODUCTION. 


that  globular  mass  of  nervous  matter,  which  is  lodged 
in  and  occupies  the  cavity  of  the  cranium  or  scull. 
It  is  of  an  irregular  figure,  exhibiting  on  its  surface 
a great  number  of  projections  and  depressions,  cor 
responding  in  some  cases  to  irregularities  in  the 
scull,  but  which  are  to  be  ascribed  in  part  also  to 
convolutions  and  cavities  in  the  brain  itself.  The 
more  important  divisions  of  the  cerebral  mass  are, 
first,  into  the  cerebrum,  which  occupies  the  whole 
of  the  upper  part  of  the  cranium,  and  the  little  brain 
or  cerebellum,  which  in  size  is  about  one  eighth  or 
ninth  part  of  the  cerebrum,  and  is  situated  under  its 
posterior  lobes ; and,  secondly,  the  longitudinal 
division  into  two  equal  and  symmetrical  halves, 
termed  hemispheres.  The  spinal  cord,  or,  as  it  is 
frequently  termed,  the  spinal  marrow,  is  a cylindrical 
body  of  nervous  matter  proceeding  from  the  lower 
part  of  the  brain,  with  which  it  is  connected  through 
the  medium  of  a medullary  mass,  called  the  medulla 
oblongata.  Like  the  bfain,  it  is  enclosed  in  mein, 
branes,  and  is  of  the  same  substance.  It  extends 
through,  and  occupies,  the  vertebral  canal.  A num- 
ber of  white  cords,  called  nerves,  proceed  from  the 
base  of  the  brain  and  from  the  spinal  marrow  to 
different  parts  of  the  system.  They  are  composed 
of  medullary  matter,  and  are  contained  in  membra- 
neous sheaths.  Some  of  them  communicate  with, 
or,  more  properly,  constitute , at  their  termination,  the 
different  organs  of  sense. 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  53 


§ 26.  Of  the  Brain , considered  as  a part  of  one 
great  Sensorial  Organ . 

The  nerves,  the  spinal  cord,  and  the  brain,  con- 
nected together  as  they  are,  consisting  essentially  of 
the  same  substance,  and  contributing,  each  in  its 
own  way  and  degree,  to  the  same  results,  may  prop- 
erly be  regarded  as  forming  one  great  Sensorial 
Organ.  It  is  by  means  of  the  assistance  furnished 
by  the  sensorial  organ  (under  which  expression  we 
include  also  the  subordinate  organs  of  taste,  smell, 
sight,  touch,  and  hearing)  that  the  mind  is  first 
brought  into  action.  On  this  organ,  the  sensorial , 
as  thus  explained,  an  impression,  originating  from 
the  presence  and  application  of  some  external  body, 
must  be  made,  before  there  can  be  sensation  and 
external  perception.  Without  the  presence  of  some 
external  body,  and  without  the  assistance  furnished 
by  the  sensorial  parts  of  the  system,  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  the  powers  of  the  mind  would  never 
be  effectively  called  into  action.  It  is  here,  in  con- 
nexion with  this  conjunction  of  body  and  mind,  that 
we  discover  the  beginnings  of  mental  movement. 
An  impression,  for  instance,  is  made  on  that  part  of 
the  sensorial  organ  called  the  auditory  nerve,  and  a 
state  of  mind  immediately  succeeds  which  is  vari- 
ously termed,  according  to  the  view  in  which  it  is 
contemplated,  either  the  sensation  or  the  percept,  on 
of  sound.  An  impression  is  made  by  the  rays  of 
light  on  that  expansion  of  the  optic  nerve,  which 
forms  what  is  called  the  retina  of  the  eye,  and  the 
intellectual  principle  is  brought  into  that  new  posi- 


54 


INTRODUCTION. 


tion,  which  is  termed  visual  perception,  or  a percep 
tion  of  sight.  And  the  same  of  other  cases. 

It  will  be  noticed,  that  we  speak  of  the  new  state 
of  mind,  the  sensation  or  external  perception,  as  im- 
mediately consequent  on  the  application  of  the  out- 
ward body  to  the  external  senses.  But  it  is  neces- 
sary to  add,  in  order  to  have  a correct  view  of  the 
case,  that  the  outward  impression  is  rapidly  propa- 
gated to  the  brain  (so  very  rapidly  that  it  may  well 
be  considered  as  a single  act)  before  the  mental 
state  results.  So  that  we  may  properly  regard  the 
brain,  so  far  as  the  mere  corporeal  process  is  con- 
cerned, as  the  ultimate  seat  of  sensation.  It  is  there 
that  the  bodily  impression  is  felt  last.  If  the  in^ 
pression  fails  to  be  felt  in  the  brain,  the  mental  state 
fails  also.  Of  this  there  is  very  easy  and  satisfac- 
tory proof.  If,  for  instance,  the  nerve,  which  con- 
nects the  outward  sense  with  the  brain,  be  divided 
or  be  greatly  compressed,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  com- 
munication between  them,  it  is  well  known  that  the 
mind  will  not  be  affected  by  the  pressure  and  appli- 
cation of  outward  objects  as  it  would  otherwise  be. 
in  other  words,  there  will  be  no  sensation. 

§ 27.  Relation  of  these  Vieivs  to  the  General 
Subject. 

Now  we  may  well  inquire  whether  this  view  ot 
the  connexion  existing  between  the  mind  and  the 
great  sensorial  organ,  particularly  the  brain,  must 
not  necessarily  have  an  intimate  relation  to  the  sub- 
ject of  insanity.  Is  it  possible  that  this  great  and 
important  organ  can,  as  a general  thing,  be  disor- 


CONNEXION  BETWEEN  THE  MIND  AND  BODY.  55 

jered,  or  even  be  disordered  merely  in  some  of  its 
parts,  without  occasioning  some  degree  of  disturb- 
ance in  the  mental  action  1 On  the  contrary,  are 
we  not  to  seek  for  the  origin  of  a considerable  por- 
tion of  mental  disorders  in  the  fact  of  the  disturbed 
and  disordered  state  of  this  part  of  the  physical  sys- 
tem ? 

We  do  not  suppose,  as  we  have  already  had  oc- 
casion to  intimate,  that  the  causes  of  mental  disorder 
are  exclusively  physical.  There  are  intellectual  and 
moral  causes,  as  well  as  those  more  obvious  and, 
perhaps,  more  common  ones,  which  are  located  in 
the  physical  structure.  Let  a man  indulge  in  the 
frequent  exercise  of  the  principle  of  resentment ; let 
the  resentful  principle  grow  stronger  and  stronger, 
as  it  will  not  fail  to  do  by  this  indulgence  ; and  ul- 
timately it  will  exercise  an  authority  inconsistent 
with  the  just  action  of  the  other  parts  of  the  mind  ; 
and  the  person  will  bear  about  him,  superinduced  by 
mental  and  not  by  physical  causes,  the  undoubted 
marks  of  insanity.  At  the  same  time,  we  are  en- 
tirely confident  that  every  system  of  Disordered 
Mental  Action  must  be  very  imperfect  which  does 
not  recognise  distinctly  the  relation  existing  between 
the  sensorial  organ  and  the  mind,  and  the  important 
and  unquestionable  fact  that  the  disordered  condition 
of  the  former  frequently  results  in  a corresponding 
disordered  state  of  the  latter. 


56 


INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTER  III 

GENERAL  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECT 

§ 28.  The  Classification  of  Insane  menial  action 
should  be  predicated  on  that  of  Sound  mental 
action. 

We  wish  to  embrace  one  other  topic,  and  only 
one,  in  this  Introduction.  It  will  be  our  object  in 
the  present  chapter  to  give  a concise  view  of  the 
general  plan  which  we  propose  to  pursue  in  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  subject  before  us.  The  general 
outline  which  has  been  given  of  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Mind,  helps  us  very  much  here.  In  truth,  it 
indicates  very  distinctly  the  course  which  ought  to 
be  taken.  We  have  already  had  occasion  to  re- 
mark, that  the  Philosophy  of  Insanity  (using  the 
term  in  the  broad  sense)  is  parallel  with  that  of  San- 
ity ; and  we  mean  to  intimate  by  this,  not  only  that 
they  occupy  the  same  wide  field,  and  proceed  side 
by  side  in  the  more  general  sense,  but  that  they  are 
parallel  with  each  other,  and  are  mutually  corre- 
spondent in  their  subordinate  divisions. 

In  writing  this  Treatise  on  Insanity,  we  propose, 
therefore,  to  pursue  the  same  course,  to  follow  the 
same  order  of  investigation,  as  if  we  were  endeavour 
ing  to  prepare  a Treatise  on  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Mind.  The  plan,  accordingly,  is  clearly  indicated 


GENERAL  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECT.  57 

m what  has  already  been  said  in  relation  to  the  Out- 
lines of  Mental  Philosophy.  We  feel  the  more 
satisfaction  in  taking  this  course,  because  the  writers 
on  this  subject  seem,  as  a general  thing,  to  have 
failed  more  in  the  matter  of  arrangement  than  they 
have  in  the  detail  of  facts,  or  in  the  philosophical 
reflections  to  which  their  facts  have  given  rise. 
Perhaps,  however,  we  ought  not  to  speak  of  their 
Works  as  a failure,  even  in  this  respect ; if  it  be  true, 
as  it  undoubtedly  is,  in  respect  to  some  of  them, 
that  their  great  and  leading  object  was,  not  to  frame 
a system,  but . merely  to  collect  facts  and  to  ascer- 
tain the  statistics  of  Insanity,  preparatory  to  the  la- 
bours of^thers,  who,  they  anticipated,  would  arise  in 
due  time  to  impress  order  and  philosophic  symmetry 
upon  the  mass  of  valuable  but  chaotic  materials. 
They  laboured  well  in  their  vocation,  and  have  mer- 
ited high  praise.  So  true  is  this,  that  all  which 
seems  to  be  wanting  at  the  present  time  is  to  take 
the  materials,  which  are  furnished  ready  at  hand  in 
great  abundance,  and  arrange  them  according  to  the 
relations  they  sustain  to  the  immutable  principles  of 
Mental  Philosophy. 

§ 29.  Defects  in  early  Classifications  and  Im - 
provements  of  them . 

The  plan  of  this  work  will  perhaps  appear  to  some 
a*  a novel  one,  and  as  wanting,  more  than  ought  to 
be  the  case,  in  the  supports  of  authority.  But,  in 
point  of  fact,  the  plan,  in  its  leading  features,  has  al- 
ready been  sanctioned  to  some  extent  by  some  wri- 
ters of  no  small  name.  In  the  time  of  Mr.  Locke, 


58 


INTRODUCTION. 


and  during  all  antecedent  periods,  so  far  as  we 
know,  it  was  a common  doctrine,  that  insanity  is 
exclusively  predicable  of  the  perceptive  or  intellect- 
ual part  of  man,  and  does  not  exist  in  the  affections. 
In  other  words,  it  consists  in  a lesion  or  injury  of 
the  intellect,  and  not  of  the  heart.  Pinel  (an  hon- 
ourable name  even  among  those  who  have  been 
most  distinguished  as  the  benefactors  of  their  race) 
proposed  the  extension  of  the  doctrine  of  insanity, 
so  as  to  include  the  moral  or  affective  part  of  man’s 
nature  as  well  as  the  intellectual.  The  proposition 
was  regarded  at  first  as  a startling  one.  Nor  does 
Pinel  appear  to  have  understood  distinctly,  and  in  its 
details,  what  may  properly  be  included  uhder  the 
head  of  the  moral  or  affective  faculties.  Neverthe- 
less, he  illustrated  and  confirmed  his  doctrine  in  its 
general  form  by  such  an  array  of  facts,  gathered 
from  his  widely  diversified  experience,  that  it  has 
ever  since  been  accredited  by  the  leading  writers. 
The  sagacity  of  Pinel,  sanctioned  by  the  facts  which 
came  under  his  notice,  led  him  to  conclude  that  the 
doctrine  of  insanity  ought  not  to  be  limited  to  the 
intellect.  We  may  now  go  farther,  and  say  that  it 
ought  not  to  be  limited  to  anything  short  of  the 
length  and  breadth,  and  the  heighth  and  depth  of  the 
whole  mind.  It  is  a source  of  pleasure,  therefore, 
to  notice  that  a recent  German  writer,  Professor 
Heinroth,  has  taken  this  ground.  As  it  has  not 
been  in  our  power  to  gain  access  to  Prof.  Hein- 
roth’s  work,  we  are  indebted  for  what  little  we  know 
of  it  to  the  recently  published  and  very  valuable 
Treatise  of  Dr.  Prichard  on  Insanity.  “ Thedisor 


GENERAL  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECT.  59 

ders  of  the  mind , according  to  this  writer ” (says 
Dr.  Prichard),  “ are  only  limited  in  number  and  in 
kind  by  the  diversities  which  exist  in  the  mental  fac- 
ulties .”  He  gives  us  to  understand  farther,  that 
Prof.  Heinroth  divides  the  mental  operations  into 
three  different  departments,  viz.,  the  Understand 
ing,  the  Feelings  or  Sentiments,  and  the  Will.  Dr. 
Prichard  had  adopted  a somewhat  different  arrange- 
ment before  the  Work  of  Heinroth  came  into  his 
hands  ; nor  did  he  find  sufficient  reason  for  altering 
his  arrangement  in  the  views  which  were  presented 
in  that  work.  But  he  has  the  candour  to  say  ex- 
pressly, that  “ no  systematic  arrangement  of  mental 
disorders  can  be  contrived  more  complete  than  that 
of  Professor  Heinroth.”  And  again,  “ His  scheme 
is  the  most  complete  system  that  can  be  formed ; 
and  I have  laid  the  outline  of  it  before  my  readers, 
as  it  may  tend  to  render  more  distinct  their  concep- 
tion of  the  relations  of  the  different  forms  of  insanity 
to  each  other.”  Dr.  Prichard  gives  a short  account 
of  the  minor  divisions  of  Heinroth’s  classification, 
which  we  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  repeat,  as 
it  furnishes  no  important  suggestion  (although,  if  we 
Mad  the  original  work  before  us,  perhaps  it  would  be 
otherwise)  which  we  shall  deem  it  necessary  to 
adopt  in  what  follows. 

§ 30.  The  Inquiry  naturally  begins  ivith  the  Exter- 
nal Intellect. 

The  first  step  to  be  taken  will  be  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  insanity  or  unsoundness  of  mental  action, 
as  it  exists  intellectually  ; that  is  to  say,  as  it  exists 


60 


INTRODUCTION 


in  the  Intellect  or  Understanding  And  here  we 
are  to  keep  in  view  the  natural  order  of  the  mind’s 
action.  If  we  begin  with  the  intellect,  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  may  begin  with  any  portion  of  it  in- 
discriminately. This  would  evidently  be  inconsis- 
tent with' the  details  at  least  of  philosophic  arrange- 
ment. We  commence,  therefore,  with  the  External 
Intellect,  or  that  portion  which,  in  consequence  of 
its  connexion  with  external  things,  is  first  brought 
into  action.  Accordingly,  it  will  be  our  object,  in 
the  first  place,  to  give  some  account  of  Disordered 
Sensation  and  of  Disordered  External  Perception, 
which  will  open  at  once  a broad  and  interesting  field 
of  inquiry. 

In  this  part  of  the  subject  we  shall  find,  for  the 
most  part,  that  the  disordered  mental  action  has  its 
basis  in  disordered  physical  action,  particularly  in 
an  irregular  or  abnormal  condition  of  the  nervous 
system.  And  here,  perhaps,  more  than  anywhere 
else,  it  will  be  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  the  gener- 
al principles  in  relation  to  the  connexion  between  the 
mind  and  body  which  have  been  brought  forward  in 
the  preceding  chapter. 

In  treating  of  sensation  and  external  perception, 
it  will  be  proper  to  consider  the  senses,  which  are 
the  instruments  of  this  form  of  mental  action,  sep- 
arately from  each  other,  at  least  as  far  as  it  can  con- 
veniently be  done,  and  also  with  reference  to  some 
definite  principle  of  arrangement.  Under  the  head 
of  Disordered  Yisual  Sensations,  the  interesting  sub- 
ject of  Apparitions  will  appropriately  have  a place. 
Furthermore,  there  are  some  states  and  powers  of 


GENERAL  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECT.  61 

the  mind,  which  from  their  nature  may  be  ranked 
either  under  the  head  of  the  external  or  the  internal 
intellect,  being  susceptible  of  existing  as  attributes 
or  manifestations  of  the  mind  in  both  forms.  We 
refer  particularly  to  the  power  which  is  denominated 
abstraction,  and  to  the  state  of  mind  which  some 
writers  have  hesitated  in  describing  as  a distinct 
mental  power,  but  which  is  recognised  under  the 
name  of  Attention.  *We  may  find  it  convenient  to 
give  some  account  of  disordered  action  as  it  is  found 
to  exist  in  connexion  with  these  mental  powers  or 
states  under  this  head. 

§ 31.  Proceeds  from  the  External  to  the  Internal 
Intellect . 

As  we  advance  farther  in  the  investigation  before 
us,  we  shall  find  that  the  intellect  may  be  disorder- 
ed, not  only  in  its  operation  through  the  senses  and 
its  connexion  with  the  external  world,  but  also  in  its 
internal  action.  Original  Suggestion,  Conscious- 
ness, Relative  Suggestion,  Reasoning,  together  with 
the  collateral  and  subordinate  powers  of  Association 
and  Memory,  may  all,  in  various  ways  and  degrees, 
be  disturbed  in  their  operation.  These  will  all  be 
considered  in  their  proper  place  and  order ; and  al- 
though it  will  be  our  object  to  be  as  concise  as  pos- 
sible, many  interesting  facts,  gathered  from  various 
sources,  will  be  presented  to  the  reader’s  notice.  . 

Under  the  preceding  head,  that  of  the  external  in- 
tellect, the  causes  of  disturbed  action,  as  we  have 
already  intimated,  will  be  found  for  the  most  part  in 
the  disordered  state  of  the  physical  system,  particu- 


62 


INTRODUCTION. 


larly  the  sensorial  organ.  Under  the  present  head, 
although  physical  causes  will  not  be  excluded,  there 
will  be  others  more  frequently  occurring,  which  are 
more  strictly  of  an  intellectual  and  moral  nature.  It 
may  be  remarked  here,  however,  in  general  terms, 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  causation  of  insanity,  wheth- 
er external  or  internal,  is  involved  as  yet,  in  many 

respects,  in  no  small  degree  of  obscurity. 

% 

§ 32.  Is  continued  in  the  Sensibilities  and  the  Will . 

From  the  internal  intellect  we  proceed,  in  the  or- 
der which  nature  evidently  points  out,  to  the  Sensi- 
bilities ; beginning  with  the  natural  or  pathematic, 
in  distinction  from  the  moral  sensibilities.  The  first 
great  division  of  the  natural  sensibilities,  as  we  have 
already  had  occasion  to  remark,  is  that  of  the  Emo- 
tions, which  is  followed  by  the  distinct  class  of  men- 
tal states  called  Desires.  Under  the  head  of  De- 
sires we  have  the  distinct  mental  principles  (com- 
plex in  their  nature,  including  both  desires  and 
emotions)  which  are  known  in  treatises  of  Mental 
Philosophy  under  the  distinct  names  of  Appetites, 
Propensities,  and  Affections.  It  is  in  connexion  with 
the  natural  sensibilities,  as  existing  particularly  un- 
der these  last  complex  forms,  that  we  propose  to 
prosecute  this  investigation.  It  is  true  that  emo- 
tions and  desires,  even  in  their  simple  and  un mixed 
form,  are  not  exempt  from  insanity ; but,  so  far  as 
this  is  the  case,  nothing  more  will  apparently  be 
necessary  than  to  remark  upon  the  subject  incident- 
ally. In  their  complex  form — in  other  words,  a/* 
they  appear  under  the  distinct  and  important  modifi- 


GENERAL  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECT.  63 

cations  of  the  Appetites,  Propensities,  and  Affections, 
they  will  deserve  and  receive  a more  particular  no- 
tice. 

This  view  of  the  subject  will  naturally  be  follow- 
ed by  some  statement  of  mental  derangement,  as  it 
is  connected  with  the  Moral  Sensibilities.  And  the 
whole  subject  will  be  closed  by  a concise  view  of 
the  insanity  of  the  Will. 

§ 33.  Of  popular  adaptation , combined  with  philo- 
sophical precision . 

A view  of  Insanity,  conducted  in  the  manner 
which  has  now  been  proposed,  would  seem  to  pre- 
sent some  claims  to  be  considered  a philosophical 
view ; which  would  not  be  the  case  if  the  inquiry 
were  conducted  without  a regard  to  fixed  principles, 
having  their  foundation  in  nature.  Such  is  our  plan ; 
and  this  plan  we  affirm  to  be  truly  a philosophical 
one.  At  the  same  time,  we  wish  to  combine  with 
a scientific  form  so  much  of  personal  and  practical 
illustration,  and  that,  too,  presented  in  such  simplicity 
of  style,  as  shall  render  the  work  accessible  and  in- 
teresting to  the  common  reader.  It  is  generally 
conceded  to  be  a fact,  that  instances  of  insanity  are 
multiplying.  Certain  it  is  that  they  are  frequent,  if 
they  are  not  actually  increasing  in  number.  Many 
are  the  families  whose  happiness  is  interrupted  by 
the  inroads  of  mental  disorder;  and  no  individual, 
whatever  may  be  his  present  soundness  of  mind,  is 
at  liberty  to  consider  himself  as  permanently  exempt 
from  its  accessions. 

It  is  desirable,  therefore,  that  a treatise  on  this 
F 


64 


INTRODUCTION. 


subject,  while  it  takes  a philosophical  view,  should, 
at  the  same  time,  be  adapted  to  popular  apprehen- 
sion. The  public  should  have  the  means  of  know- 
ing something  of  the  nature  of  these  dreaded  attacks, 
either  that  they  may  guard  against  their  occurrence, 
or  rightly  estimate  them  when  they  have  come.  Fur- 
thermore, the  philosophy  of  insanity,  using  the  term 
in  a general  sense,  is,  in  fact,  a portion,  “ part  and 
parcel,”  of  the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind ; al- 
though, with  scarcely  an  exception,  it  has  been  ex- 
cluded from  the  leading  works  on  Mental  Philoso- 
phy. And  as  such,  saying  nothing  of  other  consid- 
erations, it  ought  to  have  a place  in  every  system  of 
general  and  popular  instruction  ; and,  consequently, 
ought  to  be  adapted,  so  far  as  can  be  done  consist- 
ently with  philosophical  precision  and  truth,  to  this 
important  object. 


IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED 


MENTAL  ACTION. 

DIVISION  FIRST. 

©IS  93,  VE  RED  ACTION  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 
* ART  I. 

DERANGEMENT  OF  THE  EXTE^isaL  INTELLECT. 


DISORDERED  ACTION 


OF  THE 

EXTERNAL  INTELLECT 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATURE  OF  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

§ 34.  Remarks  on  the  Nature  of  Sensation. 

In  accordance  with  the  plan  which  has  been  laid 
down,  we  proceed  to  prosecute  our  inquiries,  in  the 
first  place,  in  connexion  with  the  external  intellect, 
or  that  portion  of  the  intellect  which  is  brought  into 
action  in  more  immediate  and  intimate  proximity 
with  external  objects.  And  under  this  general 
head,  the  first  form  of  intellectual  action  which  pre- 
sents itself  to  our  notice  is  that  of  Sensation.  Per- 
haps it  may  be  proper  to  remark  here,  that  the  term 
sensation  has  a twofold  application.  We  some- 
times use  it  as  expressive  of  a mental  power,  and 
sometimes  as  expressive  merely  of  the  result  of  the 
power ; in  other  words,  of  the  mental  state  or  act. 
The  condition,  under  which  this  state  or  act  exists, 
and  by  which  chiefly  it  is  known,  is  the  presence  of 


68  NATURE  OF  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

some  externa]  object,  operating  upon  some  organ  of 
sense.  In  other  words,  a sensation  is  a simple  state 
of  mind,  immediately  successive  to  a change  in  some 
organ  of  sense,  or  at  least  to  a bodily  change  of  some 
kind,  which  is  caused  by  the  presence  of  some  ex- 
ternal body. 

Accordingly,  while  we  speak  of  the  sensations  of 
heat  and  cold,  of  hardness  and  softness,  and  the  like, 
we  do  not  ordinarily  apply  this  term  to  joy  and  sor- 
row, hatred  and  love,  and  other  emotions  and  pas- 
sions, which,  although  they  are  states  of  the  mind, 
either  simple  or  complex,  originate,  nevertheless, 
under  different  circumstances. 

§ 35.  t fill  Sensation  is  properly  and  truly  in  the 
Mind. 

In  order  to  understand  more  fully  the  nature  of 
sensation,  we  may  properly  advert  a moment  to  the 
common  opinion,  that  sensation  has  its  true  position 
in  the  body,  and  actually  takes  place  there,  particu- 
larly in  the  organs  of  sense.  The  sensation  of 
touch,  as  people  seem  to  imagine,  is  in  the  hand, 
which  is  especially  regarded  as  the  organ  of  touch, 
and  is  not  truly  internal ; the  smell  is  in  the  nostrils, 
and  the  hearing  in  the  ear,  and  the  vision  in  the  eye, 
and  not  in  the  soul.  But' it  will  at  once  occur  that 
the  outward  organs  of  smell,  hearing,  and  vision  are 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  mere  forms  and  modifi- 
cations of  matter.  And  that  matter,  from  its  very 
nature,  is  not  and  cannot  be  susceptible  of  percep- 
tion and  feeling.  It  would  be  inconsistent  with  all 
our  notions  of  materiality  to  consider  thought  and 


NATURE  OF  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION.  69 

feeling  as  attributes  of  it.  All  we  can  say  with  truth 
and  on  good  grounds  is,  that  the  organs  of  sense  are 
accessory  to  sensation  and  necessary  to  it,  but  the 
sensation  or  feeling  itself  is  wholly  in  the  mind. 

“ A man”  (says  Dr.  Reid)  “ cannot  see  the  sat- 
ellites of  Jupiter  but  by  a telescope.  Does  he  con- 
clude from  this  that  it  is  the  telescope  that  sees  those 
stars  1 By  no  means  ; such  a conclusion  would  be 
absurd.  It  is  no  less  absurd  to  conclude  that  it  is 
the  eye  that  sees,  or  the  ear  that  hears.  The  tele- 
scope is  an  artificial  organ  of  sight,  but  it  sees  not. 
The  eye  is  a natural  organ  of  sight,  by  which  we 
see,  but  the  natural  organ  sees  as  little  as  the  arti- 
ficial.” 

But  we  presume  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  much 
at  length  into  the  consideration  of  this  topic.  We 
readily  admit  the  general  connexion  existing  between 
the  body  and  the  mind,  and  the  still  more  intimate 
and  important  connexion  existing  between  the  mind 
and  the  sensorial  organ  ; but  we  should  carefully 
guard  against  the  admission  of  views  which  seem  to 
imply,  what  is  a very  differing  thing,  the  sameness 
or  identity  of  the  mind  with  any  mere  material  modi- 
fication. 

§ 36.  Of  the  Actual  Process  in  cases  of  Sensation. 

But  while  we  admit  the  existence  of  an  intimate 
connexion  between  the  action  of  the  mind  and  the 
antecedent  action  of  some  physical  organ  in  all  cases 
of  sensation,  we  do  not  deny  that  there  is,  in  some 
respects,  a degree  of  obscurity  attending  it.  Per 
haps  all  w*e  can  say  with  safety  in  the  matter  is  this. 


70  NATURE  ©F  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

Some  object  capable  of  affecting  the  outward  organ 
must  first  be  applied  to  it  in  some  way,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  a modification  or  affection  of  the 
organ  actually  takes  place.  Subsequently  to  the 
change  in  the  organ,  either  at  its  extremity  and  out- 
ward development,  or  in  the  brain,  with  which  it  is 
connected,  and  of  which  it  may  be  considered  as 
making  a part,  a change  in  the  mind,  or  a new  state 
of  the  mind,  immediately  takes  place,  fn  the  state- 
ment so  far  we  are  sustained  by  acknowledged  facts. 

But  when  we  inquire  how  it  is,  or  why  it  is,  that 
a new  state  of  a material  organ  causes  a new  state 
of  the  mind  ; or,  in  other  words,  that  an  affection  of 
the  mind  naturally  and  necessarily  follows  an  affec- 
tion of  some  part  of  the  body,  we  touch  upon  one  of 
those  ultimate  limits  of  intellectual  action  which  seem 
to  reject  any  farther  analysis.  All  we  know,  and 
all  we  can  . state  with  confidence,  is  the  simple  fact 
that  a mental  affection  is  immediately  subsequent  to 
an  affection  or  change,  which  is  physical.  It  is  in 
this  way  that  we  find  ourselves  constituted.  Such 
is  the  appointment  of  the  Being  who  has  made  us. 

§ 37.  Of  the  Meaning  and  Nature  of  Perception . 

As  intimately  connected  with  the  subject  of  Sen- 
sation, we  now  proceed  to  that  of  Perception.  Sen- 
sation and  Perception  (we  speak  now,  it  will  be  no- 
ticed, of  external,  and  not  of  internal  perception)  have 
much  in  common  with  each  other. — Perception, 
using  the  term  in  its  application  to  outward  objects, 
differs  from  sensation  as  a whole  does  from  a part. 
It  embraces  more.  It  may  be  defined,  therefore,  ar. 


NATURE  OF  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION.  71 

affection  or  state  of  the  mi  nd  which  is  immediately 
successive  to  an  affection  of  some  organ  of  sense, 
and  which  is  referred  by  us  to  something  external  as 
its  cause. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  the  term  sensation, 
when  applied  to  the  mind,  expresses  merely  the  state 
of  the  mind  without  reference  to  anything  external, 
which  might  be  the  cause  of  it,  and  that  it  is  the 
name  of  a truly  simple  feeling.  Perception,  on  the 
contrary,  is  the  name  of  a complex  mental  state,  in- 
cluding not  merely  the  internal  affection  of  the  mind, 
but  also  a reference  to  the  exterior  cause.  Sensa- 
tion is  wholly  within  ; but  Perception  carries  us,  as 
it  were,  out  of  ourselves,  and  makes  us  acquainted 
with  the  world  around  us.  If  we  had  but  sensation 
alone,  there  would  still  be  form,  and  fragrance,. and 
colour,  and  harmony  of  sound,  but  it  would  all  seem 
to  be  wholly  internal.  Perception,  availing  itself  of 
the  facts  of  sensation,  connects  with  them  the  ideas 
of  causality  and  externality,  and  thus  reveals  to  us 
the  visible  and  tangible  realities  of  the  outward  world. 

§ 38.  Of  the  Connexion  between  Sensation  and 
Perception . 

The  mental  powers,  Sensation  and  Perception, 
are  considered  together  in  the  present  chapter,  be- 
cause they  are  closely  connected,  and,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  connexion,  throw  light  upon  each 
other.  Perception  is  the  natural  result  of  Sensation. 
It  is  that  to  which  sensation  tends,  and  without 
which,  as  its  natural  result,  sensation  would  be  al- 
most of  no  value.  Although  susceptible  of  being 


72  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

philosophically  distinguished,  they  are  yet  so  closely 
implicated  with  each  other  that  they  are,  in  a great 
degree,  practically  one. 

It  is  particularly  necessary  to  consider  them  to- 
gether in  the  examination  of  the  subject  of  Insanity. 
It  is  true  that  we  may  philosophically  make  a dis- 
tinction in  the  aspects  of  the  mental  disorder  which 
are  presented  in  the  two  cases.  And  yet  they  are 
so  closely  connected,  that  the  examination  of  them 
entirely  apart  from  each  other  would  lead  to  embar- 
rassment. The  insanity  of  external  perception  in- 
volves and  substantiates  that  of  sensation.  The 
one  does  not  exist  without  the  other ; and  the  former 
is  the  developement  and  indicator  of  the  latter.  These 
remarks  are  to  be  kept  in  view  in  connexion  with 
the  observations  which  are  to  follow. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION, 
(i.)  THE  SENSES  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE. 

§ 39.  Circumstances  attending  Disordered  Sensa- 
tions. 

Having  remarked,  so  far  as  seemed  to  be  neces- 
sary, on  the  general  nature  of  Sensation  and  Exter 
nal  Perception,  we  are  now  prepared  to  say  farther, 
ir  die  first  place,  that  sensation,  even  when  consid- 


(l.)  THE  SENSES  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE.  73 

ered  as  distinct  from  perception,  is  susceptible  of  a 
disordered  or  alienated  action.  In  the  verification 
of  this  statement  two  views  are  to  be  taken.  First. 
It  is  evidently  a law  of  our  nature,  that  the  inward 
sensation,  whenever  it  exists,  shall  correspond  to  the 
condition  of  the  outward  or  bodily  organ.  Conse- 
quently, a disordered  or  irregular  movement  of  the 
organ  necessarily  communicates  itself  to  the  inward 
or  mental  state.  Perhaps  our  meaning  may  not  be 
exactly  apprehended  here.  What  we  mean  to  as- 
sert is  simply  this,  viz.,  that  the  sensation,  in  conse- 
quence of  receiving  its  character  from  the  diseased 
organ,  is  not  such  a sensation  as  would  have  existed 
in  a different  state  of  the  organ.  The  product  of  the 
action  of  a sound  organ,  provided  there  is  no  irregu- 
lar or  abnormal  affection  of  the  mind  itself,  is  a sen- 
sation of  a well-defined  and  specific  character.  Such 
a sensation  is  a sound  or  normal  one.  On  the  other 
hand,  one  that  exists  under  the  opposite  circumstan- 
ces, is  an  unsound  or  abnormal  one.  This,  if  we 
rightly  understand  the  matter,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  result  of  the  natural  and  perma  ient  relation  be- 
tween the  organ  and  the  mental  state. 

Second.  A view  directly  the  opposite  of  this 
may  be  taken,  in  explanation  of  the  same  result 
That  is  to  say,  if  the  organ  of  sense  is  sound,  but 
the  mind  is  in  a disordered  state,  the  sensation  may 
be  unsound  or  abnormal  for  this  reason  also,  viz.,  of 
unsoundness  of  mind.  The  mind,  being  disordered 
in  itself,  is  not  in  a situation  to  receive  the  natural 
or  true  impression,  which  the  action  of  the  organ 
would  otherwise  give.  It  may  be  either  so  depress 


74  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

ed  in  its  power  of  action  as  not  to  be  deeply  enough 
affected,  or  it  may  be  so  highly  susceptible  as  to  re- 
ceive a wrong  impression  in  the  other  direction.  It 
may  be  too  vivid  or  too  weak,  or  fail,  in  some  other 
respects,  in  the  natural  and  precise  correspondence 
to  the  outward  affection.  We  make  these  general 
statements  here,  and  leave  it  to  the  reader  himself  to 
make  an  application  of  them,  in  connexion  with  the 
facts  to  be  adduced  hereafter. 

§ 40.  Disordered  Perceptions  consequent  on  Disor- 
dered Sensations. 

Perception,  as  we  have  already  had  occasion  to 
intimate,  is  something  additional  to  sensation,  and 
inclusive  of  it.  Accordingly,  the  perception  will  be 
as  the  sensation  is.  If  the  sensation  be  actually 
disordered,  it  will  be  found  to  be  the  case  that  the 
perception  will  partake  of  the  disorder,  and  will  be 
unreal,  visionary,  and  deceptive.  Perception  always 
has  reference  to  some  outward  cause  ; we  mean 
here  outward,  even  in  reference  to  the  organ  of 
sense.  And  when  the  perceptive  power  is  not  dis- 
ordered, we  perceive  things,  to  the  limits  of  that 
power,  just  as  they  are.  But  it  will  be  recollected 
that  sensation  is  an  intermediate  step,  preparative  to 
the  result  of  perception.  Consequently,  if  the  sen- 
sation is  disordered,  the  relation  existing  between 
the  subsequent  perception  and  the  outward  cause  of 
perception  is  disturbed.  And,  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  perception  cannot  be  expected  to  corre- 
spond, and  will  not,  in  fact,  correspond  to  the  realjty 
and  truth  of  things.  It  becomes,  what  has  just  been 


asserted,  unreal  and  visio  In  other  words,  it 

imposes  upon  our  belief,  b;  ting,  with  such  dis- 
tinctness as  to  secure  our  the  existence  and 


(I.)  THE  SENSES  OF 


ell  and  taste.  75 


presence  of  objects  which  are  noP^igsent,  and  often 
not  real.  It  surrounds  us  with  a world  of  mere  illu- 
sions. . 

In  accordance  with  these  views,  we  find  it  to  be 
the  case  that  there  are  various  kinds  of  diseased  or 
disordered  sensations  and  perceptions,  correspond- 
ing to  the  particular  outward  organ  of  sense,  what- 
ever it  is,  which  happens  to  be  disordered.  These 
sensations  and  perceptions  (for  they  are  so  close  y 
connected  that  it  is  not  only  difficult,  but,  for  nearly 
all  practical  purposes,  quite  unnecessary  to  separate 
them)  we  propose  now  to  examine.  And,  in  doing 
this,  we  shall  find  it  not  only  the  most  satisfactory, 
but  the  most  convenient  method,  to  pursue  the  in- 
quiry in  connexion  with  each  of  the  organs  of  sense 
separately.  Accordingly,  as  it  is  practically  of  but 
little  consequence  with  which  of  the  organs  we  be- 
gin, we  shall  commence  our  remarks  with  those 
which,  from  their  results  or  some  other  cause,  are 
generally  considered  the  lowest  in  importance  and 
rank,  and  proceed  to  those  which,  in  their  connex- 
ion with  the  operations  of  the  mind  at  least,  appear 
to  be  more  important. 

§ 41.  Of  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions , 
connected  with  the  Organ  of  Smell. 

In  accordance  with  the  suggestion  which  has  just 
been  made,  we  may  properly  begin  with  the  Sense 
of  Smell.  The  medium  through  which  we  have  the 


76  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

sensations  and  perceptions  of  smell,  is  the  organ 
which  is  termed  the  olfactory  nerve,  situated  princi- 
pally in  the  nostrils,  but  partly  in  some  continuous 
cavities.  When  any  odoriferous  particles,  sent  from 
external  objects,  affect  this  organ,  there  are  certain 
states  of  mind  produced  which  vary  with  the  nature 
of  the  odoriferous  bodies.  The  facts  of  the  existence 
and  of  the  nature  of  these  states  of  mind  are  made 
known  by  our  consciousness.  And  as  the  intima- 
tions and  the  leading  facts  of  Consciousness  are  un- 
questionably common  to  all  persons,  we  take  it  for 
granted  that  no  one  is  ignorant  either  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  sensations  and  perceptions  of  smell,  or 
of  their  general  nature. 

Among  other  things,  it  is  well  known  that,  in  a 
sane  or  sound  mind,  acting  in  connexion  with  a 
sound  state  of  the  outward  organ,  the  perceptions  of 
smell,  and  the  sensations  which,  as  their  antecedents, 
are  involved  in  them,  always  have  a definite  and 
well-known  character ; and  which,  in  accordance 
with  this  character,  we  properly  describe  as  sane  or 
sound  sensations  and  perceptions.  But  if  either  the 
mind,  considered  in  itself,  be  disordered,  or  if  such 
be  the  case  with  the  outward  organ,  in  connexion 
with  which  the  mind  acts,  the  sensations  and  per- 
ceptions, under  such  circumstances,  will  be  found  to 
vary,  in  a greater  or  less  degree,  from  the  standard 
of  soundness.  In  other  words,  they  will  have  the 
character  of  disorder,  unsoundness,  or  alienation. 
That  such  unsound  sensations  and  perceptions,  con- 
nected in  their  origin  with  the  sense  of  smell,  some- 
times exist,  is  sufficiently  verified  by  facts. 


(I.)  THE  SENSES  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE.  77 

Some  of  these  facts  we  shall  now  proceed  to 
mention,  although  it  may  not  be  proper  to  delay, 
since  there  are  other  views  of  mental  disorder  of 
greater  importance,  in  order  to  bring  forward  instan- 
ces and  illustrations  at  great  length. 

§ 42.  Statements  Illustrative  of  the  Preceding 
' Section . 

There  is  a remark  in  the  valuable  Treatise  on 
Mental  Derangement  of  Dr.  Andrew  Combe,  which, 
not  improbably,  his  own  personal  observations  had 
verified  to  this  effect,  that  “ the  senses  of  taste, 
hearing,  sight,  and  smell  may  be  perverted  ; and 
then  odours  are  felt  and  tastes  perceived  which  no 
healthy  organs  can  recognise.”*  Speaking  of  in- 
sane persons,  Dr.  Neville  remarks,  “ Some  are  tor- 
mented wherever  they  go  by  bad  smells,  and  may 
be  seen  compressing  their  nostrils  in  order  to  escape 
the  annoyance  from  which  they  suffer.”!  Buffon, 
in  his  Natural  History  of  Man,  has  given  an  account 
of  a priest  of  Guyenne,  by  the  name  of  Blanchet, 
who  had  experienced  a violent  attack  of  insanity, 
and  who  himself,  after  his  recovery,  made  a state- 
ment in  writing  of  the  peculiar  sensations  he  had 
during  the  continuance  of  his  disorder.  Blanchet 
states,  in  general  terms,  that  his  senses  became  so 
exceedingly  quick  and  delicate  as  to  subject  him  al- 
ternately to  exquisite  pleasure  or  the  greatest  suf- 
fering. The  sense  of  smell,  as  well  as  the  other 
senses,  was  disordered.  He  says  expressly  u I 

* Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  Boston,  ed.,  p.  216. 

t Neville’s  Insanity,  London  ed.,  p.  24. 


78  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

seemed  at  times  to  perceive  odours  and  delicious 
perfumes,  whose  exquisite  savours  neither  nature 
nor  the  art  of  the  chymist  could  equal.  At  other 
times,  insupportable  odours,  nauseous  and  bitter 
tastes  drove  me  almost  to  desperation.  Even  the 
sense  of  touch  was  affected  with  these  extremes  of 
pleasure  and  pain.” 

The  celebrated  Esquirol  mentions  the  case  of  a 
young  female  under  his  care  in  the  Hospital  La  Sal- 
petriere,  whose  sense  of  smell  was  disordered.  She 
would  frequently  request  the  removal  of  the  cause  of 
some  disagreeable  odour.  At  other  times  she  spoke 
of  enjoying  the  most  fragrant  perfumes,  although  in 
neither  case  was  there  any  odoriferous  body  near. 
“ It  is  a circumstance  worthy  of  remark”  (says  Dr. 
Adams,  who  has  referred  to  this  individual  in  a re- 
cent valuable  article  on  Psycho-Physiology),  “ that 
she  had  lost  the  sense  of  smell  so  as  to  be  insensi- 
ble of  the  presence  of  natural  odours,  while  the  dis- 
ordered state  of  her  brain  was  giving  her  the  most 
vivid  impressions  of  odours  when  none  were  present 
to  impress  the  organ  of  smell.”* 

Dr.  Burrows  mentions  the  case  of  a sea-captain, 
who,  in  consequence  of  being  wrecked,  was  com- 
pelled to  suffer  the  extremities  of  famine.  “ The  lat- 
ter part  of  the  time,  when  his  health  was  almost  de- 
stroyed by  privation  and  long  suffering,  a thousand 
strange  images  affected  his  mind  ; every  particular 
sense  was  perverted,  and  produced  erroneous  im- 
pressions ; flagrant  perfumes  had  a fetid  odour, 
and  all  objects  appeared  of  a greenish  or  yellow 

* American  Biblical  Repository,  No.  xxxiv. 


OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE.  79 


(l.)  THE  SENSES 

hue.”*  Dr.  Conolly  mentions  the  case  of  a wom- 
an who  experienced  simultaneous  illusions  of  sight, 
smell,  and  hearing.  “ All  kinds  of  animals  seemed 
to  be  scampering  before  her ; the  smell  of  brim- 
stone, and  the  continual  sound  of  singing  voices, 
conspired  to  trouble  her.J?'f 

Here,  then,  are  cases,  as  we  understand  the  sub- 
ject, of  really  disordered  mental  action  ; very  trifling 
ones,  perhaps,  in  themselves  considered,  but  still  ac- 
tually existing.  The  mind  does  not,  in  these  cases, 
coriespond  to  the  intentions  and  the  undisturbed 
tendencies  of  its  own  nature  ; it  is  impelled  by  a 
wrong  bias  ; and,  under  this  unnatural  impulsive  in- 
fluence, is  the  subject  of  an  operation  which,  to  say 
^the  least,  is  not  a sound  one. 

§ 43.  Of  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions 
connected  with  the  Sense  of  Taste . 

The  mental  action  which  takes  place  in  connex- 
ion with  the  organ  of  Taste  next  proposes  itself  for 
consideration.  It  is  the  tongue,  covered  with  its 
numerous  papillae,  which  essentially  forms  this  or- 
gan, although  the  papillae  are  found  scattered  in  oth- 
er parts  of  the  cavity  of  the  mouth.  The  applica- 
tion of  any  sapid  body  to  this  organ  immediately 
causes  in  the  organ  itself  a change,  an  alteration,  or 
an  affection  ; and  this  is  at  once  followed  by  a men- 
tal affection  or  a new  state  of  the  mind.  In  this 
way  we  have  the  sensations  and  perceptions,  to 
which  we  give  the  various  names  sweet,  bitter,  sour* 
acrid,  &c. 

* Burrows’s  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  p.  320. 

I Conolly’s  Indications  of  Insanity,  p.  114. 

G 


80  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

The  sensations  and  perceptions  of  Taste,  as  well 
as  those  of  Smell,  may  be  disordered. 

First.  If,  in  consequence  of  actual  bodily  dis- 
ease, an  organ  of  sense  is  brought,  without  the  pres- 
ence of  an  outward  object,  into  that  particular  state 
into  which  it  is  ordinarily  brought  by  the  application 
of  Its  appropriate  external  object,  the  same  sensa- 
tion, attended  also  with  its  resulting  perception,  will 
arise  in  the  mind  in  the  former  case  as  in  the  latter. 
In  other  words,  the  person  will  seem  actually  to 
smell,  or  taste,  or  hear,  as  much  so  as  if  some  ob- 
ject of  smell,  taste,  or  hearing  were  actually  present. 
The  sensation  will  be  so  well  defined,  and  the  per- 
ception, of  which  it  is  the  basis,  so  distinct,  that  the 
belief  will  be  controlled  ; and  he  will  have  no  doubl 
of  the  real  existence  and  presence  of  odoriferous, 
sapid,  and  other  external  objects,  corresponding  to 
the  inward  sensations  and  perceptions,  unless  he  is 
aware  of  the  peculiar  state  of  the  outward  organ, 
and  is  in  that  way  kept  from  error. 

Second.  If  the  disordered  action  which  we  have 
supposed  to  exist  in  the  outward  organ,  or  external 
sensorial  developement,  should  be  found  to  exist  ex- 
clusively in  that  part  of  the  great  sensorial  organ 
which  we  denominate  the  Brain,  the  effect  upon  the 
mind  will  be  the  same.  That  is  to  say,  the  person 
will  have  the  sensation  or  perception  precisely  as  if 
the  object  were  present.  The  case  of  the  woman 
in  the  Hospital  La  Salpetriere,  mentioned  in  the  pre- 
ceding section,  is  an  instance  in  point.  It  appears 
that,  while  the  outward  organ  of  smell  had  so  lost 
its  power  as  to  render  her  insensible  of  the  presence 


(l.)  THE  SENSES  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE.  81 

of  natural  odours,  and  also  when  no  odoriferous 
bodies  were  present  to  impress  the  organ,  if  it  had 
been  susceptible  of  impressions,  there  were,  never- 
theless, distinct  and  very  vivid  impressions  of  odours, 
which  may  probably  be  ascribed,  as  is  suggested  by 
Dr.  Adams,  to  a disordered  action  existing  exclu- 
sively in  the  brain. 

Third.  Furthermore,  it  will  be  kept  in  recollec- 
tion, that  there  is  not  only  an  action  of  the  body  upon 
the  mind,  but  also  of  the  mind  upon  the  body.  The 
influence  in  the  two  cases  may  properly  be  regarded 
as  reciprocal,  though  not,  perhaps,  in  an  equal  de- 
gree. Hence  it  is  possible  (and,  in  some  instan- 
ces, is  undoubtedly  the  fact)  that  a very  excited  and 
unnatural  state  of  the  mind  may,  unaided  by  the 
presence  of  an  outward  body,  produce  in  some  part 
of  the  sensorial  organ  the  precise  state  or  affection 
which  the  presence  of  such  a body  would  produce. 
And  the  natural  consequence  of  this  state  of  things 
will  be  a reaction  upon  the  mind  itself,  and  the  pro- 
duction of  false  sensations  and  perceptions  ; that  is, 
of  sensations  and  perceptions  without  anything  ex- 
ternal corresponding  to  them. 

The  conceptive  power,  for  instance,  sometimes 
becomes  unnaturally  excited  ; so  much  so  as  to 
control  our  belief.  In  other  words,  we  may  have 
such  distinct  conceptions  of  smells,  tastes,  sounds, 
and  the  like,  that  we  cannot  help  fully  believing  in 
their  actual  existence  and  presence,  and  that  we  are 
truly  the  subjects  of  them.  At  such  a time,  certain 
ly,  the  mind  will  be  likely  to  have  an  influence  on 
the  outward  organ,  and  to  bring  it  into  a position 


82  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

precisely  corresponding  to  the  internal  vivid  concep 
tion. 

These  explanatory  views,  although  they  are  intro 
duced  in  connexion  with  the  sense  of  taste,  are  ap 
plicable  to  the  disordered  action  of  all  the  senses. 

§ 44.  Illustrations  of  the  foregoing  Views  in  con 
nexion  with  Disordered  Taste . 

To  apply  these  views  to  the  sense  of  Taste.  It 
is  well  known  that  insane  persons  not  unfrequently 
ascribe  some  peculiarity  of  taste  to  objects  which 
does  not  belong  to  them,  and  which  they  would  not 
ascribe  to  them  if  the  sensorial  organ  in  all  its  parts, 
and  the  mind  also,  were  in  a perfectly  sound  state. 
The  priest  of  Guyenne,  mentioned  in  a former  sec- 
tion, gives  us  to  understand,  that  in  his  case  the 
sense  of  taste,  as  well  as  the  other  senses,  had  its 
vicissitudes  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Sometimes  the 
savours  were  exquisite,  exceeding  the  capabilities  ot 
nature  and  art.  Sometimes  nauseous  and  bitter 
tastes  drove  him  almost  to  desperation.  In  the 
statement  of  Dr.  Combe,  introduced  in  the  section 
illustrative  of  disordered  smells,  we  are  informed,  in 
general  terms,  that  the  sense  of  taste,  as  well  as 
the  senses  of  smell,  hearing,  and  sight,  may  be  per- 
verted ; and  that  then  tastes  may  be  perceived  which 
no  healthy  organs  can  recognise. 

Dr.  Neville,  in  some  remarks  upon  insane  per- 
sons, makes  the  following  statement,  which  involves 
some  facts  illustrative  of  the  subject  under  consider- 
ation. “ The  feeling  by  which  we  are  admonished 
of  the  necessity  of  taking  meat  and  drink,  is  very 


(l.)  THE  SENSES  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE.  83 

commonly  either  blunted  or  very  much  exalted. 
Many  insane  persons  never  show  the  slightest  signs 
of  feeling  either  hunger  or  thirst.  They  voluntarily 
pass  days  without  food,  and  would  sometimes  per- 
ish of  inanition,  were  they  not  compelled  to  feed  ; 
others,  on  the  contrary,  seem  insatiable  in  their  ap- 
petites ; and  their  whole  minds  are,  apparently,  con- 
centrated on  the  pleasures  of  the  table.”*  Dr. 
Good  mentions  the  case  of  a young  woman  who 
was  wholly  destitute,  or  nearly  so,  of  the  power  of 
discriminating  either  the  smell  or  taste  of  objects. 
In  this  instance,  as  in  most  others,  it  is  probable  that 
the  disorder  existed  primarily  (although  it  is  possible 
it  might  have  been  internal  and  mental)  in  the  out- 
ward organ,  and  thence  communicated  itself  to  the 
internal  sensations  and  perceptions.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  true  cause,  the  resulting  states  of 
mind  could  not  be  regarded  otherwise  than  as  re- 
ally disordered.  * 

Instances  similar  in  their  results  to  those  which 
have  been  mentioned  might  be  multiplied  from  the 
writings  of  individuals  who  have  had  charge  of  in- 
stitutions for  the  insane,  or  have  enjoyed  other  fa- 
vourable opportunities  of  judging.  The  general 
principles  which  have  been  laid  down,  and  the  facts 
which  have  been  mentioned,  will  probably  enable 
the  intelligent  reader  to  understand  the  subject,  so 
far  as  it  is  connected  with  the  lower  senses  of  smell 
and  taste,  without  going  farther  into  particulars. 

* Neville’s  Insanity,  p.  27 


84  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION, 
(ll.)  THE  SENSE  OF  HEARING. 

§ 45.  Of  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions  in 
connexion  with  the  Hearing. 

In  the  prosecution  of  this  part  of  our  general  sub- 
ject, we  proceed  to  remark  farther,  that  there  may 
be  imperfect  and  disordered  sensations  connected 
with  the  sense  of  Hearing.  The  causes  of  disor- 
dered auditory  sensations  and  perceptions,  like  those 
of  other  mental  acts  connected  with  the  senses,  are 
threefold  ; distinct  in  their  nature,  but  yet  suscepti- 
ble (and  this  is,  perhaps,  generally  the  fact)  of  acting 
in  combination.  ^ 

In  the  first  place,  disordered  auditory  states  of 
mind  may  arise  from  a disordered  condition  of  the 
auditory  nerve.  It  is  well  known,  as  we  have  al- 
ready had  occasion  to  intimate,  that  an  unusually 
strong  or  inordinate  affection  of  any  of  the  organs 
of  sense  may  be  followed  by  actual  sensations,  when 
the  usual  outward  cause  of  such  sensations  is  no 
longer  present.  If  the  eye  be  fixed  for  any  length 
of  time  upon  some  bright  object — the  sun,  for  in- 
stance— the  optic  nerve  is  found  to  be  powerfully  and 
unfavourably  affected.  And  when  we  turn  our  eye 
from  the  bright  object,  we  find  that  its  image,  in 
consequence  of  the  excited  state  of  the  retina,  still 


85 


(il.)  THE  SENSE  OF  HEARING. 

emains.  In  other  words,  the  retina,  owing  to  the 
great  power  of  the  first  impression,  continues  to  be 
affected  in  the  same  way  as  when  the  object  was 
before  it.  And  the  mind,  consequently,  is  in  a cor- 
responding state  ; that  is,  it  seems  to  see  the  object, 
although  it  is  no  longer  present.  So,  when  the  au- 
ditory nerve  has  been  for  a long  time  affected  by  a 
loud  and  continuous  sound,  the  physical  affection  re- 
mains after  the  sound  (that  is,  the  outward  cause  of 
the  sound)  has  ceased.  The  movement  of  the  tym- 
panum, which  was  so  powerfully  affected  in  the  first 
instance,  has  not  ceased  ; and,  so  long  as  this  is  the 
case,  the  mind  is  affected  in  the  same  manner  as  it 
the  outward  cause  of  sound  existed. 

§ 46.  Facts  Illustrative  of  Disordered  Auditory 
Sensations  and  Perceptions . 

These  are  cases,  it  is  true,  of  merely  occasional 
or  temporary  disorder  of  the  physical  organs ; but 
facts  of  this  kind  evidently  go  to  show  that  there  is 
a possibility , at  least,  of  these  organs  being  perma- 
nently disordered.  And  other  classes  of  facts  evince, 
beyond  all  question,  that  this  possibility  is  sometimes 
realized.  Accordingly,  persons  (probably  in  conse 
quence  of  the  organ  having  been  unduly  affected  at 
some  previous  time,  and  thus  thrown  into  an  unnat- 
ural position)  are  sometimes  troubled  with  a ringing 
noise,  which  seems  to  them  the  sound  of  bells.  At 
another  time  they  hear,  for  hours  and  days  together, 
the  rumbling  of  carts  or  the  explosions  of  cannon. 
At  other  times,  again,  their  ears  are  affected  with 
what  they  imagine  to  be  the  voices  and  songs  of 


86  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION 

celestial  beings.  There  is  an  account  given  in  a 
foreign  Medical  Journal  (the  Medico-Chirurgical 
Repertory  of  Piedmont)  of  a .young  lady  who  at- 
tended for  the  first  time  the  music  of  an  orchestra, 
with  which  she  was  exceedingly  pleased.  She  con- 
tinued to  hear  the  sounds  distinctly  and  in  then  or- 
der for  weeks  and  months  afterward,  till,  the  whole 
system  becoming  disordered  in  consequence  of  it, 
she  died. 

In  some  instances  there  is  an  unpleasant  feeling 
in  the  tympanum  of  the  ear,  as  if  it  were  greatly  dis- 
tended or  stretched  tight,  attended  with  an  increased 
sensation  of  sound,  so  that  very  small  sounds  appear 
like  thunder.  A letter  to  Dr.  Rush  from  one  of  his 
patients,  whose  nervous  system  had  become  much 
deranged,  has  these  expressions : “ I am,  as  it 
were,  all  nerve  ; the  least  noise  is  like  a shock  ot 
thunder ; so  that  for  seven  years  I have  been  in  the 
constant  habit  of  stopping  both  ears  with  wax.”  “ A 
mere  catarrh”  (says  Dr.  Conolly,  Insanity,  p.  238) 
“ will  sometimes  cause  one  ear  to  convey  a differ- 
ent sound  from  that  conveyed  by  the  other ; the 
same  note,  but  in  a different  key ; or  the ' same 
words,  but  as  if  from  two  voices,  one  an  octave 
higher  than  the  other.” 

§ 47.  Of  the  Brain  in  connexion  with  Diseased 
Auditory  states  of  Mind. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  seems  to  be  clear 
that  the  auditory  nerve  sometimes  becomes  morbidly 
affected  to  such  a degree,  that  there  is  an  internal 
sensation  of  sound  without  any  corresponding  exter- 


87 


(II.)  THE  SENSE  OF  HEARING. 

nal  cause  whatever.  The  medium  of  communica- 
tion which  the  mind  employs  is  in  fault.  The  ma 
chinery  of  the  instrument  of  external  perception  is 
disordered  ; and,  as  a natural  consequence,  the  mind 
loses  its  power  of  answering  promptly  and  correctly 
to  the  external  reality  and  aspect  of  things. 

We  proceed  to  remark,  in  the  second  place,  that 
the  same  results  will  follow  if  a diseased  action 
should  be  found  to  exist,  not  in  the  outward  organ, 
viz.,  the  auditory  nerve,  but  in  the  part  of  the  brain 
which  is  particularly  connected  with  it.  Esquirol, 
in  the  article  Demonomanie,  in  the  Dictionnaire  des 
Sciences  Medicates,  gives  some  account  of  the  dis- 
ordered mental  action  of  a woollen  spinster,  who 
was  under  his  care  in  the  La  Salpetriere  Hospital, 
which  seems  to  confirm  this  view.  Among  other 
things,  he  mentions  her  return  from  a long  walk  at 
a certain  time.  Becoming  fatigued,  she  lay  down 
upon  the  ground  to  rest.  “ In  a short  time  she  felt 
a motion  in  her  head , and  heard  a noise  like  that  of 
a spinning-ivheel It  is  certainly  a reasonable  sup- 
position here,  that  the  affection  was  in  the  brain 
rather  than  in  the  outward  organ.  The  illusory 
sound  like  that  of  a spinning-wheel  resulted,  in  all 
probability,  from  the  circumstance  of  the  brain’s  as- 
suming the  same  position  or  the  same  movement, 
into  which  it  had  been  customarily  brought  by  the 
real  sound  of  the  wheel  when  she  was  at  her  work. 

Nevertheless,  the  two  cases  are  intimately  con- 
nected with  each  other.  It  is  generally  difficult  to 
decide  with  certainty  whether  the  original  cause  of 

* E»ictionnaire  des  Sciences  Medicates,  tom.  viii.,  p.  302. 

H 


88  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

disordered  auditory  sensations  exists  in  a diseased 
state  of  the  brain  or  of  the  auditory  nerve.  Proba- 
bly, in  a majority  of  cases,  the  diseased  action  exists 
in  both  of  these  parts  of  the  great  sensorial  organ  at 
the  same  time. 

The  facts  which  have  already  been  given  in  the 
preceding  section  will  serve  to  illustrate  this  cause 
of  mental  disorder,  viz.,  a disordered  action  of  the 
brain,  as  well  as  that  first  mentioned.  And  some 
other  facts  of  a similar  nature  may  properly  be  added 
here. 

Persons  who  are  subject  to  disordered  auditory 
sensations  frequently  hear  their  names  called.  44  We 
are  accustomed”  (says  Dr.  Rush,  speaking  of  names) 
44  to  hear  them  pronounced  more  frequently  than  oth- 
er words  ; and  hence  the  part  of  the  ear  which  vi- 
brates with  the  sound  of  our  names  moves  more 
promptly,  from  habit,  than  any  other  part  of  it.” 
And  this,  we  may  well  suppose,  is  especially  the 
case  if  the  organ  of  hearing  be  disordered.  Some- 
times short  sentences  are  heard,  generally  having 
relation  to  the  subject  upon  which  the  mind  happens 
to  be  exercised  at  the  moment.  We  learn  from 
Washington  Irving,  that  Christopher  Columbus  was 
at  one  time  subject  to  deceptive  auditory  sensations 
He  relates  that,  in  the  midst  of  his  gloom,  when  he 
had  abandoned  himself  to  despair,  Columbus  heard 
a voice  calling  to  him  in  the  following  terms  : 44  Oh, 
man  of  little  faith  ! fear  nothing  ; be  not  cast  down. 
I will  provide  for  thee.  The  seven  years  of  the  term 
of  gold  are  not  expired ; and  in  that  and  in  all  oth- 
er things  I will  take  care  of  thee.”  It  is  possible, 


89 


(il.)  THE  SENSE  OF  HEARING. 

nowever,  in  the  case  of  Columbus,  that  the  decep- 
tive sensations  may  havtfarisen  from  a peculiarly 
excited  state  of  mind,  without  the  accessory  fact  ol 
a disturbed  organ.  A view  of  the  subject  which  re- 
quires, in  its  place,  a more  particular  notice. 

It  is  here,  in  connexion  with  these  facts  and  views, 
that  we  find  an  explanation,  in  part  at  least,  of  those 
singular  soliloquies  which  are  sometimes  carried  on 
by  insane  persons.  Acting  under  the  impression 
that  they  are  actually  spoken  to,  they  utter  the  cor- 
responding replies;  and  thus  a sort  of  interlocutory 
conversation  is  carried  on,  a part  only  of  which  is 
audible,  except  to  the  vitiated  ear  of  insanity. 

§ 48.  Third  Cause  of  Disordered  Jluditoi'y  Sensa- 
tions and  Perceptions. 

We  come  now  to  a third  cause  of  the  disorder- 
ed states  of  mind  which  we  are  considering.  The 
sensorial  organ  may  be  sound  in  all  its  parts,  and 
yet  the  mind  may,  in  its  own  nature,  be  so  disorder- 
ed as  to  produce  these  vitiated  and  abnormal  results. 
It  is  an  acknowledged  truth  (and  we  hope  to  be  ex- 
cused for  repeating  it),  that  strong  affections  of  the 
mind  may  cause  new  modifications  of  the  bodily 
part,  as  certainly  and  effectually  as  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  violent  affections  of  the  body  may  have  their 
result  in  the  mind.  Accordingly,  a person  in  a high 
degree  of  mental  excitement  may  have  such  a dis- 
tinct conception  of  a human  voice,  of  the  sound  of 
a musical  instrument,  or  of  some  other  sound,  that 
the  auditory  nerve,  in  consequence  of  the  sympathy 
between  the  mind  and  the  body,  will  become  affect- 


90  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

ed  precisely  as  if  an  external  cause  of  sound  exist- 
ed. And  then  the  sound^that  is,  the  internal  sen- 
sation of  sound,  follows. 

Persons,  for  instance,  sitting  alone  in  a room,  are 
sometimes  interrupted  by  the  supposed  hearing  of  a 
voice  which  calls  to  them.  But,  in  truth,  it  is  only 
their  own  internal  conception  of  that  particular  sound, 
which,  in  consequence  of  some  inordinate  mental 
excitement,  happens,  at  the  moment,  to  be  so  distinct 
as  to  cause  a modification  of  the  auditory  nerve, 
such  as  is  common  in  cases  of  actual  hearing,  and 
thus  imposes  itself  on  them  for  a reality.  And  this 
may  be  done,  it  will  be  remembered,  when  there  is 
no  actual  disease  of  the  physical  organ. 

This  is  probably  the  whole  mystery  of  what  Bos- 
well has  related  as  a singular  incident  in  the  life  of 
Dr.  Johnson,  that,  while  at  Oxford,  he  distinctly 
heard  his  mother  call  him  by  his  given  name,  al- 
though she  was,  at  the  very  time,  in  Litchfield.  The 
same  principle  explains  also  what  is  related  of  Na- 
poleon. Previously  to  his  Russian  expedition,  he 
was  frequently  discovered  half  reclined  on  a sofa, 
where  he  remained  several  hours,  plunged  in  pro- 
found meditation.  Sometimes  he  started  up  con- 
vulsively and  with  an  ejaculation.  Fancying  he 
heard  his  name,  he  would  exclaim,  “Who  calls  me?” 
These  are  the  sounds,  susceptible  of  being  heard  at 
any  time  in  the  desert  air,  which  started  Robinson 
Crusoe  from  his  sleep  when  there  was  no  one  in  his 
solitary  island  but  himself. 

“ The  airy  tongues  that  syllable  men’s  names, 

On  shores,  in  desert  sands,  and  wildernesses.” 


91 


(il.)  THE  SENSE  OF  HEARING. 

Perhaps  it  ought  to  be  added,  as  a matter  of  pos- 
sibility at  least  (and  the  principle  involved  in  the  re- 
mark will  apply  equally  well  to  any  other  organ  of 
sense),  that  the  conception  of  sound  may  at  times 
be  so  distinct  as  to  control  a person’s  belief,  and 
thus  assume  the  appearance  of  reality,  without  any 
corresponding  position  of  the  auditory  nerve.  It  is, 
unquestionably,  an  established  principle  in  mental 
philosophy,  that  the  belief  may  sometimes  be  con- 
trolled in  that  way.  And,  whenever  this  is  the  case, 
whatever  is  believed  to  be  affects  us  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  it  had  an  actual  existence.  Such, 
however,  is  the  powerful  influence  of  the  mind  over 
the  body,  it  is  probable,  that,  in  nearly  all  such  cases 
of  highly  excited  conception,  attended  with  belief, 
the  physical  organ  puts  itself  in  harmony  with  the 
internal  mental  state. 

§ 49.  The  Disordered  auditorij  Sensations  of  the 
poet  Cowper, 

The  mental  hallucinations  to  which  the  poet 
Cowper  was  subject  appeared,  among  other  forms, 
in  that  of  deceptive  or  illusive  sensations  of  hearing. 
All  the  causes  of  this  form  of  mental  disorder  seem 
to  have  existed  in  his  case.  It  has  never  been 
doubted  that  his  nervous  system  was  very  much  dis- 
ordered ; and  it  is  certainly  no  improbable  supposi- 
tion, that  the  irregular  and  diseased  action  was  ex- 
perienced in  the  brain,  as  well  as  in  the  outward  de- 
velopements  of  the  sensorial  organ.  And  then  his 
mind,  too,  was  intensely  conceptive  and  imaginative, 
to  a degree  that  almost  overstepped  the  limits  of 


92  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

sanity.  Is  it  surprising,  then,  that  he  should  have 
heard  voices  when  there  was  nothing  present  which 
had  the  power  of  sound? 

He  does  not  himself,  however,  appear  to  have 
suspected  the  psychological  or  the  physiological 
causes  of  the  voices  which  he  from  time  to  time 
heard  ; but  regarded  them  as  actual  communications 
from  invisible  beings.  In  a letter  to  one  of  his  cor- 
respondents, he  says,  u I awoke  this  morning  with 
these  words  relating  to  my  work  loudly  and  distinct- 
ly spoken  : 

“ ‘ Apply  assistance  in  my  case , indigent  and  ne- 
cessitous.’ 

“ And  about  three  mornings  since  with  these  : 

“ ‘ It  will  not  be  by  common  and  ordinary  means? 

“ It  seems  better,  therefore,  that  I should  wait  till 
it  shall  please  God  to  set  my  wheels  in  motion,  than 
make  another  beginning  only  to  be  obliterated  like 
the  two  former.  I have  also  heard  these  two  words 
on  the  same  subject : 

“ 4 Meantime,  raise  an  expectation  and  desire  oj 
it  among  the  people?  ” 

At  the  commencement  of  another  letter  we  find 
the  following  remarkable  statement : “ My  experi- 
ence since  I saw  you  affords,  on  recollection,  no- 
thing worthy  to  be  sent  to  Olney,  except  the  follow- 
ing notice,  which  I commit  to  writing,  and  commu- 
nicate as  a kind  of  curiosity  rather  than  for  any  other 
reason  ; though  Milton,  who  is  at  present  an  inter- 
esting character  to  us  both,  is  undoubtedly  the  sub- 
ject of  it.  I waked  the  other  morning  with  thesa 
words  distinctly  spoken  to  me : 


93 


(ill.)  THE  SENSE  OF  TOUCH. 

“ « Charles  the  Second,  though  he  was,  or  wished  to 
be  accounted  a man  of  fine  tastes  and  an  admirer  of 
the  arts,  never  saw,  or  expressed  a wish  to  see,  the 
man  whom  he  ivould  have  found  alone  superior  to  all 
the  race  of  men.'  " 

Mr.  Southey  has  recently  published  an  interesting 
life  of  this  distinguished  poet,  in  which  he  relates  the 
above  instances,  and  others  similar  to  them. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 
(hi.)  the  sense  of  touch. 

§ 50.  Disordered  Sensations  and  Perceptions  con- 
nected with  the  Sense  of  Touch. 

The  sense  of  Touch  may  properly  present  itself 
next  in  order.  The  principal  organ  of  this  sense  is 
the  hand.  Nevertheless,  it  ought  not  to  be  consid- 
ered as  limited  to  that  part  of  our  frame,  but  as  dif- 
fused over  the  whole  body.  It  is  not  surprising, 
however,  that  the  hand  should  principally  arrest  our 
attention  as  the  organ  of  this  sense,  since  it  is  fur- 
nished with  various  articulations  ; is  easily  moveable 
by  the  muscles ; and  can  readily  adapt  itself  to  the 
various  changes  of  form  in  the  objects  to  which  it  is 
applied. 

The  sense  of  touch,  like  the  other  senses,  may  be 
disordered  in  itself  and  in  its  sensorial  connexions 


94  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

(we  have  reference  here  particularly  to  the  brain), 
and,  as  a natural  consequence,  in  its  mental  results. 
As  various  principles  already  laid  down  are  applica- 
ble here,  we  shall  proceed,  without  delaying  upon  the 
general  views  which  the  subject  presents,  to  mention 
some  incidents  and  facts  which  may  tend  to  illustrate 
this  form  of  alienation.  It  may  be  proper  to  add, 
however,  that  the  natural  results  of  the  sense  of 
touch  are  more  various  than  those  of  the  other  sen- 
ses ; and  that,  as  would  naturally  be  expected,  there 
is  no  less  diversity  in  the  morbid  results.  They  re- 
late not  only  to  form  and  extension,  but  to  hardness 
and  softness,  heat  and  cold,  pleasure  and  pain,  and 
whatever  else  may  in  any  way  pertain  to  that  sense. 

§ 51.  Facts  Illustrative  of  Tactual  Disorders. 

Dr.  Abercrombie  mentions  a case,  originally  re- 
corded in  the  Memoirs  of  the  Medical  Society  of 
London,  of  a gentleman  “ who,  after  a paralytic  at- 
tack, had  such  a morbid  state  of  sensation  that  cold 
bodies  felt  to  him  as  if  they  were  intensely  hot. 
When  he  first  put  on  his  shoes,  he  felt  them  very 
hot ; and,  as  they  gradually  acquired  the  temperature 
of  his  feet,  they  appeared  to  him  to  cool.”  He 
mentions  also  the  case  of  a soldier,  a very  strong 
man,  and  able  for  all  his  duties,  who  had  so  com- 
pletely lost  the  feeling  of  his  right  arm  and  leg,  that 
he  allowed  the  parts  to  be  cut,  or  red-hot  irons  to  be 
applied  to  them,  without  complaining  of  any  pain.* 

Mr.  Southey,  in  his  Life  of  Wesley  (vol.  ii.,  chap, 
xviii.),  gives  an  interesting  account  of  a zealous  and 
* Diseases  of  the  Brain,  p.  275,  6. 


95 


(ill.)  THE  SENSE  OF  TOUCH. 

devoted  itinerant  preacher  by  the  name  of  Haime. 
The  case  of  this  man,  as  Mr.  Southey  himself  inti- 
mates, is  worthy  of  notice  in  a physical  and  psycho- 
logical, as  well  as  in  a religious  point  of  view.  At 
one  time  he  suffered  greatly  from  extreme  religious 
depression,  which  brought  him,  to  say  the  least,  to 
the  very  borders  of  insanity.  Some  of  the  physical 
sensations  which  this  pious  man  experienced  at  this 
time  seem  to  me  to  illustrate  the  subject  now  before 
us.  We  give  the  statement  in  his  own  words.  “ So 
great  was  the  displeasure  of  God  against  me,  that 
he  in  a great  measure  took  away  the  sight  of  my 
eyes.  I could  not  see  the  sun  for  more  than  eight 
months.  Even  in  the  clearest  summer  day  it  al- 
ways appeared  to  me  like  a mass  of  blood.  At  the 
same  time,  I lost  the  use  of  my  knees.  I could 
truly  say,  4 Thou  hast  sent  fire  into  my  bones.’  I 
was  often  as  hot  as  if  I were  burning  to  death. 
Many  times  I looked  to  see  if  my  clothes  were  not 
on  fire.  I have  gone  into  a river  to  cool  myself ; 
but  it  was  all  the  same  ; for  what  could  quench  the 
wrath  of  his  indignation  that  was  let  loose  upon  me  1 
At  other  times,  in  the  midst  of  summer,  I have  been 
so  cold  that  I knew  not  how  to  bear  it.  All  the 
clothes  I could  put  on  had  no  effect ; but  my  flesh 
shivered,  and  my  very  bones  quaked.” 

Dr.  Burrows,  in  his  Commentaries  on  Insanity, 
narrates  a remarkable  case  having  relation  to  this 
subject  in  the  following  terms  i u A gentleman, 
aged  thirty-six,  insane,  with  a strong  hereditary  pre- 
disposition to  suicide,  contrived,  during  the  tempo- 
rary absence  of  his  keeper,  though  his  legs  were 


96  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

fastened  together,  to  kick  a hole  in  the  fireguard 
and  thrust  his  feet  into  a quick  fire,  which  he  made 
more  fierce  by  tearing  up  a book  and  thrusting  the 
leaves  in.  He  was  found  a few  minutes  after,  sit- 
ting very  composedly  in  this  position.  His  toes 
and  part  of  one  foot  were  severely  burned ; the  other 
escaped  with  a smart  scorching.  In  the  burned  foot 
inflammation,  extensive  and  deep  eschars,  and  mor- 
tification, with  sloughing  of  the  muscles  and  tendons, 
followed.  And,  finally,  all  the  bones  of  the  toes, 
and  some  of  the  metatarsal  bones,  sloughed  away. 
The  cure  of  this  foot  occupied  more  than  a year ; 
the  scorched  one  soon  got  well.  But  neither  du- 
ring the  combustion  of  the  toes,  nor  for  months  af- 
terward, upon  removing  the  diseased  parts  or  dress- 
ing the  wound,  was  any  pain  expressed.  But  when 
the  mind  improved  and  the  desire  of  suicide  dimin- 
ished, which  it  did  long  before  the  wound  healed,  he 
complained  violently  of  the  pain  he  suffered  from  it 
or  when  it  was  dressed.”* 

This  case  seems  to  show  (and  it  is  what  the  anal- 
ogy presented  by  the  irregular  action  of  the  other 
senses  would  lead  us  to  expect)  that  disordered  tac- 
tual sensations  do  not  depend  exclusively  upon  a 
disordered  condition  of  the  bodily  organ ; but  also, 
and  perhaps  in  an  equal  degree,  upon  an  irregular 
or  abnormal  action  of  the  mind.  In  many  cases 
there  is  probably  a combined  sensation,  the  cor- 
poreal combining  itself  with  the  mental.  A case 
mentioned  in  Dr.  Brewster’s  Work  on  Natural  Ma- 
gic is  one  of  this  character,  presenting  the  results 
* Burrows’s  Commentaries  on  Insanity.  Part  ii.,  Com.  ii , p 390 


9? 


(in.)  the  sense  of  touch. 

of  a morbid  state  of  the  body  operated  upon  by  an 
inordinately  excited  state  of  the  mind.  It  is  the  ac- 
count of  a lady  who  was  subject  to  spectral  illu- 
sions, of  whom  it  is  expressly  said  that  she  pos- 
sesses a “ naturally  morbid  imagination,  so  strongly 
affecting  her  corporeal  impressions  that  the  story  of 
any  person  having  suffered  severe  pain,  by  accident 
or  otherwise,  will  occasionally  produce  acute  twinges 
in  the  corresponding  part  of  her  person.  An  ac- 
count, for  instance,  of  the  amputation  of  an  arm, 
will  produce  an  instantaneous  and  severe  sense  of 
pain  in  her  own  arm.”  * 

§ 52.  Other  cases  illustrative  of  Disordered  Sensa- 
tions and  Perceptions. 

There  are  some  cases  of  tactual  disorder  still 
more  striking  than  those  which  have  been  mention- 
ed. It  is  not  unfrequently  the  fact,  that  persons 
have  very  peculiar  tactual  sensations  existing,  not  in 
a particular  part  merely,  but  over  the  whole  body. 
One,  for  instance,  has  a sensation  which  conveys  to 
him  the  idea  of  great  bodily  enlargement  or  diminu- 
tion. Another  has  a sensation  of  lightness,  as  if  he 
were  composed  of  feathers.  Another  experiences 
a feeling  of  weight,  as  if  he  were  made  of  lead.  And 
others,  again,  have  a strong  and  indescribable  sen- 
sation, which  they  indicate  by  saying,  it  seems  to 
them  as  if  they  were  made  of  glass  or  of  some 
other  substance. 

Some  very  marked  cases  of  insanity  have  a con- 
nexion with  the  facts  which  have  now  been  alluded 
to.  The  organ  of  touch,  for  instance,  throughout 


98  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

the  physical  system  is  so  disordered  as  to  give  a 
person  the  distinct  sensation  of  brittleness  or  of 
being  made  of  glass.  The  sensation,  we  will  sup- 
pose, is  so  distinct  and  so  strong  as  to  control  this 
person’s  belief;  and  that  he  actually  believes  him-  I 
self  to  be  made  of  glass.  This,  certainly,  is  possi- 
ble. The  state  of  mind,  it  will  be  recollected,  which 
is  called  belief,  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a voluntary 
one  ; but  has  its  laws,  which  necessarily  determine 
it.  And  we  cannot  be  surprised,  therefore,  that, 
under  the  circumstances  supposed,  he  should  have 
a full  persuasiortf  that  he  is  physically  in  this  condi- 
tion. In  other  words,  he  is,  in  his  own  view  and 
practically,  a man  of  glass,  and  regulates  his  con- 
versation and  his  conduct  in  consistency  with  this 
fundamental  error.  We  have  here  a full  and  mark- 
ed case  of  insanity  ; one  which  is  universally  ac- 
knowledged to  be  so ; but  which,  in  its  origin,  ap- 
pears to  be  founded  exclusively  upon  a disordered 
condition  of  the  sense  of  touch.  And  the  same  of 
other  cases. 

§ 53.  Application  of  these  views  to  the  Witchcraft 
Delusion  in  JYew-England. 

The  statements  of  this  chapter  will  help  to  explain 
one  of  the  leading  features  of  the  witchcraft  delu 
sion,  which  prevailed  in  New-England  about  the 
year  1690.  The  feature  we  refer  to  was  this.  The 
unfortunate  subjects,  as  they  were  supposed  to  be, 
of  diabolical  arts,  often  complained  that  they  were 
pricked  with  pins,  or  pierced  with  knives,  or  struck 
with  blows.  And  all  by  the  means  and  through  the 


99 


(ill.)  THE  SENSE  OF  TOUCH. 

agency  of  some  invisible  hand.  The  simple  fact 
probably  was,  that  they  were  merely  the  subjects  of 
disordered  or  alienated  sensations  and  perceptions 
of  the  touch.  They  felt  something,  undoubtedly. 
And  the  sensation  was  very  much  such  a one  as 
would  have  followed  the  prick  of  a pin,  the  wound 
from  a knife,  or  the  infliction  of  a blow.  But  there 
was,  in  fact,  nothing  more  than  what  can  be  easily 
explained  on  natural  and  philosophical  principles. 
There  is  no  need  to  suppose  the  introduction  of  in- 
visible and  external  agency.  Dr.  Cotton  Mather, 
who  is  the  principal  historian  of  those  remarkable 
events,  furnishes  one  fact  that  throws  some  light 
upon  this  point.  Speaking  of  the  bewitched  per- 

sons, he  says:  “They  often  felt  thfe  hand  that 
scratched  them,  while  yet  they  saw  it  not;  but, 
when  they  thought  they  had  hold  of  it,  it  would  give 
them  the  slip.  Once  the  fist  beating  the  man  was 
discernible,  but  they  could  not  catch  hold  of  it.,?# 

We  admit,  however,  that  the  principles  of  this 
chapter  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  all  the  facts 
which  are  said  to  have  occurred  in  that  remarkable 
period  of  delusion.  We  shall  hereafter,  probably, 
have  occasion,  in  connexion  with  other  forms  of  dis- 
ordered mental  action,  to  refer  to  the  subject  agaim 
* Mather’s  Magnalia,  book  vi.,  ch.  7. 


100  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 


CHAPTER  V. 

DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION, 
(iv.)  THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT. 

$ 54.  Of  the  Outward  or  Physical  Organ  of  the 
Scnsalio7is  and  Perceptions  of  Sight . 

Following  the  plan  of  inquiry  which  we  have 
marked  out,  we  proceed  now  to  the  consideration  of 
disordered  mental  action  as  it  exists  in  connexion 
with  the  sense  of  sight.  The  organ  of  this  sense  is 
the  eye.  The  medium  on  which  this  organ  acts 
are  rays  of  light,  everywhere  diffused,  and  always 
advancing,  if  they  meet  with  no  opposition,  in  direct 
lines.  The  eye,  which  may  be  regarded  as  a sort 
of  telescope,  having  its  distinct  parts,  and  discover- 
ing throughout  the  marks  of  admirable  wisdom,  not 
only  receives  externally  the  medium  on  which  it 
acts,  but  carries  the  rays  of  light  into  itself ; and, 
on  principles  purely  scientific,  refracts  and  combines 
them  anew.  If  they  were  to  continue  passing  on 
precisely  in  the  same  direction,  they  would  produce 
merely  one  mingled  and  indistinct  expanse  of  col- 
our. In  their  progress,  however,  through  the  crys- 
talline humour,  they  are  refracted  or  bent  from  their 
former  direction,  and  are  distributed  to  certain  focal 
points  on  the  retina,  which  is  a white,  fibrous  ex- 
pansion of  the  optic  nerve.  As  soon  as  the  rays  of 
light  have  been  distributed  on  their  distinct  portions 


(IV.)  THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT. 


101 


of  the  retina,  and  have  formed  an  image  there,  they 
are  immediately  followed  by  the  sensation  or  per- 
ception which  is  termed  sight. 


§ 55.  Disordered  Visual  Sensations  and  Per- 
ceptions. 

Whenever  we  seem  to  see  things  which  we  do 
not  see  $ in  other  words,  whenever  the  visual  per- 
ception is  not  in  accordance  with  the  outward  re- 
ality, we  naturally  and  properly  speak  of  such  a sen- 
sation or  perception  as  a disordered  one.  The  causes 
• of  such  disordered  visual  results  are  various. 

I.  The  first  which  we  shall  mention  is  one  en- 
tirely analogous  to  the  cause  of  disordered  sensa- 
tions in  other  cases,  viz.,  an  unnatural  and  morbid 
sensibility  of  the  retina  of  the  eye,  either  the  whole 
of  the  retina  or  only  a part.  This  cause,  it  is  true, 
is  in  some  degree  conjectural,  in  consequence  of  the 
retina  being  so  situated  as  to  render  it  difficult  to 
make  it  a subject  of  observation  and  experiment. 
:But  knowing,  as  we  do,  that  the  nervous  system 
generally  is  liable  to  be  diseased,  and  that  the  dis- 
ease of  a particular  portion  is  commonly  productive 
of  results  having  relation  to  the  object  or  uses  of 
that  portion,  we  may  for  this  reason,  as  well  as  for 
what  we  know  directly  and  positively  of  the  occa- 
sionally disordered  affections  of  the  optic  nerve,  give 
it  a place  in  the  explanations  of  the  subject  now  be- 
i fore  us.  In  these  cases  the  optic  nerve  is  a source 
of  action  to  itself.  It  is  so  excitable,  so  morbidly 
sensitive,  that  it  repeats  its  antecedent  states,  as  it 


102  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 


were,  automatically,  when  the  natural  causes  01 
those  states  are  no  longer  present. 

II.  The  second  cause  is  the  mental  state  itsell 
acting  sympathetically  upon  the  visual  organ.  We 
know,  when  the  object  of  sight  is  directly  before  the 
eye,  that  there  is  a new  state,  an  affection  of  the  op-  j 
tic  nerve  ; and  it  is  probable,  in  consequence  of  the 
sympathy  between  the  mind  and  body,  that,  when,  in 
the  absence  of  a visible  body,  we  merely  think  or 
conceive  of  one,  there  is  always  a very  slight  sym- 
pathetic affection  of  the  retina,  analogous  to  what 
exists  when  the  visible  object  is  actually  present. 
In  a perfectly  healthy  state  of  the  body,  including 
the  organ  of  visual  sense,  this  affection  of  the  retina 
is  of  course  very  slight.  But  under  the  influence 
of  a morbid  sensibility,  the  mere  conceptions  of  the 
mind,  if  they  happen  to  be  particularly  vivid,  may  at 
times  impart  such  an  increased  activity  to  the  whole 
or  a part  of  the  retina  as  to  give  existence  to  disor- 
dered or  illusory  sights. 

§ 56.  The  preceding  Views  confirmed  by  the  Anal- 
ogy of  the  other  Senses . 

It  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  visual  as  of  auditory 
sensations.  The  vibrations  of  the  morbidly  sensi- 
tive nerve  of  the  ear  will*cause  sensations  of  sound 
within,  wholly  independent  of  any  external  cause. 
The  auditory  nerve  may  either,  in  the  first  place,  be 
a source  exclusively  of  action  to  itself,  or  may  be, 
in  the  second  place,  under  the  influence  chiefly  ot 
sympathy  from  the  mind  ; but  in  either  case  it  acts 
irrespective  of  an  outward  sonorous  cause.  So  in 


(IV.)  THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT.  103 

regard  to  the  optic  nerve  and  the  portions  of  the 
sensoiial  organ  immediately  connected  with  it.  It 
may  be  so  morbidly  sensitive  as  to  act  of  itself,  and 
to  give  re-existence,  from  the  mere  force  of  habit,  to 
the  pictures  that  were  formerly  impressed  upon  it. 
And  particularly  the  mere  thought  or  conception  of 
a visible  object  may  affect  it,  by  the  power  of  sym- 
pathy, as  really  and  in  the  same  way  as  if  such  visi- 
ble object  were  actually  present  to  the  sight.  And 
thus  the  individual  who  is  the  subject  of  these  exci- 
ted or  morbid  affections,  whether  they  are  exclusive- 
k ly  physical,  or  physical  and  mental  together,  may  be 
regarded  as  possessing  the  power  in  himself  of  ori- 
ginating and  sustaining  the  representation  or  pictures 
of  objects,  although  no  such  objects  are  present.  In 
other  words,  as  these  results  depend  upon  a morbid 
state  of  his  physical  or  mental  system,  or  of  both 
combined,  rather  than  upon  any  deliberate  act  of  his 
will,  he  may  properly  be  regarded  as  the  subject  of 
disordered  visual  sensations,  more  commonly  known 
j as  spectral  illusions. 

We  will  only  add,  in  confirmation  of  what  has 
been  said  in  reference  to  the  possible  and  actual  af- 
fection of  the  retina,  that  in  one  of  the  most  inter- 
esting cases  of  disordered  visual  sensations  which 
have  been  published,  the  person  who  was  the  sub- 
ject of  them  expressly  states,  that,  for  some  hours 
i preceding  their  occurrence,  she  had  a peculiar  feel- 
ing in  the  eyes,  which  was  relieved  as  soon  as  they 
i had  passed  away.* 

* Brewster’s  Natural  Magic,  Letter  III. 


1 


104  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 


57.  Illustrations  of  the  Subject  from  the  use  of 
Opium . 

There  are  some  articles,  such  as  ardent  spirits  in 
their  various  forms,  opium,  and  the  febrile  miasma 
gas,  as  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  remark  in 
a former  chapter,  which,  on  being  introduced  into 
the  system,  and  especially  when  taken  repeatedly 
and  in  considerable  quantities,  are  found  powerfully 
to  affect  the  mind.  And  the  effect  on  the  mind  ap- 
pears to  be  produced  by  means  of  an  intermediate 
influence,  as  we  should  naturally  expect  it  would  be, 
upon  the  sensorial  organ.  All  the  various  sensa- 
tions and  perceptions,  those  which  originate  in  the 
sense  of  sight  no  less  than  others,  may  be  more  or 
less  disordered  in  this  way. 

It  appears  from  the  work  entitled  the  Confessions 
of  an  English  Opium-eater,  that  the  author  of  it  was 
inordinately  addicted  to  the  use  of  opium  ; so  that, 
in  the  end,  not  only  his  health  was  affected,  but  his 
intellect  was  thrown  into  an  unnatural  and  disorder- 
ly posture.  The  nerve  of  vision  became  so  disor- 
dered that  it  at  once  assumed  the  position  which 
his  thoughts  indicated,  whatever  that  might  be.  So 
that  his  eye,  in  discordance  with  its  natural  laws  of 
action,  constantly  peopled  the  surrounding  vacant 
space  with  visions  and  phantasms  of  terror  or  of 
beauty.  He  informs  us,  among  other  things,  that 
at  night,  when  he  lay  in  bed,  vast  processions  pass- 
ed along  in  mournful  pomp.  But  his  visions  do  not 
appear  to  have  been  limited  to  representations  of  a 
mournful  character.  Whatever  he  happened  to  think 


105 


(iV.)  THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT. 

upon,  whether  it  were  landscapes,  or  palaces,  or  ar- 
mfes  in  battle  array  ; in  a word,  whatever  was  a sub- 
ject of  thought,  and  was  capable  of  being  visually 
represented,  formed  themselves  into  images  or  phan • 
tasms  of  the  eye,  and  swept  before  him  in  order  and 
distinctness,  no  less  marked  and  imposing  than  if 
the  real  objects  themselves  had  been  present. 

§ 58.  Disordered  Action  may  exist  in  connexion  ivith 
more  than  one  Sense  at  the  same  time. 
Sometimes  (and  not  unfrequently)  the  mental  dis- 
order, which  exists  by  means  of  the  senses,  extends 
to  two  or  more  of  the  senses  at  the  same  time.  Such 
seems  to  have  been  the  fact  in  the  case  of  that  re- 
markable visionary,  Blake,  the  English  painter. 
“ Did  you  ever  see  a fairy’s  funeral,  madam  1”  he 
once  said  to  a lady  who  happened  to  sit  by  him  in 
company.  “ Never,  sir !”  was  the  answer.  “ I 
have,”  said  Blake,  “ but  not  before  last  night.”  He 
then  proceeded  to  state  as  follows  : 

“ I was  walking  alone  in  my  garden.  There 
was  great  stillness  among  the  branches  and  flowers, 
and  more  than  common  sweetness  in  the  air.  I 
heard  a loiv  and  pleasant  sound , and  knew  not 
whence  i/;  came.  At  last  I saw  the  broad  leaf  of  a 
flower  move,  and  underneath  I saw  a procession  of 
. creatures  of  the  size  and  colour  of  green  and  gray 
grasshoppers,  bearing  a body  laid  out  on  a roseleaf, 
which  they  buried  with  songs,  and  then  disappear- 
ed.”* It  would  seem  from  this  statement,  and  from 
other  things  which  are  related  of  him,  that  this  re- 
* Macnish’s  Philosophy  of  Sleep,  p.  229. 


106  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 

markable  person  was  the  subject  of  disordered  au- 
ditory as  well  as  visual  sensations. 

We  might  multiply  instances  and  illustrations  un- 
der this  head,  but  perhaps  it  is  needless.  The  sub- 
ject, as  it  presents  itself  to  notice  here,  is  closely 
connected  with  the  disordered  action  of  the  concep-  i 
tive  power ; so  much  so,  that  the  farther  examina- 
tion of  it  at  present  would  necessarily  imply  the  an- 
ticipation of  some  things  which  are  to  be  said  here- 
after. There  remain,  however,  one  or  two  inci- 
dental topics. 

§ 59.  Of  Disordered  Perceptions  in  connexion  with 
excited  Religious  Feeling. 

As  having  a relation  with  what  has  been  said  un- 
der the  general  subject  of  alienated  Sensations  and 
Perceptions,  it  may  be  proper  briefly  to  refer  to  some 
facts  that  have  attracted  notice  in  connexion  with 
strongly  excited  religious  feeling.  Not  unfrequent- 
ly,  individuals  at  such  times  have  been  the  subjects 
of  perceptions  which  were  unnatural  and  illusory. 
Nor  have  the  illusions  been  limited  to  one  sense 
merely. 

One,  for  instance,  has  beheld  angels  ascending 
to  heaven,  or  descending  on  the  ladder  of  Jacob  ; 
or  has  seen  the  river  of  the  water  of  life,  clear  as 
crystal.  Another  has  heard  the  voices  of  invisible 
beings  singing  the  song  of  Moses  and  the  Lamb. 
Another,  again,  has  seen  the  Saviour  in  the  most 
trying  moments  of  the  crucifixion  ; and  has  no  more 
doubt  of  having  truly  and  visually  beheld  him,  than 
the  disciple  Thomas  when  he  thrust  his  hand  into 
his  side. 


107 


(iV.)  THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT. 

We  are  aware  that  this  subject  is  one  of  a deli- 
cate nature,  and  on  which  we  are  greatly  liable  to  be 
misunderstood.  Accordingly,  we  do  not  hesitate 
frankly  to  express  our  conviction  that  there  is  such 
a thing  as  spiritual  communications  ; special  influ- 
ences of  the  Holy  Spirit ; joys  unspeakable,  flowing 
from  a celestial  source  ; a living  mental  intercourse 
with  heaven.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  the  less 
true  that  there  may  be  sights  seen  which  are  not 
spiritual,  but  corporeal,  and  voices  heard  which  are 
not  from  above.  Is  it  not  dangerous  to  rest  one’s 
hopes  and  belief  of  possessing  a truly  religious  char- 
acter on  things  of  this  kind?  Without  rudely  set- 
ting at  defiance  any  feelings  and  opinions  which  may 
happen  to  exist  on  this  subject,  we  may  still  take 
the  liberty  to  inquire  whether  the  strong  bodily  sen- 
sations which  have  sometimes  been  felt,  and  the 
sights  which  have  been  seen,  and  the  voices  which 
have  been  heard,  cannot  very  often,  as  in  instances 
already  remarked  upon,  be  traced  to  some  disorder 
of  the  physical  system  ? Or,  admitting  that  the  body 
is  sound  and  under  no  special  excitement,  whether 
they  may  not  be  merely  our  own  thoughts,  strength- 
ened by  reflection  rendered  intense  by  desire  ? 

I 

“ Alas ! we  listen  to  our  own  fond  hopes, 

Even  fill  they  seem  no  more  our  fancy’s  children  , 

We  put  them  on  a prophet’s  robe,  endow  tnem 

With  prophet’s  voices,  and  then  Heaven  speaks  in  them. 

And  that  which  we  would  have  be,  surely  shall  be.” 

The  salvation  of  the  soul  is  too  weighty  a con- 
cern to  be  risked  on  such  an  uncertain  foundation  ; 
especially  as  we  have  the  Wrord  of  life,  which  points 


108  DISORDERED  SENSATION  AND  PERCEPTION. 


out  the  marks  of  a truly  religious  state,  yet  without 
making  mention,  as  far  as  we  are  able  to  perceive, 
of  dreams,  and  sounds,  and  visions,  as  included 
among  those  marks. 

60.  Concluding  Remarks  on  Disordered  Sensa- 
tion and  Perception . 

Such  are  some  of  the  aspects  and  varieties  of 
mental  disorder,  which  are  presented  under  the  gen- 
eral head  of  Disordered  Sensation  and  Perception. 
The  facts  which  have  been  mentioned  may  appear 
inconsiderable  in  themselves,  but  they  are  important 
in  their  totality.  A man  might  perhaps  escape  the 
imputation  of  insanity,  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of 
the  term,  who  happened  not  to  smell  aright ; but  if 
in  addition  to  that,  he  did  not  taste  aright,  nor  touch 
aright,  nor  hear  aright,  nor  see  aright ; if  he  put 
sweet  for  bitter,  and  bitter  for  sweet ; if  he  heard 
audible  voices  in  the  midst  of  utter  stillness ; if  he 
peopled  the  vacant  space  around  him  with  mere  ima- 
ginary visibilities  ; if  all,  or  even  half  of  this,  were 
true,  it  does  not  appear,  whatever  might  be  true  of 
the  imputation  of  absolute  insanity,  how  he  could 
well  lay  claim  to  the  possession  of  entire  soundness 
of  mind. 

It  is  true,  there  are  forms  and  modifications  of 
disordered  mind  more  deeply  seated  and  more  for- 
midable than  these  which  we  have  now  been  con- 
templating. But  it  cannot  be  denied  that  these, 
though  nearer  the  surface  of  the  mind,  and  more 
easily  manageable  than  others,  are  yet  of  sufficient 
importance  to  require  a particular  notice.  They 


EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS.  109 

give  to  the  whole  mind  an  anomalous  aspect ; they 
perplex  the  outward  conduct,  and  diminish  a per- 
son’s happiness  and  usefulness. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

^ 61.  On  the  General  Psychological  Nature  of 

Conceptions. 

We  proceed  now  to  the  consideration  of  another 
form  of  disordered  mental  action,  viz.,  Excited  or 
Disordered  Conceptions.  Conceptions, the  states 
of  mind  to  which  our  attention  is  now  directed,  are 
those  ideas  which  we  have  of  any  absent  objects  of 
sensation  and  perception.  When  a sapid  body  or 
an  odoriferous  body  is  presented  to  its  appropriate 
organ  of  taste  or  smell,  the  effect  which  follows  in 
the  mind  is  termed  a sensation.  When  we  after- 
ward think  of  that  sensation,  as  we  sometimes  ex- 
press it ; in  other  words,  and  more  properly,  when 
the  sensation  is  recalled,  even  though  very  imper- 
fectly, without  the  object  which  originally  caused  it 
being  present,  it  then  becomes,  by  the  use  of  lan- 
guage,  a conception. 

And  it  is  the  same  in  any  instance  of  perception. 
When,  in  strictness  of  speech,  we  are  said  to  per- 
ceive anything,  as  a flower,  a tree,  or  a building,  the 


110  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

objects  of  our  perceptions  are  in  all  cases  before  us 
But  we  may  form  conceptions  of  them  ; they  may 
be  recalled  and  exist  in  the  “ mind’s  eye,”  however 
remote  they  may  be  in  fact,  both  in  time  and  place. 
Accordingly,  these  mental  states  are  distinct  from 
every  other ; they  have  their  specific  or  characteris- 
tic nature  and  traits  ; and,  in  various  points  of  view, 
are  unquestionably  deserving  of  especial  attention. 
Nevertheless,  it  will  not  be  necessary  particularly  to 
delay  upon  them  in  this  place.  In  their  natural  or 
ordinary  form  they  will  generally  be  found  to  have 
a place  in  treatises  on  Mental  Philosophy,  where 
they  are  sufficiently  explained.  It  will  answer  cur 
purpose  to  refer  to  a single  trait  more.  It  is  this. 
These  states  of  mind  are  susceptible  of  variations  in 
their  degree  of  strength  or  vividness  ; and  the  con- 
sequence is,  that  they  sometimes  assume  modifica- 
tions which,  especially  in  the  form  of  inordinately 
excited  or  disordered  conceptions,  very  proper- 
ly have  a place  in  a treatise  on  Disordered  Mental 
Action. 

$ 62.  There  may  be  Disordered  Conceptions  con- 
nected with  the  Action  of  all  the  Senses. 

There  may  be  conceptions  based  upon  the  ante- 
cedent operation  of  any  or  of  all  the  senses.  There 
may  be  conceptions  of  smell,  of  taste,  of  sounds,  of 
touch,  as  well  as  of  sight.  The  facts  which  we 
have  already  found  it  necessary  to  introduce,  in  con- 
nexion with  the  disordered  action  of  sensation  and 
perception,  show  this  to  be  the  case.  Conceptions 
of  sound  may  be  so  vivid  as  to  affect  our  belief,  and 


EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS.  Ill 

thus,  without  the  least  affection  of  the  auditory  nerve, 
convert  the  mere  semblance  of  audition  into  a virtual 
reality.  In  other  cases,  the  conception,  even  when 
less  excited,  may  call  into  action,  in  virtue  of  the 
sympathetic  connexion  between  the  mind  and  body, 
the  diseased  organ,  and  thus  produce  essentially  the 
same  result,  when  there  is  in  neither  case  any  exter- 
nal cause  of  sound.  And  the  same  of  other  cases 
of  sensation  and  perception  depending  upon  other 
organs.  In  fact,  the  present  subject  has  already 
been  in  part,  and  necessarily,  anticipated.  And  this 
being  the  case,  we  shall  feel  ourselves  more  at  lib- 
erty to  confine  our  remarks  here,  as  we  propose  to 
do,  to  disordered  conceptions  of  Sight.  These,  in 
consequence  of  the  great  importance  of  the  visual 
organ,  and  the  frequency  of  the  deceptions  connect- 
ed with  it,  claim  especial  attention. 

§ 63.  Of  the  less  permanent  Excited  Conceptions  of 
Sight . 

There  are  conceptions  of  sight  (disordered,  per- 
haps, in  the  sense  of  being  inordinately  excited) 
which  are  not  permanent,  but  have  merely  a mo 
mentary  existence.  (I.)  These  are  noticed,  in  the 
first  place,  in  children,  in  whom  the  conceptive  or 
imaginative  power,  so  far  as  it  is  employed  in  giving 
existence  to  creations  that  have  outline  and  form,  is 
generally  more  active  than  in  later  life.  Children, 
it  is  well  known,  are  almost  constantly  projecting 
their  inward  conceptions  into  outward  space,  and 
erecting  the  fanciful  creations  of  the  mind  amid  the 
realities  and  forms  of  matter,  beholding  houses,  men, 


112  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

towers,  flocks  of  sheep,  clusters  of  trees,  and  varie- 
ties of  landscape  in  the  changing  clouds,  in  the 
wreathed  and  driven  snow,  in  the  fairy  work  of  frost, 
and  in  the  embers  and  flickering  flames  of  the  hearth. 
This,  at  least,  was  the  experience  of  the  early  life  of 
Cowper,  who  has  made  it  the  subject  of  a fine  pas- 
sage in  the  poem  of  “ The  Task 

“ Me  oft  has  fancy,  ludicrous  and  wild, 

Soothed  with  a waking  dream  of  houses,  towers, 

Trees,  churches,  and  strange  visages  express’d 
In  the  red  cinders,  while,  with  poring  eye, 

I gazed,  myself  creating  what  I saw.” 

Beattie  too,  after  the  termination  of  a winter’s 
storm,  places  his  young  minstrel  on  the  shores  of 
the  Atlantic,  to  view  the  heavy  clouds  that  skirt  the 
distant  horizon  : 

'*  Where,  mid  the  changeful  scenery  ever  new, 

Fancy  a thousand  wondrous  forms  descries, 

More  wildly  great  than  ever  pencil  drew, 

Rocks,  torrents,  gulfs,  and  shapes  of  giant  size, 

And  glittering  cliffs  on  cliffs,  and  fiery  ramparts  rise  ” 

II.  Again,  excited  conceptions  which  are  not  per- 
manent are  frequently  called  into  existence  in  con- 
nexion with  some  anxiety  and  grief  of  mind,  or  some 
other  modification  of  mental  excitement.  A per- 
son, for  instance,  standing  on  the  seashore,  and  anx- 
iously expecting  the  approach  of  his  vessel,  will 
sometimes  see  the  image  of  it,  and  will  be  certain, 
for  the  moment,  that  he  has  the  object  of  his  antici- 
pations in  view,  although,  in  truth,  there  is  no  vessel 
in  sight.  That  is  to  say,  the  conception,  idea,  or 
image  of  the  vessel,  which  it  is  evidently  in  the  pow- 
er of  every  one  to  form  who  has  previously  seen  one, 


excited  or  disordered  conceptions.  113 

is  rendered  so  intense  by  feelings  of  anxiety  as  to 
be  the  same  in  effect  as  if  the  real  object  were  pres- 
ent, and  the  figure  of  it  were  actually  pictured  on 
the  retina.  It  is  in  connexion  with  this  view  that 
we  may  probably  explain  a remark  in  the  narrative 
of  Mrs.  Howe’s  captivity,  who  in  1775  was  taken 
prisoner,  together  with  her  seven  children,  by  the 
St.  Francois  Indians.  In  the  course  of  her  captivi- 
ty, she  was  at  a certain  time  informed  by  the  In- 
dians that  two  of  her  children  were  no  more ; one 
having  died  a natural  death,  and  the  other  being 
knocked  on  the  head.  “I  did  not  utter  many 
words”  (says  the  mother),  “but  my  heart  was  sorely 
pained  within  me,  and  my  mind  exceedingly  troubled 
with  strange  and  awful  ideas  [meaning  conceptions 
or  images].  I often  imagined,  for  instance,  that  I 
plainly^saw  the  naked  carcasses  of  my  children  hang- 
ing upon  the  limbs  of  trees,  as  the  Indians  are  wont 
to°  hang  the  raw  hides  of  those  beasts  which  they 
take  in  hunting.” 

64e  The  Conceptive  Power  may  be  placed  in 
a wrong  position  by  habit . 

The  conceptive  power,  by  the  aid  of  which  we 
have  the  internal  or  mental  recognition  of  sensible 
objects  which  are  not  present,  may,  like  the  other 
powers,  be  greatly  strengthened.  A person,  for  in- 
stance, who  has  been  accustomed  to  drawing,  re- 
tains a much  more  perfect  notion  of  a building,  land- 
scape, or  other  visible  object  than  one  who  has  not. 
A portrait  painter,  or  any  person  who  has  been  in 
the  practice  of  drawing  such  sketches,  can  trace  the 


114  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

outlines  of  the  human  form  with  very  great  ease  ; it 
requires  hardly  more  effort  from  them  than  to  write 
their  names.  This  increase  of  conceptive  power 
is  far  from  always  being  advantageous.  On  the 
contrary,  it  may  sometimes  be  carried  so  far  as  to 
affect  the  mind  in  other  respects  very  unfavourably. 
The  faculty  may  be  made  to  possess  an  exaggerated 
intensity  of  action,  resulting  in  its  interference  with 
the  due  exercise  of  other  parts  of  the  mind.  “ We 
read”  (says  Dr.  Conolly),  “that  when  Sir  Joshua 
Reynolds,  after  being  many  hours  occupied  in  paint- 
ing, walked  out  into  the  streets,  the  lamp-posts 
seemed  to  him  to  be  trees,  and  the  men  and  women 
moving  shrubs.” 

There  are  persons,  who  are  entirely  convinced  of 
the  folly  of  the  popular  belief  of  ghosts  and  other 
nightly  apparitions,  but  who  cannot  be  persuaded  to 
sleep  in  a room  alone,  nor  go  alone  into  a room  in 
the  dark.  This  is  owing  to  the  fact  of  their  having 
early  formed  conceptions  of  invisible  and  unearthly 
beings  ; conceptions  which  have  gradually  been  ren- 
dered more  vivid  and  intense  by  repetition.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  they  happen  out  at  night,  their 
minds  are  employed  in  giving  existence  to  such 
imaginary  beings  ; and  their  ideas  of  them  are  so 
vivid  as  to  control  their  belief ; and,  consequently, 
they  are  the  subjects,  at  such  times,  of  a considera- 
ble degree  of  disquiet  and  even  terror. 

“It  was  my  misfortune”  (says  Dr.  Priestly)  “ to 
have  the  idea  of  darkness,  and  the  ideas  of  invisible 
malignant  spirits  and  apparitions,  very  closely  con- 
nected in  my  infancy  ; and  to  this  day,  notwithstand- 


EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS.  ] 15 

ng  I believe  nothing  of  those  invisible  powers,  and, 
consequently,  of  their  connexion  with  darkness  or 
mything  else,  I cannot  be  perfectly  easy  in  every 
rind  of  situation  in  the  dark.” 

In  all  persons  this  faculty  may  be  trained  to  an 
increased  degree  of  strength,  by  the  same  process 
which  gives  facility  and  strength  of  action  to  other 
mental  powers,  viz.,  by  constant  repetition  or  prac- 
tice ; in  other  words,  by  the  formation  of  a habit. 
And  this  increase  of  energy  may,  by  possibility  at 
least,  be  so  great  as  to  render  it  proper  to  consider 
the  power,  under  such  circumstances,  as  existing  in 
an  unnatural  or  disordered  state. 

§ 65.  Of  Permanently  Disordered  Conceptions. 

We  thus,  by  the  considerations  which  have  been 
brought  forward,  approach,  and,  to  some  extent,  ver- 
ify the  doctrine  which  it  is  our  object  here  to  an- 
nounce, viz.,  that  the  conceptive  faculty  may  be 
truly  disordered  ; and  that,  too,  not  merely  for  a short 
time,  under  a temporary  excitement,  but  permanent- 
ly. Those  who  are  not  subject  to  this  peculiarity 
of  mind  have  but  little  idea  of  the  very  high  degree 
of  vividness  which  may  attach  to  the  mental  states. 
When  the  conceptive  power  is  inordinately  and  per- 
manently excited,  the  forms  and  outlines,  the  hues 
and  combinations  of  outward  objects  exist  in  the  in- 
tellect like  living  things,  in  the  freshness  and  dis- 
tinctness of  reality. 

And  this  is  not  all.  There  is  a relation,  more  or 
less  intimate,  among  all  the  powers  of  the  mind. 
Whenever,  for  instance,  we  have  a perception  of 


116  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

things,  our  belief  is  controlled ; in  other  words,  we  i 
naturally  and  necessarily  have  a belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  the  things  which  are  perceived.  And,  in 
like  manner,  whenever  in  the  vividness  of  concep- 
tions there  is  a near  approach  to  the  acknowledged 
and  necessary  vividness  of  the  perceptive  states  of 
the  mind,  there  is  a similar  tendency  to  an  affection 
of  the  belief.  This  tendency  is  realized  ; in  other 
words,  the  belief  is  fully  controlled,  if  the  vividness 
in  the  two  cases  is  nearly  the  same. 

Now  the  mere  inordinate  vividness  implies  a dis- 
ordered state  of  the  mind  ; but,  if  this  be  combined 
with  the  coexistence  of  a belief  in  the  actuality  of  the 
things  conceived  of,  the  disorder  is  very  much  in- 
creased. It  is  then  that  the  subject  of  this  unhappy 
Mate  of  things  may  be  said,  with  something  more 
khan  a mere  metaphorical  import  of  the  terms,  to 
kve  in  the  midst  of  a world  of  his  own  creating. 
T he  mind,  exercising  itself  upon  the  materials  which 
the  outward  world  has  furnished,  reproduces  distinct 
images  of  things,  and,  substantiating  their  reality  by 
the  authority  of  belief,  recognises  things  that  are  not 
as  in  no  ways  different  from  things  that  are.  Hence, 
there  are  constant  mistakes.  Things  unreal  are 
mistaken  for  things  real.  And  hence,  also,  there  is 
frequently  a great  perplexity  of  the  judgment  and  the 
reasoning  power.  This  is  obvious,  because  the 
judgment  and  the  reasoning  power  necessarily  im- 
plicate the  ultimate  verification  of  their  results  with 
the  certainty  and  reality  of  their  premises ; and  the 
source  of  confidence  in  the  premises  has,  in  a great 
degree,  failed.  Not  to  mention  other  incidental 


EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS.  117 


j>  evils,  which  are  likely  to  connect  themselves  with 
this  peculiar  state  of  mind. 

§ 66.  Of  disordered  Conceptions , combined  with  a 
disordered  State  of  the  outward  Organs . 

Now  if  we  connect  this  state  of  mind,  which  is 
sufficiently  unfavourable  in  itself,  with  a disorder- 
ed condition  of  the  external  senses,  the  evil  will,  if 
possible,  be  still  farther  increased.  If,  for  instance, 
the  conception  of  visible  objects  be  very  vivid,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  the  organ  of  sight  be  morbidly 
susceptible,  the  vivid  conception  will  be  likely,  by 
mere  sympathy,  to  place  the  optic  nerve  in  the  posi- 
tion of  actual  vision.  And  the  immediate  conse- 
quence is,  that,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  there  is 
at  once  a visual  perception  ; and  the  conception  and 
the  perception  become  merged  in  each  other.  Un- 
der such  circumstances,  is  it  surprising  that  men 
should  see  a variety  of  phantasms,  and  find  the 
world  peopled  with  invisible  beings  1 

But  it  is  our  wish  here  to  consider  this  state  of 
mind  separate,  as  much  as  possible,  from  mere  dis- 
ordered sensations  and  perceptions.  It  is  true  they 
are  sometimes  combined  together,  perhaps  frequent- 
ly. At  the  same  time,  if  we  wish  to  get  at  the 
sources  of  insanity  and  of  the  modifications  of  in- 
sanity, it  seems  necessary  to  give  them  a distinct 
consideration.  They  not  unfrequently  combine  to- 
gether in  producing  the  same  results ; but  there  is 
no  doubt  that  they  may  produce  essentially  the  same 
results  separately  ; and  they  have  their  distinct  laws 


118  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

of  action.  Hence  the  necessity  of  treating  of  them 
under  distinct  heads. 

§ 67.  Of  the  original  Causes  of  inordinately  excited 
Conceptions . 

It  becomes  here  an  interesting  inquiry,  upon  what 
causes  disordered  conceptions  depend  ? One  of  the 
causes  of  them  is  probably  to  be  found,  in  the  first 
place,  in  the  mind  itself ; that  is  to  say,  in  some 
other  part  of  the  mind  disconnected  from  the  con- 
ceptions themselves.  A disordered  state  of  the 
propensities  and  passions  may,  for  instance,  pro- 
duce a disordered  state  of  the  conceptions.  Take 
an  individual  who  is  of  a very  sanguine  tempera- 
ment (in  whom  that  state  of  mind  which  is  denom- 
inated Hope  is  predominant),  and  it  will  be  found,  I 
suppose,  that  his  conceptions  of  those  prospective 
objects  at  which  he  aims  are  much  more  distinct 
and  vivid  than  those  of  another  person  in  whom 
hope  is  deficient.  We  do  not  undertake  to  explain 
how  the  vividness  of  one  state  of  mind  communi- 
cates itself,  as  in  this  case,  to  another ; but  there 
will  probably  be  no  diversity  of  opinion  as  to  the 
fact. 

Take,  again,  an  individual  in  whom  the  passion 
of  fear  exists  in  an  inordinate  degree.  It  is  notori- 
ous that  such  a person  will  magnify  difficulties  and 
dangers.  His  agitated  mind  will  give  outline,  and 
prominence,  and  distinctness  to  objects  which  scarce- 
ly attract  the  notice  of  another  person.  So  intense 
are  his  conceptions,  that  his  belief  is,  in  a great  de- 
gree, controlled  by  them ; and,  against  the  remon- 


EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS.  119 

strances  of  his  reason,  he  peoples  the  darkness,  and 
even  the  day  itself,  with  imaginary  conspirators 
against  his  person,  and  with  thieves  that  lay  in  wait 
for  his  property. 

(II.)  And  why  may  we  not  suppose,  furthermore, 
that  the  conceptive  faculty  itself,  independently  of  its 
connexion  with  the  other  mental  powers,  may  some- 
times be  disordered  1 The  mind  has  its  nature  and 
its  laws  ; and,  although  it  cannot  be  diseased  or 
disordered  in  the  same  way  that  a material  exist- 
ence may  be,  yet  sound  philosophy  does  not  forbid 
the  supposition  that  it  may  possibly  be  susceptible 
of  derangement  in  such  way  and  degree  as  may  be 
consistent  with  its  own  nature.  Take,  for  instance, 
the  susceptibility  of  Belief.  The  state  of  mind 
which  we  call  belief  has  its  laws,  and  may  be  re- 
garded as  a universal  attribute  of  the  mental  nature. 
In  other  words,  all  men  have  this  susceptibility. 
F urthermore,  in  the  great  mass  of  mankind  it  exists 
nearly  in  the  same  degree,  and  exhibits  the  same 
manifestations.  And  yet  it  is  well  known  that  in 
some  individuals  it  discovers  an  extreme  quickness, 
an  astonishing  facility;  so  much  so,  that  the  persons 
in  whom  this  peculiarity  exists  unhesitatingly  receive 
every  statement  which  is  made  to  them,  however 
improbable  and  contradictory.  The  susceptibility 
obviously  exists  in  an  unnatural  and  disordered  state, 
which  in  its  action  results  in  annulling  the  beneficial 
tendencies  of  the  other  parts  of  the  mind,  and  ren- 
ders the  person,  besides  making  him  a common 
laughing-stock,  useless,  in  a great  degree,  to  socie- 
ty. This  is,  beyond  all  question,  to  be  considered 
K 


120  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

as  a disordered  state  of  the  mind  ; but  the  disorder 
does  not  appear  to  result  from  the  unnatural  and  dis-  . 
ordered  position  and  influence  of  other  parts  ol  the 
mind,  nor  from  anything  peculiar,  so  far  as  we  can 
perceive,  in  the  sensorial  organization.  The  viola- 
tion of  nature  is  to  be  found  in  the  mental  trait  itself. 
The  disease  (if  we  may  be  allowed  to  apply  the  term 
to  mental  existences)  is  connatural,  not  in  the  body, 
but  the  mind  itself,  and  in  that  particular  part  of  the 
mind. 

We  introduce  this  statement,  it  will  be  noticed,  in 
illustration  of  the  general  doctrine  that  a disorder 
of  the  mind  may  be  connatural ; that  is  to  say,  may 
really  have  its  foundation  in  the  constitution  and 
facts  of  the  mental,  in  distinction  from  the  physical 
nature.  And  if  the  susceptibility  of  belief  or  any 
other  mental  attribute  may  be  disordered  in  itself 
why  may  not  the  conceptive  power  be  disordered  in 
itself  also  ] We  suppose  it,  at  least,  to  be  possible. 

§ 68.  Instance  Illustrative  of  this  Subject. 

We  bring  the  remarks  of  this  chapter  to  a close 
by  introducing  an  instance  where  the  Conceptive 
power  seems  to  have  been  inordinately  excited ; and 
where,  also,  the  results  appear  to  have  been  more 
marked  than  ,they  would  otherwise  have  been,  in 
consequence  of  the  sympathetic  influence  of  the 
very  vivid  conceptions  on  the  disordered  physical 
system.  “ In  March,  1829”  (says  Dr.  Macnish,  in 
his  Philosophy  of  Sleep,  chap,  xv.),  “during  an  at- 
tack of  fever,  accompanied  with  violent  action  in  the 
brain,  I experienced  illusions  of  a very  peculiar  kind 


EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS,  121 

They  did  not  appear  except  when  the  eyes  were 
shut  or  the  room  perfectly  dark.  And  this  was  one 
of  the  most  distressing  things  connected  with  my 
illness  ; for  it  obliged  me  either  to  keep  my  eyes 
open,  or  to  admit  more  light  into  my  chamber  than 
they  could  well  tolerate.  I had  the  consciousness 
of  shining  and  hideous  faces  grinning  at  me  in  the 
midst  of  profound  darkness,  from  which  they  glared 
forth  in  horrid  and  diabolical  relief.  They  were 
never  stationary,  but  kept  moving  in  the  gloomy 
background.  Sometimes  they  approached  within 
an  inch  or  two  of  my  face  ; at  other  times  they  re- 
ceded several  feet  or  yards  from  it.  They  would 
frequently  break  into  fragments,  which,  after  floating 
about,  would  unite ; portions  of  one  face  coalescing 
with  those  of  another,  and  thus  forming  still  more 
uncouth  and  abominable  images.  The  only  way  I 
could  get  rid  of  those  phantoms  was  by  admitting 
more  light  into  the  chamber  and  opening  the  eyes, 
when  they  instantly  vanished  ; but  only  to  reappear 
when  the  room  was  darkened  or  the  eyes  closed. 

“ One  night,  when  the  fever  was  at  its  height,  I 
had  a splendid  vision  of  a theatre,  in  the  arena  of 
which  Ducrow,  the  celebrated  equestrian,  was  per- 
forming. On  this  occasion  I had  no  consciousness 
of  a dark  background,  like  to  that  on  which  the 
monstrous  images  floated  ; but  everything  was  gay, 
bright,  and  beautiful.  I was  broad  awake  ; my  eyes 
were  closed,  and  yet  I saw,  with  perfect  distinctness, 
the  whole  scene  going  on  in  the  theatre  : Ducrow 
performing  his  wonders  of  horsemanship ; and  the 
assembled  multitude,  among  whom  I recognised 


122  EXCITED  OR  DISORDERED  CONCEPTIONS. 

several  intimate  friends  ; in  short,  the  whole  proces.. 
of  the  entertainment,  as  clearly  as  if  I were  present 
at  it.  When  I opened  my  eyes,  the  whole  scene 
vanished  like  the  enchanted  palace  of  the  necro- 
mancer ; when  I closed  them,  it  as  instantly  returned. 

“ But,  though  I could  thus  dissipate  the  specta- 
cle, I found  it  impossible  to  get  rid  of  the  accompa- 
nying music.  This  was  the  grand  march  in  the 
Opera  of  Aladdin,  and  was  performed  by  the  orches- 
tra with  more  superb  and  imposing  effect,  and  with 
greater  loudness,  than  I ever  heard  it  before.  It  was 
executed,  indeed,  with  tremendous  energy.  This 
air  I tried  every  effort  to  dissipate,  by  forcibly  em 
deavouring  to  call  other  tunes  to  mind,  but  it  was  in 
vain.  However  completely  the  vision  might  be  dis- 
pelled, the  music  remained  in  spite  of  every  effort  to 
banish  it.  During  the  whole  of  this  singular  state 
I was  perfectly  aware  of  the  illusiveness  of  my  feel- 
ings, and,  though  labouring  under  violent  headache, 
could  not  help  speculating  upon  them  and  endeav- 
ouring to  trace  them  to  their  proper  cause.  This 
theatrical  vision  continued  for  about  five  hours  ; the 
previous  delusions  for  a couple  of  days.” 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  123 


CHAPTER  YII. 

SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

| 69.  Of  the  General  Nature  of  Spectral  Illusions 
or  Apparitions. 

The  doctrines,  which  have  been  advanced  in  con- 
nexion with  our  examination  of  disordered  Sensa- 
tions and  Perceptions,  and  of  disordered  Conceptive 
States  of  the  Mind,  appear  to  furnish  all  the  requisite 
elements  for  a satisfactory  explanation  of  Spectral 
Illusions  or  Apparitions. 

Spectral  illusions  or  apparitions  are  appearances 
which  seem  to  be  real  and  external,  but  which,  in 
truth,  have  merely  an  internal  or  subjective  exist- 
ence ; occasioned  sometimes  by  the  disordered 
state  of  the  outward  organ  of  sense  ; sometimes  by 
the  unnatural  or  disordered  state  of  the  portion  of 
the  brain  particularly  related  to  the  outward  organ ; 
sometimes  by  an  unnatural  or  abnormal  position  of 
the  conceptive  power ; and  probably,  for  the  most 
part,  by  the  combined  action  of  all  these  causes. 

Apparitions  are  very  various  in  their  character; 
as  much  so  as  the  various  objects  and  combinations 
of  objects,  which  from  time  to  time  come  under  the 
notice  of  the  visual  organ.  Accordingly,  there  may 
be  apparitions,  not  only  of  angels  and  departed  spir- 
its, which  appear  to  figure  more  largely  in  the  his- 


124  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

tory  of  apparitions  than  other  objects  of  sight,  but  of 
landscapes,  mountains,  rivers,  precipices,  festivals, 
armies,  funeral  processions,  temples  ; in  a word,  of 
all  visual  perceptions  which  we  are  capable  of  re- 
calling. 

I here  are  unreal  and  visionary  intimations,  which 
have  their  origin  in  other  senses,  and  which  mingle 
with,  and  sometimes  give  a marked  character  to,  the 
illusive  scenes  which  are  visually  enacted  ; but  ap- 
paritions, in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  have  espe- 
cial reference  to  those  things,  and  those  only,  which 
can  he  visibly  represented.  It  is  in  this  sense  of 
the  term,  in  particular,  that  we  propose  to  illustrate 
them  ; although  the  subject,  as  in  the  conclusion  of 
the  last  chapter,  has  already  been,  to  some  extent, 
anticipated.  Furthermore,  as  there  are  some  states 
of  the  body  in  connexion  with  which  apparitions  de- 
velope  themselves  more  than  at  other  times,  we  shall 
find  an  advantage  in  examining  the  subject  in  refer- 
ence to  these  more  marked  occasions. 

§ 70.  First  Cause  of  the  States  of  JVFind  termed 

Apparitions . — JYeglect  of  Periodical  Bloodlet- 
ting. 

One  of  those  more  marked  occasions  on  which 
those  states  of  mind  which  are  called  Apparitions 
will  be  likely  to  develope  themselves,  is  the  neglect 
of  periodical  bloodletting.  There  may  be  the  ele- 
ments of  these  states  of  mind  previously  existing  in 
the  mental  or  bodily  constitution,  or  in  both,  such  as 
an  unnatural  tendency  to  excitement  in  the  sensorial 
organ  or  in  the  conceptive  power  ; and  yet  this  ten- 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  125 

if  T I ■■  k' 

dency  may  not  result  in  thelslates  df-  mind  under 
consideration  until  some  mailed  and  specific  occa- 
sion shall  occur,  such  as  has  been  mentioned. 
The  doctrine  that  spectral  illusions  4>r  apparitions 
are  likely  to  be  attendant  on  a superabundance  of 
blood,  occasioned  by  the  neglect  of  periodical  blood- 
letting, seems  to  be  illustrated  and  confirmed  by  the 
actual  and  recorded  experience  of  various  individu- 
als, as  in  the  following  instance. 

Nicolai,  the  name  of  the  individual  to  whom  the 
statements  here  given  relate,  was  an  inhabitant  of 
Berlin,  a celebrated  bookseller.  He  was  a man  in 
whom  the  conceptive  or  imaginative  power  was  nat- 
urally very  excitable,  and  in  a high  degree  inventive 
or  creative.  And  what  is  a fact,  which  some  will  un- 
doubtedly esteem  it  important  to  know,  he  was  nei- 
ther an  ignorant  man  nor  superstitious  ; but,  on  the 
contrary,  possessed  of  much  information,  and  capa- 
ble of  philosophical  analysis.  The  following  ac- 
count of  the  illusive  sights  or  apparitions  which  ap- 
peared to  him  is  given  in  his  own  words : 

“My  wife  and  another  person  came  into  my 
apartment  in  the  morning  in  order  to  console  me, 
but  I was  too  much  agitated  by  a series  of  incidents, 
which  had  most  powerfully  affected  my  moral  feel- 
ing, to  be  capable  of  attending  to  them.  On  a sud- 
den I perceived,  at  about  the  distance  of  ten  steps, 

' a form  like  that  of  a deceased  person.  I pointed 
at  it,  asking  my  wife  if  she  did  not  see  it.  It  was 
but  natural  that  she  should  not  see  anything ; my 
question,  therefore,  alarmed  her  very  much,  and  she 
immediately  sent  for  a physician.  The  phantom 


126  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

continued  about  eight  minutes.  I grew  at  length 
more  calm,  and,  being  extremely  exhausted,  fell  into 
a restless  sleep,  which  lasted  about  half  an  hour. 
The  physician  ascribed  the  apparition  to  a violent 
mental  emotion,  and  hoped  there  would  be  no  re- 
turn ; but  the  violent  agitation  of  my  mind  had  in 
some  way  disordered  my  nerves,  and  produced  far- 
ther consequences,  which  deserve  a more  minute 
description. 

“ At  four  in  the  afternoon,  the  form  which  I had 
seen  in  the  morning  reappeared.  I was  by  myself 
when  this  happened,  and,  being  rather  uneasy  at  the 
incident,  went  to  my  wife’s  apartment,  but  there  like- 
wise I was  persecuted  by  the  apparition,  which,  how 
ever,  at  intervals  disappeared,  and  always  presented 
itself  in  a standing  posture.  About  six  o’clock  there 
appeared  also  several  walking  figures,  which  had  no 
connexion  with  the  first.  After  the  first  day  the 
form  of  the  deceased  person  no  more  appeared,  but 
its  place  was  supplied  with  many  other  phantasms, 
sometimes  representing  acquaintances,  but  mostly 
strangers  ; those  whom  I knew  were  composed  of 
living  and  deceased  persons,  but  the  number  of  the 
latter  was  comparatively  small.  I observed  the  per- 
sons with  whom  I daily  conversed  did  not  appear  as 
phantasms,  these  representing  chiefly  persons  who 
lived  at  some  distance  from  me. 

“ These  phantasms  seemed  equally  clear  and  dis- 
tinct at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances,  both 
when  I was  by  myself  and  when  I was  in  company, 
as  well  in  the  day  as  at  night,  and  in  my  own  house 
as  well  as  abroad  ; they  were,  however,  less  frequent 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  127 

when  I was  in  the  house  of  a friend,  and  rarely  ap- 
peared to  me  in  the  street.  When  I shut  my  eyes 
these  phantasms  would  sometimes  vanish  entirely, 
though  there  were  instances  when  I beheld  them 
with  my  eyes  closed  ; yet,  when  they  disappeared  on 
such  occasions,  they  generally  returned  when  I open- 
ed my  eyes.  I conversed  sometimes  with  my  phy- 
sician and  my  wife  of  the  phantasms  which  at  the 
moment  surrounded  me  ; they  appeared  more  fre- 
quently walking  than  at  rest,  nor  were  they  con- 
stantly present.  They  frequently  did  not  come  for 
some  time,  but  always  reappeared  for  a longer  or 
shorter  period,  either  singly  or  in  company;  the  lat- 
te^. nowever,  being  most  frequently  the  case.  1 
generally  saw  human  forms  of  both  sexes;  but  they 
usually  seemed  not  to  take  the  smallest  notice  of 
each  other,  moving  as  in  a market-place,  where  all 
are  eager  to  press  through  the  crowd ; at  times, 
however,  they  seemed  to  be  transacting  business 
with  each  other.  I also  saw  several  times  people 
on  horseback,  dogs,  and  birds. 

“ All  these  phantasms  appeared  to  me  in  their 
natural  size,  and  as  distinct  as  if  alive,  exhibiting 
different  shades  of  carnation  in  the  uncovered  parts, 
as  well  as  different  colours  and  fashions  in  their 
dresses,  though  the  colours  seemed  somewhat  paler 
than  in  real  nature.  None  of  the  figures  appeared 
particularly  terrible,  comical,  or  disgusting,  most  of 
them  being  of  an  indifferent  shape,  and  some  pre- 
senting a pleasing  aspect.  The  longer  these  phan- 
tasms continued  to  visit  me,  the  more  frequently  did 
they  return,  while,  at  the  same  time,  they  increased  in 


128  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

number  about  four  weeks  after  they  had  first  appear- 
ed. I also  began  to  hear  them  talk ; these  phan- 
toms sometimes  conversed  among  themselves,  but 
more  frequently  addressed  their  discourse  to  me  ; 
their  speeches  were  commonly  short,  and  never  of 
an  unpleasant  turn.  At  different  times  there  appear- 
ed to  me  both  dear  and  sensible  friends  of  both  sex- 
es, whose  addresses  tended  to  appease  my  grief, 
which  had  not  yet  wholly  subsided  : their  consola- 
tory speeches  were  in  general  addressed  to  me  when 
I was  alone.  Sometimes,  however,  I was  accosted 
by  these  consoling  friends  while  I was  engaged  in 
company,  and  not  unfrequently  while  real  persons 
were  speaking  to  me.  These  consolatory  address- 
es consisted  sometimes  of  abrupt  phrases,  and  at 
other  times  they  were  regularly  executed.” 

$ 71.  Methods  of  Relief  adopted  in  this  case . 

These  are  the  leading  facts  in  this  case,  so  far  as 
the  mere  appearance  of  the  apparitions  is  concerned. 
But  as  Nicolai,  besides  possessing  no  small  amount 
of  acquired  knowledge,  was  a person  of  a naturally 
philosophic  turn  of  mind,  he  was  able  to  detect  and 
to  assign  the  true  cause  of  his  mental  malady.  He 
was,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  in  the  first  place,  a 
person  of  a very  vivid  fancy,  and  hence  his  mind 
was  the  more  likely  to  be  affected  by  any  disease  of 
the  body.  A number  of  years  before  the  occurren- 
ces above  related,  he  had  been  subject  to  a violent 
vertigo,  which  had  been  cured  by  means  of  leeches; 
it  was  his  custom  to  lose  blood  twice  a year,  but 
previously  to  the  present  attack  this  evacuation  had 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  129 

oeen  neglected.  Supposing,  therefore,  that  the 
mental  disorder  might  arise  from  a superabundance 
of  blood  and  some  irregularity  in  the  circulation,  he 
again  resorted  to  the  application  of  leeches.  When 
the  leeches  were  applied,  no  person  was  with  him 
besides  the  surgeon ; but,  during  the  operation,  his 
chamber  was  crowded  with  human  phantasms  of  all 
descriptions.  In  the  course  of  a few  hours,  how- 
ever, they  moved  around  the  chamber  more  slowly ; 
their  colour  began  to  fade,  until,  growing  more  and 
more  obscure,  they  at  last  dissolved  into  air,  and  he 
ceased  to  be  troubled  with  them  afterward.* 

^ 72.  Second  Cause  of  Spectral  Illusions  or  Appa- 
ritions.— Attacks  of  Fever. 

Violent  fevers  also,  calling  into  action  the  hidden 
materials  and  elements  of  illusive  sights,  are  found 
at  times  to  constitute  another  leading  occasion  of 
Apparitions.  The  vivid  conceptions  which  the  sick 
person  has,  operate  sympathetically  upon  his  disor- 
dered physical  system,  until  the  mind,  projecting,  as 
it  were,  its  own  creations  into  the  exterior  space, 
peoples  the  room  with  living  and  moving  phantoms. 
“ Spectral  illusions”  (says  Dr.  Macnish)  “ are  more 
frequently  induced  by  fever  than  by  any  other  cause.” 

*•  Memoir  on  the  Appearance  of  Spectres  or  Phantoms  occa- 
sioned by  Disease,  with  Psychological  Remarks,  read  by  Nico- 
ai  to  the  Royal  Society  of  Berlin,  on  the  28th  of  February, 
1799  ; as  quoted  by  Hibbert,  pt.  i.,  ch.  i. — Walter  Scott,  in  his 
Demonology  and  Witchcraft,  speaks  of  the  apparitions  of  Nico- 
iai  as  a leading  case  in  this  department  of  human  knowledge. 
He  also  expresses  the  opinion,  that  many  others  have  had  the 
same  experience  with  Nicolai,  but  have  been  deterred  by  vari- 
ous causes  from  making  it  public. 


130  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

There  is  a statement  illustrative  of  this  view  of  the 
subject  in  the  fifteenth  volume  of  Nicholson’s  Phil- 
osophical Journal,  a part  of  which  will  be  here  re- 
peated. The  fever  in  this  instance,  of  which  an 
account  is  given  by  the  patient  himself,  was  of  a 
violent  character,  originating  in  some  deep-seated 
inflammation,  and  at  first  affecting  the  memory,  al- 
though not  permanently. 

“ Being  perfectly  awake”  (says  this  person),  “ in 
full  possession  of  memory,  reason,  and  calmness, 
conversing  with  those  around  me,  and  seeing,  with- 
out difficulty  or  impediment,  every  surrounding  ob- 
ject, I was  entertained  and  delighted  with  a succes- 
sion of  faces,  over  which  I had  no  control,  either  as 
to  their  appearance,  continuance,  or  removal. 

“ They  appeared  directly  before  me,  one  at  a 
time,  very  suddenly,  yet  not  so  much  so  but  that  a 
second  of  time  might  be  employed  in  the  emergence 
of  each,  as  if  through  a cloud  or  mist,  to  its  perfect 
clearness.  In  this  state  each  face  continued  five  or 
six  seconds,  and  then  vanished,  by  becoming  grad- 
ually fainter  during  about  two  seconds,  till  nothing 
was  left  but  a dark  opaque  mist,  in  which  almost 
immediately  afterward  appeared  another  face.  All 
these  faces  were  in  the  highest  degree  interesting  to 
me  for  beauty  of  form,  and  for  the  variety  of  expres- 
sion they  manifested  of  every  great  and  amiable 
emotion  of  the  human  mind.  Though  their  atten- 
tion was  invariably  directed  to  me,  and  none  of  them 
seemed  to  speak,  yet  I seemed  to  read  the  very 
soul  which  gave  animation  to  their  lovely  and  intel- 
ligent countenances.  Admiration,  and  a sentiment 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  131 

of  joy  and  affection  when  each  face  appeared,  and 
regret  upon  its  disappearance,  kept  my  mind  con- 
stantly riveted  to  the  visions  before  it ; and  this 
state  was  interrupted  only  when  an  intercourse  with 
the  persons  in  the  room  was  proposed  or  uiged, 
&c.  The  apparitions  which  this  person  experien- 
ced were  not  limited  to  phantasms  of  the  human 
countenance  ; he  also  saw  phantasms  of  books,  and 
of  parchment  and  papers  containing  printed  matter. 
Nor  were  these  effects  exclusively  confined  to  ideas 
received  from  the  sense  of  sight;  at  one  time  he 
seemed  to  himself  to  hear  musical  sounds  ; that  is, 
his  conceptions  of  sound  were  so  exceedingly  vivid, 
combined,  probably,  with  the  sympathetic  concur- 
rence of  a disordered  auditory  organ,  that  it  was,  in 
effect,  the  same  as  if  he  had  really  heard  melodious 
voices  and  instruments. 

^ 73.  Third  Cause  of  Apparitions. — Inflammation 
of  the  Brain. 

In  the  third  place,  spectral  illusions  or  apparitions 
will  be  likely  to  be  called  into  existence  by  means 
of  inflammations  and  other  diseases  of  the  brain. 
We  may  infer,  from  certain  passages  which  are  found 
in  his  writings,  that  Shakspeare  had  some  correct 
notions  of  the  influence  of  a disordered  condition  of 
the  brain  on  the  mental  operations.  We  allude, 
among  others,  to  the  passage  where,  in  explanation 
of  the  apparition  of  the  dagger  which  appeared  to 
Macbeth,  he  says, 

<«  A dagger  of  the  mind,  a false  creation, 

Proceeding  from  the  heat-oppressed  brain  ” 


132  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

Whether  the  seat,  or  appropriate  and  peculiar  res* 
idence  of  the  soul  be  in  the  brain  or  not,  it  seems 
to  be  certain  that  this  part  of  the  bodily  system  is 
connected  in  a very  intimate  and  high  degree  with 
the  exercises  of  the  mind ; particularly  with  percep- 
tion and  volition.  Whenever,  therefore,  the  brain  is 
disordered,  whether  by  a contusion  or  by  a removal 
of  part  of  it,  by  inflammation  or  in  other  ways,  the 
mind  will,  in  general,  be  affected  in  a greater  or  less 
degree.  It  may  indeed  be  said,  that  the  immediate 
connexion  in  the  cases  which  we  now  have  refer- 
ence to,  is  not  between  the  mind  and  the  substance 
of  the  brain,  but  between  the  mind  and  the  blood 
which  is  thrown  into  that  part  of  the  system.  It  is, 
no  doubt,  something  in  favour  of  this  notion,  that  so 
large  a portion  of  the  sanguineous  fluid  finds  a cir- 
culation there ; it  being  a common  idea  among  anat- 
omists, that  at  least  one  tenth  of  all  the  blood  is  im- 
mediately sent  from  the  heart  into  the  brain,  although 
the  latter  is  in  weight  only  about  the  fortieth  part  of 
the  whole  body.  It  is  to  be  considered  also,  that 
the  effects  which  are  wrought  upon  the  mind  by  the 
nitrous  oxide  and  the  febrile  miasma  gas,  are  caused 
by  an  intermediate  influence  on  the  blood.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  may  be  said  that  there  cannot  be  a 
great  acceleration  of  the  blood’s  motion,  or  increase 
of  its  volume,  without  a very  sensible  effect  on  the 
cerebral  substance.  And,  therefore,  it  may  remain 
true  that  very  much  may  be  justly  attributed  to  the 
increase  of  quantity  and  motion  in  the  blood,  and 
still  the  brain  be  the  proximate  cause  of  alterations 
in  the  states  of  the  mind. 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  133 

§ 74.  Facts  having  relation  to  the  third  Cause  oj 
Apparitions. 

But  here  we  stand  in  need  of  facts,  as  in  all  otoer 
parts  of  this  investigation.  The  following  state- 
ment, selected  from  a number  of  others  not  less  au- 
thenticated, can  be  relied  on.*  A citizen  of  King- 
ston-on-Hull  had  a quarrel  with  a drunken  soldier, 
who  attempted  to  enter  his  house  by  force  at  an  un- 
seasonable hour.  In  this  struggle  the  soldier  drew 
his  bayonet,  and,  striking  him  across  the  temples,  di- 
vided the  temporal  artery.  He  had  scarcely  recov- 
ered from  the  effects  of  a great  loss  of  blood  on  this 
occasion,  when  he  undertook  to  accompany  a friend 
in  his  walking-match  against  time,  in  which  he  went 
forty-two  miles  in  nine  hours.  He  was  elated  by 
his  success,  and  spent  the  whole  of  the  following 
day  in  drinking,  &c. 

The  result  of  these  things  was  an  affection,  prob- 
ably an  inflammation,  of  the  brain.  And  the  conse- 
quence of  this  was,  the  existence  of  those  vivid  states 
of  mind  which  are  termed  apparitions.  According- 
ly, our  shopkeeper  (for  that  was  the  calling  of  this 
person)  is  reported  to  have  seen  articles  of  sale 
upon  the  floor,  and  to  have  beheld  an  armed  soldier 
entering  his  shop  when  there  was  nothing  seen  by 
other  persons  present.  In  a word,  he  was  for  some 
time  constantly  haunted  by  a variety  of  spectres  or 
imaginary  appearances ; so  much  so  that  he  even 
found  it  difficult  to  determine  which  were  real  cus- 

» gee  the  Edinburgh  Medical  and  Surgical  Journal,  vol.  vi., 
d.  288. 


134  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

tomers  and  which  were  mere  phantasms  of  his  own 
mind.  The  remedy  in  this  case  was  bloodletting, 
and  some  other  methods  of  cure  which  are  practised 
in  inflammations  of  the  brain.  The  restoration  of 
the  mind  to  a less  intense  and  more  correct  action 
was  simultaneous  with  that  of  the  physical  system. 

§ 75.  Fourth  Cause  of  Spectral  Illusions  or  Appa- 
ritions.— Hysteria . 

It  is  farther  to  be  observed,  that  people  are  not 
unfrequently  affected  with  apparitions  in  the  parox- 
ysms of  the  disease  known  as  Hysteria  or  hyster- 
ics. For  the  nature  of  this  disease,  which  Exists 
under  a variety  of  forms,  and  is  of  a character  so 
peculiar  as  to  preclude  any  adequate  description  in 
the  narrow  limits  we  could  properly  allot  to  it,  the 
reader  is  referred  to  such  books  as  treat  of  medical 
subjects.  This  singular  disease  powerfully  agitates 
the  mind ; and  its  effects  are  as  various  as  they  are 
striking.  When  the  convulsive  affections  come  on,  J 
the  patient  is  observed  to  laugh  and  cry  alternately, 
and  altogether  without  any  cause  of  a rational  or 
moral  nature  ; so  that  he  has  almost  the  appearance 
of  fatuity,  or  of  being  delirious.  But  spectral  illu- 
sions or  visionary  sights  are  among  its  most  striking 
attendants.  The  subjects  of  it  distinctly  see  every 
description  of  forms ; trees,  houses,  men,  women, 
dogs,  and  other  inferior  animals,  balls  of  fire,  ce- 
lestial beings,  &c.  We  can,  without  doubt,  safely 
refer  to  the  experience  of  those  who  have  been  much 
conversant  with  instances  of  this  disease  in  confirm- 
ation of  this* 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  135 

The  existence  of  the  states  of  mind  under  con- 
sideration might,  without  much  question,  be  found, 
on  farther  examination,  to  connect  itself  with  other 
forms  of  disease.  The  subject  is  certainly  worthy, 
whether  considered  in  relation  to  science  or  to  hu- 
man happiness,  of  such  farther  developements  as  it 
is  capable  of  receiving. 

§ 76.  Of  Ghosts  and  other  Spectral  Appearances . 

In  connexion  with  what  has  been  said  in  this  and 
some  of  the  preceding  chapters,  it  may  not  be  out 
of  place  to  add  something  in- explanation  of  ghosts 
and  other  spectral  appearances,  which  occupy  so 
conspicuous  a place  in  popular  superstitions. 
Ghosts  are  partly  apparitions,  taking  that  term 
as  it  has  been  illustrated,  and  in  part  mental  illu- 
sions, arising  from  not  viewing  objects  aright.  In 
respect  to  all  appearances  of  this  nature,  remark,  I. — 
That  they  are  seen  most  frequently  in  the  dark,  hard- 
ly any  one  pretending  to  have  seen  them  in  the  day- 
time. And  this  is  a circumstance  altogether  in  fa- 
vour of  the  idea  that  they  are  in  nearly  all  cases,  al- 
though they  cannot  all  be  referred  to  one  cause, 
mere  deceptions  practised  on  us,  either  by  means  of 
the  senses  or  by  means  of  an  excited  internal  con- 
ception, operating  in  some  cases,  perhaps,  upon  a 
disordered  physical  system.  In  the  dark,  as  we  are 
exposed  to  a greater  variety  of  dangers  than  at  other 
times,  our  feelings  are  in  consequence  excited  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  and,  as  there  is  a great  dim- 
ness in  the  outlines  of  objects,  they  readily  assume, 


136  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

when  viewed  under  such  circumstances,  new,  and 
various,  and  uncertain  shapes. 

II._~Let  it  be  observed,  as  another  circumstance 
commonly  attending  their  visitations,  that  ghosts  and 
other  spectres  are  seen  most  frequently  among  peo- 
ple of  very  little  mental  cultivation,  among  the  ig- 
norant. Uninslructed  minds  are  generally  the  most 
credulous.  If  there  were  truly  any  beings  in  nature 
of  this  sort,  and  they  were  anything  more  than  ima- 
ginary appearances,  persons  who  are  well-informed 
and  philosophic  would  stand  a chance,  equally  good 
with  others,  of  forming  an  acquaintance  with  them. 
From  these  two  circumstances  we  seem  to  be  justi- 
fied in  the  supposition,  that  many  of  these  imagina- 
ry beings  are  the  creations  of  a credulous  and  exci- 
ted mind,  viewing  objects  at  an  hour  when  their 
outlines  cannot  be  distinctly  seen. 

§ 77.  Other  Circumstances  characteristic  of  their 

recurrence. 

HI. It  is  to  be  remarked  farther,  that  ghosts, 

whenever  they  present  themselves,  are  found  to 
agree  very  nearly  with  certain  previous  conceptions 
which  persons  have  formed  in  respect  to  them.  If, 
for  instance,  the  ghost  be  the  spirit  of  one  with  whom 
we  have  been  particularly  acquainted,  he  appears 
with  the  same  lineaments,  although  a little  paler, 
and  the  same  dress,  even  to  the  button  on  his  coat ; 
the  dress  in  general,  however,  is  white,  correspond- 
ing to  the  colour  of  the  burial  habiliments  ; so  that 
they  may  be  said  to  have  a personal  or  individual,  a 
generic,  and,  as  some  have  maintained,  a national 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  13? 

character.  “ They  commonly  appear”  (says  Grose, 
^ho  has  written  on  this  subject)  u in  the  same  dress 
hey  wore  while  living;  although  they  are  some- 
times clothed  all  in  white ; but  that  is  chiefly  the 
churchyard  ghosts,  who  have  no  particular  business, 
out  seem  to  appear  pro  bono  publico,  or  to  scare 
drunken  rustics  from  tumbling  over  their  graves. 
Dragging  chains  is  not  the  fashion  of  English 
ghosts,  chains  and  black  vestments  being  chiefly 
the  accoutrements  of  foreign  spectres  seen  in  arbi- 
trary governments.” 

IY. — This  additional  circumstance  remains  also  to 
be  noticed,  viz.,  wherever  ghostly  and  spectral  beings 
have  come  from  the  dead  to  the  living,  it  has  gener- 
ally been  found  that  they  were  among  the  particular 
friends,  although  sometimes  of  the  enemies,  of  those 
whom  they  came  to  see.  This  is  very  natural.  It 
is  our  friends  and  enemies  whom  we  think  most  of; 
much  more  than  of  those  to  whom  we  are  unknown, 
and  towards  whom  our  feelings  are  indifferent.  A 
person,  for  instance,  has  lost  a very  near  friend  by 
death  ; his  soul  is  greatly  distressed  ; and  amid  the 
joys  of  life,  which  have  now  lost  their  charms,  and 
amid  its  cares,  to  which  he  turns  with  a broken 
heart,  he  incessantly  recalls  the  image  so  endeared 
to  him.  What  wonder,  then,  that  his  imagination, 
which,  in  the  light  of  the  day,  was  able  to  keep  be- 
I tore  itself  the  picture  of  the  departed,  should,  in  the 
stillness  and  shades  of  midnight,  when  remembran- 
ces multiply,  and  feelings  grow  deeper  and  deeper, 
mcrease  that  picture  to  the  size,  and  give  to  it  the 
vivid  form  of  real  life  ! These  circumstances  justify 


138  ^PECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

JS  m ascribing,  for  the  most  part,  the  existence  of 
that  supposed  class  of  beings  called  ghosts  (and  we 
may  include  in  the  remark  all  spectres  whatever)  to 
the  two  causes  mentioned  at  the  commencement  of 
this  topic,  viz.,  conceptions  rendered  inordinately  in 
tense,  and  objects  actually  seen,  but  under  such  cir- 
cumstances as  to  be  misrepresented  to  us. 

§ 78.  Farther  Illustrations  and  Remarks  on  the 
same  Subject . 

The  principles  laid  down  in  this  chapter  illustrate 
various  incidents,  hitherto  considered  very  remarka- 
ble, which  are  to  be  found  in  history,  both  ancient  and 
modern.  They  help  to  illustrate,  for  instance,  the 
alleged  appearance  of  Caesar’s  ghost  to  Marcus 
Junius  Brutus  on  the  plains  of  Philippi ; a circum- 
stance which  is  the  foundation  of  a passage  in  the 
play  of  Julius  Caesar. 

“ How  ill  this  taper  burns  ! Ha  ! who  comes  here  ? 

I think  it  is  the  weakness  of  mine  eyes, 

That  shapes  this  monstrous  apparition. 

It  comes  upon  me  ; art  thou  anything? 

Art  thou  some  god,  some  angel,  or  some  devil  V* 

Brutus  was  not  only  greatly  fatigued  at  the  time 
this  terrific  figure  appeared  to  him,  but  his  mind 
was  exceedingly  anxious;  and  we  may  therefore 
well  suppose  that  the  spectral  apparition  was  merely 
an  internal  excited  conception. 

It  is  also  worthy  of  inquiry  whether  these  views 
may  not  account,  in  part  at  least,  for  a singular 
power  of  the  Scotch  Highlanders,  called  the  second 
sight.  Especially  as  they  live  in  a dark,  lonely. 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  139 

and  mountainous  country,  and  their  feelings,  in  com 
sequence,  are  not  only  likely  to  be  quickened  and 
impetuous,  like  their  own  mountain  torrents,  but  to 
possess  a cast  of  melancholy.  Such  a state  of  feel- 
ing is  favourable  to  the  existence  of  inordinately  ex- 
cited conceptions  or  apparitions;  and  apparitions 
(that  is,  the  seeing  of  things  which  are  not  present) 
is  implied  in  the  exercise  of  the  second  sight. 

^ 79.  Remarks  of  Walter  Scott  on  the  subject  of 
Ghost-stories . 

As  the  interest  of  this,  subject  is  not  limited  to 
novelists  and  the  writers  of  romance,  but  is  practi- 
cally and  widely  important,  we  are  induced  to  sub- 
join here  a passage  from  a popular  author,  who  is, 
perhaps,  better  qualified  than  almost  any  other  wii- 
ter  to  form  a correct  opinion  on  it.  “ There  are 
many  ghost-stories  which  we  do  not  feel  at  liberty 
to  challenge  as  impostures,  because  we  are  confi- 
dent that  those  who  relate  them  on  their  own  author- 
ity actually  believe  what  they  assert,  and  may  have 
good  reason  for  doing  so,  though  there  is  no  real 
phantom  after  all.  TVe  are  far,  therefore,  fiom  aver- 
ring that  such  tales  are  necessarily  false.  It  is  easy 
to  suppose  the  visionary  has  been  imposed  upon  by 
a lively  dream,  a waking  revery,  the  excitation  of  a 
powerful  imagination,  or  the  misrepresentation  of  a 
diseased  organ  of  sight ; and,  in  one  or  other  of 
these  causes  (to  say  nothing  of  a system  of  decep- 
tion, which  may,  in  many  instances,  be  probable), 
we  apprehenj  a solution  will  be  found  for  all  cases 
of  what  are  ca/°d  real  ghost-stories. 


140  SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS. 

“ In  irulh,  the  evidence  with  respect  to  such  ap- 
paritions is  very  seldom  accurately  or  distinctly  ques- 
tioned. A supernatural  tale  is,  in  most  cases,  re- 
ceived as  an  agreeable  mode  of  amusing  society, 
and  he  would  be  rather  accounted  a sturdy  moralist 
than  an  entertaining  companion  who  should  employ 
himself  in  assailing  its  credibility.  It  would,  indeed, 
be  a solecism  in  manners,  something  like  that  of 
impeaching  the  genuine  value  of  the  antiquities  ex- 
hibited by  a good-natured  collector  for  the  gratifi- 
cation of  his  guests.  This  difficulty  will  appear 
greater,  should  a company  have  the  rare  good  for- 
tune to  meet  with  the  person  who  himself  witnessed 
the  wonders  which  he  tells  ; a well-bred  or  prudent 
man  will,  under  such  circumstances,  abstain  from 
using  the  rules  of  cross-examination  practised  in  a 
court  of  justice  ; and  if  in  any  case  he  presumes  to 
do  so,  he  is  in  danger  of  receiving  answers,  even 
from  the  most  candid  and  honourable  persons,  which 
are  rather  fitted  to  support  the  credit  of  the  story 
which  they  stand  committed  to  maintain,  than  to  the 
pure  service  of  unadorned  truth.  The  narrator  is 
asked,  for  example,  some  unimportant  question  with 
respect  to  the  apparition  ; he  answers  it  on  the  hasty 
suggestion  of  his  own  imagination,  tinged  as  it  is 
with  belief  of  the  general  fact,  and,  by  doing  so,  often 
gives  a feature  of  minute  evidence  which  was  before 
wanting,  and  this  with  perfect  unconsciousness  on 
his  own  part.  It  is  a rare  occurrence,  indeed,  to 
find  an  opportunity  of  dealing  with  an  actual  ghost- 
seer  ; such  instances,  however,  I have  certainly  my- 
self met  with,  and  that  in  the  case  of  able,  wise, 


SPECTRAL  ILLUSIONS  OR  APPARITIONS.  141 

candid,  and  resolute  persons,  of  whose  veracity  I 
had  every  reason  to  be  confident.  But,  in  such  in- 
stances, shades  of  mental  aberration  have  afterward 
occurred,  which  sufficiently  accounted  for  the  sup- 
posed apparitions,  and  will  incline  me  always  to  feel 
alarmed  in  behalf  of  the  continued  health  of  a friend 
who  should  conceive  himself  to  have  witnessed  such 
a visitation. 

“ The  nearest  approximation  which  can  be  gen- 
erally made  to  exact  evidence  in  this  case,  is  the 
word  of  some  individual  who  has  had  the  story,  it 
may  be,  from  the  person  to  whom  it  has  happened, 
but  most  likely  from  his  family  or  some  friend  of 
the  family.  Far  more  commonly,  the  narrator  pos- 
sesses no  better  means  of  knowledge  than  that  of 
dwelling  in  the  country  where  the  thing  happened, 
or  being  well  acquainted  with  the  outside  of  the 
mansion  in  the  inside  of  which  the  ghost  appeared. 

“ In  every  point,  the  evidence  of  such  a second- 
hand retailer  of  the  mystic  story  must  fall  under  the 
adjudged  case  in  an  English  court.  The  judge 
stopped  a witness  who  was  about  to  give  an  account 
of  the  murder,  upon  trial,  as  it  was  narrated  to  him 
by  the  ghost  of  the  murdered  person.  ‘Hold,  sir,’ 
said  his  lordship  ; ‘ the  ghost  is  an  excellent  wit- 
ness, and  his  evidence  the  best  possible  ; but  he 
cannot  be  heard  by  proxy  in  this  court.  Summon 
him  hither,  and  I’ll  hear  him  in  person ; but  your 
communication  is  mere  hearsay,  which  my  office 
compels  me  to  reject.’  Yet  it  is  upon  the  credit  ol 
one  man,  who  pledges  it  upon  that  of  three  or  four 
persons,  who  have  told  it  successively  to  each  other, 


142  DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 

that  vve  are  often  expected  to  believe  an  incident  in 
consistent  with  the  laws  of  nature,  however  agreea- 
ble  to  our  love  of  the  wonderful  and  the  horrible.”1 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE  POWER  OF  ABSTRAC- 
TION. 

§ 80.  Remarks  on  the  general  JYature  of  this 
Power . 

The  power  of  abstraction  is  not,  properly  speak 
ing,  an  original  and  distinct  source  of  knowledge  ; 
but  it  furnishes,  nevertheless,  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant means,  in  virtue  of  which  the  knowledge 
which  we  have  may  be  separated  from  other  knowl- 
edge, and  contemplated  in  a new  aspect.  It  is  the 
perceptive  power  (the  external  perceptivity)  which 
gives  the  carpenter  a knowledge  of  the  log  of  wood, 
upon  which  he  finds  himself  employed  ; but  it  is  the 
abstractive  power  which  enables  him  to  contemplate 
this  complex  object  in  its  parts,  separating  the  vari- 
ous traits  or  qualities  of  length,  breadth,  hardness, 
firmness,  texture,  colour,  and  the  like,  and  making 
them,  in  their  state  of  intellectual  insulation  from 
each  other,  the  subjects  of  fixed  and  distinct  exam- 
ination. It  applies  equally  well  to  external  and  to 
* Scott’s  Demonology  and  Witchcraft,  Letter  X. 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION. 


143 


internal  objects  ; it  separates  and  holds  in  its  grasp 
the  invisible  objects  of  mind,  as  well  as  the  visible 
and  tangible  objects  of  outward  sense  ; and  hence, 
if  other  things  furnish  no  reason  to  the  contrary,  it 
may,  without  impropriety,  be  considered  under  the 
general  head  of  the  External  Intellect  as  well  as  at 
any  subsequent  place. 

§ 81.  Farther  considerations  on  the  Nature  of  this 
Poiver. 

In  order  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  abstrac- 
tive power  more  fully,  we  proceed  to  say  farther, 
that  in  every  case  of  abstraction  there  appears  to  be 
a number  of  things  involved.  In  the  first  place,  it 
is  implied  that  the  object  in  respect  to  which  the  act 
of  abstraction  is  to  take  place,  is  complex ; or,  if  the 
object  be  not  complex,  that  there  is,  at  least,  a com- 
bination of  objects  or  parts  of  objects  present  to  the 
mind.  There  is  implied  farther,  that  in  every  case 
of  abstraction  there  must  necessarily  be  a determi- 
nation, a choice,  an  act  of  the  will.  This  internal 
voluntary  movement  must  concern  the  complex  ob- 
ject before  the  mind ; or,  if  the  object  be  not  one, 
the  combination  of  objects  before  the  mind,  in  some 
specific  and  precise  point  of  view,  rather  than  an- 
other. So  that  we  may  truly  and  justly  be  said  to 
have  not  only  a desire,  but  a determination  to  con- 
sider or  examine  some  part  of  the  complex  object 
or  objects  before  us  more  particularly  than  other 
parts.  When  the  mind  is  in  this  manner  directed 
to  any  particular  object  out  of  many,  or  to  any  par- 
ticular part  of  a single  complex  object,  we  find  it  to 
M 


144 


DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 


be  the  fact,  that  the  principle  of  association,  or  what- 
ever principle  it  is  which  keeps  the  other  objects  or 
parts  of  objects  in  their  state  of  union  with  it,  ceases, 
in  a greater  or  less  degree,  to  operate  and  to  main- 
tain that  union  ; the  other  objects  rapidly  fall  off  and 
disappear,  and  the  particular  object  or  part  of  an  ob- 
ject, towards  which  the  mind  is  especially  directed, 
remains  the  sole  subject  of  consideration.  That  is 
to  say,  it  is  abstracted,  or  becomes,  as  it  is  repre- 
sented and  exists  in  the  mind,  an  abstract  idea.  And 
if  this  be  a correct  statement  of  the  matter,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  abstractive  power  is  not,  properly 
speaking,  a simple  power,  but  implies  a complex 
movement  of  the  mental  action. 

It  ought,  perhaps,  to  be  added  here,  that  the  ab- 
straction or  separation  of  the  object  may  exist  men- 
tally when  it  cannot  take  place  in  the  object  itself. 
For  instance,  the  size,  the  figure,  length,  breadth, 
colour,  &c.,  of  a building,  may  each  of  them  be 
made  subjects  of  separate  mental  consideration,  al- 
though there  cannot  be  an  actual  or  real  separation 
of  all,  or,  perhaps,  any  of  these  things  in  the  build- 
ing itself. 

§ 82.  Of  Natural  Defect  in  the  Power  of  Ab- 
straction. 

The  power  of  abstraction,  to  a greater  or  less  ex- 
tent, is  unquestionably  one  of  the  leading  attributes 
of  human  nature.  Many  discussions  have  arisen  in 
relation  to  it.  Whether  it  is  or  is  not  a power  pos- 
sessed by  brute  animals,  has  been  made  a matter  of 
inquiry  ; but  this  is  a point  which  it  is  not  necessary 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION.  145 

to  discuss  here.  Whatever  may  be  true  of  brute 
animals,  certain  it  is,  at  any  rate,  that  man  could  not 
be  what  he  is  without  it ; and  that  the  want  of  it  to 
any  great  extent,  and  also  its  disordered  action, 
whatever  phasis  the  irregularity  may  assume,  must 
be  regarded  as  a great  misfortune. 

In  some  instances  the  abstractive  power  is  sim- 
ply defective  ; it  falls  below  that  average  amount  of 
energy  which  characterizes  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind. It  may  not,  however,  be  always  easy  to  de- 
tect this  deficiency.  It  shows  itself,  as  a general 
statement,  in  a dulness  or  hebetude  of  mind,  in  a 
mingling  and  confusion  of  objects,  which  is  some- 
times mistaken  for  the  mere  want  of  external  per- 
ception. 

But  perhaps  we  may  be  a little  more  specific,  and 
go  a little  more  into  particulars.  The  classification 
of  objects  implies  the  exercise  of  abstraction.  Its 
exercise  is  implied,  again,  in  the  giving  of  general 
names,  and  also  in  the  formation  and  use  of  num- 
bers. These  are  its  common  and  almost  necessary 
results,  saying  nothing  of  the  immense  power  which, 
in  its  higher  efforts,  it  gives  to  the  human  mind. 
Hence  the  man,  in  whom  this  power  is  naturally  de- 
ficient, fails  very  much  in  distinguishing  one  class  of 
objects  from  another,  even  if  there  is  no  marked  de- 
fect in  the  external  perceptive  powers.  He  mistakes 
and  confounds  the  names  of  objects,  as  well  as  the 
objects  themselves.  Incapable  of  separating  the  at- 
tributes of  things,  by  which  they  are  distinguished 
one  from  another,  he  seems  to  behold  them  in  a 
dilated  and  unformed  mass,  as  objects  are  seen  in  a 


146 


DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 


mist.  In  respect  to  the  uses,  powers,  and  relations 
of  numbers,  and  to  all  the  truths  and  processes  in- 
volved in  mathematical  formularies,  he  is  utterly 
at  a loss  ; he  stands  aghast,  and  feels  very  much  as 
does  the  sailor,  in  the  midst  of  a boundless  ocean 
without  chart  or  compass. 

§ 83.  Illustrations  of  natural  Defect  in  this  Power 

How  often  such  instances  of  deficient  abstractive 
power  occur,  we  are  not  able  to  say.  Undoubtedly 
the  weakness  of  some  inefficient  minds  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  located  here,  which,  as  it  is  presented  tc 
the  unpractised  eye  of  common  observation,  would 
be  ascribed  to  some  other  part  of  the  mind ; perhaps 
to  the  perceptive  powers,  to  memory,  or  to  reason- 
ing. If  such  is  the  case,  the  instances  of  defective 
abstractiveness,  if  such  an  expression  may  be  allow- 
able, are  more  frequent  than  is  commonly  supposed. 

We  have  just  had  occasion  to  intimate  that  the 
power  of  abstraction  is  called  into  exercise  in  the 
formation,  understanding,  and  application  of  num- 
bers. Something  farther  may  properly  be  said  here. 
Before  we  can  consider  objects  as  forming  a multi- 
tude, or  are  able  to  number  them,  it  seems  necessa- 
ry to  be  able  to  apply  to  them  a common  name. 
This  we  cannot  do  until  we  have  reduced  them  to  a 
genus  or  species  ; and  the  slighest  reflection  will 
sufficiently  show  that  the  formation  of  genera  and 
species  necessarily  implies  the  exercise  of  the  ab- 
stractive power.  If  the  formation  and  the  use  of 
numbers,  and  the  knowledge  of  mathematical  truths 
and  relations  generally,  rest  upon  the  exercise  of 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION. 


147 


the  abstractive  power,  then  we  may,  perhaps,  find  in 
truths  of  this  nature  the  readiest  and  most  decisive 
test  of  the  original  weakness  or  strength  of  that 
power.  Where  there  is  a great  natural  deficiency 
of  the  power  in  question,  the  mind  recedes  from  the 
presence  of  diagrams  and  numerical  processes  as 
instinctively  as  the  sensitive  plant  falls  back  from 
the  roughest  touch.  The  records  of  literary  institu- 
tions too  often  show  that  such  cases,  though  not  al- 
ways in  the  highest  degree,  have  an  existence.  Ex- 
treme cases,  however,  sometimes  occur. 

Dr.  Gall  mentions  a citizen  of  Paris,  not  alto- 
gether wanting  in  intelligence  in  other  respects,  who, 
to  use  his  own  language,  “ is  so  destitute  of  the 
talent  of  combining  numbers,  that  it  has  always  been 
impossible  to  make  him  comprehend  that  two  and 
two  make  four,  or  that  two  and  one  make  three.” * 
What  a difference  (it  would  require  no  feeble  calcu- 
lus to  estimate  it)  between  the  abstractive  power  of 
such  a man,  and  that  of  Leibnitz  and  Newton ! 

§ 84.  Of  excessive  Facility  and  Profoundness  in 
the  Abstracting  Power. 

Abstraction  (although  this  is  not  all  that  is  involv- 
ed in  the  term)  implies  the  direction  of  the  attention 
to  the  particular  abstracted  objects  before  the  mind, 
exclusive  of  other  objects.  This  state  of  mind  is, 
perhaps,  in  no  case  a perfect  one.  Other  objects 
will,  from  time  to  time  slightly  obtrude  themselves 
on  the  mind’s  notice  ; disturbing,  though  not  essen- 
tially interrupting,  the  chain  of  thought.  And  this 
* Gall’s  Works,  Boston  ed.,  vol.  v.,  p.  93. 


148 


DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 


seems  to  be  the  intention  of  nature,  viz.,  that,  even 
in  profound  abstraction,  there  should  be  something 
conservative,  and  that  an  individual,  in  thinking  of 
the  subject  before  him,  should  not  absolutely  forget 
what  belongs  to  himself  as  a man.  Accordingly, 
this  faculty  (for  such  we  call  it,  although  there  are  a 
number  of  things  involved  in  it,  making  it  a complex 
rather  than  a simple  power)  may  undoubtedly  be  dis- 
ordered by  too  great  facility  and  profoundness.  In 
such  cases,  as  in  all  others,  it  is  altogether  probable 
that  the  abstractive  power  operates,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, under  the  direction  of  the  will.  The  mind 
is  directed  towards  a particular  subject,  and  con- 
templates it  in  its  own  and  in  its  relative  abstract- 
ness, because  the  individual  chooses  or  wills  to  do 
it.  But  the  abstraction  speedily  becomes  so  intense, 
that  the  energy  of  the  will  seems,  under  these  new 
circumstances,  unequal  to  the  control  of  the  mental 
action.  The  restorative  power  seems  to  be  quite  in 
abeyance.  The  man  remains  profoundly  adhesive, 
if  we  may  be  allowed  the  expressions,  in  the  mud 
of  his  own  contemplations  ; apparently  unable  to  get 
out  himself,  and  insensible,  to  a most  remarkable 
degree,  to  any  suggestions  and  appliances  which 
may  come  from  any  other  source.  For  the  time 
being,  he  is  a lost  man ; not  only  lost  to  the  exter- 
nalities of  common  decency  and  propriety,  but  lost 
to  himself;  and  ignorant,  in  another  sense  than  that 
of  the  Apostle  Paul,  whether  be  is  in  the  body  or  out 
of  the  body. 

Such  persons  sometimes  have  the  reputation  of 
profound  men.  Profound  men  they  undoubtedly 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION. 


149 


are ; but  it  is  generally  much  less  evident  that  they 
are  men  of  good  common  sense,  oi  that  they  are 
practically  useful.  Their  abstractiveness  (a  conve- 
nient single  term  to  express  the  faculty  in  question) 
is  out  of  proportion  to  the  other  powers  of  the  mind, 
so  that  the  other  powers  seem  to  be  absorbed  in 
this.  In  the  language  of  Dr.  Good,  “ all  the  ex- 
ternal senses  remain  in  a state  of  torpor  ; so  that  the 
eyes  do  not  see,  nor  the  ears  hear,  nor  the  flesh  feel; 
and  the  miser  may  be  spoken  to,  or  conversation 
may  take  place  around  him,  or  he  may  even  be 
struck  upon  the  shoulders,  without  any  knowledge  of 
what  is  occurring.” 

§ 85.  Further  Illustrations  of  this  Topic. 

It  is  true  that  a man  of  a perfectly  sound  mind 
may,  under  some  accidental  circumstances  (perhaps 
under  the  influence  of  some  uncommon  feelings  of 
curiosity,  or  of  joy,  or  of  sorrow),  be  absorbed  to 
that  degree  of  intensity  which  has  now  been  descri- 
bed. But  when  this  is  frequently  the  case ; when 
a man  is  liable,  at  any  time  and  place,  to  be  carried 
out  of  the  reach  of  all  ordinary  facts  and  relations 
into  the  region  of  pure  and  unmitigated  ideality,  the 
description  of  a perfectly  sound  mind  will  not  apply 
with  perfect  propriety.  We  do  not  mean  to  inti- 
mate that  he  is  what,  in  common  parlance,  is  termed 
a crazy  man,  and  that  he  is,  generally  speaking,  a 
proper  subject  of  those  precautions  which  craziness 
implies,  but  simply  to  say  that  the  description  oi' 
perfect  soundness  is  inappropriate.  The  true  bal- 
ance of  the  mind  is  lost.  He  is  what  the  people, 


150 


DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 


with  a significant  whisper,  sometimes  call  an  odd 
man,  perhaps  a very  odd  man. 

We  know  but  little  of  the  personal  and  private 
history  of  Archimedes,  the  justly  celebrated  geom- 
etrician of  Syracuse.  But,  so  far  as  we  have  a 
knowledge  of  him,  he  might,  perhaps,  be  justly  con- 
sidered as  at  least  a partial  illustration  of  the  views 
which  have  been  given.  He  was  occupied  with 
some  geometrical  demonstration  at  the  very  time 
when  the  Roman  army  took  Syracuse,  and  so  in- 
ter) :ly  engaged  in  it  that  he  was  wholly  insensible  to 
the  &cenes  of  confusion  and  suffering  which  ensued, 
and  to  the  shouts  and  outcries  which  everywhere  re- 
sounded. He  was  even  calmly  drawing  the  lines  ot 
a diagram,  when  a soldier  suddenly  entered  his  room 
and  placed  a sword  to  his  throat.  “ Hold,  friend” 
(said  Archimedes),  “ one  moment,  and  my  demon- 
stration will  be  finished.” 

At  any  rate,  whatever  may  have  been  true  of  the 
Syracusan  geometrician,  such  instances  are  un- 
doubtedly to  be  found.  It  is  unquestionably  the 
case,  that  there  are  men  who  have  the  power  of  vol- 
untarily abstracting  their  minds  from  every  other 
subject,  and  fixing  it  intensely  upon  the  subject  be- 
fore them,  without  possessing  an  equal  power  ot 
promptly  recalling  their  attention  to  other  objects 
which  may  happen  in  the  mean  while  to  present  a 
reasonable  claim  upon  their  notice.  Sir  Walter 
Scott,  in  the  Romance  of  St.  Ronan’s  Well,  has 
given,  with  his  usual  descriptive  accuracy,  a deline- 
ation of  one  of  this  class,  in  the  following  terms  : 
“ Bewildered  amid  abstruse  researches,  metaphysi 


L 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION 


151 


cal  and  historical,  Mr.  Cargill,  living  only  for  him- 
self and  his  books,  acquired  many  ludicrous  habits, 
which  exposed  the  secluded  student  to  the  ridicule  of 
the  world,  and  which  tinged,  though  they  did  not  al- 
together obscure,  the  natural  civility  of  an  amiable 
disposition,  as  well  as  the  acquired  habits  of  polite- 
ness which  he  had  learned  in  the  good  society  that 
frequented  Lord  Bidmore’s  mansion.  He  not  only 
indulged  in  neglect  of  dress  and  appearance,  and  all 
those  ungainly  tricks  which  men  are  apt  to  acquire 
by  living  very  much  alone  ; but  besides,  and  espe- 
cially, he  became  probably  the  most  abstracted  and 
absent  man  of  a profession  peculiarly  liable  to  cher- 
ish such  habits.  No  man  fell  so  regularly  into  the 
habit  of  mistaking,  or,  in  Scottish  phrase,  misken- 
ning  the  person  he  spoke  to,  or  more  frequently  in- 
quired at  an  old  maid  after  her  husband,  at  a child- 
less wife  after  her  young  people,  at  the  distressed 
widower  after  the  wife  at  whose  funeral  he  himself 
had  assisted  but  a fortnight  before  ; and  none  was 
ever  more  familiar  with  strangers  whom  he  had  nev- 
er seen,  or  seemed  more  estranged  from  those  who 
had  a title  to  think  themselves  known  to  him.  The 
worthy  man  perpetually  confounded  sex,  age,  and 
calling  ; and  when  a blind  beggar  extended  his  hand 
for  charity,  he  has  been  known  to  return  the  civility 
by  taking  off  his  hat,  making  a low  bow,  and  hoping 
his  worship  was  well.”* 

* St.  Ronaa’s  Wdl,  chap.  xvj. 


152 


DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 


§ 86.  Illustration  from  Bruy  ere*  s Manners  of  the 

Age. 

Bruyere  sketches  a character,  under  the  name  of 
Menalcas,  which,  in  some  of  its  points  at  least,  cor- 
responds to  the  views  which  have  now  been  present- 
ed. “ Menalcas  (the  character  is  supposed  to  have 
been  drawn  from  life,  viz.,  the  Count  de  Brancas) 
goes  down  stairs,  opens  the  door  to  go  out,  shuts  it. 
He  perceives  that  his  nightcap  is  still  on ; and,  ex- 
amining himself  a little  better,  finds  but  one  half  of 
his  face  shaved,  his  sword  on  his  right  side,  his 
stockings  hanging  over  his  heels,  and  his  shirt  out 
of  his  breeches.  If  he  walks  into  the  street,  he  feels 
something  strike  on  the  face  or  stomach.  He  can’t 
imagine  what  it  is,  till  waking  and  opening  his  eyes, 
he  sees  himself  by  a cartwheel,  or  under  a joiner’s 
penthouse,  with  the  coffins  about  his  ears.  One 
time  you  might  have  seen  him  run  against  a blind 
man,  push  him  backward,  and  afterward^  fall  over 
him.  Sometimes  he  happens  to  come  up,  forehead 
to  forehead,  with  a prince,  and  obstructs  his  passage. 
With  much  ado  he  recollects  himself,  and  has  but 
just  time  to  squeeze  himself  close  to  a wall  to  make 
room  for  him.  He  seeks  quarrels  and  brawls,  puts 
himself  into  a heat,  calls  to  his  servants,  and  tells 
them,  one  after  another,  everything  is  lost  or  out  of 
the  way,  and  demands  his  gloves,  which  he  has  on 
his  hands  ; like  the  woman,  who  asked  for  her  mask 
when  she  had  it  on  her  face.  He  enters  an  apart- 
ment, passes  under  a sconce,  on  which  his  periwig 
hitches,  and  is  left  hanging.  The  courtiers  look  on 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION. 


153 


him  and  laugh.  Menalcas  laughs  too,  louder  than 
any  of  them,  and  turns  his  eyes  round  the  company 
to  see  the  man  who  shows  his  ears  and  h^s  lost  his 
wig.  He  says  yes,  commonly,  instead  of  no. 
And  when  he  says  no,  you  must  suppose  he  would 
say  yes.  When  he  answers  you,  perhaps  his  eyes 
are  fixed  on  yours,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  he 
sees  you,  nor  any  one  else,  nor  anything  in  the 
world.  All  that  you  can  draw  from  him,  when  he 
is  most  sociable,  are  some  such  words  as  these  : 
Yes , indeed , ’ Us  true , good,  all  the  better,  sincerely,  1 
believe  so,  certainly,  ah,  oh,  heaven,  and  some  other 
monosyllables,  which  are  not  spoken  in  the  right 
place  neither.  He  never  is  among  those  whom  he 
appears  to  be  with.  He  calls  his  footman  very  se- 
riously, Sir,  and  his  friend,  Robin . He  says  your 
Reverence  to  a prince  of  the  blood,  and  your  High- 
ness to  a Jesuit.  When  he  is  at  mass,  if  the  priest 
sneezes,  he  cries  out,  4 God  bless  you?  He  is  in 
company  with  a judge,  grave  by  his  character,  and 
venerable  by  his  age  and  dignity,  who  asks  him  if 
such  a thing  is  so.  Menalcas  replies,  4 Yes,  madam? 
As  he  came  up  once  from  the  country,  his  footmen 
attempted  to  rob  him  and  succeeded.  They  jump- 
ed down  from  behind  the  coach,  presented  the  end 
of  a flambeau  to  his  throat,  demanded  his  purse,  and 
he  delivered  it  to  them.  Being  come  home,  he  told 
the  adventure  to  his  friends,  who  asked  him  the  cir- 
cumstances, and  he  referred  them  to  his  servants 
« Inquire  of  my  men,’  said  he,  4 they  were  there.’  ’’ 


154 


DISORDERED  STATE  OF  THE 


§ 87.  Other  instances  illustrative  of  excessive  Ab- 
straction. 

We  may,  perhaps,  in  this  connexion,  although  it 
is  not  without  some  degree  of  hesitation  that  we  do 
it,  refer  to  the  case  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  as  a per- 
son in  whom  the  abstractive  power,  sometimes  at 
least,  seems  to  have  showed  itself  in  excess.  His 
mind,  in  the  exercise  of  this  power,  seized  the  sub- 
ject before  it,  insulated  it,  removed  everything  else 
to  an  unseen  distance,  and  held  it  in  its  inextricable 
grasp  firmly  and  alone  ; but,  in  doing  this,  the  ab- 
stractive power  seems  to  have  absorbed  all  the  other 
mental  powers  ; and  while  the  subject  of  his  exam- 
ination was  so  thoroughly  brought  within  its  control 
as  to  be  in  some  sense  lost  in  the  mind,  it  might  be 
said,  with  almost  equal  truth,  that  the  philosopher 
was  lost  in  the  subject.  His  biographers  assure  us 
(and  the  facts  which  they  detail  sufficiently  confirm 
their  statements),  that  his  thoughts  at  such  times,  as 
he  sat  for  hours  on  his  bedside  without  dressing  him- 
self, or  in  some  other  position  equally  indicative  of 
their  intensity,  appeared  to  preserve  no  connexion 
with  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life. 

Still  more  striking  was  this  singular  trait  in  Dr. 
Robert  Hamilton,  the  author  of  a celebrated  “ Es- 
say on  the  National  Debt,”  and  esteemed  a pro- 
found and  clear-headed  philosopher.  A writer  in 
the  New  Monthly  Magazine,  after  speaking  of  the 
profound  science,  beautiful  arrangement,  and  clear 
expression,  characteristic  of  Dr.  Hamilton’s  wri- 
tings, goes  on  to  say  ; “Yet,  in  public,  the  man  was 


POWER  OF  ABSTRACTION. 


155 


a shadow  ; pulled  off  his  hat  to  his  own  wife  in  the 
streets,  and  apologized  for  not  having  the  pleasure 
of  her  acquaintance ; went  to  his  classes  in  the  col- 
lege on  the  dark  mornings,  with  one  of  her  white 
stockings  on  one  leg,  and  one  of  his  own  black 
ones  on  the  other ; often  spent  the  whole  time  of 
the  meeting  in  moving  from  the  table  the  hats  of  the 
students,  which  they  as  constantly  returned ; some- 
times invited  them  to  call  on  him,  and  then  fined 
them  for  coming  to  insult  him.  He  would  run 
against  a cow  in  the  road,  turn  round,  beg  her  par- 
don, 4 Madam,’  and  hope  she  was  not  hurt.  At 
other  times  he  would  run  against  posts,  and  chide 
them  for  not  getting  out  of  his  way ; and  yet  his 
conversation  at  the  same  time,  if  anybody  happen- 
ed to  be  with  him,  was  perfect  logic  and  perfect 
music.” 

The  case  of  the  Rev.  Dr.  George  Harvest,  one 
of  the  ministers  of  Thames  Ditton,  and  said  to  have 
been  a man  of  uncommon  abilities  and  an  excel- 
lent scholar,  is  very  similar.  44  He  was  once”  (so 
say  the  accounts  of  the  peculiarities  which  distin- 
guished him)  44  on  the  eve  of  being  married  to  the 
bishop’s  daughter,  when,  having  gone  a gudgeon 
fishing,  he  forgot  the  circumstance,  and  overstayed 
the  canonical  hour,  which  so  offended  the  lady  that 
she  indignantly  broke  off  the  match.  If  a beggar 
happened  to  take  off  his  hat  to  him  in  the  streets,  in 
hopes  of  receiving  alms,  he  would  make  him  a bow, 
tell  him  he  was  his  most  humble  servant,  and  walk 
on.  He  has  been  known  on  Sundays  to  forget 
the  days  on  which  he  was  to  officiate,  and  would 


156  DISORDERED  STATE,  ETC. 

walk  ir  to  church  with  his  gun  under  his  arm,  to  as- 
certain what  the  people  wanted  there.  Once,  when 
he  was  playing  at  backgammon,  he  poured  out  a 
glass  of  wine,  and  it  being  his  turn  to  throw,  having 
the  box  in  one  hand  and  the  glass  in  the  other,  and 
being  extremely  dry,  he  swallowed  down  both  the 
dice,  and  discharged  the  wine  upon  the  dice-board. 

“ His  notorious  heedlessness  was  so  apparent 
that  no  one  would  lend  him  a horse,  as  he  frequent- 
ly lost  his  beast  from  under  him,  or,  at  least,  from 
out  of  his  hands,  it  being  his  frequent  practice  to 
dismount  and  lead  the  horse,  putting  the  bridle  un- 
der his  arm,  which  the  horse  sometimes  shook  off, 
or  the  intervention  of  a post  occasioned  it  to  fall. 
Sometimes  it  was  taken  off  by  the  boys,  when  the 
parson  was  seen  drawing  his  bridle  after  him  ; and 
if  any  one  asked  him  after  the  animal,  he  could  not 
give  the  least  account  of  it,  or  how  he  had  lost  it.”* 

Instances  of  this  kind  might  be  easily  multiplied. 
It  will  be  noticed,  that  in  cases  such  as  have  been 
enumerated,  the  leading  trait  is  not  mere  weakness 
of  the  mind,  not  that  specific  characteristic  which  is 
known  in  writers  on  Insanity  under  the  name  of  im- 
becility, not  mere  helplessness  and  wandering  of  the 
attention  ; but  an  excessive  facility  and  profound- 
ness of  abstraction,  which  results  in  excluding  all 
notice  of  everything,  whether  of  greater  or  less  im- 
portance, excepting  the  particular  subject  which  at 
the  moment  happens  to  occupy  the  mind.  No  mat- 
ter what  the  nature  of  the  subject  is.  It  may  be  of 
great  moment  or  of  very  trivial  moment ; the  crea- 
* Macnish’s  Philosophy  of  Sleep,  ch.  xvii. 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


157 


tion  of  a world  or  the  birth  of  an  insect.  It  is  all 
the  same  to  Menalcas.  Relatively  to  him,  there  is 
nothing  which,  for  the  time  being,  comes  at  all  into 
comparison.  The  proprieties  of  time  and  place  ; the 
conventional  decencies  and  civilities  of  society ; the 
claims  of  age,  talents,  and  station  ; the  common 
practical  duties  of  life  ; everything,  in  a word,  is  dis- 
regarded, forgotten,  involuntarily  thrown  out  of  ac- 
count. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 

§ 88.  Of  the  general  nature  of  attention. 

The  mere  fact  of  Attention  or  mental  Concen- 
tration is,  unquestionably,  a different  thing  from 
Concentrativeness,  or  that  elementary  power  (if 
such  there  be,  and  whatever  may  be  its  nature)  by 
means  of  which  we  give  attention.  Our  inquiries, 
in  the  first  place,  have  relation  to  the  fact  of  atten- 
tion rather  than  the  power.  Probably  we  come  near 
the  common  view  of  the  matter  by  saying,  in  general 
terms,  that  attention  expresses  the  state  of  the  mind 
when  it  is  steadily  and  strongly  directed  to  the  ob- 
ject, whatever  it  is,  which  happens  to  be  before  it. 
As  the  mind,  in  the  exercise  of  Attention,  generally 
directs  itself  to  a particular  object,  exclusive  of  other 


158 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


objects,  it  is  not  surprising  that  atteniion  should 
sometimes  be  confounded  with  Abstraction.  Atten- 
tion, however,  does  not  make  it  a chief  or  leading 
object,  as  Abstraction  does,  to  consider  things  apart, 
and  in  a state  of  isolation  from  each  other,  but  par- 
ticularly to  consider  them  fixedly  and  closely,  wheth- 
er they  present  themselves  to  the  mind  alone  or  in 
connexion  with  other  objects.  In  other  words,  the 
grasp  which  the  perceptive  power  fixes  upon  the  ob- 
ject of  its  contemplations,  whether  considered  as  one 
or  many,  abstractly  or  complexly,  is  essentially  an 
undivided,  an  unbroken  one. 

In  what  way  the  perceptive  or  intellective  power 
is  able  to  do  this,  it  may  not  be  an  easy  matter  to 
determine  with  entire  certainty.  But  the  probability 
is,  that  it  is  owing  to  a distinct  and  specific  act  of 
the  will,  directing,  condensing,  and  confining  to  a 
particular  point,  the  movement  of  the  percipient  na- 
ture. So  that  in  all  cases  of  attention  the  act  of  the 
mind  may  be  regarded  as  a complex  one,  involving 
not  only  the  mere  perceptions,  or  series  of  percep- 
tions, but  also  an  act  of  the  will,  founded  on  some 
feeling  of  desire  or  sentiment  of  duty.  It  is  the  act 
of  the  will,  prompted,  in  general,  by  the  feeling  of 
desire  or  interest,  which  keeps  the  mind  intense  and 
fixed  in  its  position.  Nevertheless,  as  we  gener- 
ally have  reference,  when  we  speak  of  this  subject, 
to  the  intellectual  movement  rather  than  to  the  voli- 
tive  or  voluntary  energy  which  may  be  supposed  to 
lay  back  of  it,  it  is  not  without  reason  that  we  pro- 
pose to  consider  it  under  the  head  of  the  intellect 
rather  than  under  any  subsequent  division.  And,  as 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


159 


Attention,  like  Abstraction,  is  as  predicable  of  the 
External  Intellect  as  of  the  Internal,  it  may  as  well 
be  considered  under  the  former  subordinate  division 
as  under  the  latter. 

§ 89.  Of  differences  in  the  Degree  of  Attention, 

It  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  we  often  speak  of  At- 
tention as  great  or  small,  as  existing  in  a very  high 
or  a very  slight  degree.  When  the  view  of  the 
mind  is  only  momentary,  and  is  unaccompanied,  as 
it  generally  is  at  such  times,  with  any  force  oi  emo- 
tion or  energy  of  volitive  action,  then  the  attention 
is  said  to  be  slight.  When,  on  the  contrary,  the 
mind  directs  itself  to  an  object  or  series  of  objects 
with  earnestness,  and  for  a considerable  length  of 
time,  and  refuses  to  attend  to  anything  else,  then  the 
attention  is  said  to  be  intense. 

Some  persons  possess  a command  of  attention  in 
a very  high  degree.  There  have  been  mathemati- 
cians who  were  able  to  investigate  the  most  abstruse 
and  complicated  problems  amid  'every  variety  and 
character  of  disturbance.  It  is  said  of  Julius  Caesar, 
that,  while  writing  a despatch,  he  could  at  the  same 
time  dictate  four  others  to  his  secretaries  ; and,  if 
he  did  not  write  himself,  could  dictate  seven  letters 
at  once.  The  same  thing  is  asserted  also  of  the 
Emperor  Napoleon,  who  had  a wonderful  capability 
of  directing  his  whole  mental  energy  to  whatever 
came  before  him.* — Many  other  striking  instances 
of  this  kind,  illustrating  the  immense  energy  of  at- 
tention which  is  characteristic  of  some  individuals, 
might  be  introduced  here  if  it  were  necessary. 

* Elements  of  Mental  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.,  $ 153,  3ded. 

N • 


160 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


§ 90.  Of  Jlbsence  of  Mind , or  inability  to  fix  the 
Attention . 

But  this  view  of  the  subject,  viz.,  great  strength 
or  energy  of  attention,  is  of  less  consequence  to  us, 
in  our  present  inquiries,  than  the  opposite.  In  some 
men  there  seems  to  be  an  utter  inability  to  detain 
the  intellect,  for  any  length  of  time,  upon  a given 
topic.  Every  new  object  which  presents  itself, 
every  new  idea  which  arises  in  the  mind,  claims  the 
attention,  slight  as  it  is,  which  had  just  before  been 
given  to  some  other  object  or  some  other  thought. 
The  mind  may  be  considered  as  in  a state  of  con- 
stant transition  from  object  to  object,  almost  without 
motive  and  without  purpose. 

Such  a state  of  the  mind  is,  in  the  highest  degree, 
unfortunate.  It  is  fatal  to  the  acquisition  of  knowl- 
edge^ If  the  eye  of  the  student,  who  is  the  subject 
of  it,  is  fixed  upon  his  book,  it  is  probable  that  his 
thoughts  are  altogether  removed  from  any  connex- 
ion with  the  thoughts  and  reasonings  of  his  author. 
To  all  practical  purposes,  the  faculties  of  a person 
in  this  situation  are  obliterated  and  lost.  Of  what 
use  are  perceptive  powers,  and  judgment,  and  pow- 
ers of  reasoning,  if,  in  consequence  of  weakness  of 
the  will,  or  for  any  other  cause,  it  is  impossible  to 
direct  them,  for  any  length  of  time,  to  any  definite 
and  practicable  purpose  ? Such  a person  is  unable 
to  make  any  favourable  impression  on  the  commu- 
nity ; he  is  even  unable  to  manage  the  concerns  of 
his  own  family  ; and  is  likely  to  be  a source  of  great 
anxiety  and  trouble  to  all  with  whom  he  is  immedi- 
ately connected. 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


161 


§91.  Illustration  of  inordinately  weak  or  disordered 
Attention . 

An  interesting  case,  illustrative  of  this  mental  dis- 
order, is  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Sir  Alexander 
Crichton.  The  case  is  repeated  in  Dr.  Good’s 
Study  of  Medicine  (vol.  iv.,  class  iv.,  ord.  i.);  and 
it  is  in  the  words  of  this  last-mentioned  and  highly 
valuable  writer  that  we  give  it  here.  Of  the  indi- 
vidual whose  character  he  is  describing,  he  says : 
“ In  his  disposition  he  was  gentle  and  calm,  but 
somewhat  unsociable.  His  absence  of  mind  was 
extreme,  and  he  would  sometimes  willingly  sit  for  a 
whole  day  without  moving.  Yet  he  had  nothing  of 
melancholy  belonging  to  him  ; and  it  was  easy  to 
discover  by  his  countenance  that  a multiplicity  of 
thoughts  were  constantly  succeeding  each  other  in 
his  imagination,  many  of  which  were  gay  and  cheer- 
ful ; for  he  would  heartily  laugh  at  times,  not  with 
an  unmeaning  countenance,  but  evidently  from  men- 
tal merriment.  He  was  occasionally  so  strangely 
inattentive,  that,  when  pushed  by  some  want  which 
he  wished  to  express,  if  he  had  begun  a sentence, 
he  would  suddenly  stop  short  after  getting  half  way 
through  it,  as  though  he  had  forgotten  what  else  to 
say.  Yet,  when  his  attention  was  roused,  and  he 
was  induced  to  speak,  he  always  expressed  himself 
in  good  language,  and  with  much  propriety  ; and  if 
a question  were  proposed  to  him  which  required  the 
exercise  of  judgment,  and  he  could  be  made  to  at- 
tend to  it,  he  judged  correctly. 

« It  was  with  difficulty  he  could  be  made  to  take 


162  DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 

any  exercise  ; but  was  at  length  prevailed  upon  to 
drive  his  curricle,  in  which  Sir  Alexander  at  times 
accompanied  him.  He  at  first  could  not  be  pre- 
vailed upon  to  go  beyond  half  a mile  ; but  in  suc- 
ceeding attempts  he  consented  to  go  further.  He 
drove  steadily,  and,  when  about  to  pass  a carriage, 
took  pains  to  avoid  it  ; but  when  at  last  he  became 
familiarized  with  this  exercise,  he  would  often  re- 
lapse into  thought,  and  allow  the  reins  to  hang  loose 
in  his  hands.  His  ideas  seemed  to  be  for  ever  va- 
rying. When  any  one  came  across  his  mind  which 
excited  anger,  his  horses  suffered  for  it;  but  the 
spirit  they  exhibited  at  such  an  unusual  and  unkind 
treatment  made  him  soon  desist,  and  re-excited  his 
attention  to  his  own  safety.  As  soon  as  they  were 
quieted,  he  would  relapse  into  thought ; if  his  ideas 
were  melancholy,  the  horses  were  allowed  to  walk 
slow  ; if  they  were  gay  and  cheerful,  they  were  gen- 
erally encouraged  to  go  fast. 

“ Something  may  in  this  case,  perhaps,  be  owing, 
as  supposed  by  Sir  A.  Crichton,  to  an  error  in  the 
mode  of  education  ; but  the  chief  defect  seems  to 
have  been  in  the  attentive  faculty  itself,  and  its  la- 
bouring under  a natural  imbecility  which  no  mode 
of  education  could  entirely  have  removed.” 

In  connexion  with  the  remark  just  made,  Dr. 
Good,  from  whom  we  take  this  statement,  goes  on 
to  assert  the  important  doctrine  which  we  have  re- 
peatedly had  occasion  to  advance,  that  the  various 
powers  of  the  mind  may  be  weak  and  diseased  in 
tnemselves.  In  other  words,  they  may  be  diseased 
originally  and  in  their  own  nature,  and  independent- 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


163 


1 y of  other  causes.  At  least,  it  is  thus  that  we  un- 
derstand him. 

§ 92.  Cases  of  sudden  failure  of  Ike  Attention . 

It  is  sometimes  the  case,  that  the  power  of  Atten- 
tion fails  suddenly,  in  minds  where  it  had  existed 
with  a considerable  degree  of  energy  up  to  the  very 
time  of  its  failure.  Previous  to  this  period,  the  in- 
dividual was  capable  of  directing  his  attention,  with 
at  least  the  ordinary  degree  of  quickness  and  effect, 
to  any  subjects  which  might  present  themselves. 
But  from  that  time  the  power  vanishes  ; the  mind 
wanders  abroad,  independent  of  all  control ; but 
perhaps  the  evil  is  only  temporary. — A striking  in- 
stance and  illustration  of  what  has  just  been  said  is 
to  be  found  in  the  Psychological  Magazine.  The 
individual  was  a Mr.  Spalding,  a gentleman  well 
known  in  Germany  for  his  literary  acquirements. 
The  statement  not  only  had  reference  to  his  own 
personal  experience,  but  was  drawn  up  and  publish- 
ed by  himself.  It  is  as  follows  : 

“ I was  this  morning  engaged  with  a great  num- 
ber of  people,  who  followed  each  other  quickly,  and 
to  each  of  whom  I was  obliged  to  give  my  attention. 
I was  also  under  the  necessity  of  writing  much  ; but 
the  subjects,  which  were  various,  and  of  a trivial  and 
uninteresting  nature,  had  no  connexion  the  one  with 
the  other.  My  attention,  therefore,  was  constantly 
kept  on  the  stretch,  and  was  continually  shifting 
from  one  subject  to  another.  At  last  it  became  ne- 
cessary that  I should  write  a receipt  for  some  money 
I had  received  on  account  of  the  poor.  I seated 


164 


disordered  attention 


myself  and  wrote  the  first  two  words,  but  in  a mo- 
ment found  that  I was  incapable  of  proceeding,  for 
I could  not  recollect  the  words  which  belonged  to 
the  ideas  that  were  present  in  my  mind.  1 strained 
my  attention  as  much  as  possible,  and  tried  to  write 
one  letter  slowly  after  the  other,  always  having  an 
eye  to  the  preceding  one,  in  order  to  observe  wheth-  ) 
er  they  had  the  usual  relationship  to  each  other ; but 
1 remarked,  and  said  to  myself  at  the  time,  that  the 
characters  I was  writing  were  not  those  which  I 
wished  to  write,  and  yet  I could  not  discover  where 
the  fault  lay.  I therefore  desisted ; and  partly  by 
broken  words  and  syllables,  and  partly  by  gestures, 

I made  the  person  who  waited  for  the  receipt  under- 
stand he  should  leave  me.  For  about  half  an  hour 
there  reigned  a kind  of  tumultuary  disorder  in  my 
senses,  in  which  I was  incapable  of  remarking  any- 
thing very  particular,  except  that  one  series  of  ideas 
forced  themselves  involuntarily  on  my  mind.  The 
trifling  nature  of  these  thoughts  I was  perfectly  aware 
of,  and  was  also  conscious  that  I made  several  ef- 
forts to  get  rid  of  them  and  supply  their  place  by 
better  ones,  which  lay  at  the  bottom  of  my  soul.  I 
endeavoured,  as  much  as  lay  in  my  power,  consid- 
ering the  great  crowd  of  confused  images  which 
presented  themselves  to  my  mind,  to  recall  my  prin- 
ciples of  religion,  of  conscience,  and  of  future  ex- 
pectation ; these  I found  equally  correct  and  fixed 
as  before. 

“ There  was  no  deception  in  my  external  senses, 
for  I saw  and  knew  everything  around  me  ; but  I 
could  not  free  myself  from  the  strange  ideas  which 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


165 


existed  in  my  head.  I endeavoured  to  speak,  in 
order  to  discover  whether  I was  capable  of  saying 
anything  that  was  connected ; but,  although  I made 
the  greatest  efforts  of  attention,  and  proceeded  with 
the  utmost  caution,  I perceived  that  1 uniformly 
spoke  other  words  than  those  I intended.  My  soul 
was  at  present  as  little  master  of  the  organs  of 
speech  as  it  had  been  before  of  my  hand  in  writing. 
Thank  God,  this  state  did  not  continue  very  long, 
for  in  about  half  an  hour  my  head  began  to  grow 
clearer,  the  strange  and  tiresome  ideas  became  less 
vivid  and  turbulent,  and  I could  command  my  own 
thoughts  with  less  interruption.”* 

The  mind  of  the  individual,  who  gives  this  inter- 
esting account,  gradually  recovered  its  regular  ac- 
tion. He  then  recollected  the  receipt  which  he  had 
begun  to  write  ; and  in  regard  to  which  he  remem- 
bered that  he  had  laboured  under  some  strange  ina- 
bility. On  examing  the  receipt,  he  found,  to  his 
great  astonishment,  that,  instead  of  the  words  fifty 
dollct'}  5,  bem^  one  half  year's  rate,  which  he  ought 
to  have  written,  the  words  were,  fifty  dollars  through 
the  salvation  of  Bra.  He  adds  further,  that  he  could 
not  recollect  any  perception  or  business  which  he 
had  to  transact,  that  could,  by  means  of  an  obscure 
influence,  have  produced  this  phenomenon.  This 
we  acknowledge  to  be  a striking  instance  ; but  we 
do  not  doubt,  from  the  observations  we  have  been 
able  to  make  on  the  operations  of  the  human  mind, 
that  there  have,  from  time  to  time,  been  many  others 

■t,T1keu  ?erm,an  Psycbotogical  Magazine,  as  quoted  in  Mac- 
msh’s  Philosophy  of  Sleep,  ch.  xvi. 


166 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


like  it.  Cases  where  the  concentrative  element,  the  ^ 
power  of  attention,  the  ability  to  fasten  the  mind  upon 
its  appropriate  object,  has  suddenly  and  strikingly 
failed,  although,  perhaps,  not  permanently. 

§ 93.  Additional  illustration  of  this  disordered 
Action . 

There  is  rather  a striking  instance  of  the  failure  4 
of  the  Concentrative  or  Attentive  power,  mentioned 
by  Dr.  George  Combe,  which  came  within  his  per- 
sonal knowledge.  He  relates,  that  the  gentleman 
who  was  the  subject  of  it  experienced  a feeling,  as 
if  the  power  of  concentrating  his  mind  were  about  to 
leave  him.  This  naturally  caused  some  anxiety  ; 
and  he  accordingly  used  vigorous  efforts  to  preserve 
it.  “ He  directed  his  attention  to  an  object,  fre- 
quently a spire  at  the  end  of  a long  street,  and  reso- 
lutely maintained  it  immovably  fixed  there  for  a con- 
siderable length  of  time,  excluding  all  other  ideas 
from  his  mind.  The  consequence  was,  that,  in  his 
then  weak  state,  a diseased  fixity  of  mind  ensued,  in 
which  feelings  and  ideas  stood,  as  it  were,  bound  up 
and  immovable  ; and,  thereafter,  a state  in  which 
every  impression  and  emotion  was  floating  and  fickle  4 
like  images  in  water.”* 

§ 94.  Of  the  course  to  he  taken  to  restore  the  power 
of  Attention . 

It  would  be  desirable,  if  possible,  to  suggest  some 
remedies  of  this  state  of  mind,  particularly  as  it  ex 
ists  in  its  less  marked  but  more  frequent  forms.  \ 
* Combe’s  Phrenology,  Boston  ed.,  p.  137. 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


167 


I. — And  the  first  thing  to  be  done  is  to  secure  a 
healthy  and  vigorous  state  of  the  body,  especially  of 
the  nervous  system.  If  the  bodily  system  be  dis- 
eased, especially  if  there  be  a weak,  tremulous,  and 
uneasy  state  of  the  nerves,  there  will  probably  be, 
in  connexion  with  this  state  of  things,  an  uncertain 
and  dissatisfied  state  of  the  mind.  Deficient  in  en- 
ergy, and  yielding  to  the  slightest  cause  of  despond- 
ency, it  will  find  itself  incapable  of  directing  itself, 
“ with  a single  eye,”  to  the  proper  object  of  its  con- 
templations. Not  because  there  is  naturally  and 
necessarily  any  defect  in  itself,  but  because  its  ef- 
forts, even  when  put  forth  with  no  small  degree  of 
energy,  are  borne  down  by  the  appendant  burden  of 
a weak  and  inefficient  body. 

II* — In  other  cases,  the  state  of  mind  in  question 
has  been  brought  about  by  a wrong  course  of  men- 
tal training.  The  individual  has  never  been  sub- 
jected to  anything  like  severity  of  discipline  ; but 
in  study,  as  in  everything  else,  has  pursued  his  own 
pleasure,  promptly  leaving  every  inquiry  which  in- 
volved a laborious  effort,  and  seeking  some  object 
of  thought  or  action  that  was  less  repugnant.  Such 
a course  is  ultimately  fatal  to  that  energy  of  mind 
which  is  requisite  to  a high  degree  of  attention,  and 
can  be  remedied  only  by  a different  course.  The 
mind  must  be  restored  to  energy  by  a course  the 
opposite  of  that  which  has  reduced  it  to  its  present 
lassitude,  viz.,  by  labour,  which  always  has  been, 
and  always^will  be,  the  necessary  condition  of  men- 
tal as  well  as  of  physical  ability. 

III. — There  are  cases  where  the  inordinately  in- 
O 


168 


DISORDERED  ATTENTION. 


attentive  state  of  mind  has  been  caused,  not  by  any 
weakness  of  the  physical  system,  nor  by  a defect  in 
the  process  of  mental  training,  but  is  probably  owing 
to  something  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind  itself. 
If  there  may  be  a constitutional  weakness  of  the 
memory  or  of  the  reasoning  power,  may  there  not 
also  be  a constitutional  weakness  of  the  power  of 
attention,  or  of  those  elements,  whatever  they  may 
be,  which  constitute  the  power  of  attention?  When- 
ever this  is  the  case,  it  may  be  difficult  wholly  to 
eradicate  the  evil ; but  it  may  undoubtedly  be  di- 
minished by  a suitable  course  of  mental  training. 
Perhaps  the  ground  of  the  imbecility  of  attention 
may  be  found  in  the  weakness  of  the  desires,  per 
haps  in  the  feebleness  of  the  will,  or  in  some  othe* 
condition  of  the  mind  incidental  to  the  exercise  ol 
attention.  If  this  be  the  case,  a course  should  be 
taken  appropriate  to  such  a state  of  things.  Efforts 
should  be  made  (such  as  will  naturally  suggest  them- 
selves) to  increase  the  desires  ; in  other  words,  to 
excite  an  interest  in  the  subjects  brought  before  the 
mind,  to  impart  energy  to  the  action  of  the  will,  and 
to  discipline  the  mind  in  whatever  other  respects  may 
be  necessary. 


ON  DREAMING 


169 


CHAPTER  X. 

ON  DREAMING. 

§ 95.  General  statement  in  regard  to  Dreams . 

One  of  the  modifications  of  Disordered  Mental 
Action  (not  permanent,  it  is  true,  but  occasional  and 
temporary  disordered  action)  exists  in  the  form  of 
Dreams.  We  sometimes  say  of  a man,  who  is  un- 
der partial  mental  hallucination,  that  he  is  a dream- 
er ; or,  that  he  has  no  more  correctness  of  percep- 
tion and  understanding  than  if  he  were  dreaming. 
Hence  it  is  obviously  proper  to  give  some  attention 
to  these  states  of  mind.  Furthermore^as  dreams 
are  found,  for  the  most  part,  to  be  particularly  and 
very  closely  connected  with  external  perceptions 
and  conceptions,  there  seems  to  be  a propriety  in 
considering  them  in  this  place,  viz.,  under  the  gen- 
eral head  of  the  External  Intellect. 

In  undertaking  to  give  the  reader  some  account 
of  dreams,  it  will  not  be  necessary,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, to  be  particular  in  our  statements.  It  will, 
perhaps,  approach  sufficiently  near  to  a correct  gen 
eral  description  to  say,  that  they  are  our  mental 
states  and  operations  while  we  are  asleep.  But  the 
particular  views,  which  are  to  be  taken  in  the  ex 
amination  of  this  subject,  will  not  fail  to  throw  light 
on  this  general  statement. — We  proceed,  therefore, 


170 


ON  DREAMING. 


to  give  some  explanation  of  them  in  their  more 
common  or  ordinary  appearance.  And,  in  doing 
this,  shall  find  it  convenient  (as  we  have  already 
done  in  some  cases,  in  giving  an  account  of  the  reg- 
ular or  normal  mental  processes)  to  repeat  essen- 
tially the  statements  which  are  to  be  found  in  the 
recently  published  Elements  of  Mental  Philosophy ; 
a work,  where  vve  have  made  it  an  especial  object, 
although  probably  with  very  imperfect  success,  to 
give  what  we  consider  the  correct  view  of  the  mind’s 
regular  and  ordinary  action. 

§ 96.  Connexion  of  dreams  with  our  waking 
thoughts . 

In  giving  an  explanation  of  dreams,  our  attention 
is  first  arrested  by  the  circumstance  that  they  have 
an  intimate  relationship  with  our  waking  thoughts. 
The  greafcrbody  of  our  waking  experiences  appear 
in  the  form  of  trains  of  associations  ; and  these 
trains  of  associated  ideas,  in  greater  or  less  contin- 
uity, and  with  greater  or  less  variation,  continue 
when  we  are  asleep. — Accordingly,  Franklin  has 
somewhere  made  the  remark,  that  the  bearings  and 
results  of  political  events,  which  had  caused  him 
much  trouble  while  awake,  were  not  unfrequently 
unfolded  to  him  in  dreaming. — Mr.  Coleridge  re- 
lates, that,  as  he  was  once  reading  in  the  Pilgrimage 
of  Purchas  an  account  of  the  palace  and  garden  of 
the  Khan  Kubla,  he  fell  into  a sleep,  and  in  that 
situation  composed  an  entire  poem  of  not  less  than 
two  hundred  lines ; some  of  which  he  afterward 


ON  DREAMING. 


171 


committed  to  writing.  The  poem  is  entitled  Kubia 
Khan,  and  begins  as  follows : 

“ In  Xanadu  did  Kubia  Khan 
A stately  pleasure-dome  decree  ; 

Where  Alph,  the  sacred  river,  ran 
Through  caverns  measureless  to  man 
Down  to  a sunless  sea.” 

It  is  evident,  from  such  statements  as  these,  which 
are  confirmed  by  the  experience  of  almost  every 
person,  that  our  dreams  are  fashioned  from  the  ma- 
terials of  the  thoughts  and  feelings  which  we  have 
while  awake  ; in  other  words,  they  will,  in  a great 
degree,  be  merely  the  repetition  of  our  customary 
and  prevailing  associations. 

£ 97.  j Dreams  are  often  caused  by  our  sensations. 

But  while  we  are  to  look  for  the  materials  of  our 
dreams  in  thoughts  which  had  previously  existed, 
we  further  find  that  they  are  not  beyond  the  influ- 
ence of  those  slight  bodily  sensations  of  which  we 
are  susceptible  even  in  hours  of  sleep.  These  sen- 
sations, slight  as  they  are,  are  the  means  of  introdu- 
cing one  set  of  associations  rather  than  another. 
Dugald  Stewart  relates  an  incident,  which  may  be 
considered  an  evidence  of  this,  that  a person  with 
whom  he  was  acquainted  had  occasion,  in  conse- 
quence of  an  indisposition,  to  apply  a bottle  of  hot 
water  to  his  feet  when  he  went  to  bed ; and  the  con- 
sequence was,  that  he  dreamed  he  was  making  a 
journey  to  the  top  of  Mount  .Etna,  and  that  he  found 
the  heat  of  the  ground  almost  insupportable. 

A cause  of  dreams  closely  allied  to  the  above,  is 


172 


ON  DREAMING. 


the  variety  of  sensations  which  vve  experience  from 
the  stomach,  viscera,  &c.  Persons,  for  instance, 
who  have  been  for  a long  time  deprived  of  food,  or 
have  received  it  only  in  small  quantities,  hardly 
enough  to  preserve  life,  will  be  likely  to  have  dreams 
in  some  way  or  other  directly  relating  to  their  con- 
dition. Baron  Trenck  relates,  that,  being  almost 
dead  with  hunger  when  confined  in  his  dungeon, 
his  dreams  every  night  presented  to  him  the  well- 
filled  and  luxurious  tables  of  Berlin,  from  which,  as 
they  were  presented  before  him,  he  imagined  he  was 
about  to  relieve  his  hunger. 

The  state  of  health  also  has  considerable  influ- 
ence, not  only  in  producing  dreams,  but  in  giving 
them  a particular  character.  The  remark  has  been 
made  by  medical  men,  that  acute  diseases,  particu- 
larly fevers,  are  often  preceded  and  indicated  by 
disagreeable  and  oppressive  dreams. 

§ 98.  Explanation  of  the  incolierency  of  dreams . 

There  is  frequently  much  of  wildness,  inconsis- 
tency, and  contradiction  in  our  dreams.  The  mind 
passes  very  rapidly  from  one  object  to  another ; | 

strange  and  singular  incidents  occur.  If  our  dreams 
be  truly  the  repetition  of  our  waking  thoughts,  it 
may  well  be  inquired,  How  this  wildness  and  incon- 
sistency happen? 

The  explanation  of  this,  peculiarity  resolves  itself 
into  two  parts. — The  first  ground  or  cause  of  it  is, 
that  our  dreams  are  not  subjected,  like  our  waking 
thoughts,  to  the  control  and  regulation  of  surround- 
ing objects.  While  we  are  awake,  our  trains  of 


ON  DREAMING 


173 


thought  «ire  kept  uniform  and  coherent  by  the  influ- 
ence ot  such  objects,  which  continually  remind  us 
of  our  situation,  character,  and  duties,  and  which 
keep  in  check  any  tendency  to  revery.  But  in 
sleep  the  senses  are  closed ; the  soul  is,  according- 
ly, in  a great  measure  excluded  from  the  material 
world,  and  is  thus  deprived  of  the  salutary  regulating 
influence  from  that  source. 

In  the  second  place,  when  we  are  asleep,  our 
associated  trains  of  thought  are  no  longer  under  the 
control  of  the  will.  We  do  not  mean  to  say  that 
the  operations  of  the  will  are  suspended  at  such 
times,  and  that  volitions  have  no  existence ; but  only 
that  their  influence  in  a great  degree  ceases. 

A person,  while  he  is  awake,  has  his  thoughts  un- 
der such  government,  and  is  able,  by  the  direct  and 
indirect  influence  of  volitions,  so  to  regulate  them, 
as  generally  to  bring  them  in  the  end  to  some  con- 
clusion, which  he  foresees  and  wishes  to  arrive  at. 
But  in  dreaming,  as  all  directing  and  governing  in- 
fluence, both  internal  and  external,  is  at  an  end,  our 
thoughts  and  feelings  seem  to  be  driven  forward, 
much  like  a ship  at  sea  without  a rudder,  wherever 
it  may  happen. 

§ 99.  Apparent  realitij  of  dreams . {1st  cause.) 

When  objects  are  presented  to  us  in  dreams,  we 
look  upon  them  as  real ; and  events,  and  combina- 
tions and  series  of  events,  appear  the  same.  We 
feel  the  same  interest,  and  resort  to  the  same  expe- 
dients as  in  the  perplexities  and  enjoyments  of  real 
life.  When  persons  are  introduced  as  forming  a 


174 


ON  DREAMING. 


part  in  the  transactions  of  our  dceams,  we  see  them 
clearly  in  their  living  attitudes  and  stature  ; we  con- 
verse with  them,  and  hear  them  speak,  and  behold 
them  move,  as  if  actually  present. 

One  reason  of  this  greater  vividness  of  our  dream- 
ing conceptions,  and  of  our  firm  belief  in  their  real- 
ity", seems  to  be  this.  The  subjects  upon  which  our 
thoughts  are  then  employed,  occupy  the  mind  exclu- 
sively. We  can  form  a clearer  conception  of  an 
object  with  our  eyes  shut  than  we  can  with  them 
open,  as  any  one  will  be  convinced  on  making  the 
experiment ; and  the  liveliness  of  the  conception 
will  increase  in  proportion  as  we  can  suspend  the 
exercise  of  the  other  senses.  In  sound  sleep,  not 
only  the  sight,  but  the  other  senses  also,  may  be  said 
to  be  closed  ; and  the  attention  is  not  continually 
diverted  by  the  multitude  of  objects  which  arrest  the 
hearing  and  touch  when  we  are  awake.  It  is,  there- 
fore, a most  natural  supposition,  that  our  conceptions 
must  at  such  times  be  extremely  vivid  and  distinct. 

Furthermore,  it  will  be  recollected,  that  very  vivid 
conceptions  are  often  attended  with  a momentary 
belief  in  the  actuality  of  the  things  conceived  of, 
even  when  we  are  awake.  But  as  conceptions  ex- 
ist in  the  mind  when  we  are  asleep  in  a much  higher 
degree  distinct  and  vivid,  what  was  in  the  former 
case  a momentary,  becomes  in  the  latter  a perma- 
nent belief.  Hence  everything  has  the  appearance 
of  reality ; and  the  mere  thoughts  of  the  mind  are 
virtually  transformed  into  persons,  and  varieties  01  % 

situation,  and  events,  which  are  regarded  by  us  in 


ON  DREAMING. 


175 


precisely  the  same  light  as  the  persons,  and  situa- 
tions, and  events  of  our  every  day’s  experience. 

§ 100.  Apparent  reality  of  dreams.  (2d  cause.) 

A second  circumstance,  which  goes  to  account 
for  the  fact  that  our  dreaming  conceptions  have  the 
appearance  of  reality,  is,  that  they  are  not  suscepti- 
ble of  being  controlled,  either  directly  or  indirectly, 
by  mere  volition. — We  are  so  formed  as  almost  in- 
variably to  associate  reality  with  whatever  objects  of 
perception  continue  to  produce  in  us  the  same  ef- 
fects. A hard  or  soft  body,  or  any  substance  of  a 
particular  colour,  or  taste,  or  smell,  is  always,  when 
presented  to  our  senses,  followed  by  certain  states 
of  mind  essentially  the  same  ; and  we  yield  the  most 
ready  and  firm  belief  in  the  existence  of  such  ob- 
jects. In  a word,  we  are  disposed,  from  our  very 
constitution,  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  objects  of 
perception,  the  perceptions  of  which  do  not  depend 
on  the  will,  but  which  we  find  to  be  followed  by 
certain  states  of  the  mind,  whether  we  choose  it  or 

not. But  it  is  to  be  recollected  that  our  dreaming 

thoughts  are,  for  the  most  part,  mere  conceptions ; 
our  senses  being  closed  and  shut  up,  and  external 
objects  not  being  presented  to  them.  This  is  tiue. 
But  if  we  conclude  in  favour  of  the  real  existence  of 
objects  of  perception,  because  they  produce  in  us 
sensations  independently  of  our  volitions,  it  is  but  nat- 
ural to  suppose  that  we  shall  believe  in  the  reality  of 
our  conceptions  also,  whenever  they  are  in  like  man- 
ner beyond  our  voluntary  control.  They  are  both 
merely  states  of  the  mind  5 and  if  belief  always  at- 


176 


ON  DREAMING. 


tends  our  perceptions*  wherever  we  find  them  to  be 
independent  of  our  choice,  there  is  no  reason  why 
conceptions,  which  are  ideas  of  absent  objects  of 
perception,  should  not  be  attended  with  a like  belief 
under  the  same  circumstances. — And  essentially  the 
same  circumstances  exist  in  dreaming  ; that  is,  a 
train  of  conceptions  arise  in  the  mind,  and  we  are 
not  conscious  at  such  times  of  being  able  to  exer- 
cise any  direction  or  control  whatever  over  them. 
They  exist,  whether  we  will  it  or  not ; and  we  regard 
them  as  real. 

§ 101.  Of  our  estimate  of  time  in  dreaming . 

Our  estimate  of  time  in  dreaming  differs  from 
that  when  awake.  Events,  which  w?ould  take  whole 
days  or  a longer  time  in  the  performance,  are  dream- 
ed in  a few  moments.  So  wonderful  is  this  com- 
pression of  a multitude  of  transactions  into  the  very 
shortest  period,  that,  when  we  are  accidentally  awa- 
kened by  the  jarring  of  a door  which  is  opened  into 
the  room  where  we  are  sleeping,  wre  sometimes 
dream  of  depredations  by  thieves,  or  destruction  by 
fire,  in  the  very  instant  of  our  awakening. — “A 
friend  of  mine”  (says  Dr.  Abercrombie)  “ dreamed 
that  he  crossed  the  Atlantic  and  spent  a fortnight  in 
America.  In  embarking  on  his  return,  he  fell  into 
the  sea ; and,  having  awoke  with  the  fright,  discover- 
ed that  he  had  not  been  asleep  above  ten  minutes.” 

This  striking  circumstance  in  the  history  of  our 
dreams  is  generally  explained  by  supposing  that  our 
thoughts,  as  they  successively  occupy  the  mind,  are 
more  rapid  than  while  we  are  awake.  But  their  ra- 


ON  DREAMING. 


177 


pidity  may  at  other  times  be  very  great ; so  much 
so,  that,  in  a few  moments,  crowds  of  ideas  pass 
through  the  mind,  which  it  would  take  a long  time 
to  utter,  and  a far  longer  time  would  it  take  to  per- 
form all  the  transactions  which  they  concern.  This 
explanation,  therefore,  is  not  satisfactory,  for  our 
thoughts  are  oftentimes  equally  rapid  in  our  waking 
moments. 

The  true  reason,  we  apprehend,  is  to  be  found  in 
those  preceding  sections,  which  took  under  exami- 
nation the  apparent  reality  of  dreams.  Our  concep- 
tions in  dreaming  are  considered  by  us  real ; every 
thought  is  an  action ; every  idea  is  an  event ; and 
successive  states  of  mind  are  successive  actions  and 
successive  events.  He  who  in  his  sleep  has  the 
conception  of  all  the  particulars  of  a distant  military 
expedition,  or  of  a circumnavigation  of  the  globe, 
seems  to  himself  to  have  actually  experienced  all  the 
various  and  multiplied  fortunes  of  the  one  and  the 
other.  Hence  what  appears  to  be  the  real  time  in 
dreams,  but  is  only  the  apparent  time,  will  not  be 
that  which  is  sufficient  for  the  mere  thought,  but  that 
which  is  necessary  for  the  successive  actions. 

§ 102.  Dreams  sometimes  lay  the  foundation  of  a 
permanently  disordered  state  of  mind. 

It  is  sufficiently  evident  that  Dreams,  as  we  have 
already  had  occasion  to  intimate,  must  be  consider- 
ed as  disordered,  and  not  as  sane  or  sound  states  oi 
mind.  They  do  not,  however,  necessarily  imply  in- 
sanity of  mind  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  As 
soon  as  the  powers  of  the  body  are  restored,  and  the 


178 


ON  DREAMING. 


state  of  sleep  terminates,  the  mental  action,  which 
was  subject  during  the  period  of  dreaming  to  a tem- 
porary disorder,  ceases  to  exhibit  those  irregularities 
which  just  before  characterized  it.  Dreams,  never- 
theless, in  consequence  of  the  feelings  of  horror 
which  they  sometimes  occasion,  have,  in  a few  in- 
stances, been  the  cause  of  a permanently  disordered 
mental  state.  In  themselves  they  involve  nothing 
more  than  a temporary  disorder ; but  in  their  results 
they  may,  by  possibility  at  least,  lay  the  foundation 
of  a permanent  one. 

Mr.  Macnish,  in  his  recent  Work  on  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Sleep,  relates  the  case  of  a woman  in  the 
West  Highlands  of  Scotland,  who  became  deranged 
in  consequence  of  a terrific  dream.  He  states,  that 
in  her  derangement  she  escaped  to  the  mountains, 
and  lived  and  herded  with  the  wild  deer  for  seven 
years.  She  became  so  swift  of  foot,  that  the  shep- 
herds of  those  regions,  and  others  by  whom  she  was 
occasionally  seen,  could  never  arrest  her.  At  the 
end  of  her  seven  year’s  wanderings  a severe  storm 
drove  the  herds  of  deer  and  the  woman  with  them 
into  the  valleys,  where  she  was  surrounded  and 
caught.  She  was  conveyed  to  her  husband,  by 
whom  she  was  kindly  received,  and  in  the  course 
of  three  months  regained  her  reason. 

$ 103.  Mental  disorder ' sometimes  developes  itself 
in  connexion  with  dreams . 

Sometimes  persons,  under  the  influence  of  dreams, 
perform  actions  indicative  of  an  unsound  state  of 
mind,  although  the  unsoundness  of  mind  may  never 


ON  DREAMING. 


i 79 


have  been  suspected  before.  It  is  the  dream  which 
first  brings  to  light  the  hidden  trait  of  insanity.  Ot' 
this  the  following  facts  are  an  instance. 

Some  years  since,  an  individual  resident  in  Gardi- 
ner, in  the  State  of  Maine,  dreamed  that  he  was  in- 
structed by  the  Supreme  Being  to  burn  a neighbour- 
ing church,  and  also  to  kill  a certain  woman  of  his 
acquaintance.  His  mind  was  powerfully  affected. 
And,  not  doubting  that  he  had  the  highest  possible 
authority,  he  succeeded  in  burning  the  place  of  wor- 
ship, and  exhibited  every  disposition  to  execute,  as 
soon  as  possible,  the  remaining  part  of  his  teriific 
commission.  Before  he  could  effect  his  purpose, 
however,  he  was  seized  and  prevented. — Neverthe- 
less, he  remained  firm  in  his  intention  to  perfoim,  at 
the  first  favourable  opportunity,  what  he  considered 
to  be  the  will  of  God.  As  there  was  now  no  doubt 
of  his  insanity,  he  was  imprisoned  for  life,  not  merely 
as  a punishment  for  what  he  had  already  done,  but 
as  the  only  sure  means  of  preventing  the  atrocities 
which  he  still  intended  to  perpetrate.  To  his  dying 
day  he  clung  to  the  belief,  that  he  did  right  in  de- 
stroying the  building,  and  much  lamented  that  he 
was  not  permitted  to  perform  all  that  had  been  pre- 
scribed to  him.— As  has  been  intimated,  this  man 
was  essentially  insane  previous  to  this  time.  That 
is  to  say,  he  had  the  elements  of  Insanity  in  him, 
although  they  were  first  developed  and  put  in  opera- 
tion by  the  dream. 

Pinel  mentions  a case  very  similar  to  the  forego- 
ing. The  individual  was  an  old  monk,  whose  ex 
cessive  religious  feelings  had  assumed  the  form  o 


160 


ON  DREAMING. 


enthusiasm.  In  this  state  of  mind,  he  dreamed  one 
night  that  he  saw  the  Virgin,  and  that  she  gave  him 
an  express  order  to  put  to  death  a person  of  his  ac- 
quaintance, whom  he  suspected  of  infidelity.  “This 
projected  homicide”  (says  Pinel)  “ would,  no  doubt, 
have  been  executed,  had  not  the  maniac,  in  conse- 
quence of  betraying  his  purpose,  been  timely  and 
effectually  secured.” 

§ 104.  Case  of  deshmclion  of  life  arising  from  a 
dream . 

In  Hoffbauer’s  Treatise  on  Legal  Medicine  is  a 
case  narrated,  which  may  properly  be  introduced 
here.  It  is  the  case  of  Bernard  Schidmaizig.  This 
individual,  under  the  influence  of  some  terrific  dream, 
as  is  supposed,  awoke  suddenly  at  midnight,  and 
beheld,  at  the  moment  of  awaking,  what  he  conceiv- 
ed to  be  a frightful  phantom  standing  near  him.  The 
object  before  him  was  his  wife,  who  was  probably 
passing  across  the  room  at  the  time.  In  this  state 
of  mind,  half  dreaming  and  half  awake,  he  mingled 
his  own  disturbed  conceptions  with  the  reality  before 
him,  and  still  continued  to  see,  as  he  thought,  some 
phantasmagorial  appearance.  He  cried  out,  “Who 
goes  there?”  but  received  no  answer.  In  the 
greatest  affright  he  seized  a hatchet,  which  he  gen- 
erally kept  near  him,  sprung  from  his  bed,  and 
assaulted  the  imaginary  spectre.  The  blow  felled 
his  wife  to  the  ground,  and  she  died  the  next  day. 

This  case,  it  will  readily  be  perceived,  is  an  im- 
portant one  in  a legal  point  of  view.  Although  the 
result  was  horrible  in  the  extreme/  the  man  could 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


181 


not  well  be  considered  as  guilty  of  a crime.  It  is 
true  he  was  not  insane,  and  no  valid  excuse  of  his 
conduct  could  be  found  in  insanity.  Nor  was  he, 
strictly  speaking,  asleep  ; but  there  was  such  a com- 
bination of  the  sleeping  and  waking  states,  such  a 
mingling  of  what  was  actually  perceived  with  what 
was  dreamed,  combined  too  with  extreme  affright, 
that  the  same  reasons  which  would  nullify  the  crime 
of  an  insane  person  would  seem  to  apply  here,  and 
be  sufficient  to  extract  the  moral  guilt  from  this. 
The  man  evidently  was  not  himself.  He  laboured 
under  a delusion,  which,  though  different  from  in- 
sanity, practically  amounted  to  it.* 


CHAPTER  XL 

• SOMNAMBULISM. 

§ 105.  General  vie w of  Somnambulism. 

With  the  subject  of  dreaming,  that  of  Somnam- 
bulism is  naturally  and  very  intimately  connected. 
And  if  the  term  Dreaming,  in  some  important  sense, 
indicates  a perplexed  and  irregular  mental  action, 
Somnambulism  does  not  less  so.  Hence  the  pro- 
priety of  giving  some  account  of  it  in  a treatise 
which  proposes  to  give  the  outlines,  if  nothing  more, 
of  disordered  mental  action. 

* Hoff  bauer’s  Medecine  Legale,  Des  Maladies  Mentales  du 
Sommeil  (French  ed.,  by  Chambeyron). 


182 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


In  attempting  to  give  a definition,  we  are  not  cer- 
tain of  being  perfectly  safe.  Perhaps  we  shall  come 
near  enough  to  the  fact  in  the  case,  in  saying,  that 
somnambulists  are  persons  who  are  capable  of  walk- 
ing and  of  other  voluntary  actions  while  asleep. 
Of  such  persons  many  instances  are  on  record  ; and 
of  some  a particular  account  is  given.  The  in- 
stance in  the  following  section,  which  in  some  re- 
spects is  a somewhat  striking  one,  will  help  to  illus- 
trate the  nature  of  the  subject  now  before  us. 

§ 106.  Singular  instance  of  Somnambulism. 

A farmer  in  one  of  the  counties  of  Massachu- 
setts, according  to  the  account  of  the  matter  which 
was  published  at  the  time,  had  employed  himself,  for 
some  weeks  in  winter,  thrashing  his  grain.  One 
night,  as  he  was  about  closing  his  labours,  he  as- 
cended a ladder  to  the  top  of  the  great  beams  in  the 
barn,  where  the  rye  which  he  was  thrashing  was  de- 
posited, to  ascertain  what  number  of  bundles  re- 
mained unthrashed,  which  he  determined  to  finish 
the  next  day.  The  ensuing  night,  about  two  o’clock, 
he  was  heard  by  one  of  the  family  to  arise  and  go 
out.  He  repaired  to  his  barn,  being  sound  asleep 
and  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing,  set  open  his 
barn  doors,  ascended  the  great  beams  of  the  barn 
where  his  rye  was  deposited,  threw  down  a flooring; 
and  commenced  thrashing  it.  When  he  had  com 
pleted  it,  he  raked  off  the  straw,  and  shoved  the  ryt 
to  one  side  of  the  floor,  and  again  ascended  the  lad 
der  with  the  straw,  and  deposited  it  on  some  rail;- 
that  lay  across  the  great  beams.  He  then  threw 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


183 


down  another  flooring  of  rye,  which  he  thrashed  and 
finished  as  before.  Thus  he  continued  his  labours 
until  he  had  thrashed  five  floorings,  and  on  returning 
from  throwing  down  the  sixth  and  last,  in  passing 
over  part  of  the  haymow,  he  fell  off,  where  the  hay 
had  been  cut  down  about  six  feet,  on  to  the  lower 
part  of  it,  which  awoke  him.  . He  at  first  imagined 
himself  in  his  neighbour’s  barn  ; but,  after  groping 
about  in  the  dark  a long  time,  ascertained  that  he 
was  in  his  own,  and  at  length  found  the  ladder,  on 
which  he  descended  to  the  floor,  closed  his  bam 
doors  which  he  found  open,  and  returned  to  his 
house.  On  coming  to  the  light,  he  found  himself  in 
such  a profuse  perspiration  that  his  clothes  were 
literally  wet  through.  The  next  morning,  on  going 
to  his  barn,  he  found  that  he  had  thrashed,  during 
the  night,  five  bushels  of  rye,  had  raked  the  stiaw 
off  in  good  order,  and  deposited  it  on  the  great 
beams,  and  carefully  shoved  the  grain  to  one  side  of 
the  floor,  without  the  least  consciousness  of  what  he 
was  doing  until  he  fell  from  the  hay. 

§ 107.  Of  the  senses  falling  to  sleep  in  succession . 

Before  attempting  to  offer  anything  in  explanation 
of  cases  of  somnambulism,  we  wish  to  delay  a mo- 
ment for  the  purpose  of  stating  very  briefly  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  senses  are  supposed  successively  to 
fall  asleep.  What  sleep  is,  mentally  considered  and 
independently  of  the  body,  it  might  be  difficult  to  say. 
But  we  know  this,  at  least,  that  in  a state  of  sleep 
the  mind,  as  a general  thing,  ceases  to  retain  its 
customary  power  over  the  muscular  movements  of 
P 


184 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


the  system  ; and  also  that  all  the  senses  are  at  such 
times  locked  up,  as  it  were,  and  no  longer  perform 
their  usual  offices.  And  furthermore,  the  effect 
upon  the  senses  takes  place  in  such  a way,  that  it 
seems  to  be  proper  to  speak  of  them  as  separately 
or  individually  going  to  sleep  and  awaking  from 
sleep.  The  additional  fact  is,  that  they  appear  to 
fall  asleep  at  different  times  and  in  succession. 

This  last  fact  is  one  of  considerable  importance 
in  its  practical  applications.  But  we  do  not  under- 
take here  to  enter  into  particulars  and  proofs.  Ref- 
erence must  be  had  for  the  details  and  the  confirma- 
tory reasonings  and  facts  to  Cullen,  and  particularly 
to  Cabanis,*  a distinguished  French  writer  on  sub- 
jects of  this  nature.  We  give  merely  the  conclu- 
sions at  which  they  arrive. 

The  sight,  as  we  gather  from  the  writers  who 
have  been  named,  ceases,  in  consequence  of  the  pro- 
tection of  the  eyelids,  to  receive  impressions  first, 
while  all  the  other  senses  preserve  their  sensibility 
entire  ; and  may,  therefore,  be  said  to  be  first  in 
falling  asleep.  The  sense  of  taste,  according  to 
the  above  writers,  is  the  next  which  loses  its  sus- 
ceptibility of  impressions,  and  then  the  sense  of 
smelling.  The  hearing  is  the  next  in  order,  and  last 
of  all  comes  the  sense  of  touch. — Furthermore,  the 
senses  are  thought  to  sleep  with  different  degrees  of 
profoundness.  The  senses  of  taste  and  smelling 
awake  the  last ; the  sight  with  more  difficulty  than 
the  hearing,  and  the  touch  the  easiest  of  all.  Some- 
times a very  considerable  noise  does  not  awake 

* Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  L’Homme,  Mem.  x- 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


185 


person  ; but,  if  the  soles  of  his  feet  are  tickled  in  the 
slightest  degree,  he  starts  up  immediately. 

§ 108.  Similar  views  applicable  to  the  muscles . 

Similar  remarks  are  made  by  the  writers  already 
referred  to  on  the  muscles.  Those  which  move 
the  arms  and  legs  cease  to  act,  when  sleep  is  ap- 
proaching, sooner  than  those  which  sustain  the  head  : 
and  the  latter  before  those  which  support  the  back. 
— And  here  it  is  proper  to  notice  an  exception  to 
the  general  statement  made  in  the  preceding  sec- 
tion, that  the  mind  in  sleep  ceases  to  retain  its  power 
over  the  muscles.  Some  persons  can  sleep  stand- 
ing, or  walking,  or  riding  on  horseback ; with  such 
we  cannot  wfeil  avoid  the  supposition,  that  the  vol- 
untary power  over  the  muscles  is  in  some  way  re- 
tained and  exercised  in  sleep. — These  statements 
are  particularly  important  in  connexion  with  the  facts 
of  somnambulism ; only  admit  that  the  susceptibil- 
ity of  the  senses,  and  the  power  of  the  muscles  may 
remain,  even  in  part,  while  we  are  asleep,  and  we 
can  account  for  them.  We  know  that  this  is  not 
the  case  in  a vast  majority  of  instances  ; but  that  it 
does  sometimes  happen  is  a point  which  seems  at 
last  to  be  sufficiently  well  established. 

§ 109  Of  the  connexion  of  Somnambulism  with 
dreaming. 

Keeping  in  mind  the  views  that  have  been  given 
in  the  preceding  sections,  we  proceed  to  remark,  as 
has  already  been  intimated,  that  a number  of  things 
may  be  satisfactorily  said  in  explanation  of  somnam- 


186 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


bulisrn.  The  somnambulist,  in  the  first  place,  is  in, 
all  cases  dreaming,  and  we  may  suppose,  in  general, 
that  the  dream  is  one  which  greatly  interests  him. 
After  he  has  awaked,  the  action  he  has  passed 
through  appears,  in  his  recollection  of  it,  to  be  mere- 
ly a dream,  and  not  a reality.  “ A young  nobleman 
(says  Dr.  Abercrombie),  “ living  in  the  citadel  of 
Breslau,  was  observed  by  his  brother,  who  occupied 
the  same  room,  to  rise  in  his  sleep,  wrap  himself  in 
a cloak,  and  escape  by  a window  to  the  roof  of  the 
building.  He  there  tore  in  pieces  a magpie’s  nest, 
wrapped  the  young  birds  in  his  cloak,  returned  to  his 
apartment,  and  went  to  bed.  In  the  morning  he 
mentioned  the  circumstances  as  having  occurred  in 
a dream,  and  could  not  be  persuaded  that  there  had 
been  anything  more  than  a dream,  till  he  was  shown 
the  magpies  in  his  cloak.”  And  this  is  noticed  to 
be  commonly  the  fact.  What  has  been  done  has 
the  appearance  of  being  a dream.  And  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  mind  of  the  somnambulist  is  in  that 
particular  state  which  we  denominate  dreaming. 

XI. — In  the  second  place,  those  volitions,  which 
are  a part  of  his  dreams,  retain  their  power  over  the 
muscles,  which  is  not  the  fact  in  the  sleep  and  the 
dreaming  of  the  great  body  of  people. — Conse- 
quently, whatever  the  somnambulist  dreams,  is  not 
only  real  in  the  mind,  as  in  the  case  of  all  other 
dreams,  but  his  ability  to  exercise  his  muscles  en- 
ables him  to  give  it  a reality  in  action.  Whether  he 
dream  of  writing  a letter,  of  visiting  a neighbour’s 
house,  of  cutting  and  piling  wood,  of  thrashing  his 
grain,  or  ploughing  his  fields  (acts  which  have  at 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


187 


various  times  been  ascribed  to  the  somnambulist), 
his  muscles  are  faithful  to  his  vivid  mental  concep 
tions,  which  we  may  suppose  in  all  cases  closely 
connected  with  his  customary  labours  and  experi- 
ences, and  frequently  enable  him  to  complete  what 
he  has  undertaken,  even  when  his  senses  are  at  the 
same  time  closed  up. 

But  the  inquiry  arises  here,  how  it  happens,  while 
in  most  cases  both  senses  and  muscles  lose  their 
power,  in  these,  on  the  contrary,  the  muscles  are 
active,  while  the  senses  alone  are  asleep? — In  refer- 
ence to  this  inquiry,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
it  is  involved  at  present  in  some  uncertainty,  although 
there  is  much  reason  to  anticipate  that  it  may  here- 
after receive  light  from  further  investigations  and 
knowledge  of  the  nervous  system  and  functions. 
There  is  a set  of  nerves,  which  are  understood  to  be 
particularly  connected  with  respiration,  and  which 
appear  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  sensation  and  with 
muscular  action.  There  is  another  set,  which  are 
known  to  possess  a direct  and  important  connexion 
with  sensation  and  the  muscles.  These  last  are 
separable  into  distinct  filaments,  having  separate 
functions ; some  being  connected  with  sensation 
merely,  and  others  with  volition  and  muscular  action. 
In  sensation,  the  impression  made  by  some  external 
body  exists  at  first  in  the  external  part  of  the  organ 
of  sense,  and  is  propagated  along  one  class  of  fila- 
ments to  the  brain.  In  volition  and  voluntary  muscu- 
lar movement,  the  origin  of  action,  as  far  as  the  body 
is  concerned,  seems  to  be  the  reverse,  commencing  in 
the  brain,  and  being  propagated  along  other  and  ap- 


188 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


propriate  nervous  filaments  to  the  different  parts  ot 
the  system. 

Hence  it  sometimes  happens,  that,  in  diseases  01 
the  nervous  system,  the  power  of  sensation  is,  in  a 
great  measure,  lost,  while  that  of  motion  fully  re- 
mains ; or,  on  the  contrary,  the  power  of  motion 
is  lost,  while  that  of  sensation  remains.  These 
views  help  to  throw  light  on  the  subject  of  som- 
nambulism. Causes,  at  present  unknown  to  us, 
may  operate,  through  their  appropriate  nervous  fil- 
aments, to  keep  the  muscles  awake,  without  dis- 
turbing the  repose  and  inactivity  of  the  senses.  A 
man  may  be  asleep  as  to  all  the  powers  of  exter- 
nal perception,  and  yet  be  awake  in  respect  to  the 
capabilities  of  muscular  motion.  And,  aided  by  the 
trains  of  association,  which  make  a part  of  his 
dreams,  may  be  able  to  walk  about  and  to  do  many 
things  without  the  aid  of  the  sight  and  hearing. 

§ 110.  Further  illustrations  of  somnambulism . 

III. — Further,  we  are  not  to  forget  here  some  re- 
marks in  the  preceding  chapter  to  this  effect,  viz., 
that  the  sleep  of  the  senses  is  sometimes  an  im- 
perfect or  partial  one  ; and  that  at  such  times  the 
senses  are  susceptible  of  slight  external  influences. 
Both  in  somnambulism  and  in  ordinary  cases  oi 
dreaming,  the  senses  are  not  always  entirely  locked 
up ; many  observations  clearly  show,  that  it  is  pos- 
sible for  the  mind  to  be  accessible  through  them,  and 
that  a new  direction  may  be  given  in  fits  way  to  a 
person’s  dreams  without  awaking  him.  Hence 
somnambulists  may  sometimes  have  very  slight  vis- 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


189 


ual  perceptions  ; they  may,  in  some  slight  measure, 
be  guided  by  sensations  of  touch ; all  the  senses 
may  be  affected  in  a small  degree  by  their  appropri- 
ate objects,  or  this  may  be  the  case  with  some  and 
not  with  others,  without  effectually  disturbing  their 
sleep. — These  facts  will  be  found  to  help  in  ex- 
plaining any  peculiar  circumstances,  which  may  be 
thought  not  to  come  within  the  reach  of  the  gen- 
eral explanation  which  has  been  given. 

§ 111.  j Reference  to  the  case  of  Jane  Rider. 

IY. — But  this  is  not  all.  There  are  some  cases 
which  are  not  reached  by  the  statements  hitherto 
made.  There  are  not  only  slight  exceptions  to  the 
general  fact,  that  somnambulists,  like  persons  in  or- 
dinary sleep,  are  insensible  to  external  impressions, 
but  occasionally  some  of  a marked  and  extraordinary 
character.  There  are  a few  cases  (the  recent  in- 
stance of  Jane  Rider  in  this  country  is  one)  where 
persons,  in  the  condition  of  somnambulism,  have  not 
only  possessed  slight  visual  power,  but  perceptions 
of  sight  increased  much  above  the  common  degree. 
In  the  extraordinary  narrative  of  Jane  Rider,  the  au- 
thor informs  us,  that  he  took  two  large  wads  of  cot- 
ton, and  placed  them  directly  on  the  closed  eyelids, 
and  then  bound  them  on  with  a black  silk  handker- 
chief. “The  cotton  filled  the  cavity  under  the  eye- 
brows, and  reached  down  to  the  middle  of  the  cheek  ; 
and  various  experiments  were  tried  to  ascertain 
whether  she  could  see.  In  one  of  them  a watch  en- 
closed in  a case  was  handed  to  her,  and  she  was  re- 
quested to  tell  what  o’clock  it  was  by  it ; upon  which, 
after  examining  both  sides  of  the  watch,  she  opened 


190 


somnambulism. 


the  case,  and  then  answered  the  question.  She  also 
read,  without  hesitation,  the  name  of  a gentleman, 
written  in  characters  so  fine  that  no  one  else  could 
distinguish  it  at  the  usual  distance  from  the  eye.  In 
another  paroxysm,  the  lights  were  removed  from  her 
room,  and  the  windows  so  secured  that  no  object 
was  discernible,  and  two  books  were  presented  to 
her,  when  she  immediately  told  the  titles  of  both, 
though  one  of  them  was  a book  which  she  had  never 
before  seen.  In  other  experiments,  while  the  room 
was  so  darkened  that  it  was  impossible,  with  the  or- 
dinaiy  powers  of  vision,  to  distinguish  the  colours  of 
the  carpet,  and  her  eyes  were  also  bandaged,  she 
pointed  out  the  different  colours  in  the  hearth-rug, 
took  up  and  read  several  cards  laying  on  the  table, 
threaded  a needle,  and  performed  several  other 
things,  which  could  not  have  been  done  without  the 
aid  of  vision.”* — Of  extraordinary  cases  of  this 
kind,  it  would  seem  that  no  satisfactory  explanation 
(at  least  no  explanation  which  is  unattended  with 
difficulties)  has  as  yet  been  given. 

* As  quoted  in  Dr,  Oliver’s  Physiology,  chap.  xxx. 


IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED 


mental  action. 


DIVISION  FIRST. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 

' » 

PART  II. 

derangement  of  the  internal  intellect. 


DISORDERED  ACTION 

OF  THE 

INTERNAL  INTELLECT 


CHAPTER  I. 

DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 

§ 112.  Of  the  Internal  in  distinction  from  the  Ex- 
ternal  Intellect. 

It  was  remarked,  in  one  of  the  Introductory 
Chapters  to  this  Work,  that  the  Mind  may  be  con- 
sidered  under  the  three  general  heads  of  the  Intel- 
lect, the  Sensibilities,  and  the  Will.  The  Intellect, 
so  far  as  it  is  brought  into  action,  in  consequence 
of  being  immediately  in  contact  with  the  External 
World,  is  designated  by  the  epithet  External.  We 
find  it  convenient  to  call  it  the  External  Intellect. 
But,  so  far  as  the  Intellect  has  an  internal  action, 
that  is  to  say,  an  action  carried  on  without  any  di- 
rect or  very  close  connexion  with  the  external  world, 
it  is  a matter  of  convenience,  besides  involving  a 
great  philosophical  truth,  to  designate  it  as  the  In- 
ternal Intellect.  In  support  of  this  great  distinction 


194  DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 

in  the  Intellectual  action,  it  is  not  necessary  to  say 
anything  further  here,  than  to  make  the  general  re- 
mark, that  it  is  a distinction  fully  recognised,  and 
sustained,  at  greater  or  less  length,  by  many  of  the 
most  distinguished  mental  philosophers.  On  this 
matter,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary  to  delay.  We 
are  to  regard  it,  in  this  discussion  at  least,  as  a well 
ascertained  and  clearly  established  point  of  depar 
ture. 

§ 113.  Original  suggestion  to  be  regarded  as  a 
distinct  power  of  the  mind. 

Some  of  the  cases  of  thought  and  knowledge  (as 
we  have  had  occasion  to  remark  in  the  Elements  of 
Mental  Philosophy),  which  the  mind  becomes  pos- 
sessed of  in  itself,  without  the  direct  aid  of  the  Sen- 
ses, are  to  be  ascribed  to  Suggestion.  This  word, 
in  its  application  to  the  mind,  is  used  merely  to  ex- 
press a simple  but  important  fact,  viz.,  that  the  mind, 
by  its  own  activity  and  vigour,  by  the  originative  im- 
pulse of  its  own  spontaneity,  gives  rise  to  certain 
thoughts.  We  have  already  had  occasion,  in  the 
chapter  on  the  Outlines  of  Mental  Philosophy,  to 
refer  to  some  remarks  of  Dr.  Reid,  who  speaks,  in 
his  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  of  certain  notions 
(for  instance,  those  of  existence,  mind,  person, 
&c.),  as  the  “judgments  of  nature,  judgments  not 
got  by  comparing  ideas,  and  perceiving  agreements 
and  disagreements,  but  immediately  inspired  by  our 
constitution.” 

Pursuing  this  train  of  thought,  he  ascribes  thos6 
notions,  which  cannot  be  attributed  directly  to  the 


disordered  suggestion.  195 

senses  on  the  one  hand,  nor  to  the  reasoning  power 
on  the  other,  to  an  internal  or  mental  Suggestion,  as 
follows  : “ I beg  leave”  (he  expressly  says)  “ to 
make  use  of  the  word  Suggestion,  because  I know 
not  one  more  proper,  to  express  a power  of  the  mind, 
which  seems  entirely  to  have  escaped  the  notice  of 
philosophers,  and  to  which  we  owe  many  of  our  sim- 
pie  notions.” 

Mr.  Stewart  also,  in  his  Philosophical  Essays 
and  in  other  parts  of  his  valuable  Works,  appears 
very  clearly  to  take  similar  ground.  Referring  to 
certain  mental  phenomena,  particularly  such  as 
would  naturally  come  under  the  general  head  of  In- 
ternal Origin,  he  speaks  of  them,  not  as  the  objects 
of  consciousness,  but  as  merely  attendant  upon  those 
objects,  and  as  suggested  by  them. 

Suggestion,  therefore  (or,  as  we  should  prefer  to 
designate  it,  Original  Suggestion,  thus  distinguishing 
it  from  Relative" Suggestion  or  Judgment),  is  to  be 
regarded  as  a distinct  source  of  ideas.  And  cer- 
tainly no  conceptions  of  the  human  mind  are  more 
fundamental  and  important  than  those,  the  origin  of 
which  is  to  be  assigned  here.  Such  as  the  ideas  of 

EXISTENCE,  PERSONAL  IDENTITY,  UNITY,  PLURALI- 
TY, NUMBER,  SUCCESSION,  DURATION,  TIME,  POWER, 

space,  and  the  like. — What  remains  to  be  done  in 
this  chapter,  is  to  show  that  it  is  possible  for  insan- 
itv,  in  a greater  or  less  degree,  to  attach  to  the  men- 
tal action,  in  connexion  with  the  origin  of  some  of 
these  fundamental  conceptions. 


196 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 


$ 114.  Insanity  in  connexion  with  the  conviction  oj 
personal  identity. 

Among  other  important  conceptions,  the  origin  of 
which  may  be  traced  to  Original  Suggestion,  or 
which,  in  other  words,  are  originated  by  an  ultimate 
and  spontaneous  movement  of  the  mind,  is  that  of 
our  Personal  Identity.  This  is  not  only  one  of  the 
earliest,  but  one  of  the  strongest  convictions  which 
men  have  ; and  is  essential,  in  the  highest  sense  of 
that  term,  to  soundness  of  mind.  But  this  great 
link  of  thought,  which  makes  a man  one  with  him- 
self  in  all  the  varieties  of  his  past  and  present  ex- 
istence, is  sometimes  broken.  In  such  cases  the 
portion  of  past  existence  is  let  loose  from  the  pres- 
ent ; and  the  individual,  who  is  subject  to  this  form 
of  mental  malady,  confounds  himself  with  other  per- 
sons and  other  beings,  and  constantly  reasons  and 
acts  upon  this  false  view. 

Dr.  Rush  mentions  a case  to  which  this  statement 
will  apply.  “ There  is  now”  (he  says)  “ a madman 
in  the  Pennsylvania  Hospital,  who  believes  that  he 
was  once  a calf,  and  who  mentions  the  name  of  the 
butcher  that  killed  him,  and  the  stall  in  the  Philadel- 
phia market  on  which  his  flesh  was  sold,  previously 
to  his  animating  his  present  body.”  He  likewise 
mentions  the  case  of  one  of  the  princes  of  Bourbon, 
who  believed  himself  transformed  into  a plant ; and 
with  such  sincerity,  that  he  often  went  and  stood  in 
his  garden,  and  insisted  upon  being  watered  in  com- 
mon with  the  plants  around  him.* 

* Diseases  of  the  Mind,  p.  80. 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 


197 


It  is  stated,  on  the  authority  of  Pinel,  that  a cele- 
brated watchmaker  of  Paris  became  insane  during 
the  French  Revolution.  This  man  believed  that  he 
and  some  others  had  been  beheaded,  but  that  the 
heads  were  subsequently  ordered  to  be  restored  to 
the  original  owners.  Some  mistake,  however,  as 
the  insane  pc  rson  conceived,  was  committed  in  the 
process  of  restoration,  in  consequence  of  which  he 
had  unfortunately  been  furnished  with  the  head  of 
one  of  his  companions  instead  of  his  own.  He  was 
admitted  into  the  Hospital  Bicetre,  “ where  he  was 
continually  complaining  of  his  misfortune,  and  la- 
menting the  fine  teeth  and  wholesome  breath  he  had 
exchanged  for  those  of  very  different  qualities.”* 
Such  instances  show  that  the  fundamental  per- 
ception, which  we  commonly  denominate  the  feeling 
i or  consciousness  of  Personal  Identity,  and  in  virtue 
of  which  we  confidently  speak  of  ourselves  as  the 
same  being,  amid  ail  the  changes  incident  to  our  ex- 
istence, may  be  disordered ; and  that,  too,  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  cause,  as  it  were,  a dislocation  of 
our  continuity,  and  to  separate  our  personality  into 
remote  and  unrelated  fragments.  I am  aware  that 
this  aspect  of  Insanity,  considered  as  holding  a sep- 
arate and  distinctive  place,  is  not  prominent  in  the 
writers  on  that  subject.  Dr.  Rush,  however,  ex- 
pressly states,  that,  in  certain  marked  cases  which 
he  describes,  the  conviction  of  Personal  Identity 
may  for  a time  be  destroyed.  And,  in  confirmation 
of  his  remark,  he  refers  to  Shakspeare,  where  the 
* Treatise  on  Insanity,  p.  69. 


198 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 


poet  represents  King  Lear  as  uttering  the  following 
words  : 

“lam  mainly  ignorant 
What  place  this  is  ; and  all  the  skill  I have 
Remembers  not  these  garments,  nor  I know  not 
Where  I did  sleep  last  night.” 

Dr.  Combe  also  explicitly  says,  “ Patients  are 
sometimes  insane  in  the  feeling  of  Personal  Identi- 
ty.” “ Such  individuals”  (he  adds)  “ lose  all  con- 
sciousness of  their  past  and  proper  personality,  and 
imagine  themselves  different  persons  altogether ; 
while,  with  the  exception  of  this  erroneous  impres- 
sion, they  feel  and  think  correctly.” 

§115.  Disordered  mental  action,  in  connexion  with 
the  idea  of  space. 

The  idea  of  Space,  which  we  next  propose  for 
consideration,  is  revealed  to  us  in  the  Internal  intel- 
lect, and  hy  a suggestive  rather  than  a deductive 
act.  The  idea  or  conception  of  space  is  one  of  the 
clearest  which  the  mind  has.  It  seems  indispensa- 
ble that  it  should  be  so,  inasmuch  as  it  furnishes  the 
basis  for  all  our  ideas  of  the  position  or  place  ol 
things.  Nevertheless,  this  important  and  element- 
ary conception  may  be  disordered  ; and  this  disor- 
der may  extend  to  everything  that  is  incidental  to,  or 
involved  in  it,  viz.,  to  the  position  or  place  of  things. 
There  is  at  such  times  an  expansion,  an  amplifica- 
tion of  the  great  reality  developed  in  the  idea  of 
space,  which  js  not  only  strange  and  unprecedented 
in  itself,  but  which  has  the  effect  to  enlarge  and  ex- 
aggerate everything  which  is  subordinate  to  it,  in  the 
sense  of  having  a place  or  locality. 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION.  199 

The  Leper  of  Aost,  an  interesting  little  work  of 
Count  le  Maistre,  appears  to  me  to  contain  some 
allusions  to  this  peculiar  state  of  mind. — “ I yield” 
(says  the  leper,  whose  mind  had  become  affected 
and  disordered  by  the  intensity  of  disease)  “to  ex- 
traordinary impressions,  which  I feel  in  these  un- 
happy  moments.  Sometimes  it  is  as  if  an  irresisti- 
ble power  were  dragging  me  to  a fathomless  abyss. 
Sometimes  I see  nothing  but  bleak  forms  ; when  I 
endeavour  to  examine  them,  they  cross  each  other 
with  the  rapidity  of  lightning,  increase  in  approach- 
ing, and  soon  are  like  mountains,  ivhich  crush  me 
under  their  weight.  At  other  times  I see  dark 
clouds  arise  from  the  earth  around  me  ; they  come 
over  me  like  an  inundation , ivhich  increases,  advan- 
ces, and  threatens  to  ingulf  me.” 

It  is  well  known  that  the  mind  is  powerfully  and 
very  injuriously  affected  by  the  use  of  opium.  De 
Quincey’s  Confessions  of  an  Opium  Eater,  contain- 
ing very  interesting  and  striking  statements,  drawn 
from  the  author’s  own  unhappy  experience,  may  be 
considered  an  authentic  document  on  this  subject. 
This  publication  throws  some  light  upon  the  inquiry 
now  directly  before  us.  When  he  was  awake,  his 
mind  was  powerfully  affected.  But  still  more  so  in 
his  dreams.  Everything  seemed  expanded  im- 
measurably. In  one  place,  giving  an  account  of 
his  dreams,  he  says,  “ My  imagination  was  infinite.” 
Again  he  says,  more  directly  to  our  present  purpose, 
‘ I seemed  to  descend  into  chasms  and  sunless 
abysses,  depths  below  depths,  from  which  it  seemed 
hopeless  that  I could  ever  reascend.  Nor  did  I,  by 

Q 


200 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 


waking,  feel  that  I had  reascended.  Buildings, 
landscapes,  &c.,  were  exhibited  in  proportions  so 
vast  as  the  bodily  eye  is  not  fitted  to  receive.  Space 
swelled , and  was  amplified  to  an  unutterable  infinity  ” 

These  statements  seem  to  show  the  possibility 
that  the  mind  may  be  injuriously  affected  in  this 
respect  as  well  as  in  others. 

As  the  idea  of  space  is,  in  the  order  of  nature, 
antecedent  to  that  of  place,  and  may  be  considered 
as  the  foundation  or  basis  of  it,  it  is  possible  we 
may  find,  in  what  has  now  been  said,  a reason,  in 
part  at  least,  that  insane  persons  frequently  misap- 
prehend the  position  or  place  of  things,  and  are  at  a t 
loss  where  they  are. 

§ 116.  Disordered  mental  action  in  connexion  with 
Time . 

The  idea  of  duration  (or  Time,  as  we  commonly 
express  it)  is  not  given  us,  whatever  may  be  true  of 
the  measurements  of  time,  by  means  of  the  outward 
senses.  It  is  correctly  regarded  as  a communica- 
tion from  the  internal  intellect,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
power  of  original  suggestion.  The  existence  of  this 
important  mental  conception  depends  (not  the  thing 
itself,  but  merely  the  conception  or  idea  of  it)  upon 
the  previous  fact  of  a succession  in  our  mental  op- 
erations, of  which  we  are  conscious.  If  the  succes 
sion  be  disordered,  the  notion  of  time  will  be  disor- 
dered. If,  for  instance,  in  a case  of  insanity,  which 
is  sometimes  the  fact,  the  mind  be  fixed  upon  one 
thought ; if  it  suffer  a sort  of  paralysis  in  respect  to 
every  other  movement,  and  revolve  continually  in 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 


201 


the  monotonous  circle  of  a single  conception,  the 
power  of  original  suggestion,  acting  upon  such  a 
basis,  must,  of  necessity,  give  but  an  imperfect  idea 
of  the  actual  duration. 

Essentially  this  view  appears  to  be  taken  by  Dr. 
Gall.  “ It  appears”  (says  this  laborious  and  valuable 
collector  of  mental  facts)  “ that  there  is  no  idea  of 
time  with  those  insane  persons  who  remain  days 
and  weeks  fixed  in  the  same  place.  A madman  at 
Vienna  had  but  one  fixed  idea,  namely,  that  it  was 
always  the  17th  of  October.  It  often  happens  in 
mental  alienation,  as  in  other  grievous  diseases,  that 
the  idea  of  time  is  completely  destroyed.  When 
these  patients  recover,  they  begin  to  count  the  time 
from  the  moment  when  they  regained  the  distinct 
perception  of  their  existence.  After  twenty-seven 
years  of  seclusion  and  mania,  a lady  experienced  a 
revolution  favourable  to  her  moral  state.  Her  de- 
lirium and  madness  continued  during  this  space  of 
time  to  the  extent  of  tearing  her  clothes,  of  remain- 
ing naked,  &c.  At  the  moment  of  the  cessation  of 
her  delirium,  she  appeared  to  come  out  as  from  a 
profound  dream,  and  asked  after  two  young  children 
which  she  had  previous  to  her  alienation,  and  could 
not  conceive  that  they  had  been  married  several 
years  previous.”* 

Other  similar  cases  might  be  introduced.  Dr. 
Rush  mentions  the  case  of  a clergyman,  which 
furnishes  an  illustration  of  the  doctrine  which  has 
been  laid  down.  The  person  referred  to  was  insane 
four  years  and  a half.  The  peculiarity  or  type  of 
* Gall’s  Works,  Boston  ed.,  vol,  v.,  p,  95. 


202  disordered  suggestion. 

his  insanity  was  despair,  resulting  from  the  belie, 
that  he  had  lost  his  Maker’s  favour,  and  was  neces- 
sarily and  inevitably  exposed  to  everlasting  misery. 
He  kept  his  hands  constantly  in  motion,  and  con- 
stantly repeated  his  conviction  of  his  lost  condition. 
The  single  thought  of  his  present  and  prospective 
misery,  without  any  alleviation,  seems  to  have  oc- 
cupied his  mind.  After  his  recovery,  he  asserted,  in 
reference  to  the  period  of  his  insanity  (what,  indeed, 
the  principles  of  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  would 
naturally  lead  us  to  expect),  “ that  he  lost  all  sense  of 
years,  months,  weeks,  days,  and  nights,  and  even  of 
morning  and  evening  ; that,  in  this  respect,  time  was 
to  him  no  more.”* 

Dr.  Haslam  relates  the  case  of  a man  who  was 
attacked  with  insanity  at  the  period  of  the  year  when 
people  were  planting  their  corn.  Having  recovered 
at  the  period  when  the  corn  was  ripe  and  was  being 
gathered,  he  seriously  asserted  that  he  had  seen  the 
corn  planted  only  three  or  four  days  before,  and  con- 
sidered it  a very  uncommon  and  remarkable  circum- 
stance that  it  should  have  become  ripe  so  soon. 
The  simple  fact  was,  that  his  insanity  was  of  such  a 
nature  as  directly  or  indirectly  to  reach  and  perplex 
the  mental  process,  by  which  we  have  a knowledge 
of  time  and  of  its  measurements.  Time,  as  a sub 
ject  of  distinct  conception,  had  been  virtually  anni- 
hilated to  him,  almost  as  much  so  as  if  he  had  been, 
during  the  whole  period,  in  sound  sleep  or  deprived 
of  life.f 

* Diseases  of  the  Mind,  2d  ed.,  p.  95. 

f Burrows’s  Commentaries,  p.  677. 


disordered  suggestion. 


203 


^ 117.  Further  illustrations  of  disordered  Time . 
Undei  this  head  we  may  properly  introduce  an  in- 
teresting and  instructive  statement,  which  is  to  be 
found  in  the  first  volume  of  the  American  Journal  of 
Science.  The  statement  is  given  in  a letter  to  the 
editor,  Professor  Silliman,  in  the  following  terms  : 
u Some  years  ago,  a farmer  of  fair  character,  who 
resided  in  an  interior  town  in  New-England,  sold 
his  farm,  with  an  intention  of  purchasing  another  in 
a different  town.  His  mind  was  naturally  of  a mel- 
ancholy cast.  Shortly  after  the  sale  of  his  farm,  he 
was  induced  to  believe  that  he  had  sold  it  for  less 
than  its  value.  This  persuasion  brought  on  dissat- 
isfaction, and  eventually  a considerable  degree  of 
melancholy.  In  this  situation,  one  of  his  neighbours 
engaged  him  to  enclose  a lot  of  land  with  a post 
and  rail  fence,  which  he  was  to  commence  making 
the  next  day.  At  the  time  appointed  he  went  into 
the  field,  and  began,  with  a beetle  and  wedges,  to 
split  the  timber  out  of  which  the  posts  and  rails 
were  to  be  prepared.  On  finishing  his  day’s  work, 
he  put  his  beetle  and  wedges  into  a hollow  tree,  and 
went  home'.  Two  of  his  sons  had  been  at  work 
through  the  day  in  a distant  part  of  the  same  field. 
On  his  return,  he  directed  them  to  get  up  early  the 
next  morning,  to  assist  him  in  making  the  fence. 
In  the  course  of  the  evening  he  became  delirious, 
and  continued  in  this  situation  several  years  ; when 
his  mental  powers  were  suddenly  restored.  The 
first  question  which  he  asked  after  the  return  of  his 
reason,  was,  whether  his  sons  had  brought  in  the 


204  DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 

beetle  and  wedges.  He  appeared  to  be  wholly  un 
conscious  of  tiie  time  that  had  elapsed  from  the 
commencement  of  his  delirium.  Ills  sons,  appre- 
hensive that  any  explanations  might  induce  a return 
of  his  disease,  simply  replied  that  they  had  been  un- 
able to  find  them.  He  immediately  arose  from  his 
bed,  went  into  the  field  where  he  had  been  at  work 
a number  of  years  before,  and  found  the  wedges 
and  the  rings  of  the  beetle  where  he  had  left  them, 
the  beetle  itself  having  mouldered  away.  During 
his  delirium,  his  mind  had  not  been  occupied  with 
those  subjects  with  which  it  was  conversant  in 
health.” 

The  question  so  promptly  put  by  the  individual 
who  is  the  subject  of  this  narrative,  in  regard  to  the 
beetle  and  wedges,  seems  to  indicate  clearly  that  his 
mental  disorder  extended  to  that  form  of  mental  ac- 
tion which  is  involved  in  the  origination  of  our  ideas 
of  time.  There  was,  subjectively  or  relatively  to 
the  mind,  a virtual  extinction  of  time.  It  could  not 
well  be  otherwise.  The  mind,  in  its  actual  position, 
was  incapable  of  revealing  a distinct  and  well-reg- 
ulated conception  of  it.  The  philosophy  in  this 
case,  and  the  facts  which  are  narrated,  evidently  cor- 
respond to  each  other. 

§ 118.  Varieties  or  peculiarities  in  disordered  ideas 
of  Time . 

We  may  add  here,  and  in  connexion  with  what 
has  been  said,  that  disordered  time  assumes  very 
different  phases  in  different  persons.  Sometimes 
it  is  annihilated,  lost  beyond  recovery,  as  in  some  ol 


DISORDERED  SUGGESTION. 


205 


the  instances  which  have  been  mentioned.  Some- 
times it  stops  short  in  its  movement ; or,  if  it  moves 
at  all,  return's  at  brief  intervals  upon  its  own  steps, 
and  continually  revolves  around  the  same  point  ; as 
in  the  case  of  Dr.  Gall’s  madman  of  Vienna,  who 
believed  it  was  always  the  17th  of  October.  But  in 
other  cases,  it  appears  to  take  a new  pair  of  wings, 
and  fly  with  astonishing  rapidity,  so  that  the  madman 
seems  to  live  years,  perhaps  centuries,  in  an  hour. 
This  last  view  receives  some  confirmation  in  the 
statements  of  persons  who  have  been  on  the  point  of 
drowning,  but  have  been  rescued  from  that  situation. 
These  persons  inform  us,  that  the  operations  of  their 
minds  were  exceedingly  quickened.  Their  fami- 
lies, their  friends,  their  past  life,  with  its  thousand  mi- 
nute incidents,  presented  themselves  before  the  mind 
with  the  greatest  rapidity  ; in  appearance  almost  si- 
multaneously. The  consequence  was,  that  time  was 
greatly  expanded  ; and  a few  moments  became  of 
almost  interminable  length.  The  author  of  the  Con- 
fessions of  an  Opium  Eater,  who  has  already  been 
quoted,  refers  to  this  state  of  mind,  particularly  as 
it  developed  itself  in  his  dreams.  After  saying  that 
space  was  amplified  to  an  unutterable  infinity,  he 
adds  : “ This,  however,  did  not  disturb  me  so  much 
as  the  vast  expansion  of  time . I sometimes  seemed 
to  have  lived  seventy  or  a hundred  years  in  one 
night.  Nay,  sometimes  had  feelings  representative 
of  a millennium  passed  in  that  time.”  In  another 
place  he  speaks  of  himself  as  “ being  buried  for  a 
thousand  years  in  stone  coffins,  with  mummies  and 


20(3 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 


sphinxes,  in  narrow  chambers,  in  the  heart  of  eter- 
nal pyramids.” 

We  propose  to  go  no  farther  under  this  head,  viz., 
of  Original  Suggestion,  although  there  are  other 
important  ideas  which,  in  their  origin,  may  be  attrib- 
uted  to  this  source.  Indeed,  it  is  not  necessary,  nor 
even  proper,  to  say  everything  under  every  subordi- 
nate division  which  might  be  said.  The  powers  of 
the  mind  are  in  their  exercise  so  implicated  with 
each  other,  and  disorder  in  one  part  so  frequently 
extends  to  another  part,  that  such  a course  would  be 
likely  to  be  attended  with  too  many  needless  repe- 
titions. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

§119.  Of  the  meaning  of  the  term  Consciousness. 

We  proceed  now  to  the  second  great  source  ot 
internal  knowledge,  viz.,  Consciousness. — The  term 
Consciousness,  as  we  had  occasion  to  remark  in  one 
of  the  Introductory  chapters,  is  appropriated  to  ex- 
press the  way  or  method  in  which  we  obtain  the 
knowledge  of  those  objects  which  belong  to  the 
mind  itself,  and  which  do  not,  and  cannot  exist,  in 
dependently  of  some  mind.  Imagination  and  rea 
soning,  as  was  also  remarked  in  the  chapter  just  re 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS.  207 

fened  to,  are  terms  expressive  of  real  objects  of 
thought  5 but  evidently,  the  objects  for  which  they 
stand  cannot  be  supposed  to  exist,  independently  of 
some  mind  which  imagines  and  reasons.  Hence 
every  instance  of  Consciousness  may  be  regarded 
as  embracing  in  itself  three  distinct  notions  at  least, 
viz.,  the  idea  of  Self  or  of  personal  existence  ; be- 
sides this,  the  idea  or  notion  of  some  quality,  state, 
or  operation  of  the  mind";  and  also  the  relative  per- 
ception of  possession,  appropriation,  or  belonging  to, 
which  announces  or  substantiates  the  mental  quality, 
whatever  it  is,  as  an  attribute  of  the  person  or  self. 

It  may  be  added  further,  in  connexion  with  this 
topic,  that  Consciousness,  properly  speaking,  relates 
exclusively  to  the  present  time,  and  takes  no  cogni- 
zance of  the  past.  We  cannot  be  said,  in  strictness 
of  speech,  to  be  conscious  of  the  feelings  which  we 
had  yesterday,  but  merely  of  the  y'ecollection  of  them. 
But  we  may  be  conscious  of  any  mental  acts  'or 
feelings  which  exist  now. 

^ 120.  Two  forms  of  disordered  Consciousness. 

It  will  be  particularly  understood,  from  what  has 
been  said,  that  the  great  fact  of  Consciousness  al- 
ways implies  something  in  the  first  person ; an  Ego  ; 
in  plain  English,  a Self  or  I.  The  terms  self 
myself,  I,  and  the  like,  are  expressions  for  the  sim- 
ple fact  of  our  personal  existence,  which  is  one  ol 
our  earliest  conceptions,  and  is  made  known  by  wha) 
we  have  denominated  Original  Suggestion.  Con- 
sciousness, in  distinction  from  this,  expresses  the 
fact,  that  we  naturally  and  necessarily  recognise  all 
B 


208 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 


the  acts  or  operations  of  the  mental  part,  of  the  self 
or  I,  as  belonging  to  such  mental  self  or  I ; in 
other  words,  as  belonging  to  our  own  minds. — 
Consequently,  in  a sound  state  of  Consciousness, 
the  ego  or  I is  one,  and  one  only  ; and  all  mental 
acts  and  operations  are  promptly  and  invariably  re- 
ferred to  this  great  centre  of  personality.  And,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  is  an  insanity  of  mind  (specifi- 
cally an  insanity  of  Consciousness)  when  the  ego 
becomes  divided ; in  other  words,  when  a man  has 
a different  self  at  different  times  ; and  also  in  all 
cases  when  Consciousness  is  unable  to  connect  an 
individual’s  mental  acts  or  operations  invariably  with 
one  and  the  same  personal  centre. 

In  accordance  with  these  views,  there  are  two 
forms,  at  least,  of  an  unsound  state  of  Conscious- 
ness ; first,  Suspended  Consciousness,  which  is 
the  more  common  form,  and,  second,  Divided  or 
Intermittent  Consciousness. 

§ 121.  Illustrations  of  suspended  Consciousness . 

Yarious  instances  are  recorded  of  what  may  be 
called  suspended  consciousness. — The  case  al- 
ready mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  of  the 
man  who  placed  his  beetle  and  wedges  in  a hollow 
tree,  and  became  maniacal  the  night  after,  is  an  in- 
stance in  point.  It  is,  of  course,  unnecessary  that 
the  statement  should  be  repeated.  There  is  an- 
other instance  found  in  the  same  Work,  the  Ameri- 
can Journal  of  Science,  vol.  i.,  p.  432.  The  state- 
ment is  given  in  the  following  terms  : 

“ Mrs.  S.,  an  intelligent  lady,  belonging  to  a re- 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS.  209 

spectable  family  in  the  State  of  New-York,  seme 
years  ago  undertook  a piece  of  fine  needlework. 
She  devoted  her  time  to  it  almost  constantly  for  a 
number  of  days.  Before  she  had  completed  it  she 
became  suddenly  delirious.  In  this  state,  without 
experiencing  any  material  abatement  of  her  disease, 
she  continued  for  about  seven  years,  when  her  rea- 
son was  suddenly  restored.  One  of  the  first  ques- 
tions which  she  asked  after  her  reason  returned,  re- 
lated to  her  needlework.  It  is  a remarkable  fact, 
that  during  the  long  continuance  of  her  delirium,  she 
said  nothing,  so  far  as  was  recollected,  about  her 
needlework,  nor  concerning  any  such  subjects  as 
usually  occupied  her  attention  when  in  health.” 

The  case  of  an  English  clergyman,  the  Rev.  Si- 
mon Browne,  seems  properly  to  be  mentioned  here. 
This  gentleman  entertained  the  idea  that  “ he  had 
fallen  under  the  sensible  displeasure  of  God,  who 
had  caused  his  rational  soul  gradually  to  perish,  and 
left  him  only  an  animal  life  in  common  with  the 
brutes.”*  He  was  a man  of  exemplary  life,  and  of 
no  small  ability  and  learning.  His  insanity  was 
limited  to  the  single  conviction  that,  although  he 
possessed  a vital  principle  or  sort  of  animal  life,  the 
perceptive  and  reasoning  part  or  mind  was  totally 
extinct.  Accordingly,  as  every  case  of  conscious- 
ness implies  not  only  a recognition  of  the  mental 
acts,  but  a reference  of  those  acts  to  the  mind  as 
their  subject,  it  would  seem  that,  in  his  case,  con- 
sciousness was  disordered  and  suspended. 

This  case,  as  well  as  the  preceding  one  in  this 

* Conolly,  p.  412. 


210 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 


section,  might  also  have  been  introduced  under  the 
head  of  Suggestion,  since  the  facts  stated  evidently 
involve  a disordered  state  of  the  suggestive  power 
as  well  as  of  consciousness. 

§ 122.  Illustrations  of  divided  or  intermittent  Con - 
sciousness. 

There  are  other  cases  of  disordered  conscious- 
ness, somewhat  different  from  those  which  have  been 
mentioned,  which  may  be  designated  as  cases  ot 
DIVIDED  or  INTERMITTENT  CONSCIOUSNESS.  That 

is  to  say,  the  mind,  at  two  different  periods  of  time, 
is  found  to  be  in  two  different  states.  In  one  state 
its  action  is  marked  by  certain  peculiarities  ; it  has 
thoughts,  reasonings,  feelings,  remembrances  pecu- 
liar to  itself  at  that  particular  time.  In  the  other 
state  it  is  the  subject  of  thoughts,  reasonings,  and 
feelings  wholly  different ; the  point  of  transition  from 
one  state  to  a subsequent  one  is  distinct ; and  in  the 
actually  existing  state,  whatever  it  is,  there  is  a for- 
getfulness of  the  other.  “ I once  attended”  (says 
Dr.  Rush)  “ the  daughter  of  a British  officer,  who 
had  been  educated  in  the  habits  of  gay  life,  who  was 
married  to  a Methodist  minister.  In  her  paroxysms 
of  madness  she  • resumed  her  gay  habits,  spoke 
French,  and  ridiculed  the  tenets  and  practices  of  the 
sect  to  which  she  belonged.  In  the  intervals  of  her 
fits  she  renounced  her  gay  habits,  became  zealously 
devoted  to  the  religious  principles  and  ceremonies  of 
the  Methodists,  and  forgot  everything  she  did  and 
said  during  the  period  of  her  insanity.”* 

* Rush’s  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  p.  165. 


DjlSORDERED  consciousness. 


211 


The  writer  in  the  American  Journal  of  Science, 
already  repeatedly  referred  to,  narrates  a case  which 
may  properly  be  introduced  here.^  'I  he  case  is  a 
marked  and  interesting  one,  as  follows  : 

« A lady  in  New-England,  of  a respectable  fam- 
ily, was  for  a considerable  period  subject  to  parox- 
ysms of  delirium.  These  paroxysms  came  on  in- 
stantaneously, and,  after  continuing  an  indefinite 
time,  went  off  as  suddenly,,  leaving  her  mind  per- 
fectly rational.  It  often  happened  that,  when  she 
was  engaged  in  rational  and  interesting  conversation, 
she  would  stop  short  in  the  midst  of  it,  become  in  a 
moment  entirely  delirious,  and  commence  a conver- 
sation on  some  other  subject,  not  having  the  re- 
motest connexion  with  the  previous  one,  nor  would 
she  advert  to  that  during  her  delirium.  When  she 
became  rational  again,  she  would  pursue  the  same 
conversation  in  which  she  had  been  engaged  during 
the  lucid  interval,  beginning  where  she  had  left  ott. 
To  such  a degree  was  this  carried,  that  she  would 
complete  an  unfinished  story  or  sentence,  or  even  an 
unfinished  word.  When  her  next  delirious  parox- 
ysm came  on,  she  would  continue  the  conversation 
which  she  had  been  pursuing  in  her  preceding  par- 
oxysm ; so  that  she  appeared  as  a person  might  be 
supposed  to  do  who  had  two  souls,  each  occasion- 
ally dormant  and  occasionally  active,  and  utterly  ig- 
norant of  what  the  other  was  doing.” 

There  is  a particularly  interesting  case  of  divided 
or  intermittent  consciousness  to  be  found  in  the 
Medical  Repository,  in  a communication  from  Dr. 
Mitchell,  of  the  City  of  New-York,  to  the  Rev.  l)r 
Nott. 


212 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 


“ When  I was  employed”  (says  the  writer  of 
this  communication),  “ early  in  December,  1815, 
with  several  other  gentlemen,  in  doing  the  duty 
of  a visiter  to  the  United  States’  Military  Acade- 
my at  West  Point,  a very  extraordinary  case  of 
Double  Consciousness  in  a woman  was  related 
to  me  by  one  of  the  professors.  Major  Elicott, 
who  so  worthily  occupies  the  mathematical  chair 
in  that  seminary,  vouched  for  the  correctness  of 
the  following  narrative,  Ihe  subject  of  which  is  re- 
lated to  him  by  blood,  and  an  inhabitant  of  one  of 
the  western  counties  of  Pennsylvania.  Miss  R. 
possessed,  naturally,  a very  good  constitution,  and 
arrived  at  adult  age  without  having  it  impaired  by 
disease.  She  possessed  an  excellent  capacity,  and 
enjoyed  fair  opportunities  to  acquire  knowledge. 
Besides  the  domestic  arts  and  social  attainments, 
she  had  improved  her  mind  by  reading  and  conver- 
sation, and  was  well  versed  in  penmanship.  Her 
memory  was  capacious,  and  stored  with  a copious 
stock  of  ideas.  Unexpectedly,  and  without  any 
forewarning,  she  fell  into  a profound  sleep,  which 
continued  several  hours  beyond  the  ordinary  term. 
On  waking,  she  was  discovered  to  have  lost  every 
trait  of  acquired  knowledge.  Her  memory  was 
tabula  rasa;  all  vestiges,  both  of  words  and  things, 
were  obliterated  and  gone.  It  was  found  necessary 
for  her  to  learn  everything  again.  She  even  acqui- 
red, by  new  efforts,  the  art  of  spelling,  reading,  wri- 
ting, and  calculating,  and  gradually  became  acquaint- 
ed with  the  persons  and  objects  around,  like  a being 
for  the  first  time  brought  into  the  world.  In  these 


DISORDERED  CONSCIOUSNESS. 


213 


exercises  she  made  considerable  proficiency.  But, 
after  a few  months,  another  fit  of  somnolency  inva- 
ded her.  On  rousing  from  it,  she  found  herself  re- 
stored to  the  state  she  was  in  before  the  first  parox- 
ysm, but  was  wholly  ignorant  of  every  event  and 
occurrence  that  had  befallen  her  afterward.  i?he 
former  condition  of  her  existence  she  now  calls  the 
Old  State,  and  the  latter  the  New  State ; and  she 
is  as  unconscious  of  her  double  character  as  two 
distinct  persons  are  of  their  respective  natures.  For 
example,  in  her  old  state,  she  possesses  all  her  ori- 
ginal knowledge  ; in  her  new  state,  only  what  -she 
acquired  since.  If  a gentleman  or  lady  be  introdu- 
ced to  her  in  the  old  state,  and  vice  versa  (and  so  of 
all  other  matters),  to  know  them  satisfactorily  she 
must  learn  them  in  both  states.  In  the  old  state 
she  possesses  fine  powers  of  penmanship,  while  in 
the  new  she  writes  a poor,  awkward  hand,  having 
not  had  time  or  means  to  become  expert.  During 
four  years  and  upward,  she  has  undergone  periodi- 
cal transitions  from  one  of  these  states  to  the  other. 
The  alterations  are  always  consequent  upon  a long 
and  sound  sleep.  Both  the  lady  and  her  family  are 
now  capable  of  conducting  the  affair  w’ithout  embai- 
rassment.  By  simply  knowing  whether  she  is  in 
the  old  or  new  state,  they  regulate  the  intercourse, 
and  govern  themselves  accordingly.” 

It  would  not  be  difficult,  probably,  to  multiply 
cases  similar  to  those  which  have  been  mentioned. 
They  are  of  great  interest  in  themselves,  and  they 
seem  clearly  to  establish  the  existence  of  that  pecu- 
liar form  of  mental  disorder  in  connexion  with  which 


214 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF 


they  are  introduced.  It  is  unnecessary,  after  what 
has  already  been  said,  and  especially  in  connexion 
with  what  remains  to  be  said,  to  intimate  how  erro- 
neous was  that  ancient  doctrine  of  insanity,  which 
resolved  it,  in  all  cases  and  under  all  its  aspects,  into 
one  type  or  form. 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR 
JUDGMENT. 

§ 123.  Relative  Suggestion  or  Judgment  a distinct 
Power. 

Among  other  powers  or  susceptibilities  of  the 
human  mind  is  that  by  which  we  perceive  or  feel 
the  relation  of  objects  to  each  other  in  certain  re- 
spects. The  office  of  this  power  is  not  merely  to 
perceive  objects  in  themselves,  which  may  be  done 
by  means  of  the  senses,  or  by  original  suggestion,  01 
in  some  other  way,  but  precisely  what  has  been  said, 
viz.,  to  perceive  and  to  make  known  to  us  their  re- 
lations. Hence  the  name,  which  is  properly  given 
to  it,  that  of  relative  suggestion  ; although,  as 
we  have  already  stated  in  a previous  chapter,  it  is 
frequently  expressed  by  the  less  definite  term  judg- 
ment. We  shall  employ  the  two  terms,  in  what 
we  have  to  say  at  present,  as  synonymous  w ith  each 
other. 


RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR  JUDGMENT.  215 

The  power  of  relative  suggestion,  or  the  judg- 
ment, if  we  choose  so  to  term  it,  is  very  properly  re- 
garded in  systems  of  Mental  Philosophy  as  a con- 
natural and  ultimate  principle  of  the  mind  ; in  othei 
words,  a principle  so  thoroughly  elementary,  that  it 
cannot  be  resolved  into  any  other.  The  human  in- 
tellect is  so  made,  so  constituted,  that,  when  it  per- 
ceives different  objects  together,  or  has  immediately 
successive  conceptions  of  any  absent  objects  of  per- 
ception, their  mutual  relations  (we  do  not  mean  to 
say  all,  but  some  of  them  at  least)  are  immediately 
felt  by  it. 

§ 124.  Of  the  vieivs  which  have  sometimes  been 
taken  of  this  'power . 

We  are  aware,  however,  that  the  view  which  has 
now  been  presented,  and  which  is  the  prevalent  one 
at  the  present  time,  has  not  always  been  taken.  It 
has  sometimes  been  made  a question  whether  man 
really  possesses  the  power  under  consideration,  re- 
garded as  a distinct  and  original  power.  Some  of 
the  earlier  French  philosophers  seem  to  have  es- 
poused the  negative  of  this  question.  It  was  the 
doctrine  of  Helvetius,  and  of  the  French  philosophic 
school  generally,  which  was  predominant  in  his  day, 
that  all  mental  acts  may  be  resolved  into  Sensation. 
“All  the  operations  of  the  mind”  (he  expressly 
says)  “ are  reduced  to  mere  sensations.  Why  then 
admit  in  man  a faculty  of  judging  distinct  from  the 
faculty  of  sensation.”*  He  then  goes  on  with  a 

* Helvetius  on  Man,  Hooper’s  translation,  sec.  il,  chs.  iiu 
iv.,  and  v. 


216 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF 


1 


train  of  reasoning,  to  show  that  the  comparing  or 
judging  power  and  sensation  are  essentially  one. 

This,  as  seems  to  be  generally  conceded  at  the 
present  time,  is  an  erroneous  view  of  the  human 
mind  ; a doctrine  equally  at  variance  with  our  person- 
al consciousness,  and  with  the  facts  gathered  from 
the  observation  of  others.  Nothing  can  be  more 
obvious  than  the  fact,  notwithstanding  the  assertions 
of  these  writers,  that  men  possess  not  only  the  pow- 
ers of  sensation  and  of  external  perception,  but  of 
judgment,  in  the  positive  and  full  sense  of  that  term  ; 
that  is,  of  perceiving  the  relations  of  agreement  and 
disagreement,  and  other  relations  existing  in  the  ob- 
jects which  they  perceive.  But  this  is  not  all.  It 
is  not  enough  to  say  that  the  power  of  Relative 
Suggestion  or  Judgment  has  an  existence  merely. 
It  is  necessary  to  add,  that  it  is  a leading  power  of 
the  mind  ; a characteristic  and  exceedingly  important 
element ; one  which  not  only  furnishes  an  explana- 
tion, to  a considerable  extent,  of  man’s  intellectual 
ability,  but  of  those  diversities  of  mental  efficiency 
by  which  one  man  is  distinguished  from  another. 

$ 125,  Weak  or  disordered  Judgment  arising  from 
natural  obtuseness  of  JMind. 

Without  delaying  longer  upon  the  subject  of  the 
existence  and  of  the  nature  of  this  power,  we  shall 
proceed  at  once  to  consider  it  in  connexion  with  the 
general  inquiry  of  imperfect  and  disordered  mental 
action.  And  our  first  general  remark  is,  that  an 
imperfect,  defective,  or  disordered  judgment  may 
exist  in  various  forms.  I. — In  the  first  place  we 


RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR  JUDGMENT.  21? 

■discover  in  some  persons,  owing  to  the  original  con- 
stitution of  the  mind,  or  to  accidental  injuries,  or  oc- 
casionally, perhaps,  to  some  other  causes,  an  obtuse- 
ness or  want  of  quickness  in  relative  perceptions. 
The  external  perceptive  faculties  of  these  persons 
may  be  sufficiently  acute  and  active  ; they  may  ex- 
hibit a quick  reception  of  everything  which  is  ad- 
dressed to  the  outward  senses ; but,  when  they  are 
required  to  judge  of  one  thing  as  compared  with  an- 
other, and  to  indicate  in  what  they  agree  and  in  what 
they  differ,  and  thus  to  call  into  exercise  the  dis- 
criminating power  in  distinction  from  mere  percep- 
tion, they  discover  at  once  a degree  of  mental  infe- 
riority, which  would  not  have  been  suspected  by 
'merely  looking  at  another  form  of  mental  action. 
This  trait  of  mind  is  happily  described  by  Dr.  Con- 
olly  ill  the  following  terms. — “ Defect  of  the  Com- 
paring power”  [by  which  he  means  the  judgment, 
as  every  act  of  judging  involves  comparison]  “ is 
observable  in  the  pursuits  and  progress  of  many  men 
in  all  professions.  The  industry  of  such  men  is 
great,  but  often  ill-directed  : they  do  not  distinguish 
trifles  from  things  of  importance,  and  are  generally 
occupied  about  matters  of  little  worth.  In  my  own 
profession,  we  see  such  minds  engaged  in  the  prose- 
cution of  minute  observations  ; all  the  larger  features 
of  pathology,  all  general  principles  of  practice,  escape 
them  ; but  a symptom  not  heeded  or  not  valued  by 
i others,  or  any  deviation  from  common  anatomical 
arrangement,  or  a line  in  the  face,  or  a pimple  on  the 
hand,  or  a streak  on  the  tongue,  or  a pretended  spe- 
cific, fills  them  with  the  anticipated  delight  of  a dis- 


218 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF 


covery.  They  do  not  compare  one  symptom  with 
another ; they  pronounce  diseases  to  exist  which 
are  really  not  present  ; they  do  not  contrast  the  rep- 
utation of  a new  medicine  with  that  of  other  medi- 
cines, once  brought  forward  in  the  same  way,  and 
then  abandoned  ; they  do  not  compare  effects  with 
causes,  but  suppose  they  have  cured  diseases  which 
were  only  imaginary,  with  specifics  of  which  the 
virtue  is  equally  imaginary  ; and  thus,  but  in  a state 
of  continual  satisfaction,  they  grow  old  without  ex- 
perience. These  errors  and  many  others,  to  which 
something  analogous  may  doubtless  be  found  in  ev- 
ery department  of  study,  arise  from  defective  powers 
of  comparing  one  thing  with  another.” 

§ 126.  Disordered  Judgment  as  connected  with  in- 
capacity of  Attention . 

II. — In  other  cases  the  defect  in  the  exercises  of 
the  power  of  Judgment  does  not  seem  to  be  owing 
so  much  to  any  obtuseness  in  the  power  itself,  as  to 
an  inability  of  fixing  the  attention,  and  a consequent 
rapid  transition  from  one  object  to  another.  There 
are  some  men  who  have  a quick  perception,  who 
bestow  more  or  less  notice  on  almost  everything  ! 
which  comes  in  their  way,  but  do  not  appear  to  be  j 
capable  of  a fixedness  or  continuity  of  thought.  They 
are  like  the  winds,  always  in  motion,  but  always 
veering  from  one  point  of  the  compass  to  another. 

This  state  of  things  may  be  owing  to  two  causes 
in  particular ; first,  a want  of  voluntary  energy ; 
second,  a disordered  action  of  the  principle  of  asso-  , 
eiation. — Where  there  is  a want  of  voluntary  power, 


RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR  JUDGMENT.  219 

it  will  be  found  difficult,  in  a multitude  of  cases,  to 
keep  the  mind  long  enough  fixed  upon  the  object  of 
inquiry  to  estimate  it  properly  in  all  its  bearings.  1 
am  aware  that  some  writers  adopt  (he  opinion,  that 
the  Will  has  no  direct  power  over  trains  of  thought, 
either  in  originating  them,  or  in  directing  and  regu- 
lating them  when  they  are  already  called  into  exist- 
ence! But  this  opinion,  so  far  at  least  as  it  relates 
to  the  regulation  of  trains  of  thought  already  present 
to  the  mind,  is  undoubtedly  an  erroneous  one.  The 
power  of  the  Will  is  unquestionably  great  in  this 
respect ; but  it  is  no  less  true,  that  it  is  much  great- 
er in  some  persons  than  in  others.  In  some  it  is 
very  deficient;  and  the  consequence  is  an  incapa- 
city of  continuity  of  thought,  and  a rapid  transition 
from  one  thing  to  another,  which  is  necessarily  very 
unfavourable  to  accurate  judgment. 

But  that  trait  of  mind  which  we  are  now  consid- 
ering is  more  frequently  owing  to  a disordered  ac- 
tion, or,  at  least,  a peculiarity  in  the  principle  of  As- 
sociation. The  peculiarity  of  mind  which  we  now 
have  in  view  is  known  in  common  parlance  under 
the  designation  of  “ light-headedness.”  And  we  of- 
ten speak  of  the  persons  who  exhibit  it  as  “ flighty” 
or  “ hairbrained,”  in  consequence  of  their  thoughts 
flying  rapidly  from  one  thing  to  another.  But  as  it 
will  be  necessary  to  recur  to  this  subject  under  an- 
other head,  we  will  not  dwell  upon  it  here. — All  we 
have  to  add  is,  that  whether  this  unfixedness  and 
evanescence  of  perception  be  owing  to  a weakness 
of  the  Will  or  to  a too  rapid  action  of  the  Associa- 
(jag  principle,  it  is  in  either  case  inconsistent,  to  a 


220 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF 


r 


great  degree,  with  entire  soundness  of  Judgment. 
And  one,  at  least,  of  the  forms  of  disordered  Judg- 
ment is  to  be  explained  by  keeping  these  facts  in 
view. 


§ 127.  Of  disordered  Judgment  in  connexion  with 
facility  of  Belief. 

HI. — Another  form  of  weak  or  imperfect  Judg-  1 
ment  seems  to  be  closely  connected  with  a disor- 
dered state  of  the  susceptibility  of  Belief.  There 
are  some  persons  whom,  in  consequence  of  the  fa- 
cility with  which  they  receive  the  statements  made 
to  them,  we  are  accustomed  to  designate  as  credu- 
lous persons.  And  it  will  hardly  be  denied,  that 
we  generally  connect  the  idea  of  weakness  of  Judg-  ‘ 
ment  with  the  existence,  whenever  it  is  ascertained 
to  be  a permanent  mental  trait,  of  Credulity. 

Credulous  persons  (pursuing  the  subject  a little 
more  into  particulars)  take  statements  too  much 
upon  trust.  It  is  a characteristic  trait,  that  they  re- 
ceive without  hesitation  the  most  exaggerated  ac-  ( 
counts.  Their  belief,  instead  of  being  graduated  to 
the  degrees  of  presumption,  probability,-  and  certain- 
ty, in  some  degree  of  accordance  with  the  evidence, 
assumes  the  highest  form  at  once,  and  receives  eve- 
rything that  is  proposed  to  it  as  a thing  unquestion- 
able. 

Now  let  us  consider  a moment  the  bearing  of  this 
state  of  things  on  the  Judgment.  It  is  evidently  not  V 
so  much  the  office  of  the  Judgment,  in  its  original 
and  appropriate  exercise,  to  ascertain  facts,  as  to 
ascertain  the  relations  existing  among  them,  and  to 


RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR  JUDGMENT.  22 1 

decide  upon  their  character,  as  compared  one  with 
another.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  the  less  clear  that 
facts,  as  they  come  under  the  cognizance  of  the 
Judgment,  exist  in  the  mind  in  the  shape  of  beliefs, 
either  presumptive,  probable,  or  certain.  And  if  the 
position  of  the  belief  be  wrong,  it  does  not  easily 
appear  how  the  decision  of  the  Judgment,  which  is 
founded  upon  such  belief,  can  be  right. 

We  have  here,  therefore,  another  class  of  persons 
who  exhibit  a defective  or  disordered  Judgment ; the 
defect  arising  not  so  much  from  anything  in  the 
judging  power  itself,  as  from  its  connexion  with  the 
disordered  action  of  another  susceptibility. 

It  seems  to  be  this  form  of  disordered  judgment, 
more  than  any  other,  which  is  found  in  that  busy, 
amusing,  and  sometimes  beneficial  class  of  men 
who  are  known  as  Projectors.  These  persons  are 
not  only  characterized  by  adopting  some  new  idea, 
or  forming  some  untried  plan,  or  prosecuting  some 
novel  invention,  which  a man  of  very  sound  judg- 
ment may  sometimes-  do  ; but  the  difficulty  is,  that 
the  thing,  whatever  it  is,  at  once  assumes  a dispro- 
portionate place  in  the  estimation  of  the  mind.  It 
not  only  controls  the  belief  inordinately,  but  may  be 
said  to  occupy  the  whole  heart ; either  banishing  for 
a time  all  other  objects  of  contemplation,  or  making 
them  entirely  subordinate.  And  there  is  this  further 
difficulty,  that  the  strong  passion  which  these  per- 
sons exhibit,  whether  it  exists  in  the  shape  of  love, 
or  of  faith,  or  in  some  other  form,  is  less  permanent 
than  strong.  It  is  very  desultory ; excitable  and 
powerful  while  it  lasts,  but  suddenly  changing  it* 


222 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF 


object ; and,  both  in  its  location  and  its  transitions, 
in  its  excessive  adhesions  at  one  time  and  its  sudden 
disruptions  at  another,  is  the  subject  of  abundant 
ridicule  to  those  sober  and  discriminating  minds,  that 
have  less  facility  of  belief  as  well  as  less  energy  of 
emotion. 

§ 128.  Of  disordered  Judgment  in  connexion  with 
obstinacy  of  Belief 

IV. — Another  form  of  disordered  Judgment  is 
owing  to  the  fact  of  its  being  connected  with  ex- 
treme obstinacy  of  Belief,  and  is  nearly  the  opposite 
of  that  which  has  just  been  mentioned.  The  per- 
sons to  whom  we  now  refer  attach  themselves  to  a 
particular  object  or  to  a particular  aspect  of  an  ob- 
ject ; they  seize  upon  a particular  opinion,  or,  per- 
haps, the  minute  fragment  of  an  opinion  ; and  they 
hold  it  with  a tenacity  which  neither  life  nor  death 
can  separate.  All  appeals  to  their  feelings,  to  their 
sympathies,  to  their  common  humanity,  would  be  out 
of  place,  and  abundantly  ridiculous.  “ Leviathan  is 
not  so  tamed.”  But  this  is  not  all.  With  imper- 
turbable coolness,  they  turn  the  scaly  hide  of  their 
obstinacy  to  the  fiery  darts  of  truth,  and  shake  them 
off  unharmed.  No  statements  of  facts,  no  sugges- 
tions of  venerable  wisdom,  no  deductions  of  reason- 
ing, and,  least  of  all,  the  persuasions  even  of  Athe- 
nian eloquence,  have  the  effect  to  disturb,  even  for 
a moment,  the  invincibility  of  their  adhesion.  They 
give  themselves  up  to  their  object,  “ for  better  or 
worse  not  temporarily,  but,  as  it  were,  through  all 
time. 


RELATIVE  SUGGESTION  OR  JUDGMENT.  223 


This  is,  perhaps,  a strong  statement ; but  it  shows 
what  we  mean.  It  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  this 
state  of  things  does  not  imply  a disordered  action  of 
the  mind.  But  undoubtedly  there  are  varieties  here 
as  elsewhere. 

§ 129.  Of  mere  unsoundness  in  distinction  from  in - 
sanity  of  Judgment. 

We  have  thus  given  some  general  and  imperfect 
idea  of  the  more  common  forms  of  defective  or  dis- 
ordered Judgment;  but  we  do  not  wish  the  reader 
to  understand,  that  the  matter,  as  we  have  now  sta- 
ted it,  comes  up  to  the  true  idea  of  insanity  of  the 
Judgment.  The  cases  which  have  been  stated  are 
such  as  occur  very  frequently ; and,  though  they 
disqualify  the  persons  to  whom  they  attach  for  very 
many  things,  these  persons  may  still,  in  many  re- 
spects, be  very  valuable  men.  Their  judgment  is 
perplexed  in  its  action,  and  enfeebled,  but  not  ex- 
tinct. It  may  even  be  found,  in  some  individuals, 
to  possess  a high  degree  of  strength,  when  exercised 
upon  any  or  all  matters  which  do  not  come  within 
the  reach  of  the  intellectual’  malady. 

Insanity  of  the  Judgment,  in  distinction  from  mere 
ordinary  defect  or  disorder,  implies  something  more. 
It  implies  an  entire  disqualification  of  correct  views, 
either  upon  all  subjects  or  upon  some  particular 
subjects.  Not  necessarily  upon  all,  because  we 
sometimes  find  the  insanity  directing  itself  to  a par- 
ticular thing,  and  not  extending  beyond  it.  In  illus- 
tration of  what  has  now  been  said,  take  the  case  ot 
the  Projector,  the  man  of  new  schemes.  His  de- 


224  DISORDERED  ACTION,  ETC. 

votedness  to  the  particular  object  before  him  is,  in 
many  cases,  essentially  harmless  and  amusing  rather 
than  otherwise.  His  time  is  occupied  ; he  is  abun- 
dantly happy  in  prosecuting  to  its  anticipated  results 
the  “grand  experiment and  when  the  experiment 
lails  ; when  the  bubble,  which  had  so  long  delighted 
him,  bursts,  he  has  the  satisfaction  of  knowing,  what- 
ever may  be  true  of  himself,  that  he  has  contributed 
to  the  happiness  of  others,  by  exciting  to  activity  the 
pleasant  sentiment  of  the  ridiculous.  Such  cases 
as  these  are  the  more  frequent  and  common  cases  ; 
and  they  are  indicative,  beyond  all  question,  of  real 
unsoundness  of  mind  ; but  common  parlance  would 
not,  as  a general  thing,  speak  of  these  persons  as 
“ mad  people,”  as  “ crazy  people.”  They  certainly 
are  not  to  be  regarded  as  suitable  candidates  for 
banishment  from  society,  for  guardianship,  and  for 
hospitals.  With  all  their  faults,  they  are  often  found 
to  have  their  associates  and  friends,  and  are  often 
deeply  loved  in  their  families. 

Nevertheless,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  they 
approximate,  if  they  are  not  already  on  the  very  bor- 
ders of  that  frightful  condition  of  mind,  which  insan- 
ity, in  the  more  common  acceptation  of  the  term,  is 
understood  to  indicate.  They  stand,  dizzy-headed, 
on  the  brink  of  the  precipice.  Sometimes  the  mal- 
ady increases.  They  engage  in  plans  which  every- 
body else  knows  to  be  not  only  doubtful,  but  even 
hopeless.  They  are  unable  to  do  anything  else  ; 
they  exaggerate  the  importance  of  their  object ; they 
dissipate  their  property,  ruin  their  health,  and  dis- 
tress their  families.  These  people  are  called  crazy. 


DISORDERED  ACTION,  ETC.  225 

and  they  are  so.  They  are  unable  to  see  the  pre- 
cise and  full  relations  of  things.  They  omit  to  take 
into  account  a multitude  of  circumstances,  which  are 
necessary  to  such  precision  and  comprehensiveness 
of  relative  perception.  In  a single  word,  the  inex- 
pressibly important  trait  of  sound  judgment  is  not 
merely  -weakened  or  perplexed  (which  is  the  fact  in 
all  cases  of  disordered  judgment),  but  is  annihilated. 
Insanity,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  has  super- 
vened ; and  there  is  an  evident  necessity  of  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  guidance  of  friends  and  of  the  law 
for  their  own  personal  and  self-responsible  control. 


CHAPTER  IY. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSO- 
CIATION. 

§ 130.  General  remarks  on  the  nature  of  Association, 
The  laws  of  the  mind,  the  great  principles  which 
regulate  its  action,  as  well  as  its  mere  perceptions  or 
states,  may  be  disordered  ; for  instance,  the  laws  of 
Association.  The  term  Association  expresses  the 
general  fact,  that  there  is  a regular  consecution  of 
the  mental  states.  This  succession  of  mental  states, 
however,  as  is  well  ascertained,  is  not  an  accidental 
and  irregular  one,  but  has  its  laws.  The  leading 
laws  of  Association,  modified  by  some  subordinate 


226 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


ones,  are  Resemblance,  Contrast,  Contiguity  in  time 
and  place,  and  Cause  and  Effect.  Such  is  the  spe- 
cific and  just  operation  of  these  laws  in  their  appli- 
cation to  the  thoughts  and  feelings,  that  a just  and 
coherent  action,  in  other  words,  a movement  regu- 
larly successive,  and  reducible  to  fixed  principles, 
will  characterize  the  operations  of  the  mind  in  a per- 
fectly sane  state.  When  the  mind  is  disordered  in 
the  associating  principle,  the  mental  action  will  be 
very  different ; characterized  by  wildness,  exceed- 
ingly rapid  transitions,  and,  in  general,  by  great  in- 
6oherency.  Perhaps  an  instance  of  this  form  of  in- 
sanity, taken  from  real  life,  will  best  illustrate  what 
we  mean  to  say.  The  following  extract  was  taken 
down  from  the  remarks  of  an  insane  young  man  of 
a good  education,  who  was  formerly  detained  as  a 
lunatic  in  the  Pennsylvania  Hospital. 

“No  man  can  serve  two  masters.  I am  King 
Philip  of  Macedonia,  lawful  son  of  Mary,  Queen  of 
Scots,  born  in  Philadelphia.  I have  been  happy 
enough  ever  since  I have  seen  General  Washington 
with  a silk  handkerchief  in  High-street.  Money 
commands  sublunary  things,  and  makes  the  mare 
go ; it  will  buy  salt  mackerel,  made  of  tenpenny 
nails.  Enjoyment  is  the  happiness  of  virtue.  Yes- 
terday cannot  be  recalled.  I can  only  walk  in  the 
nighttime,  when  I can  eat  pudding  enough.  I shall 
be  eight  years  old  to-morrow.  They  say  R.  W.  is 
in  partnership  with  J.  W I believe  they  are  about 
as  good  as  people  in  common  ; not  better,  only  on 
certain  occasions,  when,  for  instance,  a man  wants 
to  buy  chincopins,  and  to  import  salt  to  feed  pigs. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSOCIATION.  221 

Tanned  leather  was  imported  first  by  lawyers.  Mo- 
rality with  virtue  is  like  vice  not  corrected.  L.  B. 
came  into  your  house  and  stole  a coffeepot  in  the 
twenty-fourth  year  of  his  majesty’s  reign.  Plum- 
pudding and  Irish  potatoes  make  a very  good  dinner. 
Nothing  in  man  is  comprehensible  to  it.  Born  in 
Philadelphia.  Our  forefathers  were  better  to  us 
than  our  children,  because  they  were  chosen  for 
their  honesty,  truth,  virtue,  and  innocence.  The 
Queen’s  broad  R.  originated  from  a British  forty- 
two  pounder,  which  makes  too  large  a report  for 
me.  I have  no  more  to  say.  I am  thankful  I am 
no  worse  this  season,  and  that  I am  sound  in  mind 
and  memory,  and  could  steer  a ship  to  sea,  but  am 
afraid  of  the  thiller.  ******  ******,  son  0f  Mary, 
Queen  of  Scots.  Born  in  Philadelphia.  Born  in 
Philadelphia.  King  of  Macedonia.”* 

“This  extract  will  serve  to  explain  what  we  have 
said  in  respect  to  a want  of  coherency  and  regularity 
of  mental  action,  where  the  associating  principle  is 
disordered.  In  all  cases  of  perfectly  sound  mental 
action,  there  is  a chain,  a connecting  link,  binding 
one  part  of  the  train  of  thought  to  another ; gener- 
ally easily  discoverable,  but  less  obvious  in  some 
cases  than  others.  But  in  the  extract  which  has 
been  given,  and  in  all  similar  cases  of  disordered 
mind,  it  is  very  different.  Nearly  each  successive 
thought  has  the  appearance  of  being  entirely  inde- 
pendent of  what  went  before. 


* Rush’s  Diseases  of  the  Mind. 


228 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


$ 131.  Of  sluggish  and  ineffective  Association. 

Imperfect  and  disordered  association  exists  in  a 
number  of  varieties,  and  assumes  various  aspects. 
There  are  some  cases  where  the  Associating  prin- 
ciple appears  to  be  more  sluggish  and  ineffective  in 
its  action  than  would  naturally  be  expected  in  a per- 
fectly symmetrical  mind.  The  action  of  the  mind 
is  amazingly  slow  ; it  seems  to  labour  under  a sort 
of  paralytic  torpidity  ; so  much  so,  that  it  creeps  on 
with  great  difficulty  from  one  topic  to  another.  This 
is  sometimes  noticed  in  conversation.  We  are  con- 
versing, for  instance,  with  such  a person  ; as  a nat- 
ural result  of  the  effort  of  conversation,  we  become 
in  some  degree  excited  ; our  minds,  in  consequence 
of  greater  associating  activity,  take  a position  far 
ahead ; and  we  look  back  with  a degree  of  impa- 
tience for  the  corresponding  movements  of  our  slug- 
gish interlocutor.  After  a while  we  discover  in  his 
uplifted  eye  the  gleams  of  nascent  intelligence,  and 
a thought,  perhaps  a very  just  and  appropriate  one, 
emerges  from  the  depths  of  mental  inactivity,  which 
we  imagine,  judging  from  our  own  different  mental 
structure,  ought  to  have  .been  on  its  journey  long 
before. 

The  facetious  author  of  Knickerbocker’s  History 
of  New- York,  in  exaggerating  some  peculiarities  of 
national  character,  has  given  an  uncommonly  favour- 
able view  of  this  mental  defect,  viz.,  the  ideas  are 
so  large  they  cannot  be  turned  over . He  is  speaking 
of  the  venerable  Wouter  Yan  Twiller.  “He  was 
a man  shut  up  within  himself  like  an  oyster,  and  of 


229 


PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSOCIATION. 

such  a profoundly  reflective  turn,  that  he  scarcely 
ever  spoke,  except  in  monosyllables,  yet  did  he 
never  make  up  his  mind  on  any  doubtful  point. 
This  was  clearly  accounted  for  by  his  adherents,  who 
affirmed,  that  he  always  conceived  every  object  on 
so  comprehensive  a scale,  that  he  had  not  room  m 
his  head  to  turn  it  over  and  examine  both  sides  ot 
it,  so  that  he  always  remained  in  doubt,  merely  m 
consequence  of  the  astonishing  magnitude  ot  his 
ideas.” 

It  is  here,  in  the  view  which  has  now  been  given, 
we  find  one  element  of  that  great  phasis  of  human 
nature,  mental  dulness  or  stupidity.  We  do  not 
mean  Idiocy,  but  merely  dulness,  a want  of  a quick 
and  penetrating  apprehension  of  things.  W e say  that 
we  find  here  one  element  of  this,  because  the  ele- 
ments, or,  rather,  the  sources  of  dulness,  are  many, 
and  are  implicated  in  various  parts  of  the  mental 
structure.  A man  may  be  accounted  a dull  or  stu- 
pid person  in  consequence  of  a naturally  dull  or 
blunted  power  of  external  perception,  or  in  conse- 
quence of  a weakness  in  the  power  of  relative  sug- 
gestion, or  in  consequence  of  a great  defect  in  the 
imaginative  power,  as  well  from  the  circumstance 
of  great  weakness  and  tardiness  in  the  action  ot  the 
associating  principle. 

§ 132.  Of  mental  defect  in  consequence  of  loo 
quick  and  rapid  Jlssociation * 

A more  striking  associative  defect  than  that  which 
we  have  just  been  commenting  on,  is  one  of  a di- 
rectly opposite  kind,  viz.,  too  great  rapidity  of  asso- 


230  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

ciation.  We  not  unfrequently  find  persons  whose 
thoughts  fly  from  one  subject  to  another  with  great 
rapidity  ; not  by  choice  or  an  act  of  the  will,  but  in 
spite  of  it.  A rapid  transference  of  the  mind  by  a 
voluntary  act  (a  trait  which  is  recorded  of  some  dis- 
tinguished men,  such  as  Julius  Caesar  and  Napoleon 
Bonaparte),  is  clearly  an  evidence  of  mental  power; 
a like  rapidity  of  transition,  which  is  not  voluntary, 
is  not  less  clearly  an  evidence  of  mental  weakness. 
Persons  of  this  description  exhibit  what  may  be 
called  an  incontinence  of  thought ; there  is  no  con- 
servative power  of  restraint;  the  floodgates  of  the 
mind  are  thrown  open,  and  it  rushes  onward,  not  to 
some  fixed  and  available  consummation,  but  in  ev- 
ery possible  direction,  and  bearing  every  strange 
thing  in  its  current. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  trait  of  mind  un- 
der consideration  is  commonly  attended  with  great 
volubility  of  tongue,  and  also  with  almost  constant 
motion  of  the  body.  It  is  well  known  that  the  men- 
tal action,  as  a general  thing,  has  its  external  signs. 
And  in  this  case  there  is  an  agitation  and  movement 
of  the  outward  members,  and  a rapidity  of  utterance 
corresponding  to  the  unfixed  and  rapid  movement 
within.  We  have  already  had  occasion  to  refer  to 
the  relation  existing  between  this  form  of  disordered 
association  and  a defective  or  disordered  judgment. 
As  the  subject  of  this  form  of  derangement  is  inca- 
pable of  checking  and  regulating  the  train  of  his 
ideas,  so  as  to  make  them  distinct  objects  of  com- 
parison and  reflection,  it  is  a matter  of  course,  that 
he  constantly  forms  incorrect  judgments  of  things. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSOCIATION. 


231 


§ 133.  Instances  illustrative  of  the  preceding  sec - 
tion. 

Almost  every  one  will  recollect  instances  within 
the  circle  of  his  own  acquaintance,  which  illustrate 
the  mental  traits  that  have  now  been  described. 
And  not  a few  cases  have  been  made  matters  of 
record  by  medical  and  other  writers.  An  English 
clergyman  who  visited  Lavater,  the  distinguished 
physiognomist,  has  given  an  account  of  that  singu- 
lar character,  which  seems  to  me  .accurately  to  illus- 
trate one  of  the  less  marked  forms  of  the  mental  dis- 
order now  before  us. — “ I was  detained”  (says  he) 

“ the  whole  morning  by  the  strange,  wild,  eccentric 
Lavater,  in  various  conversations.  When  once  he 
is  set  a going,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  stopping 
him  till  he  runs  himself  out  of  breath.  He  starts 
from  subject  to  subject,  flies  from  book  to  book, 
from  picture  to  picture  ; measures  your  nose,  your 
eye,  your  mouth,  with  a pair  of  compasses  ; pours 
forth  a torrent  of  physiognomy  upon  you  ; drags  you, 
for  a proof  of  his  dogma,  to  a dozen  of  closets,  and 
unfolds  ten  thousand  drawings  ; but  will  not  let  you 
open  your  lips  to  propose  a difficulty  ; and  crams  a 
solution  down  your  throat  before  you  have  uttered 
half  a syllable  of  your  objection. 

« He  is  as  meager  as  the  picture  of  famine  ; his 
nose  and  chin  almost  meet.  I read  him  in  my 
turn,  and  found  little  difficulty  in  discovering,  amid 
great  genius,  unaffected  piety,  unbounded  benevo- 
lence, and  moderate  learning,  much  caprice  and  un- 
steadiness, a mind  at  once  aspiring  by  nature  and 


232 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


grovelling  through  necessity ; an  endless  turn  to 
speculation  and  project ; in  a word,  a clever,  flighty, 
good-natured,  necessitous  man.”* 

Dr.  Conolly  also  happily  illustrates  the  subject, 
although  the  case  seems  to  have  been  less  marked 
and  decisive  than  the  one  just  mentioned,  in  his  ref- 
erence to  a man  who  was  unable  to  tell  a story 
continuously  from  beginning  to  end. — “ He  would 
begin  with  the  best  intentions,  and  proceed  a little 
way  tolerably  well ; but  the  chairs  and  tables,  and 
all  the  objects  around  him,  a hat  hung  upon  a peg, 
or  an  ornament  in  the  chimney-piece,  would  become 
interwoven  with  his  narrative,  and  lead  him  from 
subject  to  subject  with  irresistible  rapidity.” 

§ 134.  Remarks  on  Fickleness  of  Character . 

Some  cases  of  what  are  called  fickleness  of 
character  may  be  explained  in  connexion  with  the 
mental  traits  which  have  now  been  described. — The 
opposite  of  fickleness  of  character  is  permanency ; 
that  is  to  say,  a continuity  and  fixedness  of  plan  and 
pursuit,  unless  there  are  sound  reasons  for  a change. 
The  fickle  man  is  pleased  with  new  objects ; the} 
assume  an  undue  place  in  his  estimation,  as  com- 
pared with  other  objects  which  have  previously  in- 
terested him ; and  he  is  found  frequently  changing 
from  one  thing  to  another. 

This  trait  of  mind,  it  is  true,  may  sometimes  be 
owing  to  other  causes  than  that  which  we  are  par- 
ticularly considering  in  this  connexion.  It  is  some- 
times, for  instance,  found  connected  with  great 

* As  quoted  by  Dr.  Rush  in  his  Diseases  of  the  Mind, 


PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSOCIATION. 


233 


quickness  of  sensibility.  A person  susceptible  of 
very  vivid  emotions  is  more  likely  to  be  affected  by 
present  objects  than  another ; and,  in  consequence 
of  this,  may  attach  an  undue,  value  to  them,  which 
may  lead  to  an  uncertain  and  vacillating  coiAse  of 

conduct.  ..... 

Fickleness  of  character,  a trait  which  is  obviously 
very  prejudicial  to  any  person,  may  also,  and,  per- 
haps, more  frequently,  find  its  basis  in  a variable  and 
incontinent  action  ot  the  associating  piinciple.  It 
will  not  be  necessary  to  delay,  after  the  illustrations 
which  have  already  been  given,  and  the  remarks  al- 
ready made  in  various  places,  in  order  to  show  how 
this  may  be  the  case. 

§ 135.  Of  temporary  excitement  of  the  Associating 
Principle. 

Persons  of  minds  that,  in  their  ordinary  action,  are 
apparently,  in  all  respects,  sound  and  symmetrical, 
are  at  times  subject  to  singular  excitements  of  the  as- 
sociating principle.  The  cause  of  this  peculiar  men- 
tal malady  is  commonly  to  be  sought  for  in  a dis- 
ordered condition  of  the  physical  system.  The  late 
Professor  Fisher,  of  New-Haven,  has  left  a state- 
ment illustrative  of  this  inordinate  mental  affection. 
Like  that  of  Nicolai,  it  is  the  more  valuable  in  com- 
ing from  a scientific  man,  as  the  narration  is,  in  con- 
sequence, placed  above  any  suspicion  of  mistake. 
It  was  in  his  case,  however,  not  a permanent,  but 
merely  a temporary  state  of  the  mind,  arising  un- 
questionably,  as  is  generally  the  fact  in  this  form  of 
disorder,  from  some  physical  derangement. — “To 


234 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


whatever  subject”  (he  says)  “ I happened  to  direct 
my  thoughts,  my  mind  was  crowded  with  ideas  upon 
it.  I seemed  to  myself  able  to  wield  the  most  diffi 
cult  subjects  with  perfect  ease,  and  to  have  an  entire 
command  over  my  own  train  of  thought.  I found 
myself  wonderfully  inventive  ; scarce  a subject  pre- 
sented itself  in  which  I did  not  seem  to  myself  to 
perceive,  as  it  were  by  intuition,  important  improve- 
ments. I slept  but  a part  of  the  night,  my  mind  be- 
ing intensely  occupied  with  planning,  inventing,  &c. 
All  the  writing  that  I did  was  done  in  the  utmost 
hurry.  Ideas  crowded  upon  me  five  times  as  fast 
as  I could  put  down  even  hints  of  them,  and  my 
sole  object  was  to  have  some  memorial  by  which 
they  might  be  recalled.  I was  employed  the  whole 
time  in  the  most  intense  meditation  ; and,  at  the  same 
time,  thinking  never  seemed  to  be  attended  with  so 
little  effort.  I did  not  experience  the  least  confu 
sion  or  fatigue  of  mind.  My  thoughts  flowed  with 
a rapidity  that  was  prodigious ; and  the  faculties  of 
association,  memory,  &c.,  were  wonderfully  raised. 
I could  read  different  languages  into  English,  and 
English  into  Hebrew,  with  a fluency  which  I was 
never  before  or  since  master  of.  During  the  whole 
time,  though  I was  in  a low  state  of  health,  I never 
felt  the  least  pain  or  fatigue  of  body.” 

§ 136.  Additional  instance  of  this  view  of  the  sub- 
ject. 

A striking  instance  of  quickened  association  re- 
cently occurred  under  my  immediate  notice.  A stu- 
dent had,  by  special  efforts,  wrought  himself  into  con- 


PRINCIPLE  OF  ASSOCIATION. 


235 


siderable  mental  excitement  on  religious  subjects ; 
and  this  unusual  rapidity  and  power  of  mental  ac- 
tion soon  transferred  itself  to  scientific  subjects.  In 
this  state  of  things  he  was  led  to  direct  his  attention 
(a  very  unfortunate  direction  of  the  mind  under  such 
circumstances)  to  the  difficult  subjects  of  Fore- 
knowledge, Free  Agency,  and  Time.  In  the  couise 
of  a day  or  two,  he  was  very  much  absorbed  in  the 
latter  subject  in  particular.  It  was  now  that  con- 
ceptions, strange  and  unheard  of  before,  came  into 
his  mind.  Thinking  was  no  task  to  him.  His 
thoughts  flowed  with  very  great  rapidity.  Among 
other  things,  he  made  a grand  discovery,  or  what  he 
considered  to  be  such,  viz.,  not  only  that  God  is 
truth , but  the  converse  of  the  proposition  also,  which 
is  a very  different  thing,  viz.,  that  truth  is  God . 
His  grand  discovery  he  supposed  to  be  the  com- 
mencement of  the  long-expected  millennium  ; and, 
as  such,  it  was  an  era  never  to  be  forgotten ; ana 
his  imagination  was  full  of  the  glorious  events  about 
to  follow.  For  a week  he  slept  almost  none,  and 
ate  but  very  little  ; and  his  nervous  system  was  ev- 
idently very  much  disordered.  Finally,  he  reduced 
everything,  mind  and  matter,  infinite  worlds  and 
countless  intelligences,  and  all  forms  of  knowledge, 
to  this  simple  equation,  to  wit , 1 + 1—2. 

The  young  gentleman  read  his  lucubrations  to 
myself  and  another  person,  who  I suppose  is  capa- 
ble of  understanding  any  ordinary  flights  of  intellect ; 
but,  humbling  as  it  was,  we  were  obliged  to  confess 
our  inability  to  understand  the  nature  of  his  wonder- 
ful discoveries.  However,  he  consoled  himself  with 


236 


DISORDERED  ACTION,  ETC. 


the  saying  of  Scripture,  that  not  many  wise  mer. 
after  the  flesh  are  called  ; and  continued  to  pursue 
the  subject  of  his  inquiries  in  his  own  way.  In  his 
own  language,  “ his  whole  soul  was  absorbed  and 
drawn  forth  with  an  intensity  utterly  inconceivable’ 
by  any  one  who  never  experienced  the  like.  Ideas 
were  rushing  into  his  mind  in  torrents.  He  was 
exceedingly  inventive.  He  could  not  write  one  idea 
in  ten.  He  could  have  dictated  to  ten  amanuenses. 
His  powers  of  memory  and  association  were  quick- 
ened in  a wonderful  degree.  He  could  make  all 
he  ever  knew  converge,  like  rays  from  the  burning- 
glass,  to  one  tremendous  focus.  He  had  the  whole 
Bible  at  his  tongue’s  end.  Every  muscle  of  his  soul 
was  in  exercise,  but  he  felt  no  fatigue.”  He  began 
to  write  a book,  which  he  thought  would  be  another 
inspired  volume  ; and  he  accordingly  divided  it  into 
chapters  and  verses.  Finally,  his  mind  was  carried 
forward  with  such  rapidity,  and  into  such  before  un- 
known conceptions,  that  he  began  to  doubt  his  iden- 
tity. Sometimes  he  thought  that  Christ  had  reap- 
peared on  earth  in  his  own  person,  and  at  other 
times  he  questioned  whether  Paul  or  Adam  had  not 
thus  appeared.  But,  however  he  might  doubt  of 
this  point,  he  was  certain  of  one  thing,  that  true  re- 
ligion was  to  be  propagated  by  his  instrumentality 
through  the  world.  He  read,  in  particular,  the 
prophet  Daniel  and  the  Revelation,  and  every  sylla- 
ble was  as  plain  as  the  multiplication  table.  He 
searched  in  these  books  for  some  prediction  con- 
cerning himself ; and,  though  not  successful,  discov- 
ered, as  he  thought,  all  the  mysteries  of  Masonry  and 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MEMORY.  237 


of  the  Romish  church.  The  Bible  was  a new  book 
to  him.  He  fastened  his  eyes  on  its  pages  with 
maddening  intensity. 

In  this  state  of  mind  he  had  determined  upon 
leaving  college,  with  the  intention  of  communicating 
his  discoveries  to  the  world.  But  being  at  last  per- 
suaded by  some  friends  that  this  was  improper,  and 
that  his  mind  was  somewhat  out  of  order,  he  was 
finally  induced  to  take  some  medicine,  leave  books, 
mingle  in  society,  and  divert  the  mind  in  every  pos- 
sible way.  In  this  way  a check  was  given  to  the 
mental  disease;  the  mind  gradually  recovered  a 
healthy  tone,  and  all  his  wonderful  discoveries  van- 


§ 137.  General  nature  of  the  Memory. 

The  examination  of  the  Memory,  considered  as 
the  subject  of  imperfections  and  irregularities  of  ac- 
tion, naturally  follows  that  of  Association.  In  its 
general  nature,  we  cannot  but  suppose  that  the  mem- 
ory, a power  so  constant  in  its  action  and  so  impor- 
tant in  its  results,  is  well  understood ; certainly  so 
much  so  as  to  require  but  few  words  to  be  said  upon 
that  point. 


238 


DISORDERED  ACTION 


On  another  occasion,  and  having  other  objects  in 
view,  we  proposed  to  define  the  Memory  as  that  pow- 
er or  susceptibility  of  the  mind  by  which  those  con- 
ceptions are  originated  which  are  modified  by  a per- 
ception of  the  relation  of  past  time.  Accordingly, 
we  are  to  regard  it  as  a complex  rather  than  a sim- 
ple principle  ; implying,  when  called  into  exercise, 
1.  A conception  of  the  object;  2.  A perception  of 
the  relation  of  priority  in  time.  That  is  to  say,  we 
not  only  have  a conception  of  the  remembered  object, 
but  this  conception  is  attended  with  the  conviction, 
that  it  underwent  the  examination  of  our  senses,  or 
was  in  some  way  perceived  by  us  at  some  former 
period. 

The  intellectual  principle  which  we  designate  as 
the  memory,  whatever  views  may  be  taken  of  its 
general  nature,  is  subject  to  various  disorders.  The 
other  parts  of  the  intellect,  such  as  the  powers  of 
perception,  association,  imagination,  and  reasoning, 
may  be  sound  and  regular  in  their  movement,  at 
least  so  far  as  they  are  able  to  act  independent  of 
the  memory  ; while  the  action  of  the  latter  power  is 
either  essentially  obliterated,  or  is  the  subject  of 
strange  and  unaccountable  deviations. 

§ 138.  Cases  involving  a general  proslrulion  of  the 
Memory. 

One  class  of  cases,  where  we  perceive  a dis- 
organization of  the  memory,  are  those  in  which 
there  is  a general  prostration  of  power;  in  other 
words,  a defect  or  prostration  of  power,  not  limited, 
as  is  sometimes  the  case,  to  particular  objects,  but 


OF  THE  MEMORY. 


239 


extending  to  all.  Such  cases  sometimes  occur. 
Individuals  are  found  from  time  to  time,  in  whom 
the  power  of  memory  seems  to  be  entirely  gone  ; 
plucked  up,  as  it  were,  and  erased  from  the  mind  ; 
giving  scarcely  the  least  sign  of  vivification. 

This  form  of  defective  memory  is  sometimes  nat- 
ural or  congenital.  Persons  may  come  into  the 
world  almost  entirely  destitute  of  the  power  of  mem- 
ory, just  as  some  other  persons  come  into  the  world 
destitute,  in  an  equal  degree,  of  the  abstractive  and 
ratiocinative  powers.  We  do  not  propose,  however, 
to  remark  upon  these  cases  here.  A general  pros- 
tration of  memory  (saying  nothing  here  of  those  ca- 
ses where  it  is  natural  or  congenital)  may  be  caused 
in  various  ways ; perhaps,  we  may  add,  in  very 
many  ways  ; some  of  which  we  shall  proceed  to  point 
out,  without  attempting,  however,  a complete  enu- 
meration. 

1. — And,  in  the  first  place,  it  may  be  caused  by 
the  indulgence  of  deep  and  long-continued  sorrow. 
— This  source  of  injury  to  the  memory  is  somewhat 
frequent.  A person,  for  instance,,  finds  himself  the 
subject  of  various  and  great  disappointments.  Grief, 
seated  deeply  at  the  heart,  continually  preys  upon 
him  ; and  one  of  the  early  and  very  common  re- 
sults, as  already  intimated,  is  a weakness,  and  ulti- 
mately an  entire  prostration  of  the  memory.  How 
this  happens,  although  there  can  be  no  question  as 
to  the  fact,  it  may  not  be  entirely  easy  to  see.  But 
the  explanation  may,  in  part,  perhaps,  be  this.  The 
mind  is  so  entirely  occupied  with  the  particular  sub- 
ject of  its  sorrow,  whatever  it  is,  that  it  feeis  no  in 
T 


240 


DISORDERED  ACTION 


terest  in  anything  else,  and  gives  no  attention  ; and 
the  natural  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  is, 
to  a greater  or  less  extent,  a defect  of  memory. 
It  is  a great  law  of  the  memory,  that  it  must  and 
will  fail  where  there  is  a want  of  attention,  or,  what 
is  nearly  the  same  thing,  a want  of  interest. 

2.  — We  not  unfrequently  see,  in  the  second  place, 
an  almost  entire  prostration  of  the  memory  caused 
by  the  advances  and  influences  of  extreme  old  age. 
The  explanation  in  this  case  seems  to  be  this.  In 
the  great  mass  of  mankind  there  is  but  little  devel- 
opement  of  the  Internal  Intellect;  the  mind  almost 
exclusively  operates  in  connexion  with  what  is  pre- 
sented to  the  cognizance  of  the  outward  senses  : 
so  that  their  knowledge,  whatever  may  be  its  amount, 
deals  chiefly  with  the  outward  and  visible,  and  rests 
substantially  upon  a basis  of  materiality.  Accord- 
ingly, when  their  outward  senses  fail ; when  the  eye, 
and  the  ear,  and  the  taste  no  longer  furnish  their  wont 
ed  materials  for  the  mental  action,  it  is  no  wonder 
that  their  minds,  so  far  as  they  have  ever  been  call- 
ed into  exercise,  should  sink  back  into  a state  of  ut- 
ter sluggishness  and  decrepitude,  .and  that  the  mem- 
ory should  suffer  at  the  same  time  with  the  other 
mental  powers. 

3- — The  memory  sometimes  fails,  furthermore, 
and  fails  utterly,  in  connexion  with  some  violent 
disease.  Such  is  the  close  connexion  between  the 
physical  and  mental  system,  particularly  between  the 
brain  and  the  mind,  that  an  affection  of  the  former, 
as  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  remark,  is  very 
likely  to  he  attended  with  an  affection  of  the  latter. 


OF  THE  MEMORY. 


241 


x\ccordingly,  it  is  sometimes  the  case,  that  a violent 
fever,  a sudden  and  violent  blow  on  the  head,  and 
other  causes  of  physical  injury  and  disorder,  are  fol- 
lowed by  an  entire  loss  of  the  power  of  recollection. 

§139.  Of  loss  of  memory  in  relation  to  particular 
subjects . 

It  is  one  peculiarity  of  disordered  memory,  that  it 
sometimes  exists  exclusively  in  relation  to  particular 
subjects.  A certain  portion  or  section  of  the  mem- 
ory seems  to  be  lost,  while  in  all  its  applications  be- 
yond these  particular  limits,  whatever  they  may  be, 
it  remains  unimpaired. 

It  does  not  appear  that  any  explanation  of  these 
cases  has  been  given,  or  is  likely  to  be  given,  which 
will  be  generally  satisfactory.  They  undoubtedly 
involve  the  general  fact  of  a connexion  between  the 
mind  and  the  body,  particularly  between  the  mind 
and  the  brain ; but  do  not  seem  to  admit  of  a defi- 
nite and  specific  explanation,  which  will  not  be  found 
to  be  attended  with  some  formidable  objections. 
Accordingly,  in  this  state  of  things,  we  shall  feel  at 
liberty  merely  to  give  some  facts  or  instances,  with- 
out attempting  to  go  further. 

Dr.  Beattie  mentions  the  case  of  a person  who, 
in  consequence  of  a violent  blow  on  the  head,  lost 
his  knowledge  of  the  Greek  language,  but  did  not 
appear  to  have  lost  anything  else.  It  is  related  ol 
a certain  Spanish  author  (Good’s  Study  of  Medi- 
cine, vol.  iv.),  that,  being  attacked  by  an  acute  fever, 
he  forgot  all  the  languages  he  ever  knew,  and  had 
no  recollection  even  of  his  own  writings.  It  does 


242  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MEMORY. 

not  appear,  from  anything  that  is  said  in  connexion 
with  this  statement,  that  this  person’s  memory  was 
equally  impaired  on  other  subjects.  Dr.  Good  also 
mentions  the  case  of  a certain  Welshman,  who  left 
his  native  land  in  his  youth,  forgot  his  native  dialect, 
and  used  the  English  language  for  thirty  years. 
This  man  was  attacked  by  the  brain  fever,  and,  in 
consequence  of  it,  suddenly  recovered  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Welsh  language,  which  he  had  forgotten, 
and  lost  the  knowledge  of  the  English,  with  which 
he  had  been  so  long  familiar. — Other  facts  of  a 
similar  nature  might  be  introduced  if  it  were  neces- 
sary. 

§ 140.  Impaired  memory  in  connexion  with  names . 

There  have  been  persons  whose  impairment  of 
memory  was  limited  exclusively,  or  nearly  so,  to 
proper  names.  This  fact  is  noticed  by  Mr.  Combe, 
who  makes  the  remark,  that  “ numerous  cases  are 
on  record  of  the  power  of  using  words  having  been 
impaired  by  disease,  when  the  ability  to  articulate, 
and  the  powers  of  perception  and  judgment  remain- 
ed entire.”  And,  in  confirmation  of  this  general 
statement,  he  introduces  from  the  Phrenological 
Journal  the  case  of  a Mr.  Hood.  It  is  stated,  in 
respect  to  this  person,  that  he  suddenly  forgot  the 
name  of  every  object  in  nature.  “ His  recollection 
of  things  seemed  to  be  unimpaired ; but  the  names , 
by  which  men  and  things  are  known,  were  entirely 
obliterated  from  his  mind  ; or,  rather,  he  had  lost 
the  faculty  by  which  they  are  called  up  at  the  con- 
trol of  the  will.  He  was  by  no  means  inattentive, 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MEMORY.  243 

however,  to  what  was  going  on,  and  he  recognised 
friends  and  acquaintances  perhaps  as  quickly  as  on 
any  former  occasion ; hut  their  nam-es,  or  even  his 
own,  or  his  wife’s  name,  or  the  names  of  any  of  his 
domestics,  appeared  to  have  no  place  in  his  recol- 
lection.”'* 

The  father  of  the  late  Dr.  Watson,  bishop  of  Lan- 
daff,  was  unable,  in  consequence,  as  was  supposed, 
of  an  apoplectic  attack,  to  recollect  the  name  of  his 
eldest  son.  He  was  obliged  to  designate  him,  which 
he  had  very  frequent  occasion  to  do,  in  connexion 
with  his  pursuits  or  his  place  of  residence  ; calling 
him,  for  instance,  the  “ lad  at  college,”  instead  of 
repeating  his  name.  “ And  yet  he  was  able  to  re- 
peat, without  a blunder,  hundreds  of  lines  out  of 
classic  authors.” 

A case,  coming  under  this  general  head,  occurred 
a few  years  since  in  the  city  of  Washington.  A re- 
spectable and  intelligent  lady  residing  there  expe- 
rienced a slight  attack  of  apoplexy.  It  is  stated 
that,  up  to  the  time  of  this  attack,  she  possessed 
rather  uncommon  powers  of  conversation ; was  fluent, 
and  had  a ready  command  of  five  languages.  The 
apoplectic  attack,  although  it  left  her  general  power 
of  language  untouched,  destroyed  entirely  her  ability, 
with  a single  exception,  of  recalling  proper  names. 
And  this  power,  it  seems,  she  has  never,  as  yet,  re- 
covered. She  still  converses  fluently,  so  far  as 
oroper  names  are  not  concerned.  But,  whenever  a 
aame  of  this  kind  occurs,  she  is  arrested  in  her  con- 
versation, and  cannot  proceed  till  the  name  is  sug- 
* Combe’s  Phrenology,  3d  Am.  ed.,  p.  430. 


244  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MEMORY 

gested.  Whenever  this  is  done,  she  instantly  rec- 
ognises the  person  or  thing  for  which  the  name 
stands,  as  the  one  appropriate  to  her  train  of  thought 
and  conversation,  and  is  thus  enabled  to  go  on. 

In  connexion  with  these  facts,  it  will  not  be  sur- 
prising when  we  state  that  persons  sometimes  for- 
get their  own  names.  A case  of  this  kind  is  related 
in  the  Psychological  Magazine.  Some  years  since, 
a German  gentleman,  who  held  a high  rank  in  po- 
litical life,  had  occasion  to  call  at  another  person’s 
house  on  some  business.  The  servant  of  the  house, 
being  unacquainted  with  him,  asked  him  his  name. 
But  he  was  unable  to  answer;  he  had  entirely  for- 
gotten it ; and  was  under  the  disagreeable  and  rather 
ridiculous  necessity  of  asking  a friend  who  was  with 
him  what  his  own  name  was.* 

§ 141.  Of  loss  of  memory  during 'particular  periods 
of  time . 

Another  striking  modification  of  disordered  mem- 
ory is  that  which  exists  for  a particular  period  of 
time.  Dr.  Beattie  relates  the  case  of  a clergyman 
who  was  attacked  with  apoplexy ; and,  on  recover- 
ing, was  found  to  have  lost  the  recollection  of  ex- 
actly four  years.  Dr.  Abercrombie  also  relates, 
that  he  once  attended  a lady  in  a protracted  illness, 
whose  impairment  of  memory  assumed  this  form. 
She  lost  the  recollection  of  a period  of  about  ten  or 
twelve  years,  but  spoke  with  perfect  consistency  of 
things  as  they  stood  before  that  time. — Facts  of  tMs 

* For  some  of  the  above  and  other  similar  statements,  *■  <3 
Good’s  Medicine,  vol.  iv.,  p.  189. 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MEMORY.  245 

kind  cannot  fail  to  convince  us,  that  no  inconsidera- 
ble degree  of  mystery,  in  some  respects  at  least, 
still  rests  upon  the  operations  and  laws  of  the  hu- 
man mind.  It  is  true  that  various  explanations  of 
the  facts  which  have  been  given  in  this  section 
may  be  attempted  ; but  they  will  all  be  found,  on 
examination,  to  involve  more  or  less  of  merely  hy- 
pothetical views.  What  further  developements  the 
well-disciplined  inquiries  of  science  will  be  able  to 
make  in  future  time,  we  are,  of  course,  unable  to  say. 
Certainly  we  have  no  reason  for  saying  that,  in  the 
existing  state  of  mental  knowledge,  we  know  all 
which  possibly  can  be  known  ; although  it  is  un- 
doubtedly the  case,  that  at  present  we  know  only  in 
part. 

§ 142.  Of  other  modifications  of  disordered 
Memory. 

The  imperfect  and  disordered  action  of  the  mem- 
ory appears  in  a variety  of  forms,  too  numerous  to 
render  it  practicable,  in  the  narrow  limits  to  which 
the  present  work  is  restricted,  fully  to  describe  them. 
We  shall  leave  the  subject,  therefore,  with  briefly  re- 
ferring to  one  other  modification  of  disorder,  some- 
what different  from  any  which  has  hitherto  been 
mentioned.  It  consists  in  putting  one  name  for 
another,  but  always  employing  the  words  which  are 
used  in  the  same  sense.  An  individual  who  was 
the  subject  of  this  form  of  mental  disorder,  is  men- 
tioned by  Dr.  Abercrombie  ; and  some  accompany- 
ing explanations  are  given  in  the  following  terms. — 
“ He  uniformly  called  his  snuff-box  a hogshead,  and 


246  J M PERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION 

the  association  which  led  to  this  appeared  to  be  ob- 
vious. In  the  early  part  of  his  life  he  had  been  in 
Virginia,  and  connected  wilh  the  trade  in  tobacco; 
so  that  the  transition  from  snuff  to  tobacco,  and  from 
tobacco  to  a hogshead,  seemed  to  be  natural.  An- 
other gentleman  affected  in  this  rpanner,  when  he 
wanted  coals  put  upon  his  fire,  always  called  for  pa- 
per, and  when  he  wanted  paper  called  for  coals  ; 
and  these  words  he  always  used  in  the  same  man- 
ner. In  other  cases,  the  patient  seems  to  invent 
names,  using  words  which  to  a stranger  are  quite 
unintelligible  ; but  he  always  uses  them  in  the  same 
sense,  and  his  immediate  attendants  come  to  un- 
derstand what  he  means  by  them.”* 


CHAPTER  VI. 

IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  REA- 
SONING POWER. 

§ 143.  Of  the  nature  of  the  Reasoning  Power . 
It  will  be  noticed,  so  far  as  we  have  gone  in  the 
examination  of  the  subject  of  the  imperfections  and 
disorders  of  mental  action,  that  we  have  considered 
the  powers  of  the  mind  separately.  Probably  every 
power  of  the  mind,  but  particularly  those  of  the  in- 
tellect in  distinction  from  the  sensibilities,  may  be- 
* Abercrombie’s  Intellectual  Powers,  Harpers’  ed.,  p.  130. 


OF  THE  REASONING  POWER. 

come  more  or  less  disordered.  It  is  not  safe  to  re- 
strict the  doctrine  of  insanity,  much  less  of  mental 
disorder,  in  the  more  general  sense  of  the  terms,  by 
arbitrary  and  narrow  definitions.  The  statements 
which  have  already  been  given  seem  sufficiently  to 
show  the  correctness  of  the  general  doctrine  laid 
down  at  the  commencement  of  the  work,  that  the 
true  limits  of  disordered  mental  action  are  coexten- 
sive with  the  opposite,  viz.,  with  a just,  orderly, 
sound,  or  sane  state  of  the  mind.  Having  success- 
ively considered  sensation,  external  perception,  the 
conceptive  power,  original  suggestion,  conscious- 
ness, relative  suggestion  or  judgment,  association, 
and  memory,  we  propose,  as  coming  next  m order 
in  the  arrangement  which  we  have  adopted,  to  exam- 
ine the  subject  before  us,  in  its  connexion  with  the 

reasoning  power.  . 

Of  the  nature  of  the  reasoning  power,  inasmuch 
as  the  present  work  takes  for  granted  some  general 
knowledge  of  the  mind’s  ordinary  or  regular  action, 
it  is  unnecessary  to  speak  except  very  biiefly. 
When  the  power  in  question  is  in  exercise,  we  term 
such  exercise  of  it  reasoning-  Accordingly,  rea- 
soning may  be  defined  the  mental  process  or  opera- 
tion whereby  we  deduce  conclusions  from  two  or 
more  piopositions  premised.  A train  of  reasoning 
may  be  regarded,  therefore,  as  a whole,  and,  as  such, 
it  is  made  up  of  separate  and  subordinate  parts 
which  are  usually  denominated  propositions. 

The  reasoning  power,  great  as  it  is  in  its  nature 
and  its  results,  has  its  specific  position,  and  also  its 
specific  duties  or  office ; and  in  both  points  of  view 


248  IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION 

is  clearly  enough  distinguished  from  all  other  intel- 
lectual  powers.  It  is,  perhaps,  more  likely  to  be  con- 
founded with  the  power  of  Relative  Suggestion  or  the 
Judgment  than  any  other.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
distinction  between  them.  Without  Relative  Sug- 
gestion, which  is  to  be  regarded  as  a distinct  source 
of  knowledge,  there  would  be  no  perception  of  rela- 
tions in  their  simplest  possible  forms.  And,  unas- 
sisted by  reasoning,  which,  as  compared  with  the 
power  just  named,  takes  a higher  stand  and  operates 
in  a wider  field,  we  could  have  no  knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  those  things,  which  cannot  be  compared 
without  the  aid  of  intermediate  propositions. 

This  great  and  ennobling  faculty,  which  avails 
itself  of  the  intimations  and  appliances  of  nearly  all 
the  other  powers,  may  be  subject  to  imperfection  and 
disorder  in  various  ways  and  degrees,  as  we  shall 
now  proceed  to  explain. 

§ 144.  Of  failure  of  Reasoning  from  the  want  oj 
ideas . 

There  can  be  no  reasoning,  in  the  first  place, 
where  there  are  no.  ideas  previously  laid  up  in  the 
mind.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the  reasoning  power, 
ihat  it  must  have  its  data,  its  materials  on  which  to 
act.  Reasoning  deals  with  propositions,  and  prop- 
ositions involve  ideas.  He,  therefore,  who  is  con- 
tent to  be  without  ideas;  must  not  complain  to  find 
himself  no  reasoner. 

It  is  here  we  find  one  ground  of  the  failure  of 
the  reasoning  power  in  idiocy.  The  idiot  is  almost 
wholly  destitute  of  ideas;  so  that,  if  he  happens  to 


OF  THE  REASONING  POWER.  249 

possess  those  powers  of  comparison  and  combina- 
tion which  are  implied  in  reasoning,  still  he  has  no 
materials  on  which  to  employ  them.  In  such  per- 
sons, therefore,  the  reasoning  power,  even  if  it  has 
an  existence,  is  not  only  not  exercised  in  fact,  but 
it  is  impossible  that  it  should  be  ; and,  consequent- 
ly, it  is  virtually  extinct.  Even  a few  ideas,  al- 
though they  undoubtedly  have  their  value,  will  not 
be  enough  to  furnish  a ratiocinative  basts.  The 
reasoning  which  is  raised  on  such  a basis  will  gen- 
erally be  found  unsymmetrical,  built  up  in  some 
parts  and  not  in  others,  weak  in  one  place  and 
strong  in  another,  and  presenting,  on  the  whole,  either 
an  imperfect  or  a distorted  view  of  the  subject. 
Hence  we  have,  with  the  failure  of  ideas,  either  no 
reasoning  or  false  reasoning,  either  no  action  or 
perverted  action. 

§ 145.  Of  mere  weakness  or  imbecility  of  the  Rea- 
soning power. 

In  the  second  place,  we  are  led  to  remark,  that 
there  is  in  some  persons  a natural  weakness  or  im- 
becility of  the  reasoning  power,  in  itself  consider- 
ed. The  difficulty  does  not  consist,  as  in  the  case 
just  now  mentioned,  in  the  want  of  ideas  ; of  these 
they  perhaps  have  multitudes  • but  it  consists  rather 
in  their  want  of  a power  to  perceive  and  to  esti- 
mate consecutively  their  relations.  They  may,  per- 
haps, be  able  to  perceive  and  understand  separate 
relations  ; for  instance,  the  relation  existing  between 
two  objects  or  two  simple  propositions  ; but  they 
are  not  able,  by  connecting  object  with  object,  and 


250  IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION 

proposition  with  proposition,  to  deduce  remote  and 
ultimate  relations.  The  mind  does  not  expand  it- 
self sufficiently  so  as  to  embrace  the  whole  subject ; 
or  it  has  not  energy  enough  so  as  to  advance  safely 
and  firmly  from  step  to  step  ; or,  if  these  be  not  the 
proper  expressions,  we  still  have  the  general  and 
undeniable  fact  that  it  comes  short,  utterly  and  ab- 
solutely, of  the  consecutive  process  which  is  in- 
volved in  every  mental  effort  deserving  the  name 
of  ratiocination. 

Mr.  Locke  seems  to  have  had  this  class  of  per- 
sons in  mind,  where  he  remarks  in  the  following 
terms  : “ There  are  some  men  of  one,  some  but  of 
two  syllogisms,  and  no  more ; and  others  that  can 
advance  but  one  step  farther.  These  cannot  al- 
ways discern  that  side  on  which  the  strongest  proofs 
lie  ; cannot  constantly  follow  that  which  in  itself  is 
the  more  probable  opinion.” — These  persons  are 
not  insane  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that  term,  but 
they  are  accountable  only  so  far  as  they  have  abil- 
ity. They  have,  intellectually,  but  a feeble  light ; 
and,  such  as  it  is,  they  are  often  obliged  to  borrow, 
from  the  lamp  of  their  neighbours,  the  oil  that  feeds 
their  own. 

§ 146.  Of  disordered  Reasoning  in  relation  to  par- 
ticular subjects . 

One  of  the  forms  of  disordered  reasoning,  and 
one,  too,  of  very  frequent  occurrence,  is  character- 
ized by  the  circumstance  that  the  disordered  or  ab- 
normal tendency  has  relation  to  particular  subjects, 
and  is  limited  to  them.  Beyond  this  limit,  whether 


OF  THE  REASONING  POWER. 


251 


more  or  less  restricted,  the  operation  of  this  power 
appears  to  be  entirely  unobstructed.  It  might,  per- 
E be  suggested  here,  that  the  disordered  act, on 
does  not  exis°t  so  much  in  the  reasoning  power,  in 
itself  considered,  as  in  that  antecedent  state  of  mind, 
Sever  it  is,  which  furnishes  the  premises  upon 
which  the  rat, oc, native  process  is  based  That  » 
to  say,  the  reasoning  process  goes  well  in  itselt,  but 
is  upon  a wrong  track.  It  arrives  at  an  erroneous 

issue,  because  it  started  from  a wrong  point. 

A man,  for  instance,  believes  that  he  is  made  of 
glass.  He  reasons  correctly,  m deducing  the  con- 
clusion from  premises  of  this  kind,  that  he  mus 

move  slowly  and  cautiously.  Another  person  b - 

heves  that  he  is  a plant;  an  idea  which  is  said  to 
have  taken  possession  of  one  of  the  Bourbon  prin- 
ces. He  reasons  correctly  when  he  goes  into  the 
garden  and  insists  on  being  watered  in  common 
with  the  plants  around  him.  Another,  again,  e- 
Eves  that  he  is  a king;  and  he  reasons  correctly 
in  requiring  for  himself  the  homage  suited  to  a lung, 
and  hi  expressing  dissatisfaction  on  account  of  its 

“SStlh— . it  is  ve„  .rue  «h* 
mental  error  is  in  the  premises.  Nevertheless, 
when  we  consider  that  reasoning  must  necessarily 
have  its  preliminaries  or  basis,  and  that  the  true  idea 
of  rea  onPing,  at  least  in  the  higher  sense  of  the  term 
embraces  premises  as  well  as  conclusion,  we  shall 
not  hesitate  to  speak  of  such  reasoning  as  has  been 
mentioned,  although  erroneous  m the  incipient  ra  h« 


252  IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION 

er  than  the  deductive  stage,  as  on  the  whole  wrong 
perverted,  or  insane. 

§ 147.  Instance  of  the  foregoing  form  of  perverted 
Reasoning . 

We  have  an  instance  of  the  form  of  mental  dis- 
order just  described,  namely,  that  which  is  limited 
to  a particular  subject  or  class  of  subjects,  in  the 
character  of  Don  Quixote.  Cervantes,  it  will  be 
recollected,  represents  the  hero  of  his  Work  as  hav- 
ing his  naturally  good  understanding  perverted  by 
the  perusal  of  certain  foolish,  romantic  stories,  false- 
ly purporting  to  be  a true  record  of  knights  and 
deeds  of  chivalry.  These  books,  containing  the 
history  of  dwarfs,  giants,  necromancers,  and  other 
preternatural  extravagance,  were  zealously  perused, 
until  the  head  of  Don  Quixote  was  effectually  turn- 
ed by  them.  Although  he  was  thus  brought  into  a 
state  of  real  mental  derangement,  it  was  limited  to 
the  extravagances  which  have  been  mentioned.  We 
are  expressly  informed,  that  in  all  his  conversations 
and  replies,  he  gave  evident  proofs  of  a most  excel- 
lent understanding,  and  never  “ lost  the  stirrups” 
except  on  the  subject  of  chivalry.  On  this  subject 
he  “ was  crazed.” — Accordingly,  when  the  barber 
and  curate  visited  him  on  a certain  occasion,  the 
conversation  happened  to  turn  on  what  are  termed 
reasons  of  state,  and  on  modes  of  administration  ; 
and  Don  Quixote  spoke  so  well  on  every  topic  as 
to  convince  them  that  he  was  quite  sound,  and  had 
recovered  the  right  exercise  of  his  judgment.  But 
something  being  unadvisedly  said  about  the  Turkish 


OF  THE  REASONING  POWER. 


253 


war,  the  knight  at  once  remarked,  with  much  so- 
lemnity and  seriousness,  that  his  majesty  had  no- 
thing to  do  but  to  issue  a proclamation,  command- 
" !n  the  knio’hts-errant  in  Spain  to  assemble  at  his 
court  oil  a certain  day  ; and,  although  not  more  than 
half  a dozen  should  come,  among  these  one  would  be 
found  who  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  the 
whole  Turkish  power. 

When  the  subject  of  conversation  tu'>cdupon 
war,  which  had  so  near  a connexion  with  due  , 
and  lances,  and  all  the  associations  of  ch.va  ry  it 
came  within  the  range  of  his  malady,  and  led  to  t 
absurd  remark,  which  showed  at  once  the  unsound- 
ness  of  his  mind,  notwithstanding  the  sobriety  and 
good  sense  which  he  had  just  before  exhibited. 

a 148  Of  disordered  Reasoning  arising  f>  om  a dis 
* ordered  slate  of  the  other  powers  of  the  Mind. 

All  the  powers  of  the  mind  have  a connexion, 
more  or  less  close,  with  each  other  Hence  then- 
action  may  be  said,  in  reference  to  this  connexion, 
to  be  a conditional  one.  Consequently,  if  the  con- 
dition fails,  the  action  fails.  As  an  illustration,  die 
exercise  of  the  reasoning  power  implies,  as  the  ne 
cessary  condition  of  its  own  existence,  the  antece 
dent  exercise  of  memory,  of  relative  suggestion  of 
the  external  and  internal  perceptive  powers,  and  aL 
of  the  susceptibility  of  belief.  It  is  obvious  that 
disorder  cannot  attach  to  any  one  of  these  without 
indirectly  affecting  any  power  which,  although  t 
may  be  distinct,  is,  nevertheless,  in  some  sense  built 
upon  them.  'Hence  the  -easonmg  power  is  often 


254  IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED  ACTION 

disordered,  in  consequence  of  derangement  in  some 
one  of  these  powers,  or  in  some  other  part  of  the 
mind,  with  which  its  action  is  particularly  connected. 

W e make  here  this  general  remark,  as  one  which 
it  may  be  important  to  keep  in  mind,  without  deem- 
ing it  necessary  to  dwell  upon  it. 

§ 149.  Of  readiness  of  Reasoning  in  the  partially 
insane . 

Those,  who  have  been  personally  acquainted  with 
the  intellectual  condition  of  the  partially  insane,  have 
sometimes  observed  in  them  great  quickness  of 
thought  in  some  little  emergencies,  and  an  unusual 
degree  of  cunning.  When,  for  instance,  an  attempt 
has  been  made  to  seize  and  confine  them,  they  stead- 
ily and  promptly  mark  the  motions  of  their  pursu- 
ers ; they  rapidly  decipher  their  intentions  from  their 
countenance,  and  cause  them  no  small  degree  of 
perplexity.  In  particular,  it  has  been  observed  in 
some  instances  that  they  discover  more  fluency  of 
expression  and  rapidity  of  deduction  than  others  of 
a perfectly  sound  mind,  or  than  themselves  could 
have  exhibited  before,  their  derangement.  This  sin- 
gular fact  is  to  be  briefly  explained. 

The  unusual  quickness  of  deduction  and  of  ex- 
pression, which  has  sometimes  been  noticed  in  par- 
tially insane  persons,  may  be  referred  to  two  causes ; 
first,  an  uncommon  excitation  of  the  attention  and 
of  all  the  intellectual  powers  ; and,  secondly,  a re- 
moval of  those  checks  which  attend  the  sober  and 
the  rational  in  their  reasonings. 

Some  of  the  checks  which  retard  the  process  of 


OF  THE  REASONING  POWER 


255 


reasoning  in  the  case  of  men  whose  powers  are  in 
a good  state,  are  these.  I. — There  is  a distrust  of 
phraseology,  a fear  of  mistakes,  from  the  ambiguity 
and  vagueness  of  language. — The  object  of  a ra- 
tional man  is  supposed  to  be  to  arrive  at  truth,  and 
not  merely  to  gain  a victory.  He  therefore  feels 
anxious  not  only  to  employ  terms  w7hich  appear  to 
himself  proper,  but  which  shall  be  rightly  understood 
by  his  opponent.  But  the  irrational  man,  as  might 
be  expected,  does  not  find  himself  embarrassed  with 
considerations  of  this  nature.  II. — A second  ob- 

struction to  facility  and  promptness  in  argumenta- 
tion, in  the  case  of  the  sober-minded  and  rational,  is 
this  : they  fear  that  they  may  not  be  in  possession 
of  all  those  premises  on  which  the  solution  will  be 
found  in  the  event  to  depend. — Many  disputes  are 
carried  on  without  previously  forming  an  acquaint- 
ance with  those  facts,  which  are  necessarily  and 
prominently  involved.  While  disputants  of  sound 
minds  have  any  suspicion  on  this  point,  and  know 
not  but  it  will  be  labour  lost,  they  of  course  feel 
their  interest  in  the  dispute  very  much  diminished. 
III. — The  third  circumstance  to  which  reference 
was  had,  is  this  : the  influence  of  certain  feelings  of 
propriety  and  of  good  sense,  which  ordinarily  govern 
men  in  the  full  exercise  of  their  powers. 

The  disputant  feels  himself  under  obligations  to 
profess  a deference  for  his  opponent ; it  is  due  to 
the  customary  forms  of  society.  He  is  sometimes 
restrained  and  embarrassed  by  what  he  considers 
due  to  those  who  are  present  to  hear  the  argument. 
He  is  particularly  careful  to  say  nothing  foolish,  ab« 


256 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


surd,  or  uncharitable. — All  these  things  weigh  no- 
thing with  the  insane  person.  He  is  not  troubled 
about  exactness  of  expression  or  the  observance  of 
ceremonies,  but  strangely  rushes,  as  it  were,  upon 
the  main  points  of  the  controversy,  regardless  of  all 
minor  considerations.* 


CHAPTER  YII 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

§ 150.  General  remarks  on  the  nature  of  Imagi - 
nation. 

We  proceed  now  to  a consideration  of  the  defect- 
ive and  disordered  exercises  of  the  Imagination. 
The  mental  process  which  is  involved  in  any  exer- 
cise of  the  Imagination,  is  a complex  rather  than  a 
simple  operation.  Such  a process  implies,  in  par- 
ticular, the  exercise  of  the  power  of  Association,  in 
furnishing  those  conceptions  which  are  combined  to- 
gether ; also  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  Relative 
Suggestion,  by  means  of  which  the  combination  is 
effected.  Hence  we  may  properly  propose  as  a def- 
inition of  Imagination,  that  it  is  a complex  exercise 
of  the  mind,  by  means  of  which  various  conceptions 
are  combined  together  so  as  to  form  new  wholes. 
The  conceptions  may  very  properly  be  regarded  as 
* See  Stewart’s  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  vol.  ii.,  ch.  iii 


IMAGINATION. 


257 


the.  materials  from  which  the  new  creations  aie 
nmae  5 but  it  is  not  until  the  existence  of  those  acts 
which  are  implied  in  every  process  of  the  Imagina- 
tion, such  as  Association  and  Relative  Suggestion, 
that  they  are  selected,  detained  before  the  mind,  and 
ultimately  united  in  various  beautiful  combinations. 

A dry  definition  will  give  but  little  idea  of  the 
i fruitful  and  vast  results  which  flow  out  of  the  exer- 
cise of  this  power.  Sometimes  it  is  chiefly  descrip- 
tive, catching  the  images  of  things  as  they  exist  in 
nature,  subjecting  them  to  the  finest  analysis,  and 
recombining  them  in  forms  of  exquisite  beauty. 
So  that  nature  herself,  coming  from  the  hands  of  the 
infinite  and  perfect  Artist,  finds  herself  rivalled  in 
the  productions  which  man’s  imagination  gives  rise 
to.  Sometimes  it  assumes  the  suggestive  and  cre- 
ative aspect,  as  in  Spenser  and  Milton,  giving  ex- 
istence to  things  and  beings  which  have  no  parallel 
in  earthly  shapes;  creating  new  worlds,  peopling 
them  with  new  inhabitants  ; adorning  and  rendering 
them  happy  with  arts,  and  sights,  and  harmonies  un- 
known  before. 

$ 151.  Great  Imagination  does  not  necessarily  im- 
ply  a disordered  or  insane  action  of  the  Mind. 
Without  delaying  further  upon  the  general  nature 
of  Imagination,  we  now  proceed  to  some  remarks 
more  closely  connected  with  the  subject  pioperly 
before  us.  And,  in  doing  this,  it  may  be  proper  to 
allude  to  an  opinion  somewhat  prevalent,  that  great 
power  of  imagination  implies  a tendency  to  disorder- 
ed mental  action.  In  regard  to  this  opinion,  it  may 


258 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


be  remarked,  that  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case, 
although  there  is  some  foundation  for  this  view.  It 
is  undoubtedly  true,  that  there  are  some  men  of  fer- 
tile and  vigorous  imaginations,  whose  minds  are  not 
well  balanced;  who  discover  a lack  of  judgment; 
and  who  would  not  be  wisely  trusted  in  many  things 
where  sound  judgment  is  necessary.  Perhaps  there 
are  many  such  cases.  And  it  is  certain  there  are 
some,  perhaps  many,  exceptions,  especially  in  men 
of  the  very  highest  forms  of  imagination. 

If  we  may  judge  from  their  writings,  which  is  al- 
most the  only  means  of  judging  we  have,  Homei 
and  Shakspeare,  who,  by  common  consent,  are 
placed  at  the  head  of  poets,  could  not  have  been 
deficient  in  those  qualities  of  mind  which  constitute 
the  man  of  sound  judgment.  The  admirable  poems 
of  Yirgil  discover  no  such  deficiency  in  him.  On 
the  contrary,  it  may  be  said  without  hyperbole,  that 
almost  every  line  discovers,  not  only  those  powers 
of  language  and  that  exquisite  sensibility  which  are 
requisite  to  the  higher  forms  of  poetry,  but  also  a 
judgment  sound  and  well  disciplined  in  the  very 
highest  degree.  Dante  and  Milton,  without  men- 
tioning other  names,  men  who  were  emphatically 
kindred  geniuses  in  the  powers  of  the  imagination, 
were  also  men  of  such  practical  tact,  men  of  such 
discrimination  and  general  capabilities  for  business, 
that  they  were  considered  suitable  persons  to  hold 
high  stations,  and  to  exercise  important  influence  in 
the  political  movements  of  their  times. 

Great  imagination,  therefore,  does  not  necessarily 
imply  a tendency  to  disordered  mental  action,  pro- 


IMAGINATION. 


259 


vided  there  is  a suitable  division  of  power ; in  other 
words,  a corresponding  energy  in  the  other  faculties. 
The  imagination,  in  order  to  be  great  in  the  highest 
sense  of  the  term,  must  draw  nourishment  from  the 
other  powers.  Unquestionably,  if  the  poet  is  of  im- 
agination all  compact,  in  the  sense  of  excluding  a 
due  mixture  of  the  other  capabilities,  he  may  properly 
be  located,  where  Shakspeare  has  placed  him,  in 
the  same  category  with  the  lunatic.  But  such  a 
man,  although  he  may  be  a poet,  is  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  a great  poet,  any  more  than  Phaeton 
is  to  be  confounded  with  Apollo.  He  holds  the  reins 
of  the  horses  of  the  sun,  but  he  has  not  the  strength 
to  guide  them. 

§ 152.  Of  cases  of  marked  deficiency  of  Imagina- 
tion. 

There  may,  however,  notwithstanding  what  has 
been  said,  be  unsoundness  of  mind  arising  from  ex- 
cess of  imagination.  And  is  not  the  reverse  equal- 
ly true  ? Are  we  to  speak  of  that  as  a sound  mind 
where  imagination  has  no  place?  Can  there  well 
be  a greater  mental  defect  than  this  ? Certain  it  is, 
there  are  some  persons  in  whom  the  power  of  im- 
agination appears  to  be  almost  totally  extinct.  They 
are  matter-of-fact  men,  in  the  literal  sense  of  the 
terms.  They  seem  to  have  no  possible  conception 
of  anything  beyond  the  limit  and  boundary  of  what 
actually  is.  In  vain  would  Sir  Philip  Sidney,  in  his 
beautiful  Defence  of  Poetry,  attempt  to  convince 
them  that  the  imagination  hath  profit.  They  at  once 
apply  to  all  the  delightful  creations  of  this  wonderful 


260 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


faculty  Ezekiel’s  reed  ; they  measure  the  walls, 
and  the  porches,  and  the  threshold,  and  the  cham- 
bers, that  they  may  thereby  estimate  the  utilities, 
not  that  they  may  get  a clearer  perception  of  the 
beautiful.  Wonderful  to  them  is  the  idea,  that 
there  may  be  truth  and  beauty,  standing  imperisha- 
ble and  beaming  with  radiance,  and  yet  without  the 
substantial  and  literal  realization  of  anything  which 
profiteth  the  body.  What  would  such  men  make  of 
Paradise  Lost?  Would  not  even  the  flute  of  Burns, 
sounding  in  its  simplicity  from  his  native  Ayr,  prove 
a mystery?  Awakening  no  emotion  of  the  heart, 
giving  birth  to  no  conception  above  this  “diurnal 
sphere.” 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
this  faculty  is  more  frequently  dormant  than  absent ; 
that  it  wants  cultivation,  not  existence.  In  almost 
all  minds,  not  excepting  the  peasant  who  humbly 
labours  among  the  sods  of  the  earth,  there  are  some 
feeble  twinklings  of  this  inner  light.  In  many  cases 
where  neither  of  the  powers  exists  in  a remarkable 
degree,  the  power  of  imagination  is  more  vigorous 
and  active  than  that  of  reflection.  Often  uncul- 
tured men  catch  by  the  outward  eye  a glance  of  the 
charms  of  nature,  and  imagination  awakens  at  the 
happy  moment,  and  adds  to  the  beauty  of  her  tints. 

§ 15&  Disorder  of  the  Imagination  as  connected 
with  Association  and  excited  Conceptions. 

As  imagination,  considered  as  a whole,  implies 
the  exercise  of  various  subordinate  powers,  we  may 
sometimes  more  fully  understand  the  nature  of  the 


IMAGINATION. 


261 


disorders  to  which  it  is  found  to  be  subject  by  a ref- 
erence to  those  powers.  If,  for  instance,  the  power 
of  association  be  in  any  degree  disordered,  the  ef- 
fects of  this  disorder  will  be  more  or  less  felt  in  the 
imagination.  The  results  of  the  imagination  will  in 
that  case  be  discontinuous,  bizarre,  and  incoherent. 
If  the  susceptibility,  by  which  we  form  conceptions 
of  absent  objects,  be  disordered,  the  results  of  the 
imagination  will  probably  be  characterized  by  a too 
vivid  and  unnatural  aspect  of  things.  Both  features 
seem  to  be  combined  in  the  following  case,  which 
Dr.  Gall  has  extracted  from  Fodere’s  Memoir  of 
M.  Savary  : “ A carpenter  forty-seven  years  old, 
with  every  abearance  of  good  health,  was  assailed 
by  a crowd  of  strange  and  incoherent  ideas.  He 
often  imagined  himself  fluttering  in  the  air,  or  traver- 
sing smiling  fields,  apartments,  old  chateaus,  woods, 
and  gardens,  which  he  had  seen  in  his  infancy. 
Sometimes  he  seemed  to  be  walking  in  public  courts, 
places,  and  other  spots  that  were  known  to  him. 
While  at  work,  the  moment  he  was  going  to  strike 
his  axe  at  a given  place,  an  idea  would  pass  through 
his  head,  make  him  lose  sight  of  his  object,  and  he 
would  strike  somewhere  else.  He  once  rose  at 
midnight  to  go  to  Versailles,  and  found  himself  there 
without  being  sensible  of  having  made  this  journey. 
— None  of  these  hallucinations  prevent  the  patient 
from  reasoning  correctly.  He  is  astonished,  and 
laughs  at  himself  for  all  these  fantastic  visions,  but 
still  is  unable  to  withdraw  himself  from  their  influ- 
ence.’’ 


262 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


<§  154.  Disorder  of  the  Imagination  as  connected 
with  the  Sensibilities. 

When  the  imaginative  power  exists  in  the  same 
mind  in  connexion  with  strong  sensibilities,  it  is 
sometimes  the  case  that  its  operation  is  stimulated 
to  an  excessive  and  morbid  degree.  It  is  weli 
known  that  men  of  marked  imaginative  genius, 
combined  with  deep  sensibility,  often  become  men- 
tally disordered.  Not  that  we  are  authorized,  as  a 
general  thing,  to  include  these  among  the  more  stri- 
king forms  of  insanity.  Certain  it  is,  that  they  gen- 
erally attract  but  little  notice.  But  such  are  the  ex- 
travagant dreams  in  which  these  persons  indulge  ; 
such  are  the  wrong  views  of  the  character  and  ac- 
tions of  men  which  their  busy  and  melancholy  im- 
aginations are  apt  to  form,  that  they  cannot  be  reck- 
oned persons  of  truly  sound  minds.  These  instan- 
ces, which  are  not  rare,  it  is  difficult  fully  to  de- 
scribe ; but  their  most  distinguishing  traits  will  be 
recognised  in  the  following  sketch  from  Madame  de 
S tael’s  Reflections  on  the  Character  and  Writings 
of  Rousseau. 

After  remarking  that  he  discovered  no  sudden 
emotions,  but  that  his  feelings  grew  upon  reflection, 
and  that  he  became  impassioned  in  consequence  of 
his  own  meditations,  she  adds  as  follows  : “ Some- 
times he  would  part  with  you  with  all  his  former  af- 
fection ; but,  if  an  expression  had  escaped  you  which 
might  bear  an  unfavourable  construction,  he  would 
recollect  it,  examine  it,  exaggerate  it,  perhaps  dwell 
upon  it  for  a month,  and  conclude  by  a total  breach 


IMAGINATION. 


263 


with  you.  Hence  it  was  that  there  was  scarce  a 
possibility  of  undeceiving  him;  for  the  light  which 
broke  in  upon  him  at  once  was  not  sufficient  to  ef- 
face the  wrong  impressions  which  had  taken  place 
so  gradually  in  his  mind.  It  was  extremely  diffi- 
cult, too,  to  continue  long  on*  an  intimate  footing 
with  him.  A word,  a gesture,  furnished  him  with 
matter  of  profound  meditation ; he  connected  the 
most  trifling  circumstances  like  so  many  mathemat- 
ical propositions,  and  conceived  his  conclusions  to 
be  supported  by  the  evidence  of  demonstration. 

“ I believe  (she  farther  remarks)  that  imagination 
was  the  strongest  of  his  faculties,  and  that  it  had 
almost  absorbed  all  the  rest.  He  dreamed  rather 
than  existed,  and  the  events  of  his  life  might  be  said 
more  properly  to  have  passed  in  his  mind  than  with- 
out him  : a mode  of  being,  one  should  have  thought, 
that  ought  to  have  secured  him  from  distrust,  as  it 
prevented  him  from  observation ; but  the  truth  was, 
it  did  not  hinder  him  from  attempting  to  observe  ; it 
only  rendered  his  observations  erroneous.  That  his 
soul  was  tender,  no  one  can  doubt  after  having  read 
i his  works  ; but  his  imagination  sometimes  interposed 
between  his  reason  and  his  affections,  and  destroyed 
their  influence  I he  appeared  sometimes  void  of  sen- 
sibility, but  it  was  because  he  did  not  perceive  ob- 
jects such  as  they  were.  Had  he  seen  them  with 
our  eyes,  his  heart  would  have  been  more  affected 
than  ours.” 

§ 155.  Other  illustrations  of  the  same  subject . 

There  is  some  ground  for  supposing  that  state- 

X 


264 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


mems,  similar  to  those  which  have  now  been  made, 
will  apply,  in  a considerable  degree,  to  the  case  of 
Dean  Swift.  Frequent  attempts  have  been  made 
to  analyze  the  character  of  Swift,  but,  in  general, 
with  doubtlul  success.  lhat  he  was,  however,  a 
person  of  imagination  in  a high,  though  not  in  the 
highest,  sense  of  the  term,  cannot  well  be  doubted. 
Ol  this  his  writings,  and  his  prose  more  than  his  po- 
etry, are  a proof.  Moreover,  notwithstanding  the* 
asperity  and  repulsiveness  which  his  character  some- 
times assumed,  he  was,  in  the  elements  of  his  na- 
ture, a man  of  generous  and  vivid  sensibilities.  It 
is  true  they  were  not  obtruded  upon  the  public  eye, 
but  were  assiduously  nourished  in  solitude ; and, 
gaining  strength  from  this  solitary  nurture,  they  had 
the  effect  to  give  an  impulse  to  his  imagination,  by 
means  of  which  the  facts  of  friendship  and  enmity, 
of  life  and  manners,  were  presented  before  him  in 
a distorted  and  exaggerated  aspect. 

He  had,  in  particular,  a keen  perception,  arising 
in  part  from  this  exciting  tendency  of  the  imagina- 
tion, of  the  follies  and  vices  of  men  ; but  he  does 
not  appear  to  have  understood  so  well  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  sanative  principle  which  the  Chris- 
tian religion  furnishes  : consequently,  the  world  pre- 
sented to  him  a morbid  appearance,  “ dark,  with  no 
entrance  of  light.”  Disgusted  with  what  he  saw 
around  him,  he  retired  into  the  recesses  of  his  own 
bosom.  No  star  of  hope,  however  it  should  have 
been  otherwise,  arose  there.  The  image  of  evil 
continually  presented  itself  before  him,  which  the 
imaginative  power,  never  relaxing  from  its  solitary 


IMAGINATION. 


26$ 


labours,  expanded  to  gigantic  dimensions.  He 
brooded  over  it  in  silence  and  sorrow,  and  died  in  a 

madhouse.  , .. 

Such  are  the  results  (and  the  history  ot  literary 
men  gives  too  many  sad  instances  of  them)  when 
this  power  is  permitted  to  operate  without  the  checks 
of  a sound  judgment.  This  is  the  process  by  which 
generous  minds,  dwelling  too  intently  upon  the  evils 
which  all  flesh  is  heir  to,  are  often  converted  into 
misanthropists.  They  mingle  the  cup  of  poison 
with  their  own  hands,  and  drink  it. 

§ 156.  Of  inordinate  Imagination , the  opposite  of 

Misanthropical. 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  further,  that  the  operation  ot 
the  imagination  is  sometimes  just  the  reverse  ol 
what  has  been  mentioned,  particularly  in  those  per- 
sons in  whom  the  element  of  hope  is  naturally 
strong.  The  souls  of  such  persons  have  no  har- 
mony0 with  thoughts  of  evil.  If  the  inflictions  of 
present  sorrows  cannot  be  avoided,  they  flatter  them- 
selves with  coming  good,  and  build  airy  castles  tor 
the  future.  They  are  like  the  cottage  maiden 
whom  some  English  poet  celebrates. 

“Nor,  while  she  turns  the  giddy  wheel  around, 

Revolves  the  sad  vicissitudes  of  things. 

Pleased  with  the  present  and  happy  irt  the  future, 
they  kindle  the  torch  of  the  imagination  at  the  fares 
of  a rejoicing  heart.  It  is  not  with  them,  “Who 
shall  show  us  any  good  V’  but  who  shall  show  us 
anything  that  is  not  good  1 Infinite  are  the  crea- 


266  DISORDERED  ACTION,  ETC. 

tions  which  their  busy  invention  forms,  some  to  be 
realized  to-morrow,  some  to  be  realized  the  next 
year  ; some  located  in  their  native  land,  and,  as  it 
were,  on  the  very  tomb  of  their  fathers,  and  others 
shining  in  some  distant  and  conjectural  El  Dorado 
of  the  East  or  West.  Their  imagination  is  all  upon 
one  track,  onward  to  the  regions  of  light.  They 
see  no  darkness  in  the  clouds  ; they  hear  no  rum- 
bling of  the  tempest. 

How  different  this  state  of  mind  from  that  which 
has  just  now  been  described.  But,  unfortunately,  it 
is  equally  at  variance  with  the  true  state  of  things. 
Such  a man  is  a marvel  to  his  neighbours,  who,  al- 
though they  are  not  misanthropes,  do  not  see  all 
things  bright ; but  brightness  and  darkness  mingled 
together,  with  a full  proportion  of  the  latter.  They 
wonder  he  is  so  happy,  and  yet  they  call  him  a fool. 
They  shake  their  heads  in  their  wisdom,  and  mourn- 
fully predict  that  he  will  end  his  days  in  a mad- 
house. And  so  it  is.  But  the  distinctive  trait  of 
his  malady  does  not  leave  him  even  there.  His 
mind  is  in  ruins  ; but  it  is  shrouded  in  a rainbow. 
He  rattles  his  chains  with  joy,  and  makes  the  walls 
of  his  prison  echo  with  his  songs. 


NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY.  267 


CHAPTER  Till. 

NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

§ 157.  Idiocy  generally  implies  a defective  action 
of  the  whole  J\lind. 

We  propose  to  close  this  part  of  the  general  sub- 
ject with  some  remarks  upon  Idiocy.  A topic 
which  naturally  has  a place  in  a work  that  professes 
to  treat  of  defective  or  imperfect,  as  well  as  of  dis- 
ordered mental  action.  In  the  matter  of  arrange- 
ment, it  is  of  but  little  consequence  whether  we  in- 
| troduce  this  subject  here  or  in  some  other  place. 
Idiocy  does  not  imply  merely  an  imperfect  action  of 
the  External  Intellect,  or  of  the  Internal  Intellect,  or 
of  the  Natural  and  Moral  Sensibilities,  but  of  the 
whole.  Generally  speaking,  it  may  be  considered 
as  covering  the  whole  mental  area  ; presenting  a 
scene  of  desolateness  and  vacuity  throughout.  It 
has,  therefore,  no  specific  place  in  the  minor  divis- 
ions into  which  the  treatise  naturally  resolves  itself. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  basis  of  this  unfortunate  state  of 
mind  may,  with  a good  degree  of  probability,  be 
generally  located  in  the  intellect,  we  have  conclu- 
ded to  introduce  the  following  remarks  in  reference 
to  it  in  the  present  connexion,  rather  than  in  the 
subsequent  part  of  the  work,  which  has  particular  re- 
lation to  the  Sensibilities.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the 


268  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  1DIOCV 

subject  that  it  will  not  require  an  extended  discus- 
sion. 

§ 158.  Of  the  degree  of  Intellectual  Power  possessed 
in  Idiocy. 

It  will  be  proper,  in  the  first  place,  in  entering 
upon  this  subject,  to  notice  some  of  the  marks  or 
characteristics  which  are  commonly  found  to  attach 
to  a state  of  idiocy.  And  here  the  first  remark  is, 
that  persons  in  this  condition  will  always  be  found 
to  have  but  few  ideas  of  any  kind  whatever.  This 
small  number  of  ideas  they  are  able,  except  in  some 
extreme  cases,  to  compare  together,  so  far  as  to  dis- 
tinguish those  in  which  there  are  any  striking  differ- 
ences. Such,  however,  is  the  general  weakness, 
and,  at  times,  the  total  incapacity  of  the  power  of 
relative  suggestion,  that  the  class  of  General  Ab- 
stract ideas,  which  are  of  such  a nature  as  always 
to  imply  the  exercise  of  that  power,  are  not  only 
fewer  in  idiots  than  those  of  any  other  class,  but  are 
ill-defined  and  indistinct.  The  few  ideas  which  they 
actually  possess,  they  are  sometimes,  but  not  always, 
able  to  combine  together,  and  to  form  from  them 
some  simple  propositions.  They  have,  however, 
the  power  of  deducing  inferences  from  the  compari- 
son of  a number  of  consecutive  propositions,  that  is, 
by  reasoning  only  in  a very  small  degree.  Their 
great  feebleness  of  reasoning  power  is  to  be  attrib- 
uted partly  to  the  fewness  of  the  ideas  and  proposi- 
tions which  they  possess  ; partly  to  the  dulness  of 
their  susceptibility  of  perceiving  relations,  the  exer- 
cise of  which  is  always  implied  in  the  comparison  of 


269 


NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

propositions  ; and  partly,  in  some  cases,  to  a great 
weakness  of  memory.  We  say  in  some  cases,  be- 
cause idiots  have  occasionally  been  found,  who, 
while  they  have  been  deficient  in  every  other  men- 
tal power,  have  still  been  remarkable  for  memory. 
There  is  one  characteristic  of  idiocy  which  very 
seldom  fails  ; and  that  is,  an  inability  to  give  atten- 
tion. We  never,  for  instance,  find  an  idiot  who  can 
steadily  attend  to  a long  argument,  and  estimate  the 
point  and  weight  of  its  conclusion  ; even  if  it  be  ot 
such  a simple  nature  that  he  can  understand  the 
separate  ideas  and  propositions  involved  in  it. 

^ 159.  Of  the  natural  and  moral  Sensibilities  in 
Idiocy. 

Such  is  the  intellectual  power,  or,  rather,  want  ot 
intellectual  power,  which  characterizes  the  condition 
of  this  unfortunate  class  of  persons.  If  we  pass 
from  the  Intellect  into  the  region  of  the  Sensibilities, 
we  shall  find  them  estranged,  in  an  almost  equal 
degree,  from  the  common  measure  of  human  emo- 
tion and  passion.  In  general,  they  take  but  a little 
interest  in  the  loves  and  hatreds,  the  joys  and  the 
sorrows  of  others,  even  of  their  near  friends.  'I  hey 
show  no  disposition  to  engage  in  the  pursuits  which 
fire  the  hearts  and  prompt  the  efforts  of  all  around 
them,  but  appear  to  be  lost,  if  one  may  use  the  ex- 
pression, in  the  abyss  of  their  own  fatuity.  Their 
want  of  emotion,  as  well  as  the  defect  of  thought,  is 
indicated  by  a vacant  gaze,  and  a general  absence  of 
meaning  and  expression  in  the  countenance. 

If  we  pass  from  the  natural  to  the  moral  sensibiU 


270  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

ities,  we  find  it  no  better.  Whatever  injury  the  idiot 
may  do,  he  is  not,  in  general,  regarded  as  accounta- 
ble  for  it.  In  a multitude  of  cases,  he  is  not  capa- 
ble of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong  ; and,  conse- 
quently,  is  not  considered  a proper  subject  of  moral 
blame  or  approbation  from  others.  Nor  can  it  well 
be  otherwise.  Our  moral  nature  is  so  constituted, 
that  it  necessarily  acts  in  view  of  facts,  knowledge, 
the  deductions  of  reasoning.  We  cannot  feel  a thing 
to  be  right  or  wrong,  unless  we  know  something  of 
the  nature  of  the  thing  and  of  its  relations.  If  a 
man  has  no  knowledge,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
he  will  have  no  conscience  ; or,  rather,  there  will  be 
no  developement,  no  exercise  of  the  conscience.  If 
a man  of  a sound  mind  sets  fire  to  an  inhabited 
house,- he  does  wrong,  and  is  justly  punishable,  be- 
cause he  fully  understands  the  consequences  of  such 
an  act ; but  the  idiot,  who  does  the  same  thing,  is 
not  treated  as  a wrong-doer  and  as  punishable,  sim- 
ply because  to  estimate  the  consequences  in  such  a 
case  is  beyond  his  capacity.  The  idiot,  therefore, 
possesses,  as  a general  thing,  no  conscience,  be- 
cause he  has  no  adequate  basis  for  conscience  to 
rest  upon  ; in  other  words,  no  adequate  powers  of 
perception  and  reasoning.— This  is  a description  of 
common  cases  of  idiocy  ; but  there  are  gradations 
in  this,  as  well  as  in  all  other  mental  weaknesses 
and  disorders. 

§ 160.  Of  certain  marked  or  pecidiar  aspects  of 
Idiocy. 

There  is  one  peculiarity  of  idiocy  which  it  seems 


NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY.  271 

proper  to  notice  here.  It  is  sometimes  the  case  that 
there  is  something  left ; some  form  of  mental  power, 
which  exists  as  an  exception  to  the  general  character 
of  the  mind.  Some  persons,  for  instance,  who  are 
justly  considered  as  idiots,  nevertheless  show  con 
siderable  power  in  matching  rhymes.  This  power 
alone  seems  to  be  left  to  them  ; and,  by  means  of  it, 
they  are  enabled  to  furnish  some  degree  of  amuse- 
ment to  themselves  and  others.  Others,  again,  will 
exhibit  some  degree  of  mechanical  genius  ; enough, 
in  the  general  prostration  of  their  powers,  to  attract 
the  notice  of  strangers,  while  it  gives  employment  to 
themselves  ; but  it  is  always  exercised  on  a small 
scale,  and  is  remarkable  only  from  the  fact  of  its  ex 
isting  in  connexion  with  idiocy. 

There  have  also  been  instances  of  idiots,  as  we 
have  already  had  occasion  to  intimate,  who  have 
shown  considerable  power  of  memory.  They  ac- 
curately repeat  what  they  have  seen  and  heard,  al- 
though they  cannot  apply  to  their  knowledge,  which 
generally  consists  of  a mere  series  of  external  and 
unimportant  facts,  the  ordinary  powers  of  judgment. 
Some  are  said  to  be  interested  with  diversities  of 
colours,  and  to  show  a talent  for  the  copying  of 
paintings.  Sometimes  they  appear  to  understand 
the  nature  of  musical  sounds  ; and  continually  re- 
peat some  simple  and  melancholy  air.  These  things 
relieve,  although  they  do  not  essentially  alter,  the 
character  of  their  fatuity.  There  is  just  enough  left 
imperfectly  and  sadly  to  indicate  what  the  mind 
might  have  been  if  a mysterious  Providence  had  oth- 
wise  ordained. 


272  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 


§ 161.  Of  the  origin  and  caus.es  of  Idiocy. 

Idiotism  is  sometimes  congenital  or  natural ; that 
is,  the  causes  of  it  exist  from  the  commencement  of 
life.  In  many  of  these  cases,  there  is  a greater  or 
less  bodily  malformation  ; the  scull  is  of  a size  less 
than  common,  and  there  is  a disproportion  between 
the  face  and  the  head,  the  former  being  larger  in 
proportion  than  the  latter.  The  bones  of  the  head 
are  asserted  by  Dr.  Rush  to  be  preternaturally  thick  ; 
and  the  consequence  of  this  is  a diminution  of  the 
internal  capacity  of  the  cranium. — “ What  appears 
most  striking”  (says  Pinel,  in  giving  an  account  of 
an  idiot  in  the  asylum  Bicetre)  44  is  the  extremely 
disproportionate  extent  of  the  face  compared  with 
the  diminutive  size  of  the  cranium.  No  traits  of 
animation  are  visible  in  his  physiognomy.  Every 
line  indicates  the  most  absolute  stupidity.  Between 
the  height  of  the  head  and  that  of  the  whole  stature, 
there  is  a very  great  disproportion.  The  cranium 
is  greatly  depressed,  both  at  the  crown  and  at  the 
temples.  His  looks  are  heavy,  and  his  mouth  wide 
open.  The  whole  extent  of  his  knowledge  is  con- 
fined to  three  or  four  confused  ideas,  and  that  of  his 
speech  to  as  many  inarticulate  sounds.”* 

From  this  instance,  which  is  one  of  the  lowest 
forms  of  idiocy,  and  from  others  where  there  was  a 
similar  conformation  of  the  head,  Pinel  seems  to  be 
inclined  to  the  opinion  that  a malconformation  of 
the  head  in  particular  is  the  cause  of  idiotism  when 
it  exists  from  infancy. 

* Pinel’s  Treatise  on  Insanity  (Davis’s  Translation),  sect.  iii. 


NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  lDIOCiT. 


273 


The  absence  or  weakness  of  intellectual  power, 
which  is  termed  idiocy,  is  often  found  to  exist  fiom 
other  causes.  Men  of  great  mental  ability  have 
sometimes  sunk  into  the  state  of  idiotism,  in  conse- 
quence of  too  great  and  long-continued  application  of 
the  mind,  a tasking  of  its  powers  beyond  their  great- 
est strength.  Sometimes,  on  the  contrary,  the  same 
results  seem  to  have  followed  from  too  little  applica- 
tion, especially  when  combined  with  a disrelish  for 
social  intercourse,  which  might  have  checked,  and 
probably  have  prevented,  an  entire  prostration.  It 
is  obviously  one  of  the  great  laws  of  the  mind,  that 
the  progress  or  advancement  of  its  powers  is  con- 
nected with  a suitable  degree  of  exercise.  If, 
therefore,  a person  withdraws  into  inane  and  idle 
solitude  ; if  he  pertinaciously  withholds  himself  from 
the  communion  and  conflicts  of  society,  and  thus 
loses  the  opportunity  both  of  acquiring  a fund  of  new 
ideas  and  of  renovating  his  former  stores  of  knowl- 
edge, he  will  be  likely  to  find  his  mind  collapsing 
into  a state  of  weakness  and  ignorance,  approaching, 
in  the  end,  the  condition  of  idiocy. 

§ 162.  Idiocy  to  be  ascribed  sometimes  to  the  effects 
of  Age. 

Idiocy  appears,  in  some  cases,  to  be  induced  by 
mere  old  age.  The  senses  at  that  period  of  life  be- 
come dull  r the  ideas  received  from  them  are  less 
lively  than  formerly  ; the  memory  fails,  and  with  it 
the  power  of  reasoning ; and  there  is  sometimes 
combined  with  these  unfavourable  circumstances  a 
want  of  interest  in  persons  and  events  a coldness 


274  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

and  sluggishness  of  feeling,  which  perhaps  cannot 
be  considered  altogether  surprising  at  that  period  of 
life,  but  which  is  obviously  unpropitious  to  the  pres- 
ervation of  mental  energy.  In  referring  to  old  age, 
however,  in  this  connexion,  it  is  proper  to  modify 
this  general  statement  by  one  or  two  remarks. 
When  idiocy  is  superinduced  by  the  influences  of  old 
age,  this  result  is  found  for  the  most  part  to  take 
place  in  those  persons  only  in  whom  the  External 
intellect  alone  has  been  cultivated.  They  have  been 
so  situated,  being  deprived  in  early  life  of  instruc- 
tion, and  always  deprived  of  the  use  of  books,  that 
their  minds  have  been  exercised  exclusively  in  con- 
nexion with  the  senses.  They  know  but  very  little 
more  than  what  has  been  directly  addressed  to  the 
touch,  sight,  and  taste.  The  inward  fountains  of 
thought,  original  suggestion,  consciousness,  judg- 
ment, reasoning,  are  in  a great  degree  sealed  up. 
Consequently,  when  in  extreme  old  age  the  outward 
senses  are  unable  to  perform  their  office,  it  is  una- 
voidable, that  the  mind  should  sink  back  into  a state 
of  feebleness,  exhibiting  all  the  ordinary  characteris- 
tics of  idiocy. 

F urther  ; this  state  of  the  mind  may  be  caused  by 
various  diseases,  such  as  violent  fevers,  which  at 
times  suddenly  disturb  the  mental  powers,  produce 
a temporary  delirium,  and  then  leave  the  faculties  of 
the  mind  in  a permanently  torpid  and  inefficient  con- 
dition. It  may  originate  also  in  the  abuse  of  ardent 
spirits,  from  great  grief,  from  violent  blows  on  the 
head,  from  sudden  and  great  terror,  &c.  The  idi- 
ocy, which  is  natural,  and  exists  from  infancy,  has 


NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY.  275 

sometimes  been  distinguished  from  that  which  is 
brought  on  by  the  above-mentioned  and  other  causes 
in  after  life  ; but  the  mental  condition  being  in  both 
cases  essentially  the  same,  they  may  properly  be 
considered  together  in  one  view. 

§ 163.  Illustrations  of  the  causes  of  Idiocy. 

Great  and  sudden  terror  was  mentioned  as  one 
of  the  causes  of  idiocy.  Very  great  and  sudden 
excitements  of  any  of  the  passions  may  produce  the 
same  effect.  We  know  of  no  illustrations  of  this 
statement  more  striking  than  the  following,  from  the 
interesting  work  of  Pinel  on  Insanity. — “ The  feel- 
ings of  individuals,  endowed  with  acute  sensibility, 
may  experience  so  violent  a shock,  that  all  the  func- 
tions of  the  mind  are  in  danger  of  being  suspended 
in  their  exercises  or  totally  abolished.  Sudden  joy 
and  excessive  fear  are  equally  capable  of  producing 
this  inexplicable  phenomenon.  An  engineer  pro- 
posed to  the  committee  of  public  safety,  in  the  sec- 
ond year  of  the  [French]  republic,  a project  for  a 
new  invented  cannon,  of  which  the  effects  would  be 
tremendous.  A day  was  fixed  for  the  experiment 
at  Meudon  ; and  Robespierre  wrote  to  the  inventor 
so  flattering  a letter,  that,  upon  perusing  it,  he  was 
transfixed  motionless  to  the  spot.  He  was  shortly 
afterward  sent  to  Bicetre  in  a state  of  complete  idi- 
otism. 

“ About  the  same  time,  two  young  conscripts,  who 
had  recently  joined  the  army,  were  called  into  ac- 
tion. In  the  heat  of  the  engagement  one  of  them 
was  killed  by  a musket-ball  at  the  side  of  his  broth- 


276  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

er.  The  surviver,  petrified  with  horror,  was  struck 
motionless  at  the  sight.  Some  days  afterward  he 
was  sent,  in  a state  of  complete  idiotism,  to  his  fa- 
ther’s house.  His  arrival  produced  a similar  im- 
pression upon  a third  son  of  the  same  family.  The 
news  of  the  death  of  one  of  the  brothers,  and  the  de- 
rangement of  the  other,  threw  this  third  victim  into 
such  a state  of  consternation  and  stupor  as  might 
have  defied  the  powers  of  ancient  or  modern  poetry 
to  give  an  adequate  representation  of  it.  My  sym- 
pathetic feelings  have  been  frequently  arrested  by 
the  sad  wreck  of  humanity,  presented  in  the  appear- 
ance of  these  degraded  beings  ; but  it  was  a scene 
truly  heart-rending  to  see  the  wretched  father  come 
to  weep  over  these  miserable  remains  of  his  once 
enviable  family.” 

§ 164.  Of  restoration  from  a state  of  Idiocy . 

Idiocy,  so  far  as  we  have  been  able  to  learn,  is 
considered  incurable  ; at  least  a restoration  from  it 
is  more  difficult  and  less  probable  than  from  the 
more  common  forms  of  defective  mental  action. 
This  is  especially  true  when  it  is  natural  and  con- 
genital ; which  is  understood,  as  a general  thing,  to 
imply  an  imperfect  or  deformed  structure  of  the  cer- 
ebral organ.  And,  when  it  is  otherwise,  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  the  encouragement  to  effort  is  small. 
One  thing,  however,  ought  to  be  done.  The  idiot 
should  be  instructed  to  the  extent  of  his  capacity, 
whether  more  or  less.  Who  knows  but  a faithful 
training  within  the  narrow  limits  of  his  mental  capa- 
bility may  arouse  some  dormant  energy,  may  disen- 


NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY.  277 

tangle  and  adjust  some  disordered  intellectual  action, 
may  open  to  his  astonished  apprehension  some  new 
fountain  of  thought,  and  thus  produce  a complete  in- 
ternal revolution.  Such  a result,  as  facts  might  be 
adduced  to  show,  is  not  'altogether  hopeless ; al- 
though undoubtedly  the  preparatory  efforts  are  such 
as  to  require  a high  degree  of  faith  and  patience. 

§ 165.  Of  the  beneficial  results  connected  with 

Idiocy. 

And  here  it  might  be  inquired  with  some  proprie- 
ty, what  end  Providence  could  have  had  in  view  in 
permitting  the  existence  of  these  unfortunate  beings, 
except  it  be  to  try  the  faith  and  patience,  to  quicken 
the  sensibilities,  and  to  discipline  the  virtues  of  those 
by  whom  they  are  surrounded.  If  there  were  no 
vice  and  no  suffering  in  the  world,  how  could  any  of 
us  know  that  we  possess  a nature  which  would  turn 
with  horror  from  crime,  or  would  melt  with  pity  at 
misfortune  1 

There  is  an  interesting  poem  of  Wordsworth,  en- 
titled the  Cumberland  Beggar.  The  whole  business 
of  the  poor  old  man  is  to  go  from  cottage  to  cottage, 
on  his  daily  errands  of  want.  In  the  decrepitude  of 
age,  he  advances  so  slow  that  “ the  cottage  cuis,  eie 
he  have  passed  the  door,  will  turn  away  weary  of 
barking  at  him.”  But  Wordsworth  contends,  in  the 
spirit  of  a philosopher  as  well  as  of  a poet,  that  the 
old  man,  though  wholly  dependant  upon  others,  is 
not  without  some  benefit  to  mankind.  He  not  only 
serves  to  remind  the  villagers,  as  he  wanders  in  hts 
poverty  among  them,  of  the  past  offices  of  kindness 


278  NATURE  AND  CAUSES  OF  IDIOCY. 

which  they  have  shown  him,  and  again  lo  awaken, 
as  he  presents  anew  his  decrepit  form,  the  spirit  of 
benevolence  ; but  he  helps  to  quicken  in  their  hearts 
the  recollection  of  their  own  comparatively  favoured 
situation,  and  to  keep  more  vividly  alive  the  decay- 
ing sentiments  of  religious  gratitude.  This  is  the 
important  office  which  Providence  assigns  him  ; and 
who  will  say  that  the  idiot,  a being  still  more  de- 
graded, still  more  capable  of  appealing  to  our  sym- 
pathies, does  less  ! He  stands  a perpetual  monitor, 
appointed  in  the  wisdom  of  an  inscrutable  Superin- 
tendence, to  teach  us  that  man,  in  his  natural  ele- 
ments, is  what  he  is,  not  by  his  own  volition,  but  by 
the  gift  of  God  ; and  to  remind  us  individually  of 
what  we  have  more  than  others,  and  of  what  we  are 
bound  in  pity  and  in  duty  to  do  for  those  who  have 
less. 

“ And  while  in  that  vast  solitude,  to  which 
The  tide  of  things  has  led  him,  he  appears 
To  breathe  and  live  but  for  himself  alone, 

Unblamed,  uninjured,  let  him  bear  about 
The  good,  which  the  benignant  law  of  Heaven 
Has  hung  around  him ; and,  while  life  is  his. 

Still  let  him  prompt  the  unletter’d  villagers 
To  tender  offices  and  pensive  thoughts.” 


IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED 

MENTAL  ACTION. 


DIVISION  SECOND. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  SENSIBILITIES. 


\r 


cO 


DERANGEMENT 

OF  THE 

SENSIBILITIES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

disordered  action  of  the  appetites. 

^ 166.  Classification  and  method  of  inquiry. 

We  now  enter  upon  a distinct  and  very  important 
department  of  the  mental  nature,  viz.,  the  Sensibili- 
ties.  The  Sensibilities,  like  the  Intellect,  are  sus- 

ceptible of  some  subordinate  divisions;  the  most 
important  of  which  is  the  leading  and  most  general 
one  of  the  Natural  and  the  Moral  Sensibilities.  Of 
these  two  we  propose  to  consider,  first,  the  Natural 
Sensibilities.  Of  the  elementary  or  simple  feelings, 
which  come  under  this  general  head,  the  leading  di- 
vision is  into  Emotions  and  Desires.  As  we  ad- 
vance from  the  Intellect  to  the  Natural  or  Pathe- 
matic  Sensibilities,  we  find  ourselves  in  the  region 
of  the  natural  Emotions.  These  are  followed  by 
Desires. 

The  Desires,  for  the  most  part  in  combination 


282  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  APPETITES. 

with  Emotions,  assume  a number  of  distinct  and  im- 
portant modifications  or  forms,  viz.,  the  Appetites, 
Propensities,  and  Affections.  We  propose,  under 
this  general  head  of  the  Natural  Sensibilities,  to 
prosecute  the  subject  of  alienated  or  depraved  men- 
tal action,  in  connexion  with  these  principles  in  par- 
ticular. It  is  true  that  the  emotions  and  desires, 
in  their  simple  or  elementary  state,  are  susceptible 
of  an  inordinate  or  depraved  action ; but  they  do  not 
appear  to  furnish,  in  that  form,  a sufficient  basis  for 
a prolonged,  definite,  and  scientific  discussion.  It 
is  in  their  combination  with  each  other ; it  is  in  the 
shape  of  appetitive,  propensive,  and  affective  princi- 
ples, which,  in  general,  are  the  result  of  such  com- 
bination, that  they  stand  out  prominently  to  the  eye, 
and  give  a definite  aspect  to  the  character.  We 
shall  begin,  therefore,  with  the  Appetites,  which  will 
be  followed  in  the  order  in  which  they  have  been 
named  by  remarks  on  the  Propensities,  and,  finally, 
by  a consideration  of  the  Affections,  including  un- 
der that  term  the  two  leading  divisions  of  the  Benev- 
olent and  Malevolent  Affections. 

§ 167.  Of  the  distinction  between  mere  disorder  and 
Insanity  of  the  Sensibilities . 

It  may  be  proper  to  keep  in  mind  here,  that  a dis- 
tinction may  be  drawn  satisfactorily  between  mere 
disorder  or  irregularity  of  the  sensibilities,  and  in- 
sanity of  the  sensibilities.  Insanity  indicates  not 
merely  disorder,  but  disorder  existing  in  a high  de- 
gree. When,  for  instance,  the  disordered  or  irreg- 
ular state  of  mind,  which  at  first  existed  only  in  a 


disordered  action  of  the  appetites.  283 

slight  degree,  continually  increases,  so  as  at  last  to 
pass  a certain  boundary,  which  is  more  easily  con- 
ceived of  than  described,  it  becomes  Insanity  or 
Alienation.  That  is  to  say,  the  merely  irregular 
action  becomes  an  insane  or  aliented  action,  when  it 
becomes  so  great,  so  pervading,  and  so  deeply  root- 
ed in  the  mind  that  the  individual  has  no  power^of 
restoration  in  himself.  So  that  it  would  seem  to 
follow,  in  view  of  this  remark,  that  there  may  be  a 
disordered  state  of  the  mind  which  is  insanity  ; and, 
under  other  circumstances,  a disordered  state  of  the 
mind  which  is  not  insanity,  or,  rather,  which  is  less 
than  insanity.  But,  in  either  case,  this  condition  of 
mind  is  not  to  be  regarded,  nor  is  it,  in  point  of  fact, 
a sound  mental  state.  Although  we  may  not  be 
able  to  say,  specifically,  in  a given  case,  that  the 
disorder  has  reached  the  point  of  insanity,  yet  it  is 
certain  that  the  mind  in  this  disordered  state,  wheth- 
er the  disorder  be  greater  or  less,  is  presented  to  our 
view  in  a new  and  important  aspect. 

§ 168.  Of  the  disordered  and  alienated  action  of  the 
Appetites . 

In  accordance  with  the  plan  of  discussion  propo- 
sed in  the  first  section  of  this  chapter,  we  proceed 
to  remark,  in  the  first  place,  that  there  may  be  a 
disordered  and  alienated  action  of  the  Appetites. — 
It  is  well  known,  that  the  appetites  grow  stronger 
and  stronger  by  repeated  indulgence.  While  the 
process  of  increased  appetitive  tendency  is  going  on, 
there  still  remains,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  enough 
of* remonstrance  in  the  conscience,  and  of  restrictive 


284  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  APPETITES. 

and  aggressive  energy  in  the  will,  to  ward  off  that 
state  of  thraldom  which  is  rapidly  approaching.  But 
in  some  melancholy  cases  it  is  otherwise  ; the  line 
of  demarcation,  which  separates  the  possibility  and 
the  impossibility  of  a restoration,  is  passed  ; and 
from  that  time  onward  there  is  nothing  but  inter- 
minable sinking.  Such  cases  as  these  may  un- 
doubtedly be  regarded  as  coming  within  the  limits 
of  some  of  the  multiplied  forms  of  mental  alienation. 

The  most  frequent  instances  of  mental  alienation, 
originating  in  a disordered  and  excessive  energy  of 
the  appetites,  are  to  be  found  in  that  numerous  class 
of  persons  who  habitually  indulge  in  the  use  of  in- 
toxicating drugs,  particularly  ardent  spirits.  When 
the  person  who  indulges  in  the  use  of  intoxicating 
liquors  has  so  increased  the  energy  of  this  pernicious 
appetite  as  really  to  bring  himself  within  the  limits 
of  mental  alienation,  there  is  no  hope  of  a return  by 
means  of  any  effort  which  he  himself  is  capable  of 
making.  He  may  have  a clear  perception  of  the 
misery  of  his  situation ; the  desire  of  esteem  may 
still  arouse  within  him  the  recollection  of  what  he' 
once  was  and  of  what  he  still  ought  to  be ; the  con- 
science may  still  speak  out  in  remonstrance,  though 
probably  with  a diminished  voice  ; the  will  may  con- 
tinue to  put  forth  some  ineffectual  struggles  ; but  it 
is  found  to  be  all  in  vain.  If  left  to  himself,  and 
not  put  under  that  constraint  which  is  proper  to  per- 
sons in  actual  insanity,  it  may  be  regarded  as  a 
matter  of  moral  certainty  that  he  will  plunge  deep- 
er and  deeper  in  the  degrading  vice  of  which  he  is 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  APPETITES.  285 

the  subject,  so  long  as  the  remaining  powers  of  life 
shall  support  him  in  the  process. 

^169.  Facts  illustrative  of  the  preceding  statements. 

The  individuals  who  are  in  this  situation  seem 
themselves  to  have  a consciousness  of  their  danger. 
They  see  clearly  that  in  their  own  strength  there  is 
no  hope.  Some  years  since  there  was  a pamphlet 
published  in  England,  entitled  the  Confessions  of  a 
Drunkard.  The  statements  made  in  it  are  asserted, 
on  good  authority,  to  be  authentic.  And  what  does 
the  writer  say  ? “ Of  my  condition  there  is  no  hope 
that  it  should  ever  change ; the  waters  have  gone 
over  me  ; but  out  of  the  black  depths,  could  I be 
heard,  I would  cry  out  to  all  those  who  have  but  set 
a foot  in  the  perilous  flood.  Could  the  youth,  to 
whom  the  flavour  of  his  first  wine  is  delicious  as  the 
opening  scenes  of  life,  or  the  entering  upon  some 
newly-discovered  paradise,  look  into  my  desolation, 
and  be  made  to  understand  what  a dreary  thing  it  is 
when  a man  shall  feel  himself  going  down  a preci- 
pice with  open  eyes  and  a passive  will  ; to  see  his 
destruction,  and  have  no  power  to  stop  it,  and  yet  to 
feel  it  all  the  way  emanating  from  himself;  to  per- 
ceive all  goodness  emptied  out  of  him,  and  yet  not 
be  able  to  forget  a time  when  it  was  otherwise  ; to 
bear  about  the  piteous  spectacle  of  his  own  self 
ruins : could  he  see  my  fevered  eye,  feverish  with 
the  last  night’s  drinking,  and  feverishly  looking  for 
this  night’s  repetition  of  the  folly  ; could  he  feel  the 
body  of  the  death  out  of  which  I cry  hourly,  with 
feebler  and  feebler  outcry,  to  be  delivered,  it  were 


*286  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  APPETITES* 

enough  to  make  him  dash  the  sparkling  beverage  to 
the  earth  in  ail  the  pride  of  its  mantling  tempta- 
tion.”* 

In  repeated  instances  persons,  whose  desire  for 
intoxicating  articles  has  become  inordinately  strong, 
have  gone  to  keepers  of  penitentiaries  and  other 
prisons,  and  earnestly  entreated  for  admission,  on 
the  ground  that  nothing  short  of  strict  seclusion 
within  their  massy  walls  would  secure  them  against 
the  ruinous  indulgence  of  their  appetite. — “ The  use 
of  strong  drink”  (says  Dr.  Rush,  Diseases  of  the 
Mind,  chap,  x.)  “is  at  first  the  effect  of  free  agency. 
From  habit  it  takes  place  from  necessity.  That  this 
is  the  case,  I infer  from  persons  who  are  inordinate- 
ly devoted  to  the  use  of  ardent  spirits  being  irre- 
claimable, by  all  the  considerations  which  domestic 
obligations,  friendship,  reputation,  property,  and 
sometimes  even  by  those  which  religion  and  the 
love  of  life  can  suggest  to  them.  An  instance  of 
insensibility  to  the  last,  in  an  habitual  drunkard,  oc- 
curred some  years  ago  in  Philadelphia.  When 
strongly  urged  by  one  of  his  friends  to  leave  off 
drinking,  he  said,  6 Mere  a keg  of  rum  in  one  cor- 
ner of  a room,  and  were  a cannon  constantly  dis- 
charging balls  between  me  and  it,  I could  not  re- 
frain from  passing  before  that  cannon,  in  order  to 
get  at  the  rum.’  ” 

§ 170.  Further  notices  on  the  disorder  of  the 
Appetites. 

Before  leaving  this  subject  we  wish  to  recur  * 

* London  Quarterly  Review,  vol.  xvii.  p.  120. 


disordered  action  of  the  appetites.  281 

moment  to  some  remarks  of  Mr.  Stewart  in  regard 
to  the  Appetites.  He  says  they  may  be  distinguish- 
ed by  the  three  following  things : (1.)  They  take 
their  rise  from  the  body,  and  are  common  to  men 
with  the  brutes.  (2.)  They  are  not  constant,  but 
occasional.  (3.)  They  are  accompanied  with  an 
uneasy  sensation,  which  is  strong  or  weak,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  strength  or  weakness  of  the  Appetite. 

He  then  goes  on  to  state  that  our  Appetites  are 
three  in  number,  viz.,  hunger,  thirst,  and  the 
appetite  of  sex. — What  has  been  said  will  suffi- 
ciently illustrate,  in  consequence  of  the  close  analo- 
gy between  them,  the  disordered  action  of  the  first 
two,  although  the  statements  given  had  particular 
relation  to  the  irregularities  of  the  Appetite  of  thirst. 

The  Appetite  of  Sex,  also,  is  susceptible  of  an 
unrestrained  and  inordinate  action,  not  only  inuica- 
ting  insanity  in  the  specific  principle  or  Appetite  it- 
self but  resulting  in  a disorganization  and  insanity 
of  other  parts  of  the  mind.  On  this  subject,  as  this 
Treatise  is  designed  for  general  reading,  we  do  not 
propose  to  dwell.  It  will  be  enough  to  say,  that 
very  melancholy  instances  of  the  operations  and  ef- 
fects of  this  disordered  Appetite  are  found  in  many 
writers  on  Insanity,  to  which  we  hope  the  readei 
will  excuse  us  for  referring  him. — (See,  among 
other  Works,  Rush  on  the  Diseases  of  the  Mind, 
ch.  xviii.)  ■ 


288  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES* 
(i.)  PROPENSITY  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION. 

§ 171.  General  remarks  on  the  Propensities . 

As  we  proceed  in  the  examination  of  the  Natural 
or  Pathematic  Sensibilities,  we  meet  with  certain 
modifications  or  forms  of  Desire  which,  as  they  are 
different  from  the  Appetites,  require  a distinct  con- 
sideration. These  distinct  principles,  which  are 
known  as  the  propensive  principles  or  Propensities, 
differ  from  the  Appetites,  first,  in  the  circumstance 
that  they  are  much  less  dependant  for  their  existence 
and  exercise  upon  the  condition  of  the  body ; and, 
secondly,  because,  in  that  comparative  estimation 
which  is  naturally  attached  to  the  different  active 
principles  of  our  nature,  they  confessedly  hold  a 
higher  rank.  At  the  same  time  they  evidently,  in 
the  graduation  of  our  regard,  fall  below  the  Affec- 
tions, besides  being  distinguished  from  them  in  other 
respects.  And  hence  they  may  be  regarded  as 
holding  a sort  of  intermediate  place  between  the 
Appetites  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Affections  on 
the  other. 

Among  the  leading  or  more  important  of  the  Pro- 
pensities may  be  enumerated  the  principle  of  Self- 


(l)  propensity  of  self-preservation.  289 

preservation,  or  the  desire  of  continued  existence ; 
Curiosity,  or  the  desire  of  knowledge;  Sociality,  or 
the  desire  of  society  ; Self-love,  or  the  desire  of 
happiness  ; the  desire  of  Esteem  ; Imitativeness,  or 
the  propensity  to  imitate ; and  some  others.  All 
these,  it  will  be  noticed,  are  modifications  of  De- 
sire ; and  yet  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  a pleas- 
ant emotion,  in  view  of  the  object  towards  which 
the  desire  is  directed,  is  the  preparatory  condition  or 
basis  of  the  existence  of  the  desire.  And  not  only 
this,  it  is  possible  at  least  that  the  emotion  may  con- 
tinue subsequently  (as  is  the  fact  in  the  Affections) 
to  exist  in  connexion  with  the  desires ; constituting, 
in  this  manner,  the  ground  of  their  continuance,  as 
well  as  the  ground  or  condition  of  their  origin.  But 
these  are  points  which  may  properly  and  safely  be 
left  to  mental  philosophers. 

What  we  have  to  say  here  is,  that  the  vaiious 
Propensities  which  have  been  mentioned  (and  what- 
ever others  may  properly  come  under  the  denomina- 
tion of  Propensities)  are  susceptible  of  irregularity, 
from  the  lowest  degree  of  disorder  to  the  higher 
form  of  Insanity. 

$ 172.  Disordered  action  of  the  principle  of  Self- 
preservation. 

In  the  prosecution  of  this  part  of  our  subject,  we 
begin,  as  it  is  one  which  would  naturally  present  it- 
self first  for  our  consideration,  with  the  propensive 
principle  of  Self-preservation,  or  what  may  be  des- 
ignated, in  other  terms,  as  the  natural  desire  of  a 
continuance  of  existence.  This  principle,  like  the 


290  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

others  of  the  same  class,  although  not  generally  in 
so  marked  a degree,  will  sometimes  manifest  itself 
under  sudbf  circumstances,  and  in  such  a manner,  as 
obviously  to  show  that  its  action  is  not  a natural, 
regular,  or  healthy  action.  Persons  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  disordered  action  of  the  principle 
which  is  connected  with  the  preservation  of  life 
multiply,  as  they  would  be  naturally  disposed  to  do, 
images  of  danger  and  terror  which  have  no  exist- 
ence, nor  likeness  of  existence,  except  in  their  own 
disordered  minds.  They  not  only  see  perils  which 
are  invisible  to  others,  but  are  led  to  take  a multi- 
tude of  precautions  which,  in  the  estimation  of  those 
around  them,  are  altogether  unnecessary,  and  even 
ridiculous. 

Pinel,  under  the  head  of  Melancholy,  mentions 
a case  which  may  be  considered  as  illustrating  this 
subject : “ A distinguished  military  officer”  (he  says), 
“ after  fifty  years  of  active  service  in  the  cavalry,  was 
attacked  with  disease.  It  commenced  by  his  expe- 
riencing vivid  emotions  from  the  slightest  causes  ; 
if,  for  example,  he  heard  any  disease  spoken  of,  he 
immediately  believed  himself  to  be  attacked  by  it ; 
if  any  one  was  mentioned  as  deranged  in  intellect, 
he  imagined  himself  insane,  and  retired  into  his 
chamber  full  of  melancholy  thoughts  and  inquietude. 
Everything  became  for  him  a subject  of  fear  and 
alarm.  If  he  entered  into  a house,  he  was  afraid 
that  the  floor  would  fall  and  precipitate  him  amid 
its  ruins.  He  could  not  pass  a bridge  without  ter- 
ror, unless  impelled  by  the  sentiment  of  honour  for 
the  purpose  of  fighting.”* 

* Pinal,  as  quoted  in  Combe’s  Phrenology,  Boston  ed.,  p 241 


(i.)  PROPENSITY  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION.  291 

§ 173.  Other  disordered  forms  of  the  Self  preserv- 
ative principle . 

The  Propensity  of  Self-preservation,  or  desire  of 
the  continuance  of  existence*  is  generally,  and,  as 
we  suppose,  very  correctly,  considered  an  original  or 
implanted  principle  of  the  human  mind.  As  such 
it  unquestionably  has  its  distinctive  nature,  adapted 
to  the  precise  object  for  which  it  was  implanted. 
We  must  suppose,  therefore,  that  it  has  a regular  or 
normal  action,  as  well  as  an  irregular  or  abnormal 
one.  And  it  is  deviation  from  the  regular  action 
which  constitutes  irregularity  of  action.  This  ir- 
regularity, therefore,  may  show  itself  either  in  the 
form  of  excess  of  action,  or  of  defect  of  action,  or, 
what  amounts  to  nearly  the  same  thing,  by  too  great 
energy  or  too  great  weakness  of  action.  The  in- 
stance which  has  been  given  from  Pinel  shows  a 
disorder  or  irregularity  of  the  action  of  this  principle 
in  excess.  There  are  other  cases,  which  seem  not 
less  clearly  to  show,  that  the  form  or  shape  of  the 
disorder  may  sometimes  be  that  of  inordinate  weak- 
ness or  defect.  We  shall  proceed  here  to  introduce 
one  or  two  cases  of  this  kind. 

We  find  the  following  statement  in  the  Commen- 
taries on  Insanity  of  Dr.  Burrows  (p.  440) : “ Har- 
riet Cooper,  of  Haden  Hill,  Rowley  Regis,  aged  ten 
years  and  two  months,  upon  being  reproved  for  a 
trifling  indiscretion,  went  up  stairs,  after  exhibiting 
symptoms  of  grief  by  crying  and  sobbing,  and  hung 
herself  in  a pair  of  cotton  braces  from  the  rail  ot  a 
tent-bed  A girl  named  Green,  eleven  years  old, 


292  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

drowned  herself  in  the  New  Iliver,  from  the  fear  of 
correction  for  a trivial  fault.” 

“ A French  journal”  (says  Dr.  Ray,  in  his  valua* 
ble  Treatise  on  Medical  Jurisprudence,  p.  375)  “ has 
lately  reported  the  case  of  a boy  twelve  years  old, 
who  hung  himself  by  fastening  his  handkerchief  to 
a nail  in  the  wall,  and  passing  a loop  of  it  around 
his  neck,  for  no  other  reason  than  because  he  had 
been  shut  up  in  his  room,  and  allowed  only  dry 
bread,  as  a punishment  for  breaking  his  father’s 
watch.  The  same  journal  gives  another  case  of  a 
suicide  committed  by  a boy  eleven  years  old,  for 
being  reproved  by  his  father;  and  several  more  of 
a similar  description  are  also  recorded.”* 

The  records  of  such  cases,  melancholy  as  they 
are,  might  undoubtedly  be  very  much  multiplied. 
We  have  ourselves  known  a lad,  about  fourteen 
years  old,  on  the  occasion,  as  was  supposed,  of 
some  trifling  disquietude  or  offence  similar  to  those 
which  have  just  been  mentioned,  go  out  of  the  shop 
where  he  worked,  and,  in  the  light  and  pleasantness 
of  a summer’s  day,  put  an  end  to  his  life  by  hang- 
ing himself  from  a tree  in  a neighbouring  garden. 

§ 174.  Explanation  of  the  above-mentioned  cases . 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  trace  the  origin  of 
all  such  cases  exclusively  to  some  form  of  disease 
existing  in  the  physical  system  ; to  a disease,  for  in- 
stance, of  the  thoracic  or  abdominal  viscera,  or 
somewhere  else  ; but,  so  far  as  we  have  been  able 
to  perceive,  not  with  entire  satisfaction.  In  many 
* Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  No.  8,  vol.  xxvii.,  p.  212. 


(I.)  PROPENSITY  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION.  293 

cases,  undoubtedly,  the  cause  of  mental  disorder  is 
to  be  sought  in  the  previously  disordered  condition 
of  the  body,  particularly  the  nervous  system ; but 
h does  not  appear  that  this  is  always  the  fact.  Not 
unfrequently,  in  cases  of  suicide,  there  is  no  per- 
ceptible change,  no  morbid  developement  m the 
body,  which  can  furnish  an  explanation  of  that  p 
culiar,  and,  for  the  most  part,  insane  state  of  mind 
which  leads  to  self-destruction.  This  ,s  ac^'  - 
edged,  if  we  may  rely  upon  the  statements  of  . . 

Burrows  in  the  case,  by  a number  of  distinguished 
physicians.  “ The  same”  (says  Burrows,  Comm., 
H 6V‘  is  observed  in  all  cases  of  Insanity  where 
the  patient  dies  from  any  accident  soon  after  he  has 
become  insane.  The  maniacal  action  [by  which  he 
means  the  disorder  existing  mentally]  has  not  had 

time  to  take  deep  root,  and  no  visible  change  m the 

intellectual  organ  [the  brain]  is  i therefore  dete< ite  . 
This  is  additional  testimony,  which  leads  to  the  nat- 
ural inference,  that,  when  morbid  changes  are  dis- 
covered in  the  brain,  they  are  generally  the  come-, 
alienees,  and  not  the  causes  of  menial  derangement. 

9 What  view,  then,  shall  be  taken  of  the  cases 
which  have  just  now  been  mentioned,  and  others 
like  them  1 If  physical  disease,  so  far  as  we  can 
judge,  will  not  account  for  all  of  them,  what  further 
can  be  said!  The  simple  fact  seems  to  be,  that 
frequently,  in  the  instance  of  such  persons,  the  prin- 
ciple of  self-preservation,  which  in  a most  all  cases 
binds  men  so  strongly  to  the  present  life,  either  does 
not  exist  at  all,  or  exists  in  very  much  diminished 
strength.  If  a man  may  be  born  destitute,  in  a great 


294  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

degree,  of  some  of  the  appetites  or  affections,  or  des- 
titute  of  all  powers  of  reasoning,  as  in  the  case  of 
idiots,  why  may  he  not  also  come  into  the  world  with 
the  propensity  of  self-preservation  inordinately  weak, 
so  much  so  as  scarcely  to  have  any  influence  over 
his  actions  ? 

§ 175.  Further  remarks  on  this  subject . 

This  view  is  confirmed  not  only  by  the  considera- 
tion that,  in  many  cases  of  suicide,  medical  philoso- 
phers themselves  being  the  judges,  there  is  no  pre- 
tence at  all  of  there  being  any  disease  or  lesion  of  the 
physical  organs  ; but  also  by  the  fact,  although  this 
circumstance  might  not  of  itself  alone  be  a decisive 
one,  that  the  tendency  to  suicide  appears  frequently 
to  be  hereditary. — “I  have  had  several  members  of 
one  family  under  my  care”  (says  Dr.  Burrows), 
“ where  this  propensity  declared  itself  through  three 
generations.  In  the  first,  the  grandfather  hung  him- 
self ; he  left  four  sons.  One  hung  himself;  an- 
other cut  his  throat ; and  a third  drowned  himself 
in  a most  extraordinary  manner,  after  being  some 
months  insane;  the  fourth  died  a natural  death, 
which,  fiom  his  eccentricity  arid  unequal  mind,  was 
scarcely  to  be  expected.  Two  of  these  sons  had 
large  families.  One  child  of  the  third  son  died  in- 
sane ; two  others  drowned  themselves  ; another  is 
now  insane,  and  has  made  the  most  determinate  at- 
tempts on  his  life. — Several  of  the  progeny  of  this 
family,  being  the  fourth  generation,  who  are  now  ar- 
rived at  puberty,  bear  strong  marks  of  the  same 
fatal  propensity.” 


,j  j PROPENSITY  OF  SELF-PRESERVATION.  295 

Mental  traits  and  peculiarities  are  propagated 
(such  is  the  great  law  of  Providence)  with  nearly  as 
much  certainty,  in  other  words,  with  nearly  as  defi- 
nite reference  to  the  principles  of  propagative  succes- 
sion, as  those  of  the  body.  If  the  parents  exhibit  a 
mental  defect  or  disorder,  the  children  will  be  very 
likely  to  do  the  same.  If  the  parents  are  suicides, 
and  if  the  suicidal  tendency,  as  is  frequently  the  fact, 
has  its  basis  in  undue  weakness  or  estrangement  of 
the  self-preservative  principle,  we  should  not  be  sur- 
prised to  find  the  same  tendency  developing  itself  in 
some  of  their  descendants. 

The  supposition,  then,  which  we  make,  in  refer- 
ence to  such  cases  of  suicide  as  have  been  detailed, 
and  many  others  like  them,  is,  that  the  Propensity  ot 
Self-preservation  is,  naturally  and  by  the  inheritance 
of  birth,  disordered  by  defect ; in  other  words,  inor- 
dinately weak,  so  much  so  as  to  fail  in  fulfilling  the 
ordinary  purposes  of  life.  Consequently,  when 
some  disappointment  arises,  when  some  slight  pun- 
ishment is  inflicted,  when  some  current  of  public 
opinion  sets  against  the  individual,  the  dissatisfaction 
and  melancholy  which  naturally  follow  are  frequently 
found  to  be  too  great  for  the  opposing  and  conserva- 
tive principle  of  self-preservation,  which,  in  their  case, 
is  unfortunately  almost  destitute  of  power.  The 
strong  chain  which  ordinarily  binds  men  to  the  pres- 
ent scene,  is,  in  their  case,  so  exceedingly  weak,  that, 
one  after  another,  they  escape  out  of  life  on  the  very 
slightest  occasions,  and  leave  those  behind  them  to 
weep  and  wonder  at  the  strangeness  of  the  event, 
ft  is  like  what  we  sometimes  witness  in  a time  of 


296  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


storms  and  inundations,  when  those  things  which 
are  but  weakly  moored  in  their  position  are  swept 
away,  and  only  those  which  are  strongly  fastened 
remain. 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES, 
(il.)  PROPENSITY  TO  ACQUIRE  OR  ACQUISITIVENESS. 

§ 176.  The  propensity  to  acquire  an  original  or 
implanted  one. 

So  far  as  we  have  been  able  to  observe,  it  seems 
to  be  at  last  very  generally  conceded  by  writers  on 
the  Human  Mind,  however  much  they  may  differ  on 
other  points,  that  there  is  implanted  within  us  an 
original  disposition  or  propensity  to  acquire.  Nor 
could  we  reasonably  expect  that  it  should  be  other- 
wise. It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a being,  sustain- 
ing in  the  moral  world  the  high  rank  which  man 
does,  and  yet  constituted  on  the  principle  of  an  en- 
tire exclusion  of  the  Possessory  desire.  How  can  a 
rational  being,  in  the  undisturbed  exercise  of  his 
powers,  do  otherwise  than  desire  his  own  existence 
and  happiness;  and,  consequently,  those  things, 
whatever  they  may  be,  which  are  essential  to  his  ex- 
istence and  happiness.  Accordingly,  an  inspired 
apostle  directs  the  Corinthians  not  only  to  “ covet  tc 


(il.)  PROPENSITY  OF  ACQUISITIVENESS. 


297 


prophesy,”  but,  in  general  terms,  “ to  covet  earnestly 
the  best  gifts.”  1 Cor.,  xii.,  31  ; xiv.,  39. 

On  this  topic,  however,  we  need  not  delay.  *ve 
take  it  for  granted  (and  do  not  suppose,  after  the  in- 
quiries that  have  been  made  on  the  subject,  that  it 
will  be  considered  a matter  of  dispute)  that  the  prin- 
ciple in  question  is  a connatural  or  implanted  one. 
Like  all  the  other  propensive  principles  (and  the 
same  view  will  apply  to  the  appetites  and  the  affec- 
tions), the  Acquisitive  or  Possessory  principle  has  a 
twofold  action,  viz.,  instinctive  and  voluntary. 
And  in  both  of  these  forms,  as  we  shall  now  proceed 
to  show,  it  is  susceptible  of  an  abnormal  or  disor- 
dered  movement. 

§ 177.  Instances  of  the  first  hind  or  form  of  disor- 
dered action  of  the  Possessory  Principle. 

The  instances  of  disordered  action  of  the  principle 
of  Acquisitiveness,  which  naturally  present  them- 
selves to  our  notice  first,  are  what  may  be  termed 
Congenital  or  Constitutional ; and  are  evidently  the 
irregular  or  disordered  manifestations  of  the  Instinc- 
tive? rather  than  of  the  Y oluntary  modification  of  this 
propensity.  In  the  case  of  the  persons  to  whom  we 
now  have  reference,  the  disposition  to  get  possession 
of  whatever  can  be  regarded  as  property,  whether  of 
greater  or  less  value,  shows  itself,  not  only  in  great 
strength,  but  at  a very  early  period  of  life.  And  at 
no  period  of  life  does  it  appear  to  be  a matter  over 
which  they  have  a full  voluntary  control. 

There  are  a considerable  number  of  cases  ot  this 
kind  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Gall  and  Spur- 


298  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


zheim  ; and  there  are  some  notices  of  similar  cases  * 
in  a few  other  writers. — Fodere  ( Medicine  Legale,  j 
t.  i.,  p.  237)  relates  the  case  of  a female  servant 
in  his  own  family,  “ who  could  not  help  stealing  se- 
cretly from  himself  and  others  articles  even  of  tri- 
fling value  ; though  she  was  intelligent,  modest,  and  j 
religious,  and  was  all  the  while  conscious  of  and  adr 
mitted  the  turpitude  of  her  actions.  He  placed  her 
in  an  hospital,  considering  her  insane,  and,  after  ap- 
parent restoration  and  a long  trial,  he  again  took  her 
into  his  services.  Gradually,  in  spite  of  herself,  the 
instinct  again  mastered  her ; and  in  the  midst  of  an 
incessant  struggle  between  her  vicious  propensity  on 
the  one  hand  and  a conscientious  horror  of  her  con- 
dition on  the  other,  she  was  suddenly  attacked  with 
mania,  and  died  in  one  of  its  paroxysms. 

Hr.  Rush,  in  his  Medical  Inquiries,  mentions  a 
woman  who  was  entirely  exemplary  in  her  conduct, 
except  in  one  particular.  “ She  could  not  refrain 
from  stealing . What  made  this  vice  the  more  re- 
maikable  was,  that  she  was  in  easy  circumstances,  * 
and  not  addicted  to  extravagance  in  anything.  Such 
was  the  propensity  to  this  vice,  that,  when  she  could 
lay  her  hands  on  nothing  more  valuable,  she  would 
often,  at  the  table  of  a friend,  fill  her  pockets  secretly 
with  bread.  She  both  confessed  and  lamented  her 
crime.’’ 

. * TJ1S  case  is  given  as  it  is  found  in  Dr.  Ray’s  Medical  Ju 
nsprudence,  p.  190.  3 


(il.)  PROPENSITY  OF  ACQUISITIVENESS  29S 


& 178.  Instances  illustrative  of  the  subject  from  Dr. 
Gall. 

Some  of  the  facts  which  are  given  by  Dr.  Gall 
are  as  follows. — “ Yictor  Amadeus  I.,  king  of  Sar- 
dinia, was  in  the  constant  habit  of  stealing  trifles. 
Saurin,  pastor  of  Geneva,  though  possessing  the 
strongest  principles  of  reason  and  religion,  frequently 
yielded  to  the  propensity  to  steal.  Another  individ- 
ual was,  from  early  youth,  a victim  to  this  inclination. 
He  entered  the  military  service,  on  purpose  that  he 
might  be  restrained  by  the  severity  of  the  discipline  ; 
but,  having  continued  his  practices,  he  was  on  the 
point  of  being  condemned  to  be  hanged.  Ever 
seeking  to  combat  his  ruling  passion,  he  studied  the- 
ology and  became  a Capuchin.  But  this  propensity 
followed  him  even  to  the  cloister.  Here,  however, 
as  he  found  only  trifles  to  tempt  him,  he  indulged 
himself  in  his  strange  fancy  with  less  scruple.  He 
seized  scissors,  candlesticks,  snuffers,  cups,  goblets, 
and  conveyed  them  to  his  cell.  An  agent  of  the 
government  at  Vienna  had  the  singular  mania  for 
stealing  nothing  but  kitchen  utensils.  He  hired 
two  rooms  as  a place  of  deposite  ; he  did  not  sell, 
and  made  no  use  of  them.  The  wife  of  the  famous 
physician  Gaubius  had  such  a propensity  to  pilfer, 
that,  when  she  made  a purchase,  she  always  sought 
to  take  something.  The  Countess  M.,  at  Wessel, 
and  P.,  at  Frankfort,  had  also  this  propensity. 
Madame  de  W.  had  been  educated  with  peculiar 
care.  Her  wit  and  talents  secured  her  a distin- 
guished place  in  society.  But  neither  her  education 


300  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

nor  her  fortune  saved  her  from  the  most  decided  pro*  < 
pensity  to  theft.  Lavater  speaks  of  a physician, 
who  never  left  the  room  of  his  patient  without  rob- 
bing them  of  something,  and  who  never  thought  of  1 
the  matter  afterward.  In  the  evening  his  wife  used  j 
to  examine  his  pockets;  she  there  found  keys,  scis- 
sors, thimbles,  knives,  spoons,  buckles,  cases,  and 
sent  them  to  their  respective  owners.”* 

$ 179.  Second  form  of  the  alienated  action  of  the 
Possessoi'y  principle. 

There  is  another,  a second  form  of  the  irregular  j 
and  alienated  action  of  the  Acquisitive  Propensity,  J 
which  differs  from  the  first-mentioned  modification 
in  the  important  circumstance  of  its  depending  more 
upon  the  Will  of  the  person  himself  than  upon  any 
constitutional  or  connatural  trait.  Cases  of  this 
kind,  therefore,  are  voluntary ; that  is  to  say,  are 
brought  about  by  a course  of  action,  the  responsibil- 
ity of  which  rests  upon  the  individual  himself. 

Nor  is  there  anything  inconsistent  with  reason, 
any  philosophical  anomaly  in  this  view.  It  is  well 
known  that  all  the  principles  of  the  mind  rapidly  in- 
crease in  energy  and  facility  of  movement  by  mere 
repetition.  Not  only  this  ; but  the  process  may  be 
carried  so  far  as  to  give  altogether  an  undue  degree 
of  strength  to  some  one  principle  as  compared  with 
another.  In  other  words,  a right  or  healthy  acticn 
of  the  mind  may  in  this  way  be  gradually  converted 
into  an  inordinate,  uncontrollable,  or  unhealthy  ac- 
tion. Such  as  we  see  it  not  unfrequentiy  m garne- 
* Gall’s  Works,  vol.  iv.,  Am.  ed.,  p.  132. 


(II.)  PROPENSITY  OF  ACQUISITIVENESS.  301 

sters,  mercantile  men,  and  in  other  classes  of  persons, 
whose  minds  are  continually  exercised  upon  the  sole 
object  of  increasing  their  possessions. 

Among  the  class  of  confirmed  misers  we  shall  be 
likely,  from  time  to  time,  to  find  instances  and  illus- 
trations of  this  view  of  the  subject.  There  are  in- 
dividuals in  this  denomination  of  persons,  who  have 
so  increased  the  energy  of  the  Possessory  principle 
(Acquisitiveness,  as  it  is  sometimes  conveniently 
termed)  by  a long,  voluntary  course  of  repetition, 
that  its  action  is  obviously  no  longer  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Will,  but  has  passed  over,  not  merely  into 
the  region  of  temporary  disorder,  but  of  positive  and 
permanent  insanity.  Such,  probably,  must  have  been 
the  situation  of  a certain  individual  mentioned  by 
Valerius  Maximus,  who  took  advantage  of  a famine 
to  sell  a mouse  for  two  hundred  pence,  and  then 
famished  himself  with  the  money  in  his  pocket. — It 
is  difficult  to  tell,  however,  although  a person  may 
unquestionably  become  insane  in  his  avarice,  wheth- 
er this  is  actually  the  case  in  any  given  instance,  or 
whether,  notwithstanding  its  intensity,  it  falls  in 
some  degree  short  of  actual  alienation. 

§ 180.  Reference  to  the  singular  case  of  Sir  Harvey 
Elwes. 

The  reader  will  be  able,  probably,  by  consulting 
the  resources  of  his  own  recollection,  to  understand 
the  applications  of  this  subject.  Nevertheless,  we 
take  the  liberty  to  delay  a moment  upon  the  well- 
known  and  somewhat  singular  case  of  Sir  Harvey 
Elwes,  of  Stoke,  in  the  county  of  Suffolk,  England. 


302  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

Sir  Harvey  Elvves  inherited  from  a miserly  mother, 
and  an  uncle  of  the  same  parsimonious  disposition, 
the  large  property  of  £350,000.  This  singular  in- 
dividual, as  is  sometimes  the  case  with  misers,  is 
said  to  have  punctually  discharged  his  obligations 
towards  others,  and  in  some  instances  even  to  have 
conducted  with  liberality  ; but,  in  whatever  concern- 
ed himself,  his  parsimony,  notwithstanding  his  great 
riches,  was  extreme  and  unalterable.  When  trav- 
elling he  accustomed  himself  to  great  abstinence, 
that  he  might  lessen  the  charges  of  his  maintenance  ; 
and  for  the  same  reason  he  supported  his  horse  with 
the  few  blades  of  grass  which  he  could  gather  by  the 
sides  of  hedges  and  in  the  open  commons.  Like 
his  predecessor,  Sir  Harvey,  from  whom  he  seems 
to  have  derived  his  title,  and  who  was  hardly  less 
miserly  than  his  nephew,  he  wore  the  clothes  of 
those  who  had  gone  before  him  ; and  when  his  best 
coat  was  beyond  the  ability  of  any  further  service, 
he  refused  to  replace  it  at  his  own  expense,  but  ac- 
cepted one  from  a neighbour.  He  was  so  saving  of 
fuel,  that  he  took  advantage  of  the  industry  of  the 
crows  in  pulling  down  their  nests  ; and  if  any  friend 
accidentally  living  with  him  were  absent,  he  would 
carefully  put  out  his  fire  and  walk  to  a neighbour’s 
house,  in  order  that  the  same  chimney  might  give 
out  warmth  to  both.  Although  he  never  committed 
any  of  his  transactions  to  writing,  he  could  not  have 
been  ignorant  of  his  immense  wealth ; but  this  did 
not  prevent  his  being  exceedingly  apprehensive  that 
he  should  at  last  die  with  want.  “ Sometimes  hi- 
ding his  gold  in  small  parcels  in  different  parts  01 


(II.)  PROPENSITY  OF  ACQUISITIVENESS.  303 

his  house,  he  would  anxiously  visit  the  spot  to  as- 
certain whether  each  remained  as  he  had  left  it : 
arising  from  bed,  he  would  hasten  to  his  bureau  to 
examine  if  its  contents  were  in  safety.  In  later  life, 
no  other  sentiment  occupied  his  mind  : at  midnight 
he  has  been  heard  as  if  struggling  with  assailants, 
and  crying  out  in  agitation,  ‘ I will  keep  my  money, 

I will ; nobody  shall  rob  me  of  my  property  !’  though 
no  one  was  near  to  disturb  him  in  its  possession. 
At  length  this  remarkable  person  died  in  the  yeai 
1789,  aged  nearly  eighty,  and  worth  nearly  a mill- 
ion.” * 

§ 181.  Reference  to  the  case  of  Jeremiah  Hallet. 

The  case  of  Jeremiah  Hallet,  who  recently  died 
at  Yarmouth,  in  Massachusetts,  at  the  age  of  sixty- 
four,  is  very  similar  in  a number  of  respects  to  the 
foregoing.  If  the  statements  which  were  circulated 
at  the  time  of  his  death  in  the  public  newspapers  are 
correct  (and  we  see  no  reason  to  doubt  them),  he 
was  certainly  a very  eccentric  character. — It  is  re- 
lated of  him  that  his  mind  was  constantly  engrossed 
by  two  subjects,  viz.,  getting  money,  and  the  math- 
ematics. The  first  was  the  business,  the  other  the 
amusement  of  his  life.  He  was  a miser  in  every 
sense  of  the  word  ; living  alone  for  the  last  ten  years 
of  his  life,  and  denying  himself  all  the  luxuries,  and 
many  of  what  are  regarded  the  necessaries  of  life. 
He  lived  upon  the  coarsest  fare  ; and  would  sit  in  his 
room  in  cool  weather  without  a fire,  when  his  wood 

* Origin  and  Progress  of  the  Passions  (Anonymous),  vol.  i.( 
p.  310.  " 

A A 


304  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

was  rotting  in  piles  ; and  a shingle  served  him  for 
the  double  purpose  of  a fireshovel  and  bellows.  It 
is  a confirmatory  evidence  of  the  disordered  state 
of  his  mind,  that  he  committed  suicide,  probably  for 
some  reason  connected  with  the  excited  and  insane 
position  of  the  acquisitive  principle.  After  his  death, 
on  examining  his  rooms,  it  was  found  that  the  whole 
value  of  his  furniture  and  bedding  would  not  exceed 
three  dollars,  and  every  room  was  covered  with  filth 
and  dirt. 

And  yet  this  man  was  profoundly  skilled  in  the 
science  of  numbers,  and  could  boast  of  greater  pro- 
ficiency in  the  higher  branches  of  mathematics  than 
any  man  in  the  part  of  the  country  in  which  he  lived. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

(ill.)  ambition,  or  the  desire  of  power. 

$ 182.  The  desire  of  Power  an  original  or  implant 
ed  principle. 

Another  of  the  Original  Propensities,  if  we  may 
reason  from  the  facts  which  are  almost  constantly 
presented  to  our  notice,  is  the  Desire  of  Power.— It 
is  true,  that  power  is  not  a thing  which  is  directly 
addressed  to  or  cognizable  by  the  outward  senses. 


305 


(ill.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  POWER. 

We  do  not  see  Power  as  we  see  any  extended  ob- 
ject ; nor  do  we  touch  it ; nor  is  it,  properly  speak- 
ing, an  object  of  the  taste  or  of  the  smell.  But,  as 
it  is  itself  an  attribute  of  mind  rather  than  of  mat- 
ter, so  it  is  revealed  to  us  as  an  object  of  percep- 
tion and  knowledge,  by  the  Internal  rather  than  the 
External  Intellect.  Nevertheless,  although  it  is  not 
a thing  which  is  cognizable  by  the  outward  senses, 
it  is  as  much  a reality,  as  much  an  object  of  emo- 
tion and  desire,  as  if  that  were  the  case.  This  being 
the  case,  we  may  with  entire  propriety  speak  of  the 
Desire  of  Power ; for,  wherever  there  is  a thing,  a 
reality,  an  object,  that  object  may,  in  possibility  at 
least,  be  desired  ; but,  on  the  other  hand,  where 
there  is  no  object  before  the  mind,  it  is  not  possible 
for  desire  to  exist. 

In  connexion  with  these  explanatory  remarks  we 
repeat,  what  has  already  been  stated,  that  the  desire 
of  power  is  natural  to  the  human  mind  ; in  other 
words,  it  is  an  original  or  implanted  principle.  Such 
is  the  doctrine  of  Dugald  Stewart ; and  it  is  a view 
of  the  subject  which  at  the  present  time  is  very  gen- 
erally assented  to. 

§ 183.  This  propension , like  others , susceptible  of 
derangement . 

We  will  not  stop  to  enter  into  proofs  of  the  view 
which  has  now  been  presented,  for  that  is  not  our 
appropriate  business  at  present ; but  taking  it  for 
granted  that  such  an  original  principle  exists  in  the 
human  mind,  we  proceed  to  say  that  this  important 
propensity,  like  the  other  propensive  principles,  is 


306  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


susceptible  of  a disordered  and  insane  action.— 
And  why  should  it  not  be  so?  Men  place  Power 
before  them  in  its  various  forms  of  authority,  hon- 
our, high  office,  titled  dignity,  and  the  like,  as  a 
specific  and  brilliant  object  of  contemplation  and 
pursuit.  This  great  object,  whatever  the  particular 
shape  in  which  it  presents  itself,  they  behold  con- 
stantly with  an  excited  heart  and  a constrained  eye, 
till  the  corresponding  Desire,  strengthened  by  con- 
stant repetition,  becomes  the  predominant  feeling. 
If  the  desire  increases  beyond  a certain  point,  as  it 
is  very  likely  to  do  under  such  circumstances,  the 
excess  of  its  action  cannot  fail  to  interfere  with  the 
appropriate  action  of  other  parts  of  the  mind  ; and 
the  result  is  in  all  cases  a state  of  disorder,  often 
existing  in  the  specific  form  of  insanity. 

The  leading  characteristic  of  a sane  and  well-or- 
dered mind,  as  is  well  understood,  is  a harmony  of 
all  its  parts.  But  such  harmony  does  not  exist,  and 
no  approximation  to  harmony,  when  any  one  princi- 
ple becomes  so  strong,  so  overbearingly  dominant, 
as  to  suppress  and  trample  on  all  the  rest.  The  prin- 
ciple under  consideration  may,  by  a gradual  increase 
and  exercise,  become  so  powerful  (and  who  can  say 
that  this  was  not  the  fact  even  in  the  case  of  such 
men  as  Julius  Caesar,  Napoleon,  and  others  of  that 
class  ?)  as  to  bring  the  Will  itself,  which  is  the  great 
regulating  principle  of  the  mind,  into  subjection. 
And  such  complete  subjection,  too,  that  persons  in 
this  situation  can  no  more  be  accounted  persons  of 
truly  free  and  sane  minds  than  the  drunkard  can, 
mentioned  by  Dr.  Rush,  whose  appetite  was  such, 


307 


(ill.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  POWER. 

that  cannon  balls  discharged  between  him  and  his 
liquor  could  not  prevent  his  rushing  after  it. 

^ 184.  Results  of  a disappointed  love  of  Power. 

And  this  is  not  all ; nor  the  only  point  of  view  in 
which  the  subject  is  to  be  contemplated.  If  the 
aspiring  and  ambitious  tendency,  when  it  has  in- 
creased in  strength  to  a high  degree,  is  suddenly  and 
greatly  disappointed,  as  it  is  very  likely  to  be,  the 
reaction  upon  the  whole  mind  may  be  such  as  to 
cause  disorder  in  all  its  functions,  and  leave  it  a 
wide  mass  of  ruins. 

The  history  of  those  who  are  confined  in  Insane 
Hospitals  furnishes  a strong  presumption  that  such 
results  are  not  unfrequent.  Although  the  mind  is 
deranged,  the  predominant  feeling  which  led  to  the 
derangement  seems  still  to  remain.  One  individ- 
ual challenges  for  himself  the  honours  of  a chancel- 
lor, another  of  a king ; one  is  a member  of  Parlia- 
ment, another  is  the  lord-mayor  of  London ; one, 
under  the  name  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  or  Bo- 
naparte, claims  to  be  the  commander  of  mighty  ar- 
mies|  another  announces  himself  with  the  tone  and 
attitude  of  a prophet  of  the  Most  High.  Pinel  in- 
forms us  that  there  were  at  one  time  no  less  than 
three  maniacs  in  one  of  the  French  Insane  Hospi- 
ta  s*  each  of  whom  assumed  to  be  Louis  XIV . On 
one  occasion  these  individuals  were  found  disputing 
with  each  other,  with  a great  degree  of  energy,  their 
respective  rights  to  the  throne.  The  dispute  was 
terminated  by  the  sagacity  of  the  superintendent, 
who,  approaching  one  of  them,  gave  him,  with  a se- 


308  disorder  of  I he  propensities. 

rious  look,  to  understand  that  he  ought  not  to  dis* 
pute  on  the  subject  with  the  others,  since  they  were 
obviously  mad.  Is  it  not  well  known”  (said  the 
superintendent)  “ that  you  alone  ought  to  be  ac- 
knowledged as  Louis  XIV.  V9  The  insane  person, 
flattered  with  this  homage,  cast  upon  his  compan- 
ions a look  of  the  most  marked  disdain,  and  imme- 
diately retired. 

§ 185.  Additional  illustrations  of  this  subject 

Dr.  Gall  has  given  an  account  of  an  individual, 
in  whom  undoubtedly  the  passions  of  self-esteem 
and  pride  were  somewhat  marked,  but  who  seems 
equally  well,  and  perhaps  in  a higher  degree,  to  fur- 
nish an  illustration  of  the  inordinate  exercise  of  the 
principle  before  us.  He  speaks  of  this  individual 
as  a person  who,  in  childhood,  could  never  get  fa- 
miliar with  his  companions,  nor  in  adult  age  with 
his  equals.  During  a long-continued  illness,  re- 
sulting from  a blow  on  his  head,  he  exhibited  his 
predominant  traits  in  a still  higher  degree ; so  much 
so,  that  if  he  could  not  be  considered  insane  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  the  term,  he  certainly  couldP  not 
be  considered  a person  of  a perfectly  sound  mind. 
Among  other  things  indicative  of  his  peculiar  state 
of  mind,  it  is  remarked  of  him,  that  “ he  treated  his 
superiors  like  subordinates,  and  wrote  them  letters 
in  a laconic  imperative  style,  ofdering  them  to  yield 
this  or  that  favour  or  distinction.”* 

Mr.  Locke  also,  in  his  Letters  on  Toleration, 
gives  some  notice  of  an  individual  of  an  ambitious 
* Gall’s  Works,  Boston  ed.,  vol.  iv  , p.  178. 


309 


(ill.)  TIIE  DESIRE  OF  POWER 

temperament,  whose  mind  was  so  long  and  earnestly 
fixed  on  some  high  object  that  he  became  insane. 

§ 186.  Of  this  form  of  Insanity  in  connexion  with 
particular  periods  of  society. 

During  the  tremendous  events  of  the  first  French 
Revolution,  and  for  some  subsequent  years,  when, 
in  consequence  of  the  great  disorganization  of  civil 
and  political  principles  and  precedents,  the  way  was 
open  to  the  indulgence  and  the  attainment  of  splen- 
did hopes,  the  desire  of  Power  (the  ambitious  prin- 
ciple, as  we  may,  perhaps,  conveniently  term  it)  was 
called  into  frequent  and  energetic  exercise : so  much 
so  as  to  authorize  the  assertion,  by  well-informed 
persons,  that  the  cases  of  insanity  occurring  during 
that  period  took  their  character  in  a very  marked 
degree  from  this  state  of  things.  Superior  to  va- 
rious other  influences  which  sometimes  disorder  the 
human  mind,  they  nevertheless  went  mad  with  Am- 
bition. Accordingly,  if  a person  entered  the  lunatic 
establishments  of  that,  country  during  the  period  in 
question,  he  found,  in  the  language  of  Dr.  Conolly, 
a great  proportion  of  the  male  patients  believing 
“ themselves  to  be  persons  of  great  importance, 
mayors,  prefects,  directors  of  France,  generals,  mar- 
shals, kings,  or  emperors,  possessing  vast  territories, 
or  extensive  influence,  or  wealth  which  nothing  can 

exhaust.”  * 

Some,  it  seems,  took  a higher  bound  than  this, 
and,  like  Alexander,  who,  in  the  intoxication  of  suc- 
cess, claimed  to  be  descended  from  Jupiter  Ammon, 
were  not  satisfied  with  anything  short  of  the  ac- 


310  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

knowledgrnent  of  their  divine  lineage.  One  of  the 
patients  confined  at  Charenton  defended  his  claim 
to  a divine  origin  in  a letter  addressed  to  one  of  his 
attendants.  Considering  the  source  from  which  it 
comes,  and  the  light  which  it  throws  upon  insane 
mental  action,  it  will  repay  an  insertion  in  this  place 
The  letter  is  as  follows  : 

“ Sir, — I cannot  conceal  from  you  my  extreme 
astonishment  on  learning  that  the  cause  of  my  de- 
tention at  Charenton  is  a suspicion  of  madness,  on 
account  of  my  declaring  myself  to  be  the  son  of 
Jupiter.  Very  well ! You  may  convince  yourself 
of  it  by  accompanying  me  to  Olympus.  Do  you 
think  that,  if  I were  a man  of  ordinary  birth,  1 
should  possess  all  those  scientific  attainments  which 
adorn  my  mind  and  my  heart  with  all  the  flowers 
of  the  sublimest  eloquence  1 Do  you  think  I could 
have  related,  with  such  vehement,  impetuous,  war- 
like audacity,  the  high  transactions  of  all  the  repub- 
lics of  Greece  and  Rome  ? And  could  I have  re- 
stored to  the  Iliad  its  previous  colouring,  as  it  sprung 
from  the  genius  of  Kanki,  who  lived  many  millions 
of  ages  before  the  deluge  of  Ogyges  1 

“ A second  hour  sufficed  me  to  make  an  epopee, 
embracing  the  universal  history  of  Greece  and 
Rome,  and  of  this  great  and  generous  France ; the 
same  space  of  time  to  execute  a painting  of  im- 
mense and  prodigious  dimensions.  I think  I have 
sufficiently  vindicated  my  birth,  and  sufficiently  es- 
tablished that  Jupiter  is  my  father,  and  the  divine 
Juno  my  tender  mother.  I therefore  beg,  sir,  that 
you  will  have  the  goodness  to  intercede  for  me,  to 


(iv.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  311 

restore  me  to  my  family  and  to  my  divine  parents. 
I shall  cherish  a divine  gratitude  for  this  favour ; a 
gratitude  eternal  as  the  life  of  the  gods.”* 


CHAPTER  Y. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  TPIE  PROPENSITIES. 

(IV.)  IMITATIVENESS,  OR  THE  PROPENSITY  TO  IMI- 
TATION. 

§ 187.  Evidence  of  the  existence  of  this  principle. 

We  next  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  Imita- 
tiveness, or  the  Propensity  to  Imitation.  The  proof 
that  there  is  in  man  a principle  of  Imitation,  which 
impels  him  to  do  as  others  do,  is  so  abundant  as 
probably  to  leave  no  reasonable  doubt  upon  the  can- 
did mind.  We  find  evidence  of  it,  not  only  in  chil- 
dren, whose  principal  business  it  seems  to  be  to  re- 
peat whatever  they  see  others  do,  but  also  in  men, 
who  exhibit,  as  a general  thing,  a strong  tendency  to 
do  as  their  fathers  have  done  before  them.  This  is 
an  important  principle  of  our  nature  ; much  more  so 
than,  at  first  sight,  would  seem  to  be  the  case.  If  we 
examine  it  in  its  various  influences  and  relations,  it 
will  be  found  one  of  the  great  supports  of  society ; 
and  if  not  directly,  yet  indirectly,  a source  of  knowl- 
edge, happiness,  and  power. 

* Conolly’s  Inquiry,  Lond.  ed.,  p.  357. 


312  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

This  important  principle,  like  all  the  other  pro* 
pensities,  is  liable  to  occasional  disorders.  In  some 
individuals  it  is  found  to  exhibit,  as  compared  with 
its  ordinary  operation  and  character,  a decidedly 
irregular  or  diseased  action. — Cabanis  makes  men- 
tion of  an  individual,  in  whom  this  tendency  existed 
in  a very  high  degree  ; so  much  so,  that,  when  he 
was  hindered  from  yielding  to  its  impulses,  “ he  ex- 
perienced insupportable  suffering.” — Pinel,  as  he  is 
quoted  by  Dr.  Gall,  speaks  of  an  idiot  woman, 
“ who  had  an  irresistible  propensity  to  imitate  all 
that  she  saw  done  in  her  presence.  She  repeats, 
instindivehj , all  she  hears,  and  imitates  the  gestures 
and  actions  of  others  with  the  greatest  fidelity,  and 
without  troubling  herself  with  any  regard  to  pro- 
priety.”* 

§ 188.  Explanations  in  relation  to  sympathetic  Im- 
itation. 

There  is  a peculiar  form  of  disordered  Imitation, 
generally  known  in  philosophical  writers  under  the 
denomination  of  sympathetic  imitation,  which  is 
particularly  worthy  of  attention.  Of  this  we  shall 
now  proceed  to  give  some  account. 

It  is  implied,  in  the  first  place,  in  all  cases  of  Sym- 
pathetic Imitation,  that  there  is  more  than  one  per- 
son concerned  in  them  ; and  it  exists  in  general,  in 
the  highest  degree,  when  the  number  of  persons  is 
considerable.  Some  one  or  more  of  these  individ- 
uals is  strongly  agitated  by  some  internal  emotion, 
desire,  or  passion  ; and  this  inward  agitation  is  ex* 
* Gall’s  Works,  Am.  ed.,  vol.  i.,  p.  320. 


(iv.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  313 

pressed  by  the  countenance,  gestures,  or  other  ex- 
ternal signs. 

In  the  second  place,  there  is  a communication  of 
such  agitation  of  the  mind  to  others ; they  experi- 
ence, as  is  generally  the  case  when  we  witness  the 
external  signs  of  strong  feeling,  similar  emotions, 
desires,  and  passions.  And  these  new  exercises  of 
soul  are  expressed  on  the  part  of  the  sympathetic 
person  by  similar  outward  signs. — In  a single  word, 
when  we  are  under  the  influence  of  this  form  of  im- 
itation, we  both  act  and  feel  as  others.  There  is 
an  imitation  of  the  feelings  as  well  as  of  action,  a 
sympathy  of  the  mind  as  well  as  of  the  body. 

§ 189.  Familiar  instances  of  Sijmpathetic  Imitation. 

Abundance  of  instances  (many  of  them  frequent 
and  familiar)  show  the  existence  of  sympathetic 
imitation  ; in  other  words,  that  there  is  in  human 
feelings,  and  in  the  signs  of  those  feelings,  a power 
of  contagious  communication,  by  which  they  often 
spread  themselves  rapidly  from  one  to  another. 

“In  general, it  may  be  remarked”  (says  Mr.  Stew- 
art), “ that  whenever  we  see,  in  the  countenance  of 
another  individual,  any  sudden  change  of  features  ; 
more  especially  such  a change  as  is  expressive  of 
any  particular  passion  or  emotion,  our  own  counte- 
nance has  a tendency  to  assimilate  itself  to  his. 
Every  man  is  sensible  of  this  when  he  looks  at  a 
person  under  the  influence  of  laughter  or  in  a deep 
melancholy.  Something,  too,  of  the  same  kind 
takes  place  in  that  spasm  of  the  muscles  of  the  jaw 
which  we  experience  in  vawning ; an  action  which 


314  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

is  well  known  to  be  frequently  excited  by  the  conta- 
gious power  of  example.  Even  when  we  conceive , 
in  solitude,  the  external  expression  of  any  passion, 
the  effect  of  the  conception  is  visible  in  our  own  ap- 
pearance. This  is  a fact  of  which  every  person 
must  be  conscious,  who  attends,  in  his  own  case,  to 
the  result  of  the  experiment ; and  it  is  a circum- 
stance which  has  been  often  remarked  with  respect 
to  historical  painters,  when  in  the  act  of  transferring 
to  the  canvass  the  glowing  pictures  of  a creative  im- 
agination.”* 

To  these  statements,  illustrative  of  sympathetic 
imitation,  may  be  added  the  fact  that,  if  there  are 
a number  of  children  together,  and  one  of  them  sud- 
denly gives  way  to  tears  and  sobs,  it  is  generally 
the  case  that  all  the  rest  are  more  or  less  affected  in 
the  same  manner.  Another  case,  illustrative  of  the 
same  natural  principle,  is  that  of  a mob,  when  they 
gaze  at  a dancer  on  the  slack-rope.  They  seem  not 
only  to  be  filled  with  the  same  anxiety  which  we 
may  suppose  to  exist  in  the  rope-dancer  himself,  but 
they  naturally  writhe,  and  twist,  and  balance  their 
own  bodies  as  they  see  him  do.  It  has  also  been 
frequently  remarked,  that,  when  we  see  a stroke 
aimed  and  just  ready  to  fall  upon  the  leg  or  arm  of 
another  person,  we  naturally  shrink,  and  slightly 
draw  back  our  own  leg  or  arm,  with  a sort  of  pro- 
phetic or  anticipative  imitation  of  the  person  on 
whom  the  blow  is  about  to  be  inflicted.  Hysterical 
paroxysms  are  said  to  have  been  sometimes  produ- 
ced at  witnessing  the  exhibition  of  the  pathetic  parts 
* Stewart’s  Elements,  vol.  iii.,  chap.  ii. 


(JV.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  315 

of  a drama.  And  even  the  convulsions  of  epilepsy 
have  been  excited  by  the-  mere  sight  of  a person  af- 
flicted with  them. 

§ 190.  Of  Sympathetic  Imitation  in  large  multi - 

tildes. 

It  has  been  often  noticed,  that  the  power  of  sym- 
pathetic imitation  has  been  rendered  intense,  nearly 
in  proportion  to  the  numbers  assembled  together.— 
In  a large  army,  if  the  voice  of  triumph  and  joy  be 
raised  in  a single  column,  it  immediately  extends 
through  the  whole.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a single 
column  be  struck  with  panic,  and  exhibit  external 
signs  of  terror  by  flight  or  otherwise,  the  whole  army 
is  likely  to  become  rapidly  infected.  The  tremen- 
dous power  of  the  mobs,  which  are  often  collected 
in  large  cities,  may  be  explained  in  part  on  the  same 
principle.  The  dark  cloud  that  is  standing  upon 
the  brow  of  one,  is  soon  seen  to  gather  in  dark- 
ness on  the  brow  of  his  neighbour  ; and  thus  to  prop- 
agate itself  rapidly  in  every  direction,  till  one  univer- 
sal gloom  of  vengeance  settles  broadly  and  blackly 
upon  the  moving  sea  of  the  multitude. 

Similar  results  are  sometimes  witnessed  in  large 
deliberative  assemblies.  The  art  of  the  orator  in- 
troduces a common  feeling,  which  glows  simultane- 
ously in  their  bosoms.  Soon  some  one,  either  sus- 
tained by  weaker  nerves  or  under  the  influence  of 
stronger  internal  impulses,  gives  signs  of  bodily.ag- 
itation.  Those  who  sit  nearest  will  probably  next 
imbibe  the  contagion,  which  spreads  and  increases 
until  the  whole  assembly  is  in  a tumult.  The 


316  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


spread  of  this  sympathetic  communication  will  be 
particularly  rapid  if  the  first  instances  of  emotion 
and  action  are  of  a decided  and  strong  character. — 
The  statements  which  have  been  made  are  matters 
of  common  observation,  and  can  hardly  be  supposed 
to  have  escaped  the  notice  of  any.  But  there  are 
various  other  facts  on  record  of  a less  common  char- 
acter, although  involving  essentially  the  same  prin- 
ciples ; some  of  which  we  shall  now  proceed  to  men- 
tion. 

§ 191.  Of  the  Jlnimal  Magnetism  of  M.  Mesner 
in  connexion  with  this  subject . 

About  the  year  1784,  M.  Mesner,  of  Vienna, 
professed  to  perform  various  and  important  cures 
by  what  he  called  animal  magnetism.  As  this  new 
mode  of  healing  was  introduced  into  France,  and 
much  interest  was  felt  on  the  subject,  Louis  the 
Sixteenth  appointed  a number  of  persons  to  exam- 
ine into  it ; among  whom  were  Lavoisier,  Badly, 
and  Dr.  Franklin,  at  that  time  American  minister 
at  Paris.  On  inquiry,  it  appeared  that  it  was  com- 
mon in  the  process  to  assemble  a considerable  num- 
ber of  patients  together.  The  patients  were  placed 
round  a circular  box  or  bucket  of  oak,  the  lid  of 
which  was  pierced  with  a number  of  holes,  through 
which  there  issued  moveable  and  curved  branches 
of  iron.  These  branches  were  to  be  applied  by 
the.  patient  to  the  diseased  part.  The  commission- 
ers, who  were  witnesses  to  these  proceedings,  found 
that  no  effect  was  produced  at  first.  The  patients 
usually  sat  an  hour,  and  sometimes  two,  before  the 
crisis  came  on  ; being,  connected  with  each  other 


(IV.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  317 

meanwhile  by  means  of  a cord  passed  round  their 
bodies.  At  length  some  one,  wearied  and  nervous, 
and  with  feelings  evidently  much  excited,  was 
thrown  into  extraordinary  convulsions ; and  in  a 
short  time  the  whole  body  of  patients  became  sim- 
ilarly affected.  in  a greater  or  less  degree.  But  the 
commissioners  themselves,  after  having  witnessed 
these  singular  results,  consented  to  become  the  sub- 
jects of  these  experiments  in  their  own  persons. 
But  they  testify  that  no  effect  was  produced  upon 
them.  They  also  aver,  when  the  process  was  gone 
through  on  persons  alone,  the  same  effects  were  not 
produced  as  when  a number  were  together,  provided 
the  attempt  were  made  for  the  first  time.  In  the 
following  extract  they  seem  to  attribute  the  results 
partly  to  imagination  and  partly  to  sympathy ; that 
is  to  say,  to  Sympathetic  Imitation. 

“ The  magnetism,  then”  (the  commissioners  re- 
mark), “ or,  rather,  the  operations  of  the  imagination, 
are  equally  discoverable  at  the  theatre,  in  the  camp, 
and  in  all  numerous  assemblies,  as  at  the  bucket ; 
acting,  indeed,  by  different  means,  but  producing 
similar  effects.  The  bucket  is  surrounded  with  a 
crowd  of  patients ; the  sensations  are  continually 
communicated  and  recommunicated  ; the  nerves  are 
at  last  worn  out  with  this  exercise,  and  the  woman 
of  most  sensibility  in  the  company  gives  the  signal. 
In  the  mean  time,  the  men  who  are  witnesses  of 
these-  emotions  partake  of  them  in  proportion  to 
their  nervous  sensibility ; and  those  with  whom  this 
sensibility  is  greatest  and  most  easily  excited,  be- 
come themselves  the  subjects  of  a crisis. 


318  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


“ This  irritable  disposition,  partly  i.atural  and 
partly  acquired,  becomes  in  each  sex  habitual. 
The  sensations  having  been  felt  once  or  oftener 
nothing  is  now  necessary  but  to  recall  the  memory 
of  them,  and  to  exalt  the  imagination  to  the  same 
degree  in  order  to  operate  the  same  effects.  The 
public  process  is  no  longer  necessary.  You  have 
only  to  conduct  the  linger  and  the  rod  of  iron  be- 
fore the  countenance,  and  to  repeat  the  accustomed 
ceremonies.  In  many  cases  the  experiment  suc- 
ceeds, even  when  the  patient  is  blindfolded,  and, 
without  any  actual  exhibitions  of  the  signs,  is  made 
to  believe  that  they  are  repeated  as  formerly.  The 
ideas  are  re-excited  ; the  sensations  are  reproduced  ; 
while  the  imagination,  employing  its  accustomed  in- 
struments, and  resuming  its  former  routes,  gives 
birth  to  the  same  phenomena.”* 

§ 192.  Instances  of  Sympathetic  Imitation  at  the 
poorhouse  of  Haerlem, 

Multitudes  of  other  facts,  equally  well  attested, 
show  the  sympathetic  connexion  between  mind  and 
mind,  and  the  sympathy  between  the  mind  and  the 
nervous  and  muscular  system.  Few  are  more  in- 
teresting and  decisive  than  what  is  stated  to  have 
occurred  at  Haerlem  under  the  inspection  of  Boer- 
have. — “In  the  house  of  charity  at  Haerlem”  (says 
the  account),  “ a girl,  under  the  impression  of  terror, 
fell  into  a convulsive  disease,  which  returned  in  reg- 
ular paroxysms.  One  of  the  by-standers,  intent 

* Rapports  des  Commissaires  charges  par  le  Roi,  de  l’Exa 
men  du  Magnetisme  Animal  (as  quoted  by  Stewart) 


(iV.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  319 

upon  assisting  her,  was  seized  with  a similar  fit,  which 
also  recurred  at  intervals  ; and,  on  the  day  follow- 
ing, another  was  attacked ; then  a third,  and  a 
fourth  ; in  short,  almost  the  whole  of  the  children, 
both  girls  and  boys,  were  afflicted  with  these  con- 
vulsions. No  sooner  was  one  seized,  than  the  sight 
brought  on  the  paroxysm  in  almost  all  the  rest  at 
the  same  time.  Under  these  distressing  circum- 
stances, the  physicians  exhibited  all  the  powerful 
antepileptic  medicines  with  which  their  art  furnished 
them,  but  in  vain.  They  then  applied  to  Boerhave, 
who,  compassionating  the  wretched  condition  of  the 
poor  children,  repaired  to  Haerlem  ; and,  while  he 
was  inquiring  into  the  matter,  one  of  them  was  seiz- 
ed with  a fit,  and  immediately  he  saw  several  others 
attacked  with  a species  of  epileptic  convulsion.  It 
presently  occurred  to  this  sagacious  physician,  that, 
as  the  best  medicines  had  been  skilfully  administer- 
ed, and  as  the  propagation  of  the  disease  from  one 
to  another  appeared  to  depend  on  imagination  [the 
sympathy  of  imagination],  by  preventing  this  im- 
pression upon  the  mind  the  disease  might  be  cured ; 
and  his  suggestion  was  successfully  adopted.  Hav- 
ing previously  apprized  the  magistrates  of  his  views, 
he  ordered,  in  the  presence  of  all  the  children,  that 
several  portable  furnaces  should  be  placed  in  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  chamber,  containing  burning  coals, 
and  that  irons,  bent  to  a certain  form,  should  be 
placed  in  the  furnaces ; and  then  he  gave  these  far- 
ther commands  : that  all  medicines  would  be  totally 
useless,  and  the  only  remedy  with  which  he  was 
acquainted  was,  that  the  first  who  should  be  seized 
B B 


320  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

with  a fit,  whether  boy  or  girl,  must  be  burned  in  the 
arm  to  the  very  bone  by  a red-hot  iron.  He  spoke 
this  with  uncommon  dignity  and  gravity ; and  the 
children,  terrified  at  the  thoughts  of  this  cruel  rem- 
edy, when  they  perceived  any  tendency  to  the  re- 
currence of  the  paroxysm,  immediately  exerted  all 
their  strength  of  mind,  and  called  up  the  horrid  idea 
of  the  burning ; and  were  thus  enabled,  by  the 
stronger  mental  impression,  to  resist  the  influence 
of  the  morbid  propensity.” 

§ 193.  Other  instances  of  this  species  of  imitation . 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  multiply  cases  similar 
to  those  which  have  been  mentioned.  A few  years 
since,  there  was  a man  in  Chelmsford,  Massachu- 
setts, who  had  a family  of  six  children,  one  of  whom 
became  affected  with  the  chorea  or  St.  Yitus’s 
dance.  The  others,  in  the  indulgence  of  that 
thoughtless  gayety  which  is  natural  to  children, 
amused  themselves  with  imitating  his  odd  gestures, 
until,  after  a time,  they  were  irresistibly  affected  in 
the  same  way.  At  this  sfate  of  filings,  which  seems 
to  be  susceptible  of  an  explanation  in  no  other  way 
than  on  the  principles  of  sympathetic  imitation,  the 
family,  as  may  naturally  be  supposed,  were  in  great 
affliction.  The  father,  a man  of  some  sagacity  as 
well  as  singularity  of  humour,  brought  into  the  house 
a block  and  axe,  and  solemnly  threatened  to  take  off 
the  head  of  the  first  child  who  should  hereafter  exhibit 
any  involuntary  bodily  movements,  except  the  child 
originally  diseased.  By  this  measure,  which  pro- 
ceeded on  the  same  view  of  the  human  mind  as  th? 


(iv.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  321 

experiment  of  Boerhave  just  mentioned,  a new  train 
of  feeling  was  excited,  and  the  spell  was  broken.* 

It  may  be  added,  that  not  only  those  in  the  same 
family  and  in  the  same  building  have  been  seized, 
but  the  contagion  has  sometimes  spread  from  one  to 
another  (by  the  mere  influence  of  sympathetic  imi- 
tation, as  we  suppose),  over  whole  towns,  and  even 
large  districts  of  country.  This  was  the  case  in  a 
part  of  the  island  of  Anglesey  in  1796  ; and  still 
later  in  this  country,  in  some  parts  of  Tennessee. 
When  the  disease  appeared  in  Tennessee,  which 
was  essentially  of  the  nature  of  the  chorea,  al- 
though it  had  its  origin  in  connexion  with  religious 
excitement,  it  is  the  statement  of  a writer  who  seems 
to  have  had  good  opportunities  of  information  (Felix 
Robertson,  of  Tennessee,  author  of  an  Essay  on 
Chorea  Sancti  Vitij,  “ that  it  spread  with  rapidity, 
through  the  medium  of  the  principle  of  imitation. 
Thus^it  was  not  uncommon  for  an  affected  person 
to  communicate  it  to  a greater  part  of  a crowd,  who, 
from  curiosity  or  other  motives,  had  collected  around 
him.”  "I" 

§ 194.  Additional  and  striking  facts  on  this  subject. 

This  subject,  which,  after  what  has  been  said,  we 
shall  certainly  be  justified  in  considering  a very  im- 
portant one,  might  be  pursued  to  much  greater 
length.  We  shall  dismiss  it,  however,  with  a very 
few  facts  and  remarks  more. 

A few  years  since  a female  in  France,  Hemiette 

* Powers's  Essay  on  the  Influence  of  the  Imagination  p.  32 

+ See  Edinburgh  Med.  and  Surg.  Journal,  vol.  iu.,  p.  44b. 


322  DISORDER  OP  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

Cornier,  under  the  influence,  probably,  of  an  insane 
impulse,  put  to  death  a young  child,  of  which  she 
had  always  appeared  to  be  fond.  She  made  no  at- 
tempt to  escape  or  defend  herself  after  having  com- 
mitted the  deed,  but  calmly,  and  even  with  indiffer- 
ence, awaited  her  arrest.  The  conduct  of  this  un- 
fortunate woman,  and  the  trial  which  took  place,  oc- 
cupied much  of  public  attention,  and  caused  a gen- 
eral and  deep  sensation. — At  a sitting  of  the  French 
Academy  of  Medicine,  which  took  place  soon  after, 
M.  Esquirol  made  the  statement,  which  cannot  well 
be  explained  except  in  connexion  with  the  principle 
under  consideration,  that  six  cases  had  occurred  of 
persons  having  been  seized  with  the  propensity  to 
destroy  their  children  since  the  trial  of  Henriette 
Cornier  for  a similar  crime. 

At  the  same  meeting  of  the  Academy,  M.  Costel 
made  a statement,  in  connexion  with  the  same  sub- 
ject, which  is  still  more  to  our  present  purpose.  He 
stated  that  a soldier  at  the  Hotel  des  Invalides  hung 
himself  on  a certain  post.  In  a very  short  time  af- 
terward twelve  other  invalid  soldiers  hung  themselves 
in  the  same  place.  And  the  suicidal  epidemic  was 
stopped  only  by  removing  the  post. 

It  is  stated  that  thirteen  hundred  people  destroyed 
themselves  at  Versailles  in  the  year  1793  ; a fact 
which  finds  its  explanation  partly  in  the  atrocities  of 
that  remarkable  period,  and  partly  in  the  strong  ten- 
dencies of  the  principle  under  examination.  In  the 
year  1806,  sixty  persons  destroyed  themselves  in 
the  city  of  Rouen  in  the  months  of  June  and  July; 
an  event  striking  as  it  was  melancholy,  and  which 


323 


(IV.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION. 

cannot  well  be  explained,  except  in  connexion  with 
the  same  principle.  In  1813,  in  the  little  village  of 
St.  Pierre  Monjau,  in  the  Yalais,  one  woman  hung 
herself;  and  it  is  stated  that  many  others  followed 
her  example.  So  that  it  required  the  interposition 
of  the  civil  authorities  to  prevent  the  spreading  of 
this  suicidal  contagion. 

Says  Dr.  Burrows,  in  connexion  with  these  and 
other  similar  statements,  “ There  is  also  a favourite 
method,  or  a fashion  in  the  choice  of  death  some- 
times prevailing.  When  a person  of  note  has  rush- 
ed on  a voluntary  death,  the  majority  of  succeeding 
suicides  will  be  marked  by  the  selection  of  a similar 
instrument  or  mode  of  immolation,  whethei  it  be  a 
halter,  a pistol,  a razor,  or  by  drowning,  or  by  as- 
phyxia from  the  fumes  of  carbon,  which  is  now 
common  in  France.”* 

§ 195.  Application  of  these  vieivs  to  the  Witchcraft 
Delusion  in  New- England. 

The  doctrines  of  this  chapter  furnish,  in  part  at 
least,  an  explanation  of  the  witchcraft  delusion  which 
prevailed  in  New-England  about  the  year  1690.  In 
the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  recollected  that  the  exist- 
ence of  witches  and  wizards,  possessing  a powerful 
but  invisible  agency,  was  a part  of  the  popular  creed, 
and  was  generally  and  fully  believed.  It  is  further 
to  be  recollected,  that  the  people  were,  as  a general 
thing,  very  ignorant  at  that  time,  a state  of  mind  ex- 
ceedingly favourable  to  any  superstition  or  delusion 
of  that°sort ; and  also  that  their  minds  were  kept  in 
* Commentaries  on  Insanity,  p.  438. 


324  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

a state  of  constant  and  high  excitation,  not  only  m 
consequence  of  living  scattered  abioaa  and  remote 
from  each  other,  but  by  residing,  in  many  cases,  in 
the  midst  of  dense  and  dark  forests. 

Under  these  circumstances,  certain  individuals, 
under  the  influence  of  some  form  of  nervous  dis- 
ease, as  we  have  already  suggested  and  explained 
in  a former  chapter,  became  affected  with  pains  in 
certain  parts  of  the  body,  resembling  the  pain  occa- 
sioned by  the  pricking  of  pins,  or  by  sudden  and 
heavy  blows ; and  in  some  cases  became  subject  to 
certain  involuntary  motions  of  the  body,  similar  to 
those  of  the  chorea  or  St.  Yitus’s  dance.  Of 
course,  in  accordance  with  the  common  belief,  those 
mysterious  personages,  popularly  denominated  witch- 
es, were  at  their  work  ; and  the  whole  country  was 
at  once  thrown  into  a ferment.  It  is  not  easy  to 
conceive  a more  favourable  basis  than  this  for  the 
operations  of  the  powerful  principle  of  Sympathetic 
Imitation,  The  few  cases  of  nervous  and  muscu- 
lar disease  which  existed  at  first,  were  rapidly  prop- 
agated and  multiplied  on  every  side ; and,  as  the 
popular  belief  ascribed  them  to  the  agency  of  Satan, 
manifested  in  the  subordinate  agency  of  witchcraft, 
the  infatuation  soon  arose  to  the  highest  point.  The 
accusations  of  innocent  individuals  as  exercising  the 
art  of  witchery,  and  the  scenes  of  blood  which  fol 
lowed,  were  the  natural  consequence. — Simila? 
views  will  probably  apply  to  the  witchcraft  delu 
sions  which,  to  the  ruin  of  thousands  of  individuals 
have  prevailed  in  other  periods  and  countries. 


(iv.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION.  325 


j 196.  Practical  results  connected  ivilh  the  forego- 
ing views. 

As  sympathetic  imitation,  if  it  be  correctly  con- 
sidered as  a modification  of  the  more  ordinary  form 
of  Imitativeness,  is  to  be  regarded  as,  in  its  basis  at 
least,  an  original  part  of  our  mental  constitution,  we 
may  well  suppose  it  has  its  beneficial  ends.  But  it 
is  evident,  from  the  facts  which  have  been  given, 
that  it  may  also  be  attended,  and,  under  ceitain  cir- 
cumstances, is  very  likely  to  be  attended,  with  results 
of  a different  kind!  Hence  the  direction  has  some- 
times been  given  by  physicians,  that  a free  inter- 
course with  persons  subject  to  convulsive  attacks 
ought  not  to  be  unnecessarily  indulged  in,  especially 
by  such  as  are  inclined  to  nervous  affections.  And 
this  precautionary  rule  might  be  extended  to  other 
cases  : for  instance,  of  madness.  “ It  is  a ques- 
tion” (says  Mr.  Stewart,  in  the  chapter  already  re- 
ferred to)  “ worthy  of  more  attention  than  has  yet 
been  bestowed  upon  it  by  physicians,  whether  cer- 
tain kinds  of  insanity  have  not  a contagious  tenden- 
cy, somewhat  analogous  to  that  which  has  just  been 
remarked.  That  the  incoherent  ravings  and  frantic 
gestures  of  a madman  have  a singularly  painful  ef- 
fect in  unsettling  and  deranging  the  thoughts  of 
others,  I have  more  than  once  experienced  in  my- 
self; nor  have  I ever  looked  upon  this  most  afflict- 
ing of  all  spectacles  without  a strong  impression  of 
the  danger  to  which  I should  be  exposed  if  I were 
to  witness  it  daily.  In  consequence  of  this  impres- 
sion, I have  always  read,  with  peculiar  admiration, 


<*26  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

the  scene  in  the  tragedy  of  Lear,  which  forms  the 
transition  from  the  old  king’s  beautiful  and  pathetic 
reflections  on  the  storm,  to  the  violent  madness  in 
which,  without  any  change  whatever  in  his  external 
circumstances,  he  is  immediately  after  represented. 
In  order  to  make  this  transition  more  gradual,  the 
poet  introduces  Edgar,  who,  with  a view  of  conceal- 
ing himself  from  Lear,  assumes  the  dress  and  be- 
haviour of  a madman.  At  every  sentence  he  ut- 
ters, the  mind  of  the  king,  4 whose  wits1  (as  we  are 
told  in  the  preceding  scene)  were  4 beginning  to 
turn]  becomes  more  and  more  deranged,  till  at 
length  every  vestige  of  reason  vanishes  completely.” 

§ 197.  Application  of  these  vieivs  to  Legislative  and 
other  Assemblies . 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  intimate  that 
the  effects  of  sympathetic  imitation  have  been  stri- 
kingly experienced  in  public  assemblies ; and  we 
may  here  add,  when  those  effects  have  been  strong- 
ly marked,  they  have  seldom  been  beneficial.  In 
all  political  deliberative  assemblies,  it  is  a reason- 
able suggestion  that  all  violent  external  signs  of  ap- 
probation and  disapprobation  should  be,  in  a great 
degree,  suppressed.  There  is  generally  enough  in 
the  subjects  which  are  discussed  to  excite  the 
members,  without  the  additional  excitement  (to  use 
a phrase  of  Buffon)  of  44  body  speaking  to  body . ’ 
It  is  said  of  the  famous  Athenian  tribunal  of  the 
Areopagus,  that  they  held  their  deliberations  in  the 
night,  in  order  that  their  attention  might  not  be  di- 
verted by  external  objects.  And,  without  expressing 


(lV.)  PROPENSITY  TO  IMITATION,.  327 

an  opinion  on  this  practice,  it  is  certainly  not  unwise 
to  guard  against  the  terrible  influences  under  con- 
sideration ; otherwise  truth,  honour,  and  justice  will 
often  be  sacrificed  to  feeling.  Every  public  delib- 
erative assembly  has  probably  furnished  facts  illus- 
trative of  the  propriety  of  this  caution. 

Similar  remarks  will  apply  to  religious  assemblies, 
and  perhaps  with  still  more  force,  as  religious  sub- 
jects are’more  important,  and,  in  general,  more  ex- 
citing than  any  other.  If,  in  such  an  assembly,  the 
feelings  of  a few  individuals  become  so  strong  as  to 
show  themselves  very  decidedly  in  the  countenance 
and  the  movements  of  the  body,  and  particularly  by 
sobs  and  loud  outcries,  it  will  not  be  surprising  if 
this  state  of  things  should  quickly  spread  itself 
through  the  whole  body.  In  this  way  it  is  proba- 
ble that  serious  evils  have  sometimes  been  experien- 
ced, and  that  true  and  false  religious  feelings  have 
been  confounded.  It  is  true  that  people  may  some- 
times be  led,  by  the  mere  power  of  sympathy,  to 
attend  to  religious  things ; and  so  far,  if  there  are 
no  collateral  evils*  the  result  may  be  regarded  as 
favourable  ; but,  at  the  same  time,  it  should  be  kept 
in  recollection,  that  the  feelings,  which  are  really 
propagated  from  one  to  another  by  mere  sympathy, 
are  not  in  themselves  religious  feelings  in  any  prop- 
er sense  of  the  terms,  though  they  are  often  con- 
founded with  them. 


328  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


CHAPTER  YI. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES 
(V.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  ESTEEM.  * 

4 198.  The  desire  of  Esteem  susceptible  of  a disor< 
dered  action. 

There  may  be  a disordered  action  of  the  desire  o. 
Esteem.  This  principle  is  not  only  an  original  one, 
but,  as  a general  thing,  it  possesses,  as  compared 
with  some  of  the  other  propensities,  a greater  and 
more  available  amount  of  strength.  It  is  a regard 
for  the  opinion  of  others  (a  sense  of  character,  as  we 
sometimes  term  it),  which,  in  the  absence  or  the  too 
great  weakness  of  higher  principles,  serves  to  re- 
strict the  conduct  of  multitudes  within  the  bounds  of 
decency  and  order.  This  principle  is  good  and  im- 
portant in  its  place  and  under  due  regulation;  but 
it  is  exceedingly  apt  to  become  irregular,  unrestrain- 
ed, and  inordinate  in  its  exercise.  This  view  throws 
light  upon  the  character  of  many  individuals.  It  is 
here,  probably,  that  we  may  discover  the  leading  de- 
fect in  the  character  of  Alcibiades,  a name  of  dis- 
tinguished celebrity  in  the  history  of  Athens.  His 
ruling  passion  seems  to  have  been  not  so  much  the 
love  of  power  as  the  love  of  applause.  In  other 
words,  his  great  desire  was,  as  has  been  well  re 


329 


(V.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  ESTEEM. 

marked  of  him,  “ to  make  a noise,  and  to  furnish 
matter  of  conversation  to  the  Athenians.” 

Pope,  in  the  first  of  his  Moral  Essays,  illustrates 
this  subject,  in  his  usual  powerful  manner,  in  what 
he  says  of  the  Duke  of  Wharton  ; the  key  to  whose 
character  he  finds  in  the  excessive  desire  of  human 
applause. 

“ Search  then  the  ruling  passion.  There  alone 
The  wild  are  constant  and  the  cunning  known  ; 

This  clew,  once  found,  unravels  all  the  rest, 

The  prospect  clears,  and  Wharton  stands  confess’d. 
Wharton,  the  scorn  and  wonder  of  our  days, 

Whose  ruling  passion  was  the  lust  of  praise. 

Born  with  w’nate’er  could  win  it  from  the  wise, 

Women  and  fools  must  like  hrm,  or  he  dies.” 

§ 199.  Further  explanatory  remarks  on  this  subject . 

The  inordinate  exercise  of  this  propensity,  as  is 
correctly  intimated  by  Mr.  Stewart,  tends  to  disor- 
ganize the  mind.  It  cannot  well  be  otherwise. 
The  man  who  is  under  the  influence  of  such  an  ex- 
cessive appetite  for  the  world’s  smiles  and  flatteries, 
has  no  fixed  rule  of  conduct ; but  the  action  of  his 
mind,  his  opinions,  desires,  hopes,  and  outward  con- 
duct, are  constantly  fluctuating  with  the  changing 
tide  of  popular  sentiment.  It  is  nearly  impossible 
that  the  pillars  of  the  mind  should  remain  firm,  and 
without  more  or  less  undermining  and  dislocation, 
under  the  operations  of  such  a system  of  uncertainty 
and  vicissitude.  Hence  the  disorganization  which 
Mr.  Stewart  speaks  of ; not  merely  in  the  power 
primarily  affected,  but  also  in  other  parts  of  the 
mind. 

Nor  is  this  all. — When  persons  who  are  under 


330  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

the  influence  of  this  excessive  desire  are  disap- 
pointed in  the  possession  of  that  approbation  and  ap- 
plause which  are  its  natural  food,  they  are  apt  to  be- 
come melancholy,  misanthropic,  and  unhappy  in  a 
very  high  degree.  In  fact,  numerous  cases  of  ac- 
tual Insanity,  using  the  term  in  distinction  from  the 
more  ordinary  forms  of  irregularity  and  disorder, 
may  probably  be  traced  to  this  source.  Various 
statements  of  writers  on  the  subject  of  Mental 
Alienation  evidently  support  this  view. 

§ 200.  Incidents  illustrative  of  this  form  of  Alien- 
ation. 

Pinel  mentions  a young  man  who,  under  the  in 
fluence  of  an  overweening  vanity,  which  is  one  of  the 
excessive  or  disordered  exercises  of  the  implanted 
Desire  of  Esteem,  resolved  at  all  hazards  to  be- 
come distinguished  ; at  least,  like  Alcibiades,  so  far 
as  to  be  talked  about.  He  studied  natural  philoso- 
phy, chymistry,  and  the  fine  arts.  He  travelled  in 
unknown  regions,  which  his  ample  fortune  enabled 
him  to  do ; and  published  his  discoveries  with  su- 
perb plates,  and  in  a style  of  great  elegance.  He 
kept  artists  with  him  to  aid  him  in  his  plans.  In 
imitation  of  other  celebrated  names,  he  stimulated 
his  faculties,  already  over- excited,  by  the  free  use  of 
strong  coffee  and  ardent  spirits.  He  endeavoured 
to  do  without  sleep,  hurrying  from  place  to  place 
night  and  day.  And  finally,  as  might  be  expected, 
became  furiously  insane. 

An  instance  very  recently  occurred  in  Paris,  which 
may  be  regarded,  on  the  whole,  as  rather  a striking 


331 


(V.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  ESTEEM. 

illustration  of  the  shape  which  mental  disorder  as- 
sumes when  originating  in  the  propensity  which  we 
are  examining.  A journeyman  printer,  m a joke, 
threw  something  at  one  of  his  companions,  which 
broke  the  glass  of  his  spectacles,  and  slightly  wound- 
ed him.  The  feelings  of  the  sufferer  were  so  se- 
verely excited  by  what  he  considered  a premeditated 
insult,  that  he  insisted  upon  having  his  injured  hon- 
our healed  by  a mortal  duel.  The  thoughtless  of- 
fender protested  his  innocence  of  any  intended  out- 
rage. The  infatuated  man,  nevertheless,  continued 
to°urge  his  hostile  appeal  till  he  found  it  totally  in 
vain.°  Conceiving  himself  thus  degraded  for  ever, 
he  shut  himself  up  in  his  room,  in  the  Rue  de  Foin, 
and  there  at  length  did,  as  he  madly  supposed,  jus- 
tice to  himself  by  cutting  his  throat.  His  father  is 
said  to  have  put  an  end  to  his  life  in  a similar  fit  of 
monomania. 

^ 201.  Other  instances  still  further  illustrative  of 
the  subject. 

And  where  Insanity  or  the  highest  form  of  disor- 
der does  not  supervene,  there  are  sometimes  conse- 
quences scarcely  less  unfavourable.  It  is  well 
known,  that  within  a few  years  a number  of  gifted 
individuals  have  been  hurried  to  an  early  grave,  in 
consequence  of  being  held  up  to  public  contempt 
and  ridicule  in  anonymous  Reviews.  The  principle 
which  led  them  to  seek  the  sympathy  and  the  fa- 
vourable opinion  of  others  was  too  exquisitely  sus- 
ceptible to  be  treated  with  that  severity  and  roughness 
of  manners  which  it  experienced. 


332  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


The  case  of  Henry  Kirk  White,  too  keenly  alive 
to  the  frowns  and  favours  of  popular  sentiment,  not- 
withstanding his  great  and  unquestionable  excellen- 
ces, will  illustrate  what  we  mean.  Keats,  also,  the 
gifted  author  of  Endymion,  may  probably  be  re- 
garded as  another  victim  of  the  severity  of  criticism, 
operating  upon  a mind  too  eagerly  desirous  of  popu- 
lar approbation,  and  too  susceptible  to  the  influences 
of  popular  aversion  and  reproof. 

The  circumstance  that  the  inordinate  exercise  of 
the  Desire  of  Esteem  is  sometimes  connected  with 
distinguished  vigour  of  intellect  and  purity  of  moral 
sentiment,  does  not  necessarily  secure  the  disap- 
pointed and  calumniated  individual  who  is  the  sub- 
ject of  it  against  great  anguish  of  mind  ; so  great  in 
some  instances  as  not  only  to  destroy  happiness,  but 
life  itself. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 
(VI.)  SOCIALITY,  OR  THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY. 

§ 202.  Origin  of  the  propensive  principle  of  Social- 
ity. 

There  are  yet  other  propensive  principles  which 
may  properly  be  considered  under  this  general  head. 
Nothing  is  more  obvious  than  that  men  naturally 


333 


(VI.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY. 

(not  moved  to  it  primarily  by  the  influences  of  edu- 
cation,  or  considerations  of  interest,  or  anything  of 
that  kind,  but  of  themselves  and  naturally ) have  a 
desire  of  the  company  or  society  of  their  fellow- 
men;  a tendency  of  the  mind  expressed  by  the  term 

SOCIALITY  Or  SOCIABILITY. 

We  are  aware  that  some  writers  take  a different 
view,  and  endeavour  to  resolve  this  principle,  as 
well  as  some  others,  into  the  principle  of  self-love. 
But  when  we  consider  the  evident  importance  of 
this  principle  to  man  in  his  present  situation ; when 
we  take  into  account  its  early  appearance,  and  its 
immense  strength  in  childhood  as  well  as  in  later 
years,  together  with  various  other  circumstances 
which  would  be  properly  adduced  in  a full  inquiry 
into  this  topic,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  speak  of  the 
social  principle  as  an  original  or  implanted  one. 
This  propensity,  implanted  within  us  for  the  most 
useful  purposes,  may  exist  with  such  a degree  of 
weakness  on  the  one  hand,  or  with  such  a degree 
of  intensity  on  the  other,  as  justly  to  entitle  its  ac- 
tion in  either  of  these  forms  to  be  called  a disorder- 
ed, and  even,  in  some  cases,  an  alienated  or  insane 
one. 

§ 203.  True  idea  of  Alienation , or  Insanity  of  the 
Sensibilities. 

And  here  it  may  be  proper  to  revert  briefly  once 
more  to  the  precise  idea  which  we  attach  to  the 
term  Alienation,  considered  as  expressive  of  a state 
or  condition  of  the  Sensibilities.  There  may  be  an 
imperfection  of  mental  action  ; there  may  be  a dis- 


334  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

order  of  mental  action,  which  is  not,  nevertheless, 
an  absolute  alienation  or  insanity  of  mental  action. 
The  term  alienation,  and  the  same  may  be  said  of 
the  term  insanity,  properly  applies  to  those  forms  of 
mental  action  (we  speak  now  particularly  of  the  sen- 
sibilities) which  are  so  much  disordered  as  to  set  at 
defiance  any  efforts  of  the  Will  to  control  them ; in 
a word,  they  are  involuntary.  So  that,  in  accord- 
ance with  this  statement,  there  may  be  either  a dis- 
ordered state  of  the  principle  of  sociality  or  of  any 
other  principle  (that  is  to  say,  one  which  is  irregu- 
lar, but  still  is  susceptible  of  correction  under  the 
efforts  of  the  will)  ; or  there  may  be,  when  this  dis- 
order is  found  to  exist  beyond  certain  limits,  an 
alienated,  an  insane  state.  But  although  this  dis- 
tinction ought  to  be  clearly  understood,  it  is  not  ne- 
cessary, in  the  remarks  which  for  the  most  part  we 
have  occasion  to  make,  that  we  should  always  keep 
it  distinctly  in  view. 

§ 204.  The  irregular  action  of  the  Social  principle 
exists  in  two  forms. 

But  to  return  to  our  subject.  An  irregular  ac- 
tion of  the  social  principle,  whether  it  be  truly  alien- 
ated or  exist  in  some  lighter  form  of  disorder,  may 
show  itself  in  two  aspects,  which  are  entirely  diverse 
from  each  other,  viz.,  either  in  a morbid  aversion  to 
society,  or  in  a desire  of  society  inordinately  intense. 

Persons  to  whom  the  first  statement  will  apply 
are  generally,  and  for  the  most  part  justly,  designa- 
ted as  misanthropes.  There  are  some  cases,  it  is 
true,  where  the  character  of  being  misanthropic 


fvi.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY.  335 

S Li  ' ' 1 . 

does  not,  in  strictness  of  speech,  appear  to  be  ap- 
plicable. Individuals  may  be  found,  although  it  is 
not  often  the  case,  in  whom  the  social  principle  is 
naturally  so  very  weak  that  they  shun  all  intercourse 
with  their  fellow-men,  and  yet  without  hating  them. 
They  live  apart,  but  not  in  opposition.  They  have 
no  enmity  to  their  fellow-men,  although  they  do  not 
seek  their  company. 

The  more  frequent  and  decided  cases  are  those 
which  have  their  origin,  not  in  nature,  but  in  circum- 
stances. Under  the  influence  of  some  sudden  re- 
vulsion of  the  mind,  of  some  great  disappointment, 
of  some  ill-treatment  on  the  part  of  near  relatives 
and  supposed  friends,  or  of  some  other  powerful 
cause,  the  natural  tie  of  brotherhood,  which  binds 
man  to  his  fellow-man,  is  snapped  asunder,  and  the 
unhappy  individual  flees  to  the  rock  and  the  desert, 
never  more  to  return.  Such  instances  (the  Timon 
of  Athens  of  Shakspeare,  the  Black  Dwarf  of  Wal- 
ter Scott,  and  numerous  others)  are  frequently  found, 
not  only  on  the  recorded  annals  of  human  nature, 
but  in  almost  every  one’s  personal  experience. 

The  views  which  have  now  been  presented  ap- 
pear to  be  rather  remarkably  illustrated  in  the  case 
of  Henry  Welby,  who  died  in  London  in  1639,  in 
the  eighty-fourth  year  of  his  age.  This  individual 
was  a man  of  good  education  and  of  some  wealth  ; 
charitable  to  others,  and  happy  in  the  esteem  and 
love  of  his  friends.  When  he  was  about  forty  years 
of  age,  his  brother,  a man  without  affection  or  prin- 
ciple, attempted  to  shoot  him  with  a pistol  double 
charged  with  bullets. 


336  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

The  attempt  was  unsuccessful ; but  the  result 
upon  his  own  mind  was  such  as  to  fill  him  with 
horror  and  disgust  of  the  human  race.  He  resolv- 
ed, from  that  time,  to  seclude  himself  from  society. 
He  ever  afterward  lived  alone,  avoiding,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  sight  of  every  human  being,  and  spend- 
ing his  time  in  reading,  meditation,  and  prayer.  And 
although  he  seems  to  have  had  but  one  child,  an 
amiable  daughter,  who  was  happily  married,  he  could 
never,  after  having  been  affected  with  this  disorder- 
ed mental  bias,  be  persuaded  to  see  her  or  any  of 
her  family. 

§ 205.  Further  remarks  on  the  disordered  action  of 
the  Social  propensity . 

There  is  another  class  of  cases,  which  in  theii 
character  appear  to  be  directly  the  reverse  of  those 
which  have  just  been  mentioned. — Individuals,  when 
they  are  cut  off  from  society,  particularly  the  society 
of  their  friends,  are  sometimes  the  subjects  of  a 
misery  inexpressibly  intense.  In  these  persons  the 
social  principle  is,  perhaps,  too  strong.  It  is,  at 
least,  subjected  to  too  severe  a trial.  Deprived  of 
its  natural  food,  it  disorganizes,  in  the  intensity  of 
its  grief,  the  whole  mind. 

Such  was  the  case,  perhaps,  with  the  unfortunate 
Foscari,  whose  sad  story  is  so  well  known.  Hav- 
ing been  banished  from  Venice,  he  took  measures 
to  return  again,  to  see  once  more  his  beloved  pa- 
rents and  family,  at  the  evident  hazard  of  his  life. 
On  being  again  banished  from  his  country,  he  died 
in  a short  time  of  pure  anguish  of  heart. 


337 


(VI.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY. 

la  this  place,  and  as  illustrating  the  connexion 
which  the  social  principle  has  in  various  ways  with 
soundness  of  mind,  we  may  briefly  refer  to  certain 
psychological  and  disciplinary  experiments  which 
have  been  made  in  this  country. — In  the  year  1821, 
the  Legislature  of  New-York  directed  the  Superin- 
tendent of  the  Auburn  State  Prison  to  select  a num- 
ber of  the  most  hardened  criminals,  and  to  lock  them 
up  in  solitary  cells,  to  be  kept  there  day  and  night, 
without  any  interruption  of  their  solitude,  and  with- 
out labour.  This  order,  which  was  regarded,  and 
was  designed  to  be  regarded,  in  the  light  of  an  ex- 
periment, was  carried  into  effect  in  September  of 
that  year,  by  confining  eighty  criminals  in  the  man- 
ner prescribed.  On  this  experiment,  Messrs.  Beau- 
mont and  Toqueville,  who  were  recently  commis- 
sioned by  the  French  government  to  examine  and 
to  report  on  the  American  system  of  Prison  Disci- 
pline, make  the  following  remarks  : “ This  trial,  from 
which  so  happy  a result  had  been  anticipated,  was 
fatal  to  the  greater  part  of  the  convicts  ; in  order  to 
reform  them,  they  had  been  subjected  to  complete 
isolation  ; but  this  absolute  solitude,  if  nothing  in- 
terrupt it,  is  beyond  the  strength  of  man  ; it  destroys 
the  criminal  without  intermission  and  without  pity ; 
it  does  not  reform,  it  kills. — The  unfortunates  on 
whom  this  experiment  was  made  fell  into  a state  of 
depression  so  manifest,  that  their  keepers  were  struck 
with  it ; their  lives  seemed  in  danger  if  they  remain- 
ed longer  in  this  situation ; five  of  them  had  already 
succumbed  during  a single  year ; their  moral  state 
. was  not  less  alarming  ; one  of  them  had  become 


338  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 

insane  ; another,  in  a fit  of  despair,  had  embraced 
the  opportunity,  when  the  keeper  brought  him  some- 
thing, to  precipitate  himself  from  his  cell,  running 
the  almost  certain  chance  of  a mortal  fall. — Upon 
these  and  similar  effects  the  system  was  finally 
judged.  The  Governor  of  the  State  of  New-York 
pardoned  twenty-six  of  those  in  solitary  confinement. 
The  others,  to  whom  this  favour  was  not  extended, 
were  allowed  to  leave  the  cells  during  the  day,  and 
to  work  in  the  common  workshops  of  the  prison.” 

§ 206.  Of  the  disease  founded  on  the  Social  pro - 
peiisity  termed  Nostalgia. 

There  is  an  exceedingly  painful  disease,  founded, 
in  a great  degree,  upon  the  disordered  action  of  the 
social  principle,  which  is  termed  by  physicians  Nos- 
talgia, but  which  is  more  commonly  known  under 
the  familiar  designation  of  home-sickness.  This 
disease,  which  is  sometimes  fatal,  is  said  to  have 
frequently  prevailed  among  the  Swiss  when  absent 
from  their  native  country.  The  beautiful  sky  which 
shone  over  them  in  their  absence  from  their  native 
land,  the  works  of  art,  the  allurements  of  the  high- 
est forms  of  civilization,  could  not  erase  from  their 
hearts  the  image  of  their  rugged  mountains  and  their 
stormy  heavens.  They  had  society  enough  around 
them,  it  is  true ; but  it  was  not  the  society  which 
their  hearts  sought  for,  or  in  which,  in  existing  cir- 
cumstances, they  could  participate.  They  bowed 
their  heads  under  the  influence  of  a hidden  and  irre- 
pressible sorrow ; and  in  many  cases  not  merely 
pined  away,  but  died  in  the  deep  anguish  of  their 
separation. 


339 


(VI.)  THE  DESIRE  OF  SOCIETY. 

In  the  year  1733,  a Russian  army,  under  the 
command  of  General  Praxin,  advanced  to  the  banks 
of  the  Rhine.  At  this  remote  distance  from  their 
native  country,  this  severe  mental  disease  began  to 
prevail  among  the  Russians ; so  much  so,  that  five 
or  six  soldiers  every  day  became  unfit  for  duty  ; a 
state  of  things  which  threatened  to  affect  the  exist- 
ence of  the  army.  The  progress  of  this  home-sick- 
ness was  terminated  by  a severe  order  from  the 
commander  (designed  probably,  and  which  had  the 
effect  to  produce  a strong  counteracting  state  of 
mind),  that  every  one  affected  with  the  sickness 
should  be  buried  alive.* 

§ 207.  Disordered  action  of  the  'principle  of  Vera 
city. 

We  close  these  remarks  on  the  alienated  action 
of  the  Propensities,  although  we  do  not  profess  to 
have  fully  exhausted  the  subject,  by  a brief  refer- 
ence to  another  important  principle,  that  which  is  the 
natural  basis  of  the  utterance  of  the  truth. 

The  principle  of  Veracity,  or  the  tendency  of 
mind  which  leads  men  to  utter  the  truth,  appears  to 
be  an  original  or  implanted  one.  This  principle, 
either  through  habit  or  by  natural  defect,  sometimes 
exhibits  itself  in  strangely  perverted  forms. — In  ac- 
cordance with  this  view,  Dr.  Rush  speaks  of  a lying 
disease. 

“ It  differs”  (he  says)  “ from  exculpating,  fraud- 
ulent, and  malicious  lying,  in  being  influenced  by 
none  of  the  motives  of  any  of  them.  Persons  thus 
* Rush  on  the  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  2d  ed.,  p.  113. 


340  DISORDER  OF  THE  PROPENSITIES. 


diseased  cannot  speak  the  truth  on  any  subject,  noi 
tell  the  same  story  twice  in  the  same  way,  nor  de 
scribe  anything  as  it  has  appeared  to  other  people. 
Their  falsehoods  are  seldom  calculated  to  injure 
anybody  but  themselves,  being  for  the  most  part  of 
a hyperbolical  or  boasting  nature,  but  now  and  then 
they  are  of  a mischievous  nature,  and  injurious  to 
the  characters  and  property  of  others.  That  it  is  a 
corporeal  disease  [that  is  to  say,  in  some  way  con- 
nected with  a diseased  state  of  the  body],  I infer 
from  its  sometimes  appearing  in  mad  people,  who 
are  remarkable  for  veracity  in  the  healthy  states  of 
their  minds,  several  instances  of  which  I have  known 
in  the  Pennsylvania  Hospital.  Persons  affected 
with  this  disease  are  often  amiable  in  their  tempers 
and  manners,  and  sometimes  benevolent  and  chari- 
table in  their  dispositions.”* 

Enough,  perhaps,  has  been  said  on  this  part  of  our 
subject,  although  the  topic  is  not  exhausted,  to  give 
at  least  a general  idea  of  it.  The  same  train  of 
thought,  and  with  scarcely  any  modification,  will  ap- 
ply to  all  the  original  appetites  and  propensities, 
whatever  they  may  be,  which  have  not  been  noticed. 
They  are  all  implanted  by  the  Creator  of  the  mind  ; 
they  are  all  good  in  their  place,  and  under  proper 
regulation  ; they  are  all  not  only  morally  evil  when 
they  are  not  properly  controlled  and  restrained,  but 
are  liable  to  be  attended  with  more  or  less  of  men- 
tal disorder,  from  the  slightest  shades  of  disorgani- 
zation to  the  deep  and  terrible  miseries  of  permanent 
insanity. 

* Rush  on  the  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  2d  ed.,  p.  265. 


DISORDERED  ACTION,  ETC. 


341 


CHAPTER  Till. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 

§ 208.  Of  the  states  of  mind  denominated  Presenti- 
ments. 

We  proceed  now  to  remark,  that  there  may  be  a 
disordered  action  of  the  Affections  or  Passions,  as 
well  as  of  the  lower  principles  of  the  Sensitive  na- 
ture ; and  this  remark  is  designed  to  apply  to  both 
classes  of  the  Affections,  the-  benevolent  and  those 
of  an  opposite  kind.  We  do  not  propose,  however, 
in  this  chapter  to  confine  ourselves  very  strictly  to 
the  Affections,  properly  so  called,  but  shall  intro- 
duce some  collateral  or  connected  subjects,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  too  interesting  to  be  omitted, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  as  too  unimportant  to  require 
a distinct  place.  They  may  be  expected,  moreover, 
to  throw  indirectly  some  light  upon  the  leading  topic 
of  the  chapter.  We  begin  with  the  subject  of  pre- 
sentiments. 

Many  individuals  have  had,  at  certain  times,  strong 
and  distinct  impressions  in  relation  to  something  fu- 
ture ; so  much  so  that  not  the  least  doubt  has  re- 
mained in  their  own  minds  of  its  being  something 
out  of  the  common  course  of  nature.  It  is  related, 
for  instance,  of  the  nonconformist  writer,  Isaac  Am- 
brose, whose  religious  works  formerly  had  some  ce- 


342 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


lebrity,  that  he  had  such  a striking  internal  intima- 
tion of  his  approaching  death,  that  he  went  round  to 
all  his  friends  to  bid  them  farewell.  When  the  day 
arrived  which  his  presentiments  indicated  as  the  day 
of  his  dissolution,  he  shut  himself  up  in  his  room 
and  died.  Mozart,  the  great  musical  composer, 
had  a strong  presentiment  that  the  celebrated  Re- 
quiem which  bears  his  name  would  be  his  last  work. 
Nothing  could  remove  this  impression  from  his  mind. 
He  expressly  said,  “It  is  certain  I am  writing  this 
requiem  for  myself ; it  will  serve  for  my  funeral  ser- 
vice.” The  foreboding  was  realized.  It  is  stated 
of  Pendergrast,  an  officer  in  the  Duke  of  Marlbo- 
rough’s army,  that  he  had  a strong  foreboding  that 
he  would  be  killed  on -a  certain  day.  He  mention- 
ed his  conviction  to  others,  and  even  made  a writ- 
ten memorandum  in  relation  to  it.*  Henry  the 
Fourth,  of  France,  for  some  weeks  previous  to  his 
being  assassinated  by  Ravaillac,  had  a distinct  pre- 
sentiment, which  he  mentioned  to  Sully  and  other 
men  of  his  time,  that  some  great  calamity  was  about 
to  befall  him. 

Some  cases  of  Presentiments  can  undoubtedly  be 
explained  on  natural  principles.  Some  accidental 
circumstance,  a mere  word,  the  vagaries  of  a dream, 
any  trifling  event  which  happens  in  the  popular  be- 
lief of  the  time  and  country  to  be  regarded  as  a sin- 
ister omen,  may  have  been  enough,  in  some  cases, 
to  lay  the  foundation  for  them ; and  the  subsequent 
fulfilment  may  have  been  purely  accidental.  Nor 
is  it  necessary,  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  perceive, 
* Boswell’s  Life  of  Johnson,  vol.  ii.,  p.  48. 


AFFECTIONS. 


343 


to  suppose  that  in  any  cases  whatever  there  is  any 
supernatural  or  miraculous  interposition.  But,  if 
this  is  not  the  case,  it  is  difficult  to  account  for  the 
deep  conviction  which  sometimes  fastens  upon  the 
mind,  a conviction  upon  which  arguments  and  per- 
suasions are  found  to  make  no  impression,  except 
upon  the  ground  that  the  action  of  the  Sensibilities 
is  in  some  degree  disordered.  But  of  the  specific 
nature  of  that  disorder,  the  trait  or  circumstance 
which  distinguishes  it  from  other  forms  of  disorder- 
ed mental  action,  it  is  difficult  to  give  any  account 

§ 209.  Of  sudden  and  strong  impulses  of  JMind. 

There  is  another  disordered  condition  of  mind, 
different  from  that  which  has  just  been  mentioned, 
and  yet,  in  some  respects,  closely  allied  to  it.  Some 
persons,  whose  soundness  of  mind,  on  all  ordinary 
occasions,  is  beyond  question,  find  in  themselves  at 
certain  times  a sudden  and  strange  propensity  to  do 
things  which,  if  done,  would  clearly  prove  them,  to 
some  extent  at  least,  deranged.  As  an  illustration, 
a person  of  a perfectly  sane  mind,  according  to  the 
common  estimate  of  insanity,  once  acknowledged, 
that,  whenever  he  passed  a particular  bridge,  he  felt 
a slight  inclination  to  throw  himself  over,  accompa- 
nied with  some  dread  that  his  inclination  might  hurry 
him  away.  Such  slight  alienated  impulses  are  prob- 
ably more  frequent  than  is  commonly  supposed. 
And  they  exist  in  every  variety  of  degree,  sometimes 
scarcely  attracting  notice,  at  others  bearing  the  broad 
and  fatal  stamp  of  dangerous  insanity. 

Dr.  Gall  mentions  the  case  of  a woman  in  Ger- 
D d 


344 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


many,  who,  having  on  a certain  occasion  witnessed 
a building  on  fire,  was  ever  afterward,  at  intervals/ 
subject  to  strong  impulses  prompting  her  to  fire 
buildings.  Under  the  influence  of  these  impulses, 
she  set  fire  to  twelve  buildings  in  the  borough  where 
she  lived.  Having  been  arrested  on  the  thirteenth 
attempt,  she  was  tried,  condemned,  and  executed. 
“ She  could  give  no  other  reason,  nor  show  any 
other  motive  for  firing  so  many  houses,  than  this  im- 
pulse, which  drove  her  to  it.  Notwithstanding  the 
fear,  the  terror,  and  the  repentance  she  felt  in  every 
instance  after  committing  the  crime,  she  went  and 
did  it  afresh.”*  Would  not  sound  philosophy,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  requisitions  of  religion,  have  assigned 
such  a person  to  an  insane  hospital  rather  than  to  the 
block  of  the  executioner  ? 

The  same  writer,  who  has  collected  numerous 
valuable  facts  in  relation,  to  the  operations  of  the 
human  mind,  mentions  the  case  of  a German  sol- 
dier, who  was  subject  every  month  to  a violent  con- 
vulsive attack.  “ He  was  sensible”  (he  proceeds 
to  remark)  “ of  their  approach  ; and  as  he  felt,  by 
degrees,  a violent  propensity  to  kill,  in  proportion  as 
the  paroxysm  was  on  the  point  of  commencing,  he 
was  earnest  in  his  entreaties  to  be  loaded  with  chains. 
At  the  end  of  some  days  the  paroxysm  and  the  fa- 
tal propensity  diminished,  and  he  himself  fixed  the 
period  at  which  they  might  without  danger  set  him 
at  liberty.  At  Haina,  we  saw  a man  who,  at  cer- 
tain periods,  felt  an  irresistible  desire  to  injure  oth- 
ers. He  knew  this  unhappy  propensity,  and  had 
* Gall’s  Works,  vol.  iv.,  Am.  ed.,  p.  105. 


AFFECTIONS. 


345 


himself  kept  in  chains  till  he  perceived  that  it  was 
safe  to  liberate  him.  An  individual  of  melancholic 
temperament  was  present  at  the  execution  of  a crim- 
inal. The  sight  caused  him  such  violent  emotion, 
that  he  at  once  felt  himself  seized  with  an  irresisti- 
ble desire  to  kill,  while,  at  the  same  time,  he  enter- 
tained the  utmost  horror  at  the  commission  of  the 
crime.  He  depicted  his  deplorable  state,  weeping 
bitterly,  and  in  extreme  perplexity.  He  beat  his 
head,  wrung  his  hands,  remonstrated  with  himself, 
begged  his  friends  to  save  themselves,  and  thanked 
them  for  the  resistance  they  made  to  him.”* 

§ 210.  Insanity  of  the  Affections  or  Passions. 

From  the  instances  which  have  been  given,  it  will 
be  seen  that  sudden  and  strong  impulses,  indicating 
a disordered  state  of  the  mind,  may  exist  in  Refer- 
ence to  very  different  things,  and  also  in  very  vari- 
ous degrees.  The  cases  last  mentioned  were  of 
such  an  aggravated  nature,  that  they  may  properly 
be  regarded  as  instances  ^and  perhaps  the  same 
view  will  apply  to  some  other  cases  of  a less  mark- 
ed character)  of  actual  alienation  or  insanity.  And, 
as  such,  they  may  be  correctly  described  as  instan- 
ces of  the  insanity  of  the  Affections  or  Passions. 

The  insanity  of  the  passions  is  a state  of  mind 
somewhat  peculiar,  even  as  compared  with  other 
forms  of  insanity.  The  powers  of  perception,  in 
cases  of  insanity  of  the  passions,  are  often  in  full 
and  just  exercise.  The  mind  may  possess,  in  a 
very  considerable  degree,  its  usual  ability  in  compa- 
* Gall’s  Works,  vol.  i.,  Am.  ed.,  p.  329. 


346  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

ring  ideas  and  in  deducing  conclusions.  The  seat 
of  the  difficulty  is  not  to  be  sought  for  in  what  are 
usually  designated  as  the  intellectual  powers,  in  dis- 
tinction from  the  sensitive  nature,  but  in  the  passions 
alone.  The  victim  of  this  mental  disease  does  not 
stop  to  reason,  reflect,  and  compare  ; but  is  borne 
forward  to  his  purpose  with  a blind,  and  often  an  ir- 
resistible impulse. 

Pinel  mentions  a mechanic  in  the  asylum  Bice- 
tre  who  was  subject  to  this  form  of  insanity.  It 
was,  as  is  frequently  the  case,  intermittent.  He 
knew  when  the  paroxysms  of  passion  were  coming 
on,  and  even  gave  warnings  to  those  who  were  ex- 
posed to  its  effects  to  make  their  escape.  His  pow- 
ers of  correctly  judging  remained  unshaken,  not 
only  at  other  times,  but  even  in  the  commission  of 
the  most  violent  and  outrageous  acts.  He  saw 
clearly  their  impropriety,  but  was  unable  to  restrain 
himself;  and,  after  the  cessation  of  the  paroxysms, 
was  often  filled  with  the  deepest  grief. 

§ 211.  Of  the  mental  disease  termed  Hypochon- 
driasis. 

The  seat  of  the  well-known  mental  disease  term- 
ed Hypochondriasis  is  to  be  sought  for  in  a disor- 
dered state  of  the  Sensibilities.  It  is,  in  fact,  no- 
thing more  or  less  than  a state  of  deep  depression, 
gloom,  or  melancholy.  This  is  the  fact ; and  we 
never  apply  the  term  hypochondriasis  to  a state  of 
the  mind  where  such  gloom  or  melancholy  does  not 
exist ; but  it  is  nevertheless  true,  that  the  occasion 
or  basis  of  the  fact  may  sometimes  be  found  in  a 


AFFECTIONS. 


347 


disordered  condition  of  some  other  part  of  the  mind. 
One  or  two  concise  statements  will  illustrate  what 
we  mean. 

One  of  the  slighter  forms  of  hypochondriasis  can, 
perhaps,  be  traced  to  inordinate  workings  of  the 
Imagination.  The  mind  of  the  sufferer  is  fixed 
upon  some  unpromising  and  gloomy  subject ; prob- 
ably one  which  has  particular  relation  either  to  his 
present  or  future  prospects.  He  gives  it  an  undue 
place  in  his  thoughts,  dwelling  upon  it  continually. 
His  imagination  hovers  over  it,  throwing  a deeper 
shade  on  what  is  already  dark.  Thus  the  mind  be- 
comes disordered  ; it  is  broken  off  from  its  ordinary 
and  rightful  mode  of  action,  and  is  no  longer  what 
it  was,  nor  what  nature  designed  it  should  be. 

§ 212.  Of  other  forms  of  Hypochondriasis. 

There  is  another  and  still  more  striking  form  of 
hypochondriasis,  which  is  connected  in  its  origin 
with  an  alienation  of  the  power  of  belief.  As  in  all 
other  cases  of  hypochondriasis,  the  subject  of  it  suf- 
fers much  mental  distress.  He  is  beset  with  the 
most  gloomy  and  distressing  apprehensions,  occa- 
sioned, not  by  exaggerated  and  erroneous  notions  in 
general,  but  by  some  fixed  and  inevitable  false  be- 
lief.— One  imagines  that  he  has  no  soul ; another, 
that  his  body  is  gradually  but  rapidly  perishing  ; and 
a tl  ird,  that  he  is  converted  into  some  other  animal, 
or  t lat  he  has  been  transformed  into  a plant.  We 
are  told  in  the  Memoirs  of  Count  Maurepas,  a fact 
which  we  ^ave  already  had  occasion  to  refer  to,  that 
this  last  idea  once  took  possession  of  the  mind  of 


348  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

one  of  the  princes  of  Bourbon.  So  deeply  was  he 
infected  with  this  notion,  that  he  often  went  into  his 
garden,  and  insisted  on  being  watered  in  common 
with  the  plants  around  him.  Some  have  imagined 
themselves  to  be  transformed  into  glass,  and  others 
have  fallen  into  the  still  stranger  folly  of  imagining 
themselves  dead.— What  has  been  said  confirms 
our  remark,  that  although  hypochondriasis  is,  in  it- 
self considered,  seated  in  the  sensibilities,  yet  its 
origin  may  sometimes  be  found  in  a disordered  state 
of  some  other  part  of  the  mind. 

It  is  also  sometimes  the  case  that  this  diseast 
originates  in  a violation  of  some  form  of  sensitive 
action.  It  is  not  only,  as  its  appropriate  position, 
seated  in  the  sensibilities,  but  it  sometimes  has  its 
origin  there.  We  have  already  mentioned  the  case 
of *a  certain  Englishman,  a man  of  generous  and 
excellent  character,  whose  life  was  once  attempted 
by  his  brother  with  a pistol.  On  wresting  the  pistol 
from  his  brother’s  hand  and  examining  it,  he  found 
it  to  be  double  charged  with  bullets.  This  transac- 
tion, as  might  be  expected  in  the  case  of  a person 
of  just  and  generous  sentiments,  filled  him  with  such 
horror,  and  with  such  disgust  for  the  character  of  the 
man,  that  he  secluded  himself  ever  after  from  human 
society.  He  never  allowed  the  visits  even  of  his 
own  children.  It  is  certainly  easy  to  see,  that  un- 
der such  circumstances  the  sensibilities  may  receive 
such  a shock  as  to  leave  the  subject  of  it  in  a state 
of  permanent  dissatisfaction  and  gloom.  In  other 
words,  he  may  in  this  way,  and  for  such  reasons, 
become  a confirmed  hypochondriac. 


affections. 


349 


& 213.  Of  intermissions  of  Hypochondriasis , ana 
of  its  remedies. 

The  mental  disease  of  hypochondriasis  is  always 
understood  to  imply  the  existence  of  a feeling  o 
gloom  and  depression  ; but  this  depressed  feeling 
does  not  exist  in  all  cases  in  the  same  degree.  In 
all  instances  it  is’ a source  of  no  small  unhappiness, 
but  in  some  the  wretchedness  is  extreme,  ihe 
greatest  bodily  pains  are  light  in  the  comparison, 
ft  is  worthy  of  remark,  however,  that  the  mental 
distress  of  hypochondriasis  is  in  some  persons  char- 
acterized by  occasional  intermissions.  An  acci- 
dental remark,  some  sudden  combination  of  ideas, 
a pleasant  day,  and  various  other  causes,  are  found 
to  dissipate  the  gloom  of  the  mind.  At  such  times 
there  is  not  unfrequently  a high  flow  of  the  spirits, 
corresponding  to  the  previous  extreme  depression.— 
As  this  disease,  even  when  mitigated  by  occasional 
intermissions,  is  prodigal  in  evil  results,  it  becomes 
proper  to  allude  to  certain  remedies  which  have 
sometimes  been  resorted  to. 

I, The  first  step  towards  remedying  the  evil  is 

to  infuse  health  and  vigour  into  the  bodily  action, 
especially  that  of  the  nervous  system.  The  nerves, 
it  will  be  recollected,  are  the  great  medium  of  sen- 
sation, inasmuch  as  they  constitute,  under  different 
modifications,  the  external  senses.  Now  the  senses 
are  prominent  sources  of  belief  and  knowledge. 
Consequently,  when  the  nervous  system  (including, 
of  course,  the  senses)  is  in  a disordered  state,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  persons  should  have  wrong  sen- 


354)  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

satioi^s  and  external  perceptions,  and,  therefore,  a 
wrong  welief.  If  a man’s  nerves  are  in  such  a state 
that  he  feels  precisely  as  he  supposes  a man  made 
of  glass  would  feel,  it  is  no  great  wonder,  when  we 
consider  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  that  he  should 
actually  believe  himself  to  be  composed  of  that  sub- 
stance. But  one  of  the  forms  of  the  disease  in 
question  is  essentially  founded  on  dn  erroneous  but 
fixed  belief  of  this  kind.  Hence,  in  restoring  the 
bodily  system  to  a right  action,  we  shall  correct  the 
wrong  belief,  if  it  be  founded  in  the  senses  ; and,  in 
removing  this,  we  may  anticipate  the  removal  of  that 
deep-seated  gloom  which  is  characteristic  of  hypo- 
chondriasis. 

§ 214.  Farther  remarks  on  the  remedies  of  Hypo- 
chondriasis. 

II.  — As  all  the  old  associations  of  the  hypochon- 
driac have  been  more  or  less  visited  and  tinctured 
by  his  peculiar  malady,  efforts  should  be  made  to 
break  them  up  and  remove  them  from  the  mind,  by 
changes  in  the  objects  with  which  he  is  most  con- 
versant, by  introducing  him  into  new  society,  or  by 
travelling.  By  these  means  his  thoughts  are  likely 
to  be  diverted,  not  only  from  the  particular  subject 
which  has  chiefly  interested  him,  but  a new  impulse 
is  given  to  the  whole  mind,  which  promises  to  inter- 
rupt and  banish  that  fatal  fixedness  and  inertness 
which  had  previously  encumbered  and  prostrated  it. 

III.  — Whenever  the  malady  appears  to  be  found- 
ed on  considerations  of  a moral  nature,  the  hypo- 
chondriasis may  sometimes  be  removed,  or,  at  least, 


AFFECTIONS. 


351 


alleviated,  by  the  suggestion  of  counteracting  moral 
motives.  If,  for  instance,  the  despondency  of  mind 
has  arisen  from  some  supposed  injury,  it  is  desira- 
ble to  suggest  all  well-founded  considerations  which 
may  tend  to  lessen  the  sufferer’s  estimate  of  the 
amount  of  the  injury  received.  When  the  injury  is 
very  great  and  apparent,  suggestions  on  the  nature 
and  duty  of  forgiveness  may  not  be  without  effect. 
— But,  whatever  course  may  be  taken,  it  is  desirable 
that  the  attention  of  the  sufferer  should  be  directed 
as  little  as  possible  to  his  disease,  by  any  direct  re- 
marks upon  it.  It  was  a remark  of  Dr.  Johnson, 
whose  sad  experience  enabled  him  to  judge,  that 
conversation  upon  melancholy  feeds  it.  According- 
ly, he  advised  Boswell,  who,  as  well  as  himself,  was 
subject  to  melancholy  of  mind,  “Never  to  speak  of 
it  to  his  friends,  or  in  company.” 

§ 215.  Disordered  action  of  the  passion  of  Fear . 

The  passion  of  fear,  inasmuch  as  there  are  va- 
rious objects  around  us  which  are  or  may  be  dan- 
gerous, is  obviously  implanted  in  us  for  wise  purpo- 
ses. But  it  not  unfrequently  exhibits  an  irregular  or 
disordered  action.  This  disordered  state  of  the  af- 
fection may  discover  itself,  when  considered  either 
in  reference  to  the  occasion  on  which  it  exists,  or  in 
reference  to  the  degree  in  which  it  exists.  In  some 
cases,  for  instance,  it  is  connected  with  objects 
which,  in  the  view  of  reason  and  common  sense, 
ought  not  to  excite  it.  Some  persons  are  afraid  to 
be  alone  in  the  dark  ; it  is  exceedingly  distressing 
to  them.  Others  are  afraid  (so  much  so,  perhaps, 


352 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


as  to  be  thrown  into  convulsions  by  their  presence) 
of  a mouse,  or  a squirrel,  or  an  insect.  It  will  be 
necessary  to  refer  to,  and  to  give  some  explanation 
of  cases  of  this  kind,  under  the  head  of  Casual  As- 
sociations. 

Sometimes  the  disordered  action  of  the  passion  of 
fear  is  not  so  restricted  and  shut  up,  as  it  were,  to  a 
particular  thing ; but  takes  a wider  range,  attaching 
itself  to  all  objects  which  can  possibly  excite  the  idea 
of  danger,  even  in  the  slightest  degree.  Pinel,  who, 
more  than  any  other  writer,  is  the  great  source  of 
facts  on  this  part  of  our  subject,  mentions  an  indi- 
vidual who  was  so  subject  to  fears  that  he  could 
scarcely  get  a few  moment’s  repose,  “ not  lying 
down  till  four  or  five  o’clock  in  the  morning.  He 
passed  the  night  in  a state  of  constant  fear ; ima- 
gined he  heard  a voice  speaking  in  a low  tone  ; 
carefully  shut  his  door  ; a moment  after,  feared  that 
he  had  not  closed  it  tight,  and  continually  returned, 
and  continually  discovered  his  mistake.  Another 
idea  took  possession  of  his  mind  ; he  would  rise 
from  his  bed  to  examine  his  papers  ; he  would  sep- 
arate them  one  after  another  ; collect  them  again  ; 
believe  that  he  had  forgotten  something;  and  be 
afraid  of  the  very  dust  on  the  furniture.  He  would 
evince  the  greatest  instability  in  his  thoughts  and  in- 
tentions ; would  wish  and  not  wish  ; constantly  tor- 
mented by  suspicion  and  gloom  ; he  even  feared  to 
breathe  the  external  air,  and  always  kept  himself 
within  doors.” 


AFFECTIONS. 


353 


§ 216.  Other  illustrations  of  the  disordered  action 
of  this  passion. 

A^ain,  fear  may  exist  with  such  an  intensity  as 
essentially  to  affect  the  very  structure  of  the  mind, 
and  even  cause  insanity  in  the  higher  sense  of  the 
term.  Probably  the  power  of  this  passion  is  not 
well  understood.  Certain  it  is,  that  terrible  results 
have  often  followed  from  the  attempts  of  persons, 
particularly  of  children,  to  excite  it  in  others,  even 
in  sport.  Many  instances  are  on  record  of  individ- 
uals who  have  been  permanently  and  most  seriously 
injured,  either  in  mind  or  body,  or  both,  by  a sudden 
fright.  It  is  somewhere  stated  in  the  writings  of 
Pinel,  that  he  received  into  the  hospital  of  which  he 
had  charge  three  insane  persons  within  a very  short 
time,  whose  insanity  was  caused  in  this  way. 

Sometimes,  especially  when  connected  with  per- 
manent causes,  it  gradually  expands  and  strength- 
ens itself,  till  it  is  changed  into  despair.  The  dis- 
tinctive trait  of  Despair,  in  distinction  from  all  other 
modifications  of  fear,  is,  that  it  excludes  entirely  the 
feeling  of  hope,  which  exists  in  connexion  with  fear 
in  other  cases.  Despair  may  exist,  therefore,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  and  with  a greater  or  less 
amount  of  mentaf  anguish,  in  accordance  with  the 
nature  of  the  thing,  whatever  it  is,  which  occasions 
it.  When  great  present  or  future  interests  are  at 
stake,  and  the  mind,  in  relation  to  those  interests,  is 
in  a state  of  despair,  the  wretchedness  which  is  ex- 
perienced is  necessarily  extreme. 


354 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


§ 217.  Perversions  of  the  Benevolent  Jlffection « 

The  general  division  of  the  Affections,  as  is  well 
understood,  is  into  the  Benevolent  and  Malevolent. 
There  are  some  singular  perversions  of  the  benevo- 
lent affections,  as  well  as  those  of  an  opposite  kind, 
which  are  worthy  of  notice  here. — It  is  not  unfre- 
quently  the  case,  that  persons  in  a state  of  mental 
alienation  are  entirely  indifferent  to,  and  sometimes 
they  even  hate  those  whom,  at. other  times,  they  love 
most  sincerely  and  deeply.  It  is,  perhaps,  difficult 
to  explain  this,  although  it  is  practically  important  to 
know  the  fact. 

Dr.  Rush,  in  speaking  of  a singular  apathy  or 
torpor  of  the  passions,  which  is  sometimes  found  to 
exist,  says  : 46 1 was  once  consulted  by  a citizen  of 
Philadelphia,  who  was  remarkable  for  his  strong  af- 
fection for  his  wife  and  children  when  his  mind  was 
in  a sound  state,  who  was  occasionally  afflicted  with 
this  apathy ; and,  when  under  its  influence,  lost  his 
affection  for  them  all  so  entirely,  that  he  said  he 
could  see  them  butchered  before  his  eyes  without 
feeling  any  distress,  or  even  inclination  to  rise  from 
his  chair  to  protect  them.” 

II. — There  are  other  cases  where  there  seems  to 
be  not  merely  an  extinction  of  the  benevolent  affec- 
tion, but  its  positive  conversion  into  hatred.  The 
same  philosophic  physician  mentions  the  case  of  a 
young  lady,  who  was  confined  as  a lunatic  in  the 
Pennsylvania  Hospital  in  the  year  1802.  One  ot 
the  characteristics  of  her  insanity  was  hatred  for  her 
father.  She  was  gradually  restored  ; and,  for  sev- 


AFFECTIONS. 


355 


cral  weeks  before  she  was  discharged  from  the  hos- 
pital, discovered  all  the  marks  of  a sound  mind,  ex- 
cepting the  continuance  of  this  unnatural  feeling  of 
hatred.  On  a certain  day  she  acknowledged  with 
pleasure  a return  of  her  filial  attachment  and  affec- 
tion, and  soon  after  was  discharged  as  cured.* 

§ 2 IS.  Other'  cases  of  perverted  Benevolent  Affec- 
tions. 

III. — There  are  other  cases  where  insanity  is  the 
indirect  result  of  the  mere  intensity  of  the  benevolent 
affections.  In  cases  of  this  kind,  the  affections  are 
so  strong,  so  intense,  that  they  are  unable  to  with- 
stand the  shock  of  sudden  and  great  opposition  and 
disappointments. — “A  peasant  woman”  (says  Dr. 
Gall)  “ became  insane  three  times ; the  first,  at  the 
death  of  her  brother  ; the  second,  at  the  death  of  her 
father  ; and  the  third,  at  that  of  her  mother.  After 
she  had  recovered  the  third  time  she  came  to  consult 
me.  As  she  was  very  religious,  she  complained  to 
me  of  her  unfortunate  disposition  to  be  afflicted,  at 
the  loss  of  persons  who  were  dear  to  her,  more  than 
religion  permits ; an  evident  proof  that  she  had  yield- 
ed to  grief,  although  she  had  combated  it  by  motives 
which  were  within  her  reach.”  Pinel  also  mentions 
the  case  of  a young  man,  who  became  a violent  ma- 
niac a short  time  after  losing  a father  and  mother 
whom  he  tenderly  loved.  It  is  true  that  in  these 
cases  the  proximate  cause  of  the  insanity  is  sorrow 
or  grief ; but  the  remote  cause,  and  that  without 
which  the  unfortunate  result  would  not  have  existed, 
* Rush  on  the  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  n 255,  345. 


356  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

is  an  unrestrained  and  excessive  position  of  the  be 
nevolent  affections. 

It  may  be  proper  to  add  here,  that  sudden  and 
strong  feelings  of  joy  have,  in  repeated  instances, 
caused  a permanent  mental  disorganization,  and 
even  death  itself. — “ The  son  of  the  famous  Leib- 
nitz died  from  this  cause,  upon  his  opening  an  old 
chest,  and  unexpectedly  finding  in  it  a large  quantity 
of  gold.  Joy  from  the  successful  issue  of  political 
schemes  or  wishes  has  often  produced  the  same  ef- 
fect. Pope  Leo  the  Tenth  died  of  joy,  in  conse- 
quence of  hearing  of  a great  calamity  that  had  be- 
fallen the  French  nation.  Several  persons  died 
from  the  same  cause,  Mr.  Hume  tells  us,  upon  wit- 
nessing the  restoration  of  Charles  the  Second  to  the 
British  throne  ; and  it  is  well  known  that  the  door- 
keeper of  Congress  died  of  an  apoplexy,  from  joy, 
upon  hearing  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Lord  Corn- 
wallis and  his  army  during  the  American  revolution- 
ary war.”* 


CHAPTER  IX. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  MORAL  SENSIBILITIES. 

§ 219.  Nature  of  voluntary  Moral  Derangement . 

The  moral,  as  well  as  the  natural  or  pathematic 
Sensibilities,  the  Conscience  as  well  as  the  Heart, 
* Rush  on  the  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  p.  339. 


MORAL  SENSIBILITIES. 


357 


may  be  the  subject  of  a greater  or  less  degree  of 
disorder  and  alienaiion.  There  are  probably  two 
leading  forms,  at  least,  of  moral  derangement,  viz., 
voluntary,  and  natural  or  congenital. — In  re- 
gard to  voluntary  moral  derangement  we  remark,  as 
an  interesting  and  practically  important  fact,  that 
man  may  virtually  destroy  his  conscience.  There 
is  sound  philosophy  in  the  well-known  passage  of 
Juvenal,  “ nemo  repente  fuit  turpissimus.” 
The  truth  implied  in  this  passage  is  unquestionably 
applicable  to  all  persons,  with  the  exception  of  those 
few  cases  where  the  moral  derangement  is  natural 
or  congenital.  A man  is  not,  in  the  first  instance, 
turpissimus  or  a villain,  because  his  conscience 
makes  resistance,  and  will  not  let  him  be  so.  But 
if  the  energies  of  the  will  are  exercised  in  opposition 
to  the  conscience ; if,  on  a systematic  plan,  and  by 
a permanent  effort,  the  remonstrances  of  conscience 
are  unheeded,  and  its  action  repressed,  its  energies 
•will  be  found  to  diminish,  and  its  very  existence  will 
be  put  at  hazard.  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  this 
way  the  conscience  may  be  so  far  seared  as  to  be 
virtually  annihilated.  Multitudes  have  prepared 
themselves  for  the  greatest  wickedness,  and  have 
become,  in  fact,  morally  insane,  by  their  own  volun- 
tary doing.  There  is  a passage  in  Beaumont,  in 
his  “ King  and  no  King,”  which  strikingly  indicates 
the  progress  of  the  mind  in  such  cases. 

“ There  is  a method  in  mail’s  wickedness ; 

It  grows  up  by  degrees.  I am  not  come 
So  high  as  killing  of  myself ; there  are 
A hundred  thousand  sins  ’twixt  it  and  me, 

Which  I must  do.  I shall  come  to  ’ t at  last J* 


358 


DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 


We  say  in  such  cases  the  conscience  is  virtually 
annihilated.  And  by  this  remark  we  mean  that  it  [a 
inert,  inefficient,  dormant,  paralyzed.  We  do  not 
mean  that  it  is  dead.  The  conscience  never  dies. 
Its  apparent  death  is  impregnated  with  the  elements 
of  a real  and  terrible  resurrection.  It  seems  to 
gather  vivification  and  strength  in  the  period  of  its 
inactivity;  and  at  the  appointed  time  of  its  reappear- 
ance inflicts  a stern  and  fearful  retribution,  not  only 
for  the  crimes  which  are  committed  against  others, 
but  for  the  iniquity  which  has  been  perpetrated 
against  itself. 

§ .220.  Of  Accountability  in  connexion  with  this 
form  of  Disordered  Conscience . 

If  the  moral  sensibility,  under  the  system  of  re- 
pression which  has  been  mentioned,  refuses  to  act, 
the  question  arises  whether,  at  such  a time,  a person 
is  morally  accountable  for  his  conduct.  As  his  con- 
science does  not  condemn  him  in  what  he  does,  is 
the  transaction,  whatever  its  nature,  a criminal  one  1 
There  can  be  but  one  answer  to  this  question.  It 
the  individual  is  not  condemned  by  his  conscience, 
it  is  the  result  of  his  own  evil  course.  We  may  il- 
lustrate the  subject  by  a case  which  is  unhappily  too 
frequent.  A man  who  commits  a crime  in  a state 
of  drunkenness  may  plead  that  he  was  not,  at  the 
time,  aware  of  the  guilt  of  his  conduct.  And  this 
may  be  true.  But  he  was  guilty  for  placing  him- 
self in  a situation  where  he  knew  he  would  be  likely 
to  injure  others,  or  in  some  other  way  commit  un- 
lawful acts.  His  crime,  instead  of  being  diminish- 


MORAL  SENSIBILITIES. 


359 


ed,  is,  in  fact,  increased.  It  is  twofold.  He  is  guilty 
of  drunkenness,  and  he  is  guilty  of  everything  evil, 
which  he  knew,  or  might  have  known,  would  result 
from  his  drunkenness. 

In  like  manner,  a man  is  not  at  liberty  to  plead 
that  he  was  not,  in  the  commission  of  his  crimes, 
condemned  by  conscience,  if  it  be  the  fact  that  he 
has,  by  a previous  process,  voluntarily  perverted  or 
hardened  the  conscience.  On  the  contrary,  it  would 
be  fair  to  say,  as  in  the  case  of  drunkenness,  that 
he  has  increased  his  guilt ; for  he  has  added  to  the 
guilt  of  the  thing  done  the  antecedent  and  still  great- 
er crime  of  aiming  a blow  at  the  mind,  of  striking  at 
the  very  life  of  the  soul.  Practically  he  is  not  self- 
condemned,  for  the  mere  reason  that  he  has  para- 
lyzed the  principle  by  which  the  sentence  of  self- 
condemnation  is  pronounced.  But,  in  the  eye  of 
immutable  justice,  there  is  not  only  no  diminution 
of  his  guilt,  but  it  is  inexpressibly  enhanced  by  the 
attempts  to  murder,  if  we  may  so  express  it,  the 
principle  which,  more  than  anything  else,  constitutes 
the  dignity  and  glory  of  man’s  nature. 

§221.  Of  natural  or  congenital  JVLoral  Derange- 
ment. 

The  other  form  of  moral  derangement  is  natu- 
ral or  congenital.  We  do  not  know  that  we  are 
authorized  to  say  that  men  are  by  nature,  in  any 
case  whatever,  absolutely  destitute  of  a conscience ; 
nor,  on  the  other  hand,  have  we  positive  grounds  for 
asserting  that  this  is  not  the  case.  There  is  no 
more  inconsistency  or  impossibility  in  a man’s  com- 
Ee 


360  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

ing  into  the  world  destitute  of  a conscience,  than 
there  is  in  his  being  born  without  the  powers  of 
memory,  comparison,  and  reasoning,  which  we  find 
to  be  the  case  in  some  idiots.  But  certain  it  is, 
that  there  are  some  men  who  appear  to  have  natu- 
rally a very  enfeebled  conscience ; a conscience 
which  but  very  imperfectly  fulfils  its  office  ; and 
who,  in  this  respect  at  least,  appear  to  be  constitu- 
ted very  differently  from  the  great  body  of  their  fel- 
low-men. They  exhibit  an  imbecility,  or,  if  the 
expression  may  be  allowed,  an  idiocy  of  conscience, 
which  unquestionably  diminishes,  in  a very  consid- 
erable degree,  their  moral  accountability.  A num- 
ber of  those  writers  who  have  examined  the  subject 
of  Insanity  have  taken  this  view,  and  have  given  in- 
stances in  support  of  it. 

“In  the  course  of  my  1^’’  (says  Dr.  Rush),  “ I 
have  been  consulted  in  three  cases  of  the  total  per- 
version of  the  moral  faculties.  One  of  them  was  in 
a young  man,  the  second  in  a young  woman,  both  of 
Virginia;  and  the  third  was  in  the  daughter  of  a citi- 
zen of  Philadelphia.  The  last  was  addicted  to  ev- 
ery kind  of  mischief.  Her  wickedness  had  no  in- 
tervals while  she  was  awake,  except  when  she  was 
kept  busy  in  some  steady  and  difficult  employment.” 
He  refers  also  to  instances  in  other  writers. 

§ 222.  Further  illustrations  of  congenital  Moral 
Derangement. 

Dr.  Haslam,  in  his  Observations  on  Madness 
has  given  two  decided  cases  of  moral  derangement. 
One  of  these  was  a lad  about  ten  years  of  age. 


MORAL  SENSIBILITIES. 


361 


Some  of  the  traits  which  he  exhibited  were  as  fol- 
lows. He  early  showed  an  impatience  and  irrita- 
bility of  temper,  and  became  so  mischievous  and 
uncontrollable  that  it  was  necessary  to  appoint  a 
person  to  watch  over  him.  He  gave  answers  only 
to  such  questions  as  pleased  him,  and  acted  in  op- 
position to  every  direction.  44  On  the  first  interview 
I had  with  him”  (says  Dr.  Haslam),  44  he  contrived, 
after  two  or  three  minutes’  acquaintance,  to  break  a 
window  and  tear  the  frill  of  my  shirt.  He  was  an 
unrelenting  foe  to  all  china,  glass,  and  crockery 
ware.  Whenever  they  came  within  his  reach,  he 
shivered  them  instantly.  In  walking  the  street,  the 
keeper  was  compelled  to  take  the  wall,  as  he  uni- 
formly broke  the  windows  if  he  could  get  near  them ; 
and  this  operation  he  performed  so  dexterously,  and 
with  such  safety  to  himself,  that  he  never  cut  his 
fingers.  To  tear  lace  and  destroy  the  finer  textures 
of  female  ornament  seemed  to  gratify  him  exceed- 
ingly, and  he  seldom  walked  out  without  finding  an 
occasion  of  indulging  this  propensity.  He  never 
became  attached  to  any  inferior  animal,  a benevo- 
lence so  common  to  the  generality  of  children.  To 
these  creatures  his  conduct  was  that  of  the  brute  ; 
i he  oppressed  the  feeble,  and  avoided  the  society  of 
! those  more  powerful  than  himself.  Considerable 
i practice  had  taught  him  that  he  was  the  cat’s  mas- 
j ter;  and,  whenever  this  luckless  animal  approached 
i him,  he  plucked  out  its  whiskers  with  wonderful  ra- 
pidity ; to  use  his  own  language,  4 1 must  have  her 
beard  off:  After  this  operation  he  commonly 

threw  the  creature  on  the  fire  or  through  the  win* 


362  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE 

dow.  If  a little  dog  came  near  him,  he  kicked  it ; 
if  a large  one,  he  would  not  notice  it.  When  he 
was  spoken  to,  he  usually  said,  ‘ I do  not  choose  to 
answer.’  When  he  perceived  any  one  who  appear- 
ed to  observe  him  attentively,  he  always  said,  ‘ Nov/ 
I will  look  unpleasant.’  The  usual  games  of  chil- 
dren afforded  him  no  amusement ; whenever  boys 
were  at  play  he  never  joined  them  ; indeed,  the 
most  singular  part  of  his  character  was,  that  he  ap- 
peared incapable  of  forming  a friendship  with  any 
one  ; he  felt  no  considerations  for  sex,  and  would 
as  readily  kick  or  bite  a girl  as  a boy.  Of  any 
kindness  shown  him  he  was  equally  insensible ; he 
would  receive  an  orange  as  a present,  and  afterward 
throw  it  in  the  face  of  the  donor.” 

This  unfortunate  lad  seems  sometimes  to  have 
been  sensible  of  his  melancholy  condition.  W7hen, 
on  a certain  occasion,  he  was  conducted  through  an 
insane  hospital,  and  a mischievous  maniac  was 
pointed  out  to  him  who  was  more  strictly  confined 
than  the  rest,  he  said  to  his  attendant,  “ This  would 
be  the  right  place  for  me.”  He  often  expressed  a 
wish  to  die,  and  gave  as  a reason  “ that  God  had 
not  made  him  like  other  children.” 

§ 223.  Facts  in  relation  to  an  individual  in  the 
Lunatic  Asylum  in  Dublin. 

There  was  recently  an  individual  in  the  Richmond 
Lunatic  Asylum  in  Dublin,  in  whom  the  moral  sense 
seems  to  have  been  naturally  paralyzed,  or,  perhaps, 
extinct.  Some  account  is  given  of  him  by  Dr. 
Crawford,  the  physician  of  that  asylum,  in  a lettei 


MORAL  SENSIBILITIES. 


303 


to  Mr.  George  Combe.— “ It  is  one  of  those  cases” 
(says  Dr.  Crawford)  “ where  there  is  great  difficulty 
in  drawing  the  line  between  extreme  moral  depravi- 
ty and  insanity ; and  in  deciding  at  what  point  an 
individual  should  cease  to  be  considered  as  a re- 
sponsible moral  agent,  and  amenable  to  the  laws. 
The  governors  and  medical  gentlemen  of  the  asy- 
lum have  often  had  doubts  whether  they  were  justi- 
fied in  keeping  E.  S.  as  a lunatic , thinking  him  a 
more  fit  subject  for  a Bridewell.  He  appears,  how- 
ever, so  totally  callous  with  regard  to  every  moral 
principle  and  feeling  ; so  thoroughly  unconscious  of 
ever  having  done  anything  wrong ; so  completely 
destitute  of  all  sense  of  shame  or  remorse  when  re- 
proved for  his  vices  or  crimes  ; and  has  proved  him- 
self so  utterly  incorrigible  throughout  life,  that  it  is 
almost  certain  that  any  jury  before  whom  he  might 
be  brought  would  satisfy  their  doubts  by  returning 
him  insane , which  in  such  a case  is  the  most  humane 
line  to  pursue. 

“ He  was  dismissed  several  times  from  the  asy- 
lum, and  sent  there  the  last  time  for  attempting  to 
poison  his  father.  And  it  seems  fit  he  should  be 
kept  there  for  life  as  a moral  lunatic.  But  there 
has  never  been  the  least  symptom  of  diseased  action 
of  the  brain,  which  is  the  general  concomitant  of 
what  is  usually  called  insanity.” 

§ 224.  Of  Moral  Accountability  in  cases  of  natural 
or  congenital  Moral  Derangement. 

The  question  recurs  here,  also,  whether  persons 
who  are  the  subjects  of  a natural  or  congenital  mor- 


364  DISORDERED  ACTION,  ETC. 

al  derangement  are  morally  accountable,  and  in  what 
degree.  I?  there  is  naturally  an  entire  extinction  of 
the  moral  sense,  as  in  some  cases  of  idiocy  there  is 
an  entire  extinction  of  the  reasoning  power,  which, 
although  it  may  not  frequently  happen,  is  at  least  a 
supposable  case,  there  is  no  moral  accountability. 
A person  in  that  situation  can  have  no  distinct  per- 
ception of  what  right  and  wrong  are  ; nor  can  he  be 
conscious  of  doing  either  right  or  wrong  in  any  giv- 
en. case  ; and,  consequently,  being  without  either 
merit  or  demerit,  in  the  moral  sense  of  the  terms, 
he  is  not  the  proper  subject  of  reward  and  punish- 
ment. He  is  to  be  treated  on  the  principles  that 
are  applicable  to  idiots  and  insane  persons  generally. 

In  other  cases,  where  the  mental  disorder  is  not 
60  great,  but  there  are  some  lingering  rays  of  moral 
light,  some  feeble  capability  of  moral  vision,  the  per- 
son is  to  be  judged,  if  it  is  possible  to  ascertain  what 
it  is,  according  to  what  is  given  him.  If  he  has  but 
one  moral  talent,  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  the 
same  amount  of  moral  responsibility  rests  upon  him 
as  upon  another  who  possesses  ten.  The  doctrine 
which  requires  men,  considered  as  subjects  of  re- 
ward and  punishment,  to  be  treated  alike,  without 
regard  to  those  original  diversities  of  structure  which 
may  exist  in  all  the  departments  of  the  mind,  not 
only  tends  to  confound  right  and  wrong,  but  is  ab- 
horrent to  the  dictates  of  benevolence.  Many  indi- 
viduals, through  a misunderstanding  of  this  important 
subject,  have  suffered  under  the  hands  of  the  execu- 
tioner, who,  on  principles  of  religion  and  strict  jus- 
tice, should  have  been  encircled  only  in  the  arms  of 
compassion,  long-suffering,  and  charity. 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS,  ETC. 


365 


CHAPTER  X. 

CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN  CONNEXION  WITH  THE 
SENSIBILITIES. 

^ 225.  F7'equency  of  Casual  Associations , and  some 
instances  of  them . 

We  propose  to  conclude  this  part  of  our  subject 
by  giving  some  instances  of  Casual  Associations. 
Such  associations,  deeply  affecting  the  whole  char- 
acter, are  not  unfrequent.  By  a thousand  circum- 
stances, and  in  thousands  of  instances,  the  feelings 
are  wrenched  from  their  natural  position,  and  shoot 
forth  and  show  themselves  in  misplaced  and  dispro- 
portionate forms.  Casual  associations,  in  the  shape 
of  antipathies,  fears,  aversions,  prepossessions,  re- 
morse, &c.,  are  found  seated  in  many  a mind,  which 
is  otherwise  unembarrassed  and  unexceptionable  in 
its  action ; they  have  established  their  empire  there 
on  immoveable  foundations,  and  are  incorporated 
with  the  whole  mental  nature. 

If  it  were  otherwise,  how  could  a man,  who  would 
v?llingly  face  a thousand  men  in  battle,  tremble  at  a 
mouse,  a squirrel,  a thunder-shower,  at  the  trivial 
circumstance  of  placing  the  left  slipper  on  the  right 
foot,  or  any  other  very  trifling  thing  ! And  yet  such 
instances  are  without  number. — It  may  be  consid- 
ered singular  enough,  but  so  it  is,  that  some  men 


366 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN 


cannot  endure  the  sight  of  a fish,  eel,  or  lobster  ; 
another  person  is  disgusted  at  the  sight  of  cheese, 
honey,  eggs,  milk,  or  apples  ; another  is  exceeding- 
ly distressed,  and  even  convulsed,  at  the  sight  of  v 
toad  or  a cat,  a grasshopper  or  a beetle. 


§ 226.  Of  Association  in  connexion  with  the 
Appetites. 

In  proceeding  to  give  some  illustrations  of  thih 
interesting  subject,  which  has  hitherto  received  but 
little  attention,  we  begin  with  the  Appetites,  which 
are  subject  to  strong  Associative  influences,  as  will 
appear  by  some  statements. 

I. Almost  every  article  which  is  capable  of  being 

masticated  and  digested  is  made,  in  one  country  or 
another,  an  article  of  food.  It  is  the  case,  at  the 
same  time,  that  there  are  many  articles  used  as  food 
in  one  country  which  are  not  used  as  food  in  an- 
other. This  difference  in  the  manner  of  living  is  to 
be  ascribed,  in  many  cases,  to  some  early  and  fixed 
association.  In  some  countries  the  people  eat  rats, 
mice,  frogs,  lizards,  horseflesh,  dogs,  locusts,  cater- 
pillars, &c.*  In  other  countries,  in  our  own  for 
instance,  the  associations  adverse  to  the  use  of  such 
kinds  of  food  are  so  strong  that  it  is  next  to  impos- 


sible to  overcome  them. 

II. There  are  appetitive  associations  of  a dilier- 

ent  kind.  It  is  well  known,  for  instance,  that  the 
appetite  for  drink  may  be  inflamed  by  a mere  name, 
or  the  sight  of  a particular  building  or  place,  or  the 

* Lander's  Niger,  vol.  i.,  Am.  ed„  p 170  179,-Lives  of  Cel- 
ebrated  Travellers,  vol.  i.,  Am.  ed.,  p.  102,  215. 


CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBILITIES.  367 

' return  of  a certain  hour  of  the  day.  This  unques- 
tionably is  the  result  of  a casual  association.  And 
the  association  may  have  become  so  strong,  that  the 
appetite  is  rendered  wholly  irrepressible  whenever 
such  objects  recur. — This  is  particularly  true  when 
the  liquor  itself,  the  rum,  gin,  wine,  or  brandy,  is 
placed  directly  before  the  thorough-going  drunkard. 
The  appetite  in  a moment  becomes  so  strong  as  to 
convulse  the  whole  soul.  He  is  agitated  and  rent 
with  a sort  of  madness  ; and  rushes  upon  the  object 
before  him,  much  as  the  furious  lion  seizes  and 
rends  his  keeper  when  he  has  accidentally  seen  and 
tasted  his  blood. 

§ 227.  Of  Casual  Associations  in  connexion  ivith 
the  Pi'opensities. 

As  we  pass  on  from  the  Appetites  to  the  consid- 
eration of  that  part  of  our  Sentient  nature  which,  in 
distinction  from  the  appetites  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  affections  on  the  other,  is  known  as  the  Propen- 
sities, we  find  some  instances  of  the  power  of  asso- 
ciation, both  in  strengthening  and  in  annulling  them. 

Among  other  Propensities,  which  have  a distinct 

and  natural  origin,  is  the  desire  of  society ; but  it  is 
undoubtedly  the  case,  that  peculiar  circumstances 
may  operate  either  to  increase  this  desire  or  to  an- 
nul it  altogether.  All  cases  of  decided  and  perma- 
nent Misanthropy,  for  instance,  are  the  work,  with 
perhaps  a few  exceptions  of  congenital  alienation, 
not  of  nature,  but  of  circumstances.  If  a man  of 
kind  and  benevolent  feelings  is  exceedingly  ill-treat- 
ed by  one  whom  he  has  often  favoured,  it  is  possi- 
F F 


368 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN 


ble,  at  least,  that  it  will  result  in  a fixed  aversion  to* 
that  person,  which  nothing  can  afterward  overcome. 

If  a deep  and  permanent  injury  were  inflicted,  not 
merely  by  a friend,  but  a brother,  the  effect  on  the 
mind  might  be  so  great  as  not  only  to  break  up  the 
original  principle  of  sociability,  but  implant  a deci- 
ded and  unchangeable  hostility  to  the  whole  human 
race.  Such  treatment  would  be  so  contrary  from 
what  the  injured  person  had  a right  to  expect,  that 
the  mind  would  be  thrown  entirely  out  of  its  original 
position,  and  with  such  force  as  to  be  unable  to  re- 
cover it. 

§ 228.  Other  instances  of  Casual  Association  in 
connexion  with  the  Propensities. 

The  desire  of  power,  in  the  remarks  which  were 
formerly  made  upon  that  subject,  was  regarded  as 
an  original  propensity.  This  principle  may  become 
disordered  in  its  action  by  becoming  inordinately  in- 
tense, and  also  in  connexion  with  some  casual  as- 
sociation. Mr.  Locke,  in  his  Letters  on  Tolera- 
tion, mentions  the  case  of  an  individual  (the  case 
already  instanced  under  the  head  of  inordinate  de- 
sire of  power)  whose  mind  was  so  long  and  intently 
fixed  upon  some  high  object,  that  he  became  par- 
tially insane.  He  was,  for  the  most  part,  rational  at 
other  times,  but  whenever  the  object  he  had  so  ear- 
nestly pursued  was  mentioned,  it  brought  into  exer- 
cise so  many  intense  associations  that  he  immedi- 
ately became  deranged. 

Although  we  might  find  it  difficult  to  illustrate  this 
subject  from  the  ordinary  forms  of  the  propensity  to 


CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBILITIES.  369 

Imitation,  the  power  of  casual  associations  may  dis- 
tinctly be  shown  in  sympathetic  imitation.  If  a per- 
son’s feelings  be,  from  any  cause,  so  strongly  exci- 
ted as  to  show  themselves  in  involuntary  bodily  ac- 
tion, subsequently  the  mere  sight  of  the  person, 
place,  or  instrument  that  was  prominently  concerned 
in  the  original  excitement  of  the  mind,  will  general- 
ly be  attended  with  a recurrence  of  the  sympathetic 
bodily  action.  After  such  results  have  followed  a 
number  of  times,  the  association  will  become  so 
strong,  that  it  will  be  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
for  the  sympathetic  person  to  repress  the  outward 
bodily  signs,  in  all  cases,  coming  within  the  reach  of 
the  association. 

§ 229.  Inordinate  fear  from  Casual  Associations. 

The  same  views  may  undoubtedly  be  carried  into 
the  higher  department  of  the  Affections  or  Passions. 
It  is  sufficiently  evident,  for  instance,  that  the  pas- 
sion of  fear  is  an  attribute  of  man’s  nature  ; and, 
in  ordinary  cases,  it  is  susceptible  of  being  subject- 
ed to  the  control  of  reason  and  the  sentiments  of 
duty.  But  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Casual 
associations  are  sometimes  formed  which  no  effort 
of  reason  and  no  calls  of  duty  can  rend  asunder. — 
We  will  endeavour  to  illustrate  this  subject  by  some 
familiar  instances. 

Some  persons  have  been  exceedingly  frightened 
by  thunder  and  lightning  at  early  periods  of  life. 
The  fright  may  have  been  occasioned  either  direct- 
ly, or  by  the  actual  terrific  power  and  nearness  of 
the  explosion,  or  by  merely  seeing  an  exhibition  of 


370  CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN 

great  fear  in  parents  or  others  more  advanced  in 
years.  And  from  that  hour  to  the  end  of  life  they 
have  never  been  able,  with  all  possible  care  and  anx- 
iety, to  free  themselves  from  the  most  distressing 
fear  on  such  occasions. 

Casual  associations,  occasioned  by  some  unfor- 
tunate circumstances  in  early  life,  have  been  the 
source  of  very  great  and  irrepressible  fears  in  re- 
spect to  death.  The  fear  of  death  is  natural ; and, 
perhaps  we  may  say,  is  instinctive  ; but  it  does  not 
ordinarily  exist  in  such  intensity  as  essentially  to  in- 
terrupt one’s  happiness.  And  yet,  from  time  to  time, 
we  find  unhappy  exceptions  to  this  statement.  Miss 
Hamilton,  in  her  Letters  on  Education,  gives  an  in- 
teresting account  of  a lady  who  suffered  exceeding- 
ly from  such  fears.  She  was  a person  of  an  origi- 
nal and  inventive  genius,  of  a sound  judgment,  and 
her  powers  of  mind  had  received  a careful  cultiva- 
tion. But  all  this  availed  nothing  against  the  im- 
pressions which  had  been  wrought  into  her  mind 
from  infancy.  The  first  view  which  she  had  of 
death  in  infancy  was  accompanied  with  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances of  terror ; and  the  dreadful  impression 
which  was  then  made  was  heightened  by  the  injudi- 
cious language  of  the  nursery.  Ever  afterward,  the 
mere  mention  or  idea  of  death  was  attended  with 
great  suffering  ; so  much  so,  that  it  was  necessary, 
by  means  of  every  possible  precaution,  to  keep  her 
in  ignorance  of  her  actual  danger  when  she  was 
sick  ; nor  was  it  permitted,  at  any  time,  to  mention 
instances  of  death  in  her  presence.  So  that  the 
estimable  writer  of  this  statement  asserts,  that  she 


CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBILITIES.  371 

often  suffered  mere  from  the  apprehension  than  she 
could  have  suffered  from  the  most  agonizing  torture 
that  ever  attended  the  hour  of  dissolution.* 

§ 230.  Casual  Associations  in  respect  to  persons. 

That  the  Affections  may  be  more  or  less  disor- 
dered by  means  of  casual  associations,  is  further 
evident  from  what  we  notice  in  the  intercourse  of 
individuals  with  each  other.  Men  sometimes  form 
such  an  aversion  to  others,  or  associate  with  them 
such  sentiments  of  dread,  that  the  connexion  of  the 
persons  and  the  feelings  becomes  permanent  and 
unconquerable. — It  has  sometimes  been  the  case, 
that  a man  of  distinguished  talents  has  been  defeat- 
ed and  prostrated  by  another,  in  an  argument,  per- 
haps, on  some  public  occasion ; and  although  he 
harbours  no  resentment  against  his  opponent,  and 
has  no  sense  of  inferiority,  yet  he  never  afterward 
meets  him  in  company  without  experiencing  a very 
sensible  degree  of  uneasiness  and  suffering. 

Persons  have  sometimes  been  ill-treated  by  oth- 
ers ; and  this  occasionally  forms  the  basis  of  an  in- 
vincible association,  either  of  aversion  or  of  dread. 
The  poet  Cowper,  in  early  life,  suffered  in  this  way. 
A boy  of  a cruel  temper,  his  superior  in  age,  made 
him  the  object  of  long-continued  ill-treatment  and 
persecution.  “ This  boy”  (he  remarks)  “ had  im- 
pressed such  a dread  of  his  figure  upon  my  mind, 
that  l well  remember  being  afraid  to  lift  my  eyes 
upon  him  higher  than  his  knees  ; and  that  I knew 
him  by  his  shoebuckles  better  than  by  any  other 
part  of  his  dress.” 

* Elementary  Principles  of  Education  Letter  III. 


372 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN 


An  individual  was  once  perfectly  cured  of  mad- 
ness by  a very  harsh  and  offensive  operation.  Du- 
ring all  his  life  after,  he  acknowledged,  with  the  most 
sincere  gratitude,  that  he  could  not  have  received  a 
greater  benefit ; and  still  he  was  utterly  unable  to 
bear  the  sight  of  the  operator,  it  suggested  so  strong- 
ly the  dreadful  suffering  which  he  underwent* 

Some  men  have  an  exceeding  and  unaccountable 
aversion  to  the  mere  features  and  countenance  of  an- 
other, and  cannot  bear  to  be  looked  upon  by  them. 
A statement  is  somewhere  given  of  a person  of  a 
noble  family,  who  was  not  able  to  bear  that  an  old 
woman  should  look  upon  him.  Certain  persons,  in 
a season  of  merriment,  which  is  not  always  wisely 
directed  towards  these  humbling  infirmities  of  our 
nature,  succeeded  in  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  in- 
troducing him  into  the  presence  of  one  such,  but  the 
shock  to  his  feelings  was  so  great  as  to  terminate  in 
his  death. 

^231.  Casual  Association  in  connexion  with  objects 
and  places . 

The  mental  operations,  in  consequence  of  strong 
casual  associations,  may  be  perplexed  in  their  action 
in  connexion  with  particular  places  and  objects. 
“ Some  persons”  (says  Dr.  Conolly,  in  reference  to 
this  subject)  “are  mad  and  unmanageable  at  home, 
and  sane  abroad.  We  read  in  Aretseus  of  a car- 
penter who  was  very  rational  in  his  workshop,  but 
who  could  not  turn  his  steps  towards  the  Forum 
without  beginning  to  groan,  to  shrug  his  shoulders, 
* Locke’s  Essay,  book  ii.,  ch.  xxxii. 


CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBILITIES.  373 

and  to  bemoan  himself.  Dr.  Rush  relates  an  in- 
stance of  a preacher  in  America,  who  was  mad 
among  his  parishioners  except  in  the  pulpit,  where 
he  conducted  himself  with  great  ability  ; and  he  also 
speaks  of  a judge  who  was  very  lunatic  in  mixed 
society,  but  sagacious  on  the  bench.” 

“ I have  known  patients”  (says  the  same  writer 
in  another  place)  “ in  whom  there  was  a tendency 
to  mania,  complain  of  the  difficulty  they  found  in 
guarding  against  dislike,  not  only  of  particular  indi- 
viduals, but  of  particular  parts  of  a room,  or  of  the 
house,  or  of  particular  articles  of  furniture  or  dress  ; 
those  momentary  feelings  of  uneasiness  or  antipathy 
to  which  all  are  subject,  becoming  in  them  aggrava- 
ted or  prolonged.”*  In  connexion  with  the  facts 
just  stated,  he  mentions  the  case  of  an  individual 
who  could  not  bear  the  sight  of  white  stockings  ; 
and  of  a certain  Russian  general  who  entertained  a 
singular  antipathy  to  mirrors ; so  much  so,  that  the 
Empress  Catharine  always  took  care  to  give  him 
audience  in  a room  without  any. 

§ 232.  Of  Casual  Association  in  connexion  ivith 
particular  days . 

The  same  marked  tendencies  of  mind  may  some- 
times be  discovered  in  connexion  with  particular 
days  or  other  periods  of  time.  Pinel  mentions  a 
lady  who  fancied  that  Friday  was  a day  of  ill  omen 
and  ill  luck.  “ She  at  length  carried  this  notion  so 
far,  that  she  would  not  leave  her  room  on  that  day. 
If  the  month  began  on  a Friday,  it  rendered  her  ex- 

* Conolly  on  Insanity,  London  ed.,  p.  98,  218. 


374 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN 


tremely  fearful  and  miserable  for  several  days.  By 
degrees,  Thursday,  being  the  eve  of  Friday,  excited 
similar  alarms.  If  ever  she  heard  either  of  those 
days  named  in  company,  she  immediately  turned 
pale,  and  was  confused  in  her  manner  and  conver 
sation,  as  if  she  had  been  visited  by  some  fatal  mis 
fortune.’5* 

Statements,  much  to  the  same  effect,  have  been 
made  of  an  individual  no  less  distinguished  than 
Lord  Byron.  From  some  circumstance  or  other, 
he  became  deeply  impressed  with  the  belief  that 
Friday  was  destined  to  be,  in  relation  to  himself,  an 
unlucky  or  ill-omened  day.  This  was  not  a mere 
transitory  feeling,  which  was  under  the  control  of  his 
philosophy,  but  was  deeply  seated  and  operative. 
And,  with  his  characteristic  frankness,  he  did  not 
hesitate  to  declare,  or,  rather,  he  took  no  pains  to 
conceal,  that  his  mind  was  actually  under  the  des- 
potism of  this  strange  influence,  f 

We  will  subjoin  here,  as  bearing  some  affinity  to 
the  cases  which  might  properly  be  arranged  under 
this  head,  an  instance  mentioned  in  the  Encyclopae- 
dia Americana,  by  the  author  of  the  article  on  Mem- 
ory. The  statement  is  as  follows  : “ How  strange 
are  the  associations  of  ideas  which  often  take  place 
in  spite  of  us.  Every  one  must  have  experienced 
such.  The  writer  recollects  a melancholy  instance 
in  the  case  of  an  insane  boy  in  an  hospital,  whose 
derangement  was  referred  to  an  irreverent  associa- 
tion with  the  name  of  God,  which  occurred  to  him 

* Treatise  on  Insanity,  p.  140. 

f Moore’s  Life  of  Byron,  vol.  ii.,  p.  458. 


CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBILITIES.  375 

while  singing  a hymn  in  church,  and  of  which  he 
could  not  divest  himself,  the  painfulness  of  the  im- 
pression making  it  occur  to  him  more  forcibly  every 
time  he  sung  in  church,  till  his  reason  became  un- 
settled.” 

§ 233.  Antipathies  to  Animals. 

Nothing  but  the  fact  of  the  existence  and  great 
power  of  casual  associations  can  explain  the  circum- 
stance, that  individuals  have,  from  time  to  time,  dis- 
covered a very  great  antipathy  to  certain  animals. 
Tasso,  according  to  his  biographers,  would  fall  into 
convulsions  at  the  sight  of  a carp.  Henry  the 
Third,  of  England,  could  not  be  persuaded  to  sit  in 
the  room  with  a cat.  Admiral  Coligni,  a name 
justly  renowned  in  the  history  of  France,  was  so 
afraid  of  a mouse,  that  he  could  not  be  induced  to 
admit  one  to  his  presence  unless  he  had  his  sword 
in  his  hand. 

No  man  ever  gave  more  decided  proofs  of  cour- 
age than  the  celebrated  Marquis  de  la  Roche  Jac- 
queline ; but  it  is  a singular  fact  (although  no  ac- 
count is  given  of  the  origin  of  this  strange  associa- 
tion), that  he  could  not  look  in  the  face  of  a squirrel 
without  trembling  and  turning  pale.  He  himself 
ridiculed  his  weakness  in  this  respect ; but,  with  all 
his  efforts,  he  could  not  prevent  the  physical  effects 
which  have  been  referred  to,  whenever  he  was  in  the 
presence  of  that  harmless  animal. 

But  we  have  an  incident  nearer  home,  which  ap- 
pears the  less  surprising,  because  we  know  the  ori- 
gin of  it.  The  late  Governor  Sullivan,  of  Massa- 


376 


CASUAL  ASSOCIATIONS  IN 


chusetts,  when  a boy,  fell  asleep  under  a tree,  and 
was  awakened  by  a serpent  crawling  over  him.  He 
arose  in  great  terror,  ran  towards  the  house,  and  fell 
down  in  a convulsive  fit.  Afterward,  through  life, 
he  retained  such  aversion  for  everything  of  the  ser- 
pent kind,  that  he  could  not  see  one,  or  even  the 
picture  of  one,  without  falling  into  convulsions. 

Peter  the  Great,  of  Russia,  who  certainly  was  not 
wanting  in  expansion  and  force  of  mind,  was  subject 
to  a strong  and  invincible  aversion  of  this  kind.  His 
biographer,  without  giving  any  explanation  of  it, 
merely  mentions  the  facts  as  follows. — “ Nothing 
was  so  much  the  object  of  the  Czar’s  antipathy  as  a 
black  insect  of  the  scarabeus  or  beetle  kind,  which 
breeds  in  houses  that  are  not  kept  clean,  and  espe- 
cially in  places  where  meal  and  other  provisions  are 
deposited.  In  the  country  the  walls  and  ceilings  of 
the  peasant’s  houses  are  covered  with  them,  partic- 
ularly in  Russia,  where  they  abound  more  than  in 
any  other  part  of  the  world.  They  are  there  called 
taracan ; but  our  naturalists  give  them  the  name  of 
dermeste,  or  dissecting  scarabeus. 

“ Although  the  Russian  monarch  was  far  from 
being  subject  to  childish  fears  or  womanish  fancies, 
one  of  these  insects  sufficed  to  drive  him  out  of  an 
apartment,  nay,  even  out  of  the  house.  In  his  fre- 
quent journeys  in  his  own  dominions,  he  never  went 
into  a house  without  having  his  apartment  carefully 
swept  by  one  of  his  own  servants,  and  being  assured 
that  there  were  no  taracans  to  fear.  One  day  he 
paid  a visit  to  an  officer,  who  stood  pretty  high  in 
his  esteem,  at  his  country  house,  which  was  built  of 


CONNEXION  WITH  THE  SENSIBILITIES.  37? 

wood,  at  a little  distance  from  Moscow.  The  Czar 
expressed  his  satisfaction  with  what  was  offered  him, 
and  with  the  order  he  observed  in  the  house.  The 
company  sat  down  to  table,  and  dinner  was  already 
begun,  when  he  asked  his  landlord  if  there  were 
taracans  in  his  house. 

“ ‘ Not  many,’  replied  the  officer,  without  reflect- 
ing ; 4 and,  the  better  to  get  rid  of  them,  I have 
pinned  a living  one  to  the  wall.’  At  the  same  time 
he  pointed  to  the  place  where  the  insect  was  pinned, 
and  still  continued  to  palpitate.  Unfortunately,  it 
was  just  beside  the  Czar,  in  whom  the  unexpected 
sight  of  this  object  of  his  aversion  produced  so  much 
emotion,  that  he  rose  instantly  from  table,  gave  the 
officer  a violent  blow,  and  left  his  house  with  all  his 
attendants.”* 

* Staelhim’s  Original  Anecdotes  of  Peter  the  Great 


IMPERFECT  AND  DISORDERED 


mental  action. 


DIVISION  THIRD. 

DISORDERED  action  of  the  wil 


DISORDERED  ACTION 


OF  THE 

WILL. 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 

§ 234.  On  the  relation  of  the  Will  to  the  other  parts 
of  the  JVLind. 

It  cannot  fail  to  have  been  noticed,  that  our  in- 
quiries hitherto  have  proceeded  upon  the  important 
principle,  which  is  now  generally  acknowledged  to 
be  a correct  one,  of  a threefold  division  of  the  mind, 
viz.,  the  Intellect,  the  Sensibilities,  and  the  Will. 
Having  considered  the  subject  before  us,  very  brief- 
ly, it  is  true,  in  connexion  with  the  two  first-mention- 
ed departments,  we  proceed  now  to  the  only  re- 
maining topic,  viz.,  the  Disordered  Action  of  the  Will. 

The  Will  is  a department  of  the  Mind,  evidently 
standing  by  itself ; having  its  distinct  nature  and  at- 
tributes, as  well  as  its  appropriate  laws.  The  purely 
intellectual  acts  have  something  peculiar  and  char- 
acteristic, which  shuts  them  out,  as  it  were,  from  the 


362 


NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 


region  of  the  Sensibilities.  The  Sensitive  action, 
as°well  as  the  Intellectual,  has  its  specific  nature ; 
something  by  which  it  is  known  and  distinguished 
from  other  forms  of  mental  movement.  The  Will 
also  stands  apart,  having  its  appropriate  sphere  and 
its  allotted  duties ; holding,  as  it  were,  the  place  of 
keystone  to  the  arch,  and  exercising  a sort  of  super- 
visory and  authoritative  power  over  the  other  depart- 
ments of  the  mind. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Will,  considered  in  its  reg- 
ular or  normal  action,  is  a subject  of  great  impor- 
tance and  interest ; nor  will  it  be  found  wholly  want- 
ing in  interest  when  considered  in  reference  to  those 
irregularities  of  action  of  which  it  is  sometimes  the 
subject. 

§ 235.  Of  the  attribute  of  Power  as  existing  in  the 
Will. 

The  subject  of  the  disordered  action  and  insanity 
of  the  Will  will  be  found,  in  its  basis  or  origin,  to 
have  relation,  in  nearly  all  cases,  to  the  attribute  of 
Power. — It  will  be  noticed,  that  we  take  it  for  grant- 
ed that  there  is  such  a thing  as  power.  In  other 
words,  that  power,  notwithstanding  the  fact  of  its  not 
being  directly  cognizable  by  the  outward  senses  (as 
it  is  not),  is  something  positive  and  real ; something 
which  can  be  estimated  to  some  extent,  and  which 
can  be  made  a subject  of  examination,  reasoning, 
and  opinion.  Accordingly,  every  man  is  supposed 
to  know  what  power  is,  although  it  may  be  very  true 
that  it  is  not  a direct  object  of  the  sight  or  hearing, 
or  any  of  the  outward  senses. 


NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 


383 


And  not  only  this.  It  is  a fact  also,  for  which 
we  have  the  testimony  of  our  consciences,  that,  al 
though  it  does  not  exist  in  the  form  of  a separate 
faculty  analogous  to  perception  or  memory,  it  exists, 
nevertheless,  as  an  attribute  of  the  whole  mind,  and 
is  diffused,  in  a greater,  or  less  degree,  through  all 
its  faculties.  In  other  words,  we  have  an  original 
feeling  or  conviction,  originating  in  the  facts  of  our 
consciousness,  that  in  every  exercise  or  operation  of 
the  mind  there  is,  and  must  be,  power. 

And  this  is  not  all.  Power  is  not  only,  in  gen- 
eral terms,  predicable  of  the  mind  as  a whole,  but 
it  is  particularly  and  emphatically  so  of  the  depart- 
ment of  the  Will.  If  the  other  mental  acts  clearly 
indicate  to  us  the  existence  of  an  innate  energy,  cer- 
tainly we  should  not  expect  to  find  less  of  energy, 
less  of  power,  existing  as  the  basis  of  acts  of  the 
will.  When  a person  wills  to  go  to  a certain  place, 
or  wills  to  do  a certain  thing,  it  requires  no  train  of 
reasoning  to  convince  him  that  power  is  the  basis  of 
the  volition,  and,  consequently,  that  power  truly  ex- 
ists as  an  attribute  of  the  voluntary  or  volitive  nature. 

§ 236.  Of  the  degree  of  Power  existing  in  the  Will . 

We  are  not  to  suppose  that  the  power  which  ex- 
ists in  the  Will  is  unlimited  in  degree.  The  degree 
of  power  is  different  in  different  minds  ; but  in  all 
cases  it  may  be  regarded  as*a  fixed  and  definite 
thing  ; capable  of  a certain  amount  of  action,  or  of 
sustaining  a certain  degree  of  pressure,  but  utterly 
inefficient  beyond  that  amount  or  degree. 

The  Will,  therefore,  may,  under  certain  eircum- 
G o 


884 


NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 


stances,  be  overburdened  and  oppressed  in  its  action. 
YVe  may  expect  too  much  from  it ; and  it  may  not 
answer  to  our  requisitions,  merely  because  it  is  un- 
able to.  It  may  be  thrown  into  a wrong  position  by 
the  excited  state  and  the  inordinate  action  of  other 
parts  of  the  mind.  It  may  be  undermined  by  a 
crazy  belief,  or  trammelled  by  an  invincible  associ- 
ation. For  these  and  for  other  reasons,  it  may  fail 
(and,  in  point  of  fact,  this  is  not  unfrequently  the 
case)  to  discharge  successfully  its  appropriate  offices. 

§ 237.  Of  Positive  in  distinction  from  Relative 
disorder  of  the  Will . 

Accordingly,  a disordered  or  alienated  condition 
of  the  Will  is  as  frequently  relative  as  positive. 
That  is  to  say  (and  this  is  an  important  considera- 
tion, which  it  may  be  well  to  keep  in  mind),  it  fails 
to  fulfil  the  duties  which  pertain  to  it  as  a voluntary 
power,  as  frequently,  and  probably  more  so,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  disordered  action  of  other  parts  of 
the  mind,  as  in  consequence  of  any  absolute  defect 
inherent  in  itself.  Nevertheless,  there  are  some 
cases  where  it  is  evident  that  the  defective  volun- 
tary action  is  to  be  ascribed,  not  so  much  to  any 
perplexities  and  hinderances  which  lay  out  of  the  will, 
as  to  something  which  nature  herself  may  be  said  to 
have  wrought  into  it. 


IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 


385 


CHAPTER  II. 

IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 

^ 238.  Of  natural  weakness  or  imbecility  of  the  Will . 

One  of  the  forms  in  which  a disordered  will  de- 
velopes  itself  is  that  of  Imbecility  or  inordinate 
Weakness. — We  not  unfrequently  see  persons  who 
develope  this  trait  of  mind ; men  who  are  easily  in- 
timidated, vacillating,  who  affirm  when  they  should 
deny,  and  deny  when  they  should  affirm ; who,  in 
common  parlance,  and  almost  in  strict  truth,  “have 
no  will  of  their  own.” 

Their  minds  are  essentially  in  the  condition  ot  a 
paralytic  limb,  that  may  be  acted  upon,  but  without 
giving  any  signs  of  vitality  in  itself.  Sometimes 
these  persons  possess  a considerable  share  ot  natu- 
ral intellectual  vigour ; but  it  is  almost  of  no  avail, 
since  their  voluntary  energy  is  not  sufficient  to  bring 
it  into  permanent  action.  They  sometimes  foim 
plans,  but  generally  exhaust  themselves  in  the  in- 
cipient efforts,  and  the  execution  is  a non  sequitur  ! 
They  would  be  wholly  useless  in  society,  were  it  not 
that  they  can  be  acted  on  by  others,  and  thus  be 
kept  in  a sort  of  automatic  movement  by  means  of 
other  person’s  wills  substituted  in  the  place  of  their 
own. 


386 


IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 


§ 239.  Consideration  of  the  foregoing  statements  in 
connexion  with  Poiver. 

The  statements  which  have  just  been  made  illus- 
trate a leading  remark  in  the  preceding  chapter  to 
this  effect,  that  the  subject  of  disordered  action  ex- 
isting in  the  Will  will  be  found,  in  nearly  all  cases, 
to  have  a relation  to  the  attribute  of  Power.  A nor- 
mal or  right  Will  may,  of  course,  be  expected  to 
have  power  enough  to  secure  the  great  objects  for 
which  the  Will  obviously  exists,  viz.,  the  exercise  of 
a supervisory  control,  and  the  enforcement  of  that 
control  upon  the  other  parts  of  the  mind,  as  well  as 
upon  the  body.  This  is  the  true  idea  of  a perfectly 
regular  or  sane  state  of  the  Will.  Consequently, 
every  deviation  from  this  state,  when,  for  instance, 
there  is  not  power  enough  to  secure  these  great  ob- 
jects, and  the  man  is  governed  by  the  impulses  of 
association  and  feeling  rather  than  by  the  great  reg- 
ulator, necessarily  implies,  to  some  extent,  an  im- 
perfect or  disordered  state. 

And  this  is  precisely  the  case  which  was  consid- 
ered in  the  preceding  section.  The  Will  fails  of  its 
object,  and,  therefore,  is  not  such  as  it  should  be. 
It  does  not  exhibit  the  great  requisite  and  character- 
istic of  its  own  nature,  viz.,  the  element  of  authori- 
tative control,  and,  therefore,  cannot  escape  the  im- 
putation, according  to  the  degree  in  which  the  defect 
exists,  either  of  disorder  short  of  insanity,  or  of  pos- 
itive alienation. 

Of  this  form  of  disordered  Will  some  illustrations 
might  properly  be  given  in  this  place,  additional  to 


IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL.  387 

<jhe  facts  and  instances  given  in  the  chapters  on  Ab- 
straction and  Attention,  which  will  help  to  commu- 
nicate some  idea  of  it. 

§ 240.  Illustration  of  natural  imbecility  of  the  Will. 

Pinel  states,  that  he  had  frequent  opportunities  of 
seeing  a person,  whose  conduct,  as  it  seems  to  us, 
rather  strikingly  illustrates  this  form  of  mental  disor- 
der.— After  stating  that  his  ideas  appeared  to  be  in- 
sulated, and  to  rise  one  after  the  other  without  con- 
nexion, he  goes  on  to  remark  as  follows  : “ His 
motions,  his  ideas,  his  broken  sentences,  his  confu- 
sed and  momentary  glimpses  of  mental  affection,  ap- 
peared to  present  a perfect  image  of  chaos.  He 
came  up  to  me,  looked  at  me,  and  overwhelmed  me 
with  a torrent  of  words,  without  order  or  connexion. 
In  a moment  he  turned  to  another  person,  whom,  in 
his  turn,  he  deafened  with  his  unmeaning  babble,  or 
threatened  with  an  evanescent  look  of  anger.  But, 
as  incapable  of  determined  and  continued  excite- 
ment of  the  feelings,  as  of  a just  connexion  of  ideas, 
his  emotions  were  the  effects  of  a momentary  effer- 
vescence, which  was  immediately  succeeded  by  a 
calm. 

“If he  went  into  a room,  he  quickly  displaced  or 
overturned  the  furniture,  without  manifesting  any  di- 
rect intention.  Scarcely  could  one  look  off  before 
he  would  be  at  a considerable  distance,  exercising 
his  versatile  mobility  in  some  other  way.  He  was 
quiet  only  when  food  was  presented  to  him.  He 
rested,  even  at  nights,  but  for  a few  moments.”* 

* Pinei’s  Treatise  on  Insanity,  Davis’s  Translation,  p.  163. 


388  IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 

It  is  very  evident  that  the  power  of  Will  existed 
in  this  person  in  a very  limited  degree.  Indeed,  it 
is  not  easy  to  perceive  how  his  conduct  could  be 
very  much  different,  if  the  faculty  of  the  Will  had 
been  entirely  erased  from  his  mind,  and  he  had  been 
left  without  any  controlling  principle  at  all. 

§ 241.  Further  remarks  on  imbecility  of  WilL 

There  are  some  important  applications  which 
may  be  made  of  the  view  that  has  now  been  taken. 
There  are  some  men,  for  instance,  who,  under  the 
influence  of  some  more  or  less  slightly  excited  pas- 
sion, commit  crimes  which  we  should  certainly  sup- 
pose they  would  not  do  if  they  had  the  least  power 
of  self-restraint.  They  go  forward  much  as  do  some 
children,  in  whom  the  volitive  power  is  but  little  de- 
veloped, and  whose  constantly  varying  acts  seem  to 
originate  exclusively  in  mere  sensitive,  passionate 
impulses.  In  other  words,  their  conduct  is  very 
much  such  as  we  should  suppose  it  would  be  if  the 
outward  action  were  based  directly  upon  the  sensi- 
bilities, without  the  suspensive  and  regulative  faculty 
of  the  Will  intervening.  They  feel,  they  have  an 
impulse,  and  they  go  and  do  accordingly,  without 
any  interrogatory  being  put  or  any  restraint  being 
exercised  by  the  higher  regulating  power.  In  all 
such  cases,  where  we  do  not  see  occasion  for  great 
excitement  of  the  passions,  and  where,  in  point  ot 
fact,  although  there  is  some,  there  is  yet  no  very 
great  excitement,  it  seems  impossible  to  explain  the 
facts  that  present  themselves,  except  on  the  ground 
of  inordinate  weakness  of  the  Will. 


IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 


389 


I am  inclined  to  the  opinion,  that  in  many  cases 
of  murder,  if  we  could  analyze  perfectly  the  mental 
structure  of  those  who  commit  this  crime,  we  should 
find  these  individuals  differing  from  a multitude  of 
other  persons  less  in  the  positive  malignity  o t e 
passions  than  in  a great  weakness  of  the  will,  which 
renders  them  unable  to  control  their  passions, 
is  probable  that,  in  most  cases,  this  is  not  the  only 
ground  of  difference,  as  there  may,  for  instance,  be 
combined  with  the  weakness  of  the  will  an  inordi- 
nate feebleness  of  the  moral  power ; but  it  is  one, 
and  a very  important  one.  1 he  persons  in  ques- 
tion are  the  subjects  of  excited  feeling  and  passion 
in  a greater  or  less  degree  ; sometimes  in  rather  a 
small  degree.  They  have,  however,  something,  and 
evidently  must  have  something,  to  move  them  on  in 
the  course  which  they  take  ; but  they  would  proba- 
bly  do  otherwise  than  they  do,  in  fact,  and  won 
frequently  repress  their  emotions  and  passions,  which 
have  put  them  on  a wrong  direction,  if  they  were  not 
greatly  deficient  in  the  superintending  and  control- 
ling principles  of  the  mind. 

These  remarks  will  perhaps  apply  to  the  case  ot 
an  individual  by  the  name  of  Prescott,  who  was  re- 
cently executed  in  New-Hampshire  for  the  crime  of 
murder.  The  case  is  given  at  some  length,  and 
with  appropriate  remarks,  in  the  work  of  Dr.  Kay 
on  Medical  Jurisprudence. 


§ 242.  Of  alienation  of  the  Will  termed  Incon- 

STANTIA. 

Imbecility  of  the  will  is  sometimes  connected  with 


390 


IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 


an  irregular  action  of  the  power  of  Association  ; and 
it  seems  to  be  the  peculiar  modification  of  mental 
disorder  which  the  mind  then  assumes,  which  is 
known  in  medical  writers  under  the  name  of  incon- 
stantia.  The  instances  which  illustrate  this  form 
of  mental  disorder  might  many  times  be  arranged, 
according  to  the  view  which  is  taken  of  them,  eithei 
as  instances  of  alienated  will  or  alienated  associa- 
tion. The  persons  who  are  subject  to  this  form  ol 
perplexed  and  disordered  mental  action  are  desig- 
nal ed  by  various  epithets,  such  as  fickle,  flighty, 
light-headed,  hair-brained.  The  thoughts  of  these 
persons,  as  we  have  already  described  them  undei 
the  head  of  Association,  fly  from  one  subject  to  an- 
other with  great  rapidity  ; their  bodies  are  almost 
always  in  motion,  and  their  volubility  of  speech  is 
excessive. 

M.  Pinel  mentions  an  instance  (a  gentleman  who 
had  been  educated  in  the  prejudices  of  the  ancient 
noblesse  of  France)  which  illustrates  this  singular 
condition  of  mind.  “ He  constantly  bustled  about 
the  house,  talking  incessantly,  shouting,  and  throw- 
ing himself  into  great  passions  for  the  most  trifling 
causes.  He  teased  his  domestics  by  the  most  friv- 
olous orders,  and  his  neighbours  by  his  fooleries 
and  extravagances,  of  which  he  retained  not  the 
least  recollection  for  a single  moment.  He  talked 
with  the  greatest  volatility  of  the  court,  of  his  peri- 
wig, of  his  horses,  of  his  gardens,  without  waiting 
for  an  answer,  or  giving  time  to  follow  his  incohe 
rent  jargon.5’ 


IMBECILITY  OF  THE  WILL. 


391 


£ 243.  Of  superinduced  iveakness  of  Will , or  thal 
which  is  occasioned  by  wrong  mental  training , 

We  are  not  always  to  infer,  however,  from  the 
mere  fact  of  the  existence  of  a weakness  of  the 
Will,  that  it  is  in  all  cases  natural,  and,  conse- 
quently, something  for  which  the  individual  is  not 
accountable. — The  Will  admits  of  its  appropriate 
exercise,  and  its  nature  requires  such  exercise. 
And,  if  it  is  denied  what  its  nature  thus  requires  ; if 
it  is  never  placed  in  difficult  positions,  and  never 
permitted  to  exert  itself,  the  necessary  result  is,  that 
it  will  lose  in  a considerable  degree,  and  sometimes 
almost  entirely,  the  amount  of  power,  whether  more 
or  less,  which  it  naturally  had. 

There  are  sometimes  whole  classes  of  people,  in 
whom,  not  so  much  by  nature  as  by  circumstances, 
the  faculty  of  the  Will,  which  ought  ever  to  show  it- 
self as  a decisive  and  leading  principle,  appears  in- 
ert and  feeble. — Dr.  Rush  intimates  that  slaves  are 
very  apt  to  exhibit  this  trait  of  mind  ; not,  however, 
in  consequence  of  natural  imbecility  so  much  as  a 
feebleness  and  uncertainty  of  purpose,  gradually  su- 
perinduced by  being  constantly  under  the  direction 
of  others,  and  not  being  called  upon  to  exercise  their 
own  wills. 

It  may  be  added  also,  that  these  views  may  es- 
sentially aid,  in  some  cases  at  least,  in  the  explana- 
tion of  that  weakness  and  uncertainty  of  purpose 
which  we  not  unfrequently  notice  in  old  people,  and 
which  forms  an  important  element  in  that  complex 
trait  of  character  which  wc  denominate  the  childish- 


392  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  WILL  IN 

ness  of  old  age.  Their  wills  grow  weak  from  the 
want  of  exercise  ; and  their  passions,  showing  them- 
selves in  the  forms  of  peevishness  and  fickle  ill-hu- 
mour, grow  strong  for  the  opposite  reason. 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  WILL  IN  CONNEXION 
WITH  OTHER  POWERS. 

§ 244.  The  action  of  the  Will  may  be  perplexed 
through  the  medium  of  the  other  faculties. 
Sometimes  the  perplexed  and  disordered  action 
of  the  Will  is  relative  rather  than  positive.  It  stands 
well  in  itself.  It  bears  the  stamp  and  gives  the  ev- 
idence of  entire  soundness,  when  considered  apart 
from  the  other  powers.  Nevertheless,  in  conse- 
quence of  its  connexion  with  other  parts  of  the  mind 
its  action  may  be  interrupted  and  perplexed,  and 
sometimes  in  the  very  highest  degree.  TV  e do  not, 
however,  mean  to  say  that  it  is  perplexed  and  hin- 
dered in  its  action  in  all  respects,  which  is  not  the 
fact ; but  only  when  it  comes  within  reach  of  the  in- 
fluence of  this  connexion. 

§ 245.  Disordered  Action  of  the  JMind  in  connexion 
with  Casual  Associations . 

As  an  illustration  of  this  matter,  we  ma^  very 


CONNEXION  WITH  OTHER  POWERS.  393 

properly  refer  to  some  of  those  striking  facts  which 
were  introduced  in  the  chapter  on  Casual  Associa- 
tions. Peter  the  Great,  for  instance,  in  whom  en- 
ergy of  the  will  was  unquestionably  a very  conspic- 
uous characteristic,  was  utterly  unable  to  bear  the 
sight  of  a certain  insect.  La  Roche  Jacqueline,  an- 
other individual  mentioned  in  the  chapter  just  refer- 
-■sd  in.  was  brave  and  chivalric  in  the  very  highest 
uegree.  Few  names  among  the  numberless  re- 
nowned men  of  France  stand  higher  on  the  heroic 
and  patriotic  list  than  his.  And  yet  it  appears,  from 
the  accounts  which  are  given  of  him,  that  he  always 
lost  all  courage,  and  was  entirely  unmanned  in  the 
presence  of  a harmless  squirrel.  In  these,  and  a 
multitude  of  other  cases  like  them,  we  have  instan- 
ces of  men  who  possessed,  in  general,  great  energy 
and  decision,  but  who  displayed  in  certain  very  tiiv- 
ial  conjunctures  the  greatest  imbecility. 

In  all  cases  of  this  kind,  we  may  probably  regard 
the  origin,  the  scat  ot  the  disorder,  as  existing  in  the 
associating  principle.  This  principle  calls  up,  fiom 
time  to  time,  certain  very  unpleasant  feelings,  which, 
in  the  history  of  the  individual,  are  found  to  be  con- 
nected with  certain  objects.  And  it  does  it  with 
„r3at  force  and  distinctness ; so  much  so  as  to  set 
die  regulating  power  of  the  will  entirely  at  defiance. 
Consequently,  the  individual,  apparently  without  any 
adequate  cause,  is  thrown  into  great  agitation  ; his 
fears,  or,  perhaps,  some  other  passion,  are  greatly 
excited  ; his  will  is,  as  it  were,  taken  captive  ; and 
his  conduct  at  once  assumes  an  aspect  which  can 


394  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  WILL  IN 

not  be  explained  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary 
results  of  a sound  mind. 

We  assert,  therefore,  that  the  action  of  the  will 
in  these  cases  is  a disordered  one,  although  the 
cause  of  the  disorder  lays  out  of  itself,  because  it 
does  not  act,  and  is  not  able  to  act,  in  accordance 
with  the  original  tendencies  and  constitution  of  its 
own  nature.  It  is  not  what  it  should  be,  and  what 
a truly  sound  and  unperplexed  will  always  is,  viz., 
capable  of  regulating  the  feelings  and  actions,  so  far 
as  is  suitable  and  proper,  or,  in  other  words,  so  far 
as  is  required  by  a true  view  of  the  nature  and  rela- 
tions of  things. 

§ 246.  Additional  illustration  of  the  preceding  view. 

Perhaps  we  have,  in  the  personal  history  of  Dr. 
Johnson,  an  instance  of  alienation  of  will,  based  on  a 
disordered  casual  association. — “ He  had  another 
particularity”  (says  his  biographer),  “ of  which  none 
of  his  friends  ever  ventured  to  ask  him  an  explana- 
tion. It  appeared  to  me  some  superstitious  habit, 
which  he  had  contracted  early,  and  from  which  he 
had  never  called  upon  his  reason  to  disentangle  him. 
This  was  his  anxious  care  to  go  out  or  in  at  a doof 
or  passage  by  a certain  number  of  steps  from  a 
certain  point,  or,  at  least,  so  that  as  either  his  right 
or  left  foot  (I  am  not  certain  which)  should  con- 
stantly make  the  first  movement  when  he  came 
close  to  the  door  or  passage.  Thus  I conjecture  : 
for  I have,  upon  innumerable  occasions,  observed 
him  suddenly  stop,  and  then  seem  to  count  his  steps 
with  a deep  earnestness  ; and,  when  he  had  neglect- 


CONNEXION  WITH  OTHER  POWERS.  395 

ed  or  gone  wrong  in  this  sort  of  magical  movement, 

I have  seen  him  go  back  again,  put  himself  into  a 
proper  posture  to  begin  the  ceremony,  and,  having 
gone  through  it,  break  from  his  abstraction,  walk 
briskly  on,  and  join  his  company.” — With  such  clear- 
ness of  perception,  with  such  vast  powers  of  under- 
standing as  Dr.  Johnson  possessed,  we  cannot  sup- 
pose that  he  would  ever  have  submitted  to  the  utter 
folly  of  such  a practice,  if  his  will  had  not  entirely 
lost  its  power  in  that  particular,  in  consequence  of 
some  early  association,  which  had  fastened  itself  in 
the  mind  too  deeply  for  eradication. 

§ 247.  Of  alienation  of  the  Will  as  connected  iviih 
a disordered  state  or  alienation  of  Belief. 

There  are  yet  other  cases  of  a disordered  action 
of  the  Will,  resulting  from  its  connexion  with  other 
parts  of  the  mind.  There  is  a close  connexion,  for 
instance,  between  the  faculty  of  the  Will  and  that 
state  of  the  mind  which  is  termed  Belief.  And  this 
connexion  appears,  among  other  things,  in  this  way. 
It  will  be  found,  on  examination,  that  the  strength  of 
the  will’s  acts  or  volitions  will  become  diminished 
more  and  more  in  conformity  with  the  diminution  of 
belief;  and  that,  by  the  original  constitution  of  the 
mind  itself,  there  is  not  even  a possibility  of  putting 
forth  the  mental  exercise  of  volition  when  there  is 
no  belief  that  the  thing  to  which  it  relates  is  in  our 
power.  Hence  it  follows  as  a general  truth,  that  a 
disordered  or  alienated  state  of  belief  will  be  follow- 
ed by  a corresponding  alienation  of  the  will. 

Accordingly,  if  a man,  in  the  condition  of  insani- 


396  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  WILL  IN 

tv  of  belief,  truly  looks  upon  himself  as  made  of 
glass,  it  is  just  as  difficult  for  him  to  ivill  to  move 
himself  about  rapidly,  and  to  throw  himself  suddenly 
and  violently  in  contact  with  solid  and  hard  bodies, 
as  it  is  for  a man  in  a sane  mind  to  ivill  to  thrust  his 
hand  or  foot  into  the  fire  or  boiling  water,  which, 
with  many  persons,  would  be  found  to  be  an  utter 
impossibility.  His  will  is  in  such  cases  enslaved 
(not  in  the  more  common  and  ordinary  form  of  en- 
thralment, which  is  fully  consistent  with  moral  ac- 
countability), but  to  the  degree  of  insanity. 

We  will  suppose,  as  a further  illustration  of  this 
view,  that  a man  in  the  state  of  insanity  of  belief  has 
a firm  and  unalterable  conviction,  as  much  so  as  of 
his  own  existence,  that  he  has,  by  amputation  oi  in 
some  way,  lost  an  arm  or  a leg  ; and  it  will  be  found, 
just  so  long  as  he  remains  the  subject  of  this  alien- 
ation of  belief,  impossible  for  him  to  put  forth  a sin- 
gle volition  having  a relation  to  the  action  of  those 
parts  of  the  body.  To  that  extent  the  power  of  Will- 
ing is  entirely  lost.  If  his  physician,  or  any  one  else, 
should  require  him  to  put  forth  such  volition,  it  would 
appear  to  him  (and  necessarily  so,  from  the  consti- 
tution of  the  mind  itself)  not  only  impossible,  but  as 
supremely  ridiculous  as  for  a man  of  sound  mind  to 
will  to  walk  upon  the  ocean  or  to  fly  in  the  air. 

$ 248.  Alienation  of  the  Will  in  connexion  with 
Melancholy. 

Furthermore,  the  will  is  sometimes  alienated  (that 
is  to  say,  is  in  that  state  which  is  usually  indicated 
by  the  term  insanity)  in  cases  where  there  is  a 


CONNEXION  WITH  OTHER  POWERS.  39/ 

deeply-rooted  and  permanent  melancholy.  The 

mind  of  the  person  is  fixed  upon  some  gloomy  sub- 
ject ; it  remains  the  object  of  contemplation  day 
after  day  a:  d hour  after  hour ; a thick,  impenetia- 
ble  cloud  seems  to  invest  every  prospect,  whether 
present  or  fu'ure.  It  seems  to  the  spectator  that 
there  is  nothing  wanting  but  a mere  act  of  the  will, 
a resolution,  a mere  decision,  in  order  to  bring  the 
person  out  of  this  state  of  gloomy  inactivity,  and 
carry  him  once  more  into  the  discharge  of  the  duties 
of  life.  And  this  is  true,  if  the  will  could  be  made 
to  act.  But  the  gloom  spreads  itself  from  the  un- 
derstanding to  the  heart,  and  from  the  heart  to  the 
region  of  the  voluntary  power ; and  the  will,  invest- 
ed on  every  side  by  the  darkness  of  this  dense  and 
impenetrable  atmosphere,  remains  closed  up  and 
fixed,  as  if  imbedded  in  a mass  of  ice.  'W  hen  the 
gloom  is  deepened  to  a certain  degree,  although  t le 
power  of  the  will  is  not  entirely  gone,  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  it  to  put  forth  any  effective  action. 

The  English  poet  Collins  is  an  instance  of  this 
unhappy  state  of  mind.  “He  languished  some 
years”  (says  his  biographer)  “ under  that  depression 
of  mind  which  enchains  the  faculties  without  de- 
stroying them,  and  leaves  reason  the  knowledge  of 
right  without  the  poiver  of  pursuing  it.  These 
clouds,  which  he  perceived  gathering  upon  his  intel- 
lects,  he  endeavoured  to  disperse  by  travel,  and  pass- 
ed  into  France ; but  found  himself  constrained  to  yield 
to  his  malady,  and  returned.  He  was  for  some  time 
confined  in  a house  of  lunatics.”*  Well  might  this 
* Johnson’s  Lives  of  the  English  Poets,  art.  Collins. 


398  DISORDERED  ACTION  OF  THE  WILL  IN 

genuine  poet  have  adopted  the  language,  afterward 
so  feelingly  applied  to  himself  by  his  biographer, 

“ Canst  thou  not  minister  to  a mind  diseased  ? 

Pluck  from  the  memory  a rooted  sorrow 

In  all  cases  of  this  kind,  whatever  may  be  the 
cause  of  them,  the  will  has  obviously  lost  its  power; 
it  has  ceased,  and  apparently  without  the  possibility 
of  doing  otherwise,  to  exercise  that  authority  over 
the  other  powers  of  the  mind  to  which  it  is,  by  its 
nature,  entitled. 

^ 249.  Of  Account ability  in  connexion  with  Aliena- 
tion or  Insanity  of  the  Will. 

It  will  be  seen,  from  what  has  been  said,  that  the 
particular  form  or  aspect  of  disorder  and  insanity  of 
the  will  is  very  various  ; sometimes  consisting  of  the 
entire  or  almost  entire  abstraction  of  its  own  power  ; 
sometimes  in  an  immovable  fixedness,  either  occa- 
sioned by  its  own  imbecility  or  the  undue  prepon- 
derance of  some  other  principle ; sometimes  in  an 
action,  powerful  enough,  perhaps,  but  urged  on,  and 
wholly  shut  up  in  one  direction,  and  not  in  posses- 
sion of  an  adequate  degree  of  liberty ; sometimes 
in  a fickleness  approaching  to  entire  contingency, 
occasioned  by  the  suspension  or  violation  of  those 
general  laws  by  which  the  action  of  the  will  is  ordi- 
narily restrained  and  regulated. — In  all  cases  of  ac- 
tual insanity,  under  whatever  aspect  or  form  it  may 
appear,  the  person  who  is  the  subject  of  it  is  free 
from  moral  accountability,  to  the  degree  or  extent 
in  which  the  insanity  exists  ; for  it  has  now  become 
a settled  principle  on  the  subject  of  mental  aliena  * 


CONNEXION  WITH  OTHER  ROWERS.  399 

iion,  and  one  which  is  perfectly  well  understood,  that 
not  unfrequently  the  insanity  extends  to  a particular 
power  or  a particular  subject,  and  that  beyond  that 
particular  power  or  subject  the  ordinary  degree  of 
perception  and  action  remains. 

But  the  question  here  presents  itself  to  us,  How 
can  we  ascertain  the  existence  of  insanity  ? By 
what  rule  can  it  be  discovered  or  known  to  exist  in 
a particular  case  ? How  can  the  line  of  demarcation 
be  detected  between  that  pressure  of  the  will  known 
as  mere  temporary  enthralment,  which  exists  in  such 
a limited  degree  as  to  be  consistent  with  moral  ac- 
countability, and  actual  insanity  of  the  will,  which 
wholly  destroys  it? — On  this  subject  we  do  not  feel 
called  upon  to  lay  down  any  general  rule ; nor,  if 
we  were,  should  we  be  able  to  do  it.  The  Supreme 
Being  alone  can  tell,  with  entire  certainty,  when  the 
limit  is  passed  beyond  which  moral  accountability 
ceases  to  exist.  Men  can  do  nothing  more  than 
approximate  to  such  certainty  of  decision,  determin- 
ing, according  to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  on  the 
circumstances  of  individual  cases. 


THE  END. 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBANA 


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